Case Study 3 - Building a Force for Denial: Evaluating Strategy and Investment Alignment

How well do the National Defence Strategy and the Integrated Investment Program develop force structure appropriate to a strategy of deterrence by denial?

12/07/2026

<30 min

Editorial Note: This paper was drafted in March 2025. The information and context herein were correct at the time of drafting. The strategic situation and some Australian Government policies may have changed.

Introduction

Amid rising strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, Australia has reoriented its defence policy around deterrence by denial as the core of its military posture. Articulated most recently in the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and supported by the Integrated Investment Program (IIP), this shift reflects a growing recognition that Australia's geography, while once a protective buffer, no longer guarantees security in the face of long-range missile threats, grey-zone coercion, and regional instability.

As stated in the NDS, this approach “aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional security and prosperity and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance”.¹ Glenn Snyder first highlighted that denying an adversary access to territory or success in battle can serve as a powerful deterrent.² Building on this foundation, Zilincik and Sweijs have proposed a contemporary framework of four operational logics of denial: capability elimination, operational paralysis, tactical performance degradation, and strategic effect reduction.³ These logics operate across physical and temporal dimensions, offering a robust framework for assessing the effectiveness of force structure.

This essay evaluates how well the 2024 NDS and IIP develop a force structure suitable for a strategy of deterrence by denial. It applies the four-logics framework to analyse whether Australia’s emerging capabilities meet the demands of modern conflict across the spectrum, from conventional warfare to grey-zone threats. It argues that while the NDS and IIP demonstrate significant progress toward enabling denial in conventional scenarios, especially through investments in long-range strike, undersea warfare, and base defensive improvements, gaps remain in resourcing and preparedness for grey-zone operations. Ultimately, this analysis finds that the force structure reflects a credible shift toward deterrence by denial, but its effectiveness will depend on sustained investment, regional access, and the ability to operationalise these capabilities promptly.

Deterrence by Denial: Concept and Framework

The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) builds on the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) by elevating deterrence, particularly deterrence by denial, as the central pillar of Australia’s defence posture. Deterrence by denial aims to reduce an adversary’s chances of success, or at minimum, alter their perception of it enough to discourage them from taking action.⁴ This highlights the importance of undermining not just military means, but confidence in their outcomes. However, as Snyder observes, denial is ineffective if the deterring state lacks the tactical capacity to physically block or disrupt an adversary’s objectives.⁵ Building on this foundation, Zilincik and Sweijs refine the concept by offering a practical framework to evaluate denial strategies, particularly in relation to force structure planning under the NDS and IIP. They identify four operational logics of denial: capability elimination, operational paralysis, tactical performance degradation, and strategic effect reduction.⁶ Operating across space and time, these logics combine to create layered barriers that reinforce deterrence.

The first logic of denial is capability elimination, which involves preventing an adversary from deploying or utilising key military assets by striking them before they can be effectively brought to bear. This form of denial typically occurs beyond the defender’s immediate territory and often precedes the formal outbreak of hostilities.⁷ The core of this strategy lies not only in physically neutralising an adversary’s capabilities, as seen in traditional defensive approaches, but also in signalling that pursuing such objectives would be prohibitively costly and unlikely to succeed.⁸ Historical and contemporary examples illustrate how states have employed this logic. For instance, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 sought to neutralise the United States Pacific Fleet, thereby preventing interference while Japan consolidated its victories across Southeast Asia.⁹ In a more recent context, the Stuxnet cyber-attack allegedly conducted by the United States and Israel, targeted Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities, aiming to delay or prevent the development of a nuclear weapons program without initiating open conflict.¹⁰ These cases demonstrate how capability elimination can shape adversary calculations by pre-emptively undermining their critical systems and platforms.

While capability elimination seeks to prevent an adversary from fielding key military assets, operational paralysis focuses on disrupting those assets once deployed, denying them the ability to achieve their intended objectives.¹¹ As Snyder argues, denying an adversary access to territory or obstructing their ability to effect an attack can be a highly effective form of deterrence.¹² Achieving operational paralysis typically requires the use of offensive capabilities by the defender,¹³ which serve to signal that any act of aggression would be prohibitively costly and unlikely to succeed, making the investment of resources unjustifiable.¹⁴ A notable historical example of operational paralysis is the use of the Dowding system during the Battle of Britain, which integrated early warning radar with coordinated fighter command and control. This enabled the Royal Air Force (RAF) to optimise its limited resources in effectively intercepting and repelling German air raids.¹⁵ Other examples include using air power and submarines to disrupt enemy supply lines, significantly degrading an adversary’s ability to manoeuvre and sustain operations.¹⁶ Ultimately, these examples show how operational paralysis can serve as a powerful deterrent by raising the costs of aggression and undermining the adversary’s ability to sustain offensive operations.

The next logic of denial is Tactical Performance Degradation, which focuses on reducing the effectiveness of an adversary’s forces once an attack is underway. As Zilincik and Sweijs explain, its primary aim is “to make it more difficult for the adversary’s attack to inflict damage on the target once the adversary’s attack reaches the target”.¹⁷ The deterrent value of denial forces lies predominantly in their effectiveness at defending territory.¹⁸ Tactical performance degradation can be implemented through passive measures, which are primarily defensive, or active measures, which incorporate offensive action to disrupt or neutralise enemy attacks.¹⁹ Passive approaches include fortifications, camouflage, and defensive obstacles, while active measures encompass air defence systems, forward screening elements, and rapid reaction forces. Historical examples include the French-constructed Maginot Line as a passive denial measure, and Israel’s Iron Dome as a modern example of an active defence system.²⁰ Together, these measures demonstrate how degrading an adversary’s tactical effectiveness at the point of contact can serve as a powerful deterrent by reducing the likelihood of operational success and increasing the cost of aggression.

The final denial logic is Strategic effect reduction, which aims to deny an adversary any meaningful gain from their attack, even if it achieves tactical success.²¹ This logic is inherently defensive, focused on preserving the status quo rather than achieving conquest, and typically comes into effect on the home front after an attack has occurred.²² It is often understood through the lens of resilience, defined as a system’s ability to maintain functionality despite disruption or attack.²³ A resilient force can quickly recover and re-establish combat effectiveness, even in the face of tactical setbacks. A recent example is the Ukrainian military in its ongoing conflict with Russia: despite suffering battlefield losses, Ukraine has leveraged Western military aid, adapted its tactics, and employed innovative technologies to blunt the strategic impact of Russian aggression. Zilincik and Sweijs also identify logistics and redundancy as key enablers of strategic effect reduction.²⁴ Sustained resupply and support operations maintain morale and ensure the flow of essential equipment and ordnance, allowing continued resistance and increasing the cost of adversary gains. Similarly, redundancy in command, control, and communications blunts the effectiveness of strikes aimed at severing leadership from frontline forces, reducing the strategic utility of such attacks. Strategic effect reduction thus strengthens deterrence by demonstrating that even successful attacks will fail to achieve decisive results, undermining adversary confidence and disincentivising aggression. The following sections evaluate how well the NDS and IIP develop capabilities aligned with each of the four denial logics.

Applying the Four Logics of Denial to the NDS and IIP

Capability Elimination

The NDS and IIP include significant investment in capabilities that may contribute to capability elimination. Undersea warfare receives 17% of the decade's funding, focused on nuclear-powered submarines and autonomous underwater systems.²⁵ These platforms create uncertainty for adversaries by threatening high-value assets, limiting their confidence in success.²⁶ Similarly, investments in long-range guided weapons and explosive ordnance²⁷ aim to strike critical nodes in adversary combat systems and potentially home bases at ranges up to 5000 to 8000 kilometres.²⁸ Furthermore, investment in offensive cyber capabilities²⁹ extends Australia’s operational reach into emerging domains, enhancing its ability to disrupt adversaries beyond the physical battlespace. These investments reinforce Australia’s capacity for impactful projection, ensuring that adversary forces are held at risk from greater ranges.

While the NDS and IIP demonstrate Australia’s commitment to enhancing its cyber, long-range strike, and undersea warfare capabilities, it remains uncertain whether these investments are designed, or appropriate for the logic of capability elimination. For example, Australia’s investment in cyber capabilities³⁰ lacks clarity on whether they will serve offensive, pre-emptive roles. Similarly, the planned acquisition of SSN-AUKUS submarines will enhance Australia’s ability to project force and threaten high-value adversary targets, including those located deep within hostile territory,³¹ while long-range precision missile systems are expected to place critical adversary infrastructure within striking range.³² Even if intended for capability elimination, their practical application is constrained by serious operational and strategic challenges.

These constraints raise critical questions about the real-world effectiveness of Australia’s emerging capabilities in a pre-emptive context. While such missions might offer tactical advantages or delay adversary operations, they also carry a high risk of escalation and political and military backlash. Pre-emptive strikes risk portraying Australia as the aggressor,³³ damaging its legitimacy and straining alliances. This is especially dangerous when confronting a militarily superior adversary such as China, where miscalculation could provoke broader conflict.³⁴ Moreover, operating within China’s sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment, particularly in contested regions like the South China Sea, raises significant doubts about the survivability of Australia’s relatively small submarine fleet and the effectiveness of offensive missile strikes in high-risk, pre-emptive operations. Finally, these factors suggest that while Australia is investing in relevant capabilities, it is not yet positioned to realise capability elimination as a credible or timely denial strategy. Delays in delivering SSN-AUKUS submarines and long-range missiles weaken the urgency outlined in the NDS. As Dowse notes, the slow pace of modernisation risks opening a strategic window during which adversaries may act with reduced fear of deterrence.³⁵

Operational Paralysis

The NDS and IIP reflect Australia’s commitment to deterrence by denial, particularly through investments that support the logic of operational paralysis. Central to this approach is the implicit threat that Australia’s strike capabilities will alter an aggressor’s risk and cost calculus, thereby deterring hostile actions.³⁶ This intent is evident in the prioritisation of long-range offensive strike capabilities, integrated theatre command and control systems,³⁷ electronic warfare systems,³⁸ joint targeting enterprises,³⁹ and enhancements to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.⁴⁰ Collectively, these capabilities are designed to disrupt an adversary’s ability to coordinate, manoeuvre, and adapt during operations, particularly in contested environments beyond Australia’s immediate territory. For instance, the integration of persistent surveillance through uncrewed aerial and space-based platforms enables rapid target identification and coordination with long-range precision strike assets, effectively denying adversaries freedom of action across Australia’s northern approaches. In a complementary role, future SSN-AUKUS submarines and long-range missile systems may be used to disrupt adversary logistics and command structures in depth, degrading operational momentum and stalling further advances. The Army’s shift to a mobile littoral force⁴¹ improves deployment of land-based strike systems across the northern archipelago, enabling a more agile forward posture.

However, by its nature, operational paralysis can only be employed as a logic of denial in response to an adversary actively threatening or initiating conventional attack. This presents a challenge when confronting threats that remain below the threshold of overt aggression. For instance, China frequently employs state-sponsored irregular forces, such as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), to assert its maritime claims in contested areas.⁴² These grey-zone tactics are deliberately designed to stay beneath established thresholds for escalation or armed conflict,⁴³ thereby complicating the applicability of denial logics such as operational paralysis. Maintaining operational access in the region is also critical for enabling forward defence and achieving operational paralysis.⁴⁴ However, such access is contingent on sustained regional cooperation and cannot be taken for granted.

Tactical Performance Degradation

The NDS and IIP outline a range of capabilities and commitments that enhance Australia’s ability to implement tactical performance degradation. Australia’s traditional geographic advantage has been rapidly eroded by the reach of modern missile systems,⁴⁵ prompting the need for urgent strategic adaptation as highlighted in the Defence Strategic Review.⁴⁶ Key active defensive measures include investment in Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), which incorporates advanced missile systems, diverse delivery platforms, and improved battlespace awareness through enhanced command and control networks, extending also to defence against small autonomous aerial systems.⁴⁷ The Army’s acquisition of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) will further strengthen land and maritime strike capabilities, enhancing the ability to deny adversary access to key operational areas.⁴⁸ These assets are complemented by other capabilities, including submarines, naval surface strike platforms, and autonomous systems operating in protective and screening roles.

The NDS and IIP also outline several passive defensive measures that support tactical performance degradation. A central initiative is the planned $14–18 billion investment in northern military infrastructure, intended to enhance base survivability and reduce the effectiveness of adversary strikes.⁴⁹ However, the plan lacks detail on how these facilities will be hardened to withstand modern precision attacks. Additionally, the Army’s transition to a littoral manoeuvre force⁵⁰ enables the dispersion of offensive support assets across Australia’s northern approaches, complicating adversary targeting and increasing the survivability of key capabilities during conflict.

But the effectiveness of these capabilities is further challenged by Australia’s vast geography. MacCallion and Stewart contend that while HIMARS could play a valuable role in a regional conflict if deterrence fails, its deterrent value is limited by the small number of launchers and uncertainty regarding basing.⁵¹ Similarly, Dowse argues that Australia remains poorly prepared to deter long-range missile threats.⁵² Given the breadth of Australia’s strategic interests, it is neither necessary nor feasible to defend all territory equally. Instead, air defence efforts should prioritise the protection of critical northern military infrastructure from emerging threats such as hypersonic weapons and autonomous aerial systems, rather than pursuing an unrealistic and prohibitively expensive nationwide missile shield.⁵³ More broadly, protecting critical national infrastructure, including undersea communication cables that connect Australia to allies and trading partners, presents additional challenges. Defending such infrastructure against grey-zone threats involves complex legal and operational considerations⁵⁴ and risks diverting limited defence resources from other high-priority missions.

Strategic Effect Reduction

To support the logic of strategic effect reduction, the NDS and IIP take important steps toward ensuring the ADF can sustain operations and remain combat-effective following an attack. Central to the concept of resilience is the proposed increase in protection of northern bases.⁵⁵ Funding has been directed toward hardening defence infrastructure in northern Australia and strengthening cybersecurity capabilities,⁵⁶ both essential for withstanding and recovering from disruption. Fortified bases improve the survivability of support infrastructure and enable combat operations to continue despite adversary strikes.

In addition, the NDS and IIP prioritise enhancing cyber resilience and ensuring communications redundancy. The NDS notes that “malign actors, both state and non-state, are improving their cyber capabilities, increasing the risk of disruptions to Australia’s critical systems, infrastructure and networks”.⁵⁷ In response, the IIP allocates between $15 and $20 billion to strengthen Australia’s cyber capabilities, aiming to safeguard military and civilian systems from emerging digital threats.⁵⁸ Similarly, the NDS articulates “an uplift to Defence’s communications networks, providing greater network efficiency, resilience and redundancy”,⁵⁹ supported by IIP investments in sovereign space communications infrastructure.⁶⁰ These measures are vital to maintaining command, control, and operational continuity in increasingly contested cyber, information, and electromagnetic domains, thereby diminishing the impact of both conventional and grey-zone attacks and reinforcing the broader logic of deterrence by denial.

In terms of logistical resilience, investments in air mobility and the development of the Army’s littoral manoeuvre capabilities will support the recovery, resupply, and reinforcement of forward combat elements from a network of resilient northern airbases,⁶¹ reducing the risk that tactical setbacks translate into strategic defeat. More broadly, the NDS also articulates improvements to national infrastructure, such as roads, railways, ports, and telecommunications,⁶² which are critical for reconstituting degraded capabilities and maintaining operational continuity in protracted conflicts. Furthermore, the NDS consistently emphasises the importance of embedding resilience into critical combat support systems, through measures such as increasing fuel and munitions stockpiles, expanding sovereign shipbuilding capacity, and establishing a domestic guided weapons manufacturing capability.

However, workforce shortages continue to constrain Australia’s defence ambitions, and initiatives such as increased remuneration or relaxed entry requirements⁶³ are unlikely to achieve the necessary recruitment outcomes.⁶⁴ If the ADF cannot meet personnel targets to adequately staff critical denial capabilities, the attrition sustained during initial combat phases could lead to a rapid depletion of essential skills, ultimately undermining the effectiveness of strategic effect reduction.

Conclusion

The 2024 NDS and IIP represent a deliberate shift in Australia’s defence force structure toward deterrence by denial. Through the lens of Zilincik and Sweijs’ four-logics framework, it is evident that the force structure investments outlined in both documents are aligned with the requirements of a denial strategy, particularly against conventional threats. Capability elimination is supported by planned investments in long-range strike, offensive cyber and undersea warfare capabilities; operational paralysis is enabled by the development of ISR, joint targeting, and command systems; tactical degradation is reinforced by investments in air defence, long range strike, and base hardening; and cyber resilience, logistics, and infrastructure upgrades support strategic effect reduction.

However, several critical limitations remain. The effectiveness of a denial strategy is limited by workforce and resource shortages, restricted regional access, and delays in delivering essential capabilities such as SSN-AUKUS submarines, air defence systems, and guided weapons. Political constraints, survivability concerns, and escalation risks, especially against stronger adversaries, limit the ADF’s pre-emptive capability elimination. Additionally, the NDS appears focused on defeating aggression near Australia’s northern approaches, offering limited deterrence against gradual territorial gains through grey-zone activities.⁶⁵ This is where deterrence by denial is most difficult to implement and continues to challenge Australia’s capacity to respond effectively below the threshold of armed conflict.

Ultimately, the NDS and IIP have made significant progress in aligning Australia’s force structure with the requirements of deterrence by denial, particularly in the context of conventional and regional military threats. However, to ensure the strategy’s effectiveness against both conventional and grey-zone challenges, these structural advancements must be supported by sustained political commitment, reliable funding, integrated national resilience, and enhanced coordination across Defence, industry, and diplomacy. Only through these measures can Australia credibly deny adversaries confidence in the success of coercion, conventional or otherwise.

Bibliography

Australian Government – Department of Defence. Defence Strategic Review. Canberra, ACT: 2023. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review

Australian Government – Department of Defence. Integrated Investment Program. Canberra, ACT: 2024. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program

Australian Government – Department of Defence. National Defence Strategy. Canberra, ACT: 2024. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program

Davis, Malcom. “Building integrated air and missile defence for Australia.” 2023. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/building-integrated-air-and-missile-defence-for-australia/

Dowse, Andrew. “Australia’s Defense Strategy.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 7, no. 6 (September 1, 2024): 1–13. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=8348d33b-712a-3d78-95d2-2871f6ad6596.

Imperial War Museum. “How Radar Gave Britain The Edge In The Battle Of Britain” 2025. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-radar-gave-britain-the-edge-in-the-battle-of-britain

Goldsmith, Sam. “Achieving ‘deterrence by denial’ will be a major challenge for Australia.” 2022. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/achieving-deterrence-by-denial-will-be-a-major-challenge-for-australia/

Gompert, David C., Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin. “Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941.” In Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, 93–106. RAND Corporation, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287m9t.15.

Gosling, Luke. “Deterring at a distance: The strategic logic of AUKUS.” Lowy Institute. 2024. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/deterring-distance-strategic-logic-aukus

Lindsay, JonR. 2013. “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare.” Security Studies 22 (3): 365–404. doi:10.1080/09636412.2013.816122.

Lupovici, Amir. “Deterrence through Inflicting Costs: Between Deterrence by Punishment and Deterrence by Denial.” International Studies Review 25, no. 3 (September 1, 2023): 1–21. doi:10.1093/isr/viad036.

MacCallion, Gregory, and Courtney Stewart. “Australian Deterrence: Land Power’s Contribution to the Integrated Force.” Australian Army Journal 20, no. 2 (December 1, 2024): 48–76. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=a3b8aa9d-ba71-300c-8656-fa2379aa38db.

Patton, Susannah. “Australia must take Southeast Asian reactions to AUKUS seriously.” 2021. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-must-take-southeast-asian-reactions-to-aukus-seriously/

Rahman, Chris, and Prakash Gopal. “The Role of Deterrence in Australian Strategic Thought: Implications for ANZUS.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 7, no. 6 (September 1, 2024): 84–100. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=bd10e6c5-48ee-3ba0-8a4a-5a81c4f9cfe1.

Runde, Daniel F., Murphy, Erin L. and Bryja, Thomas. “Safeguarding Subsea Cables: Protecting Cyber Infrastructure amid Great Power Competition.” 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/safeguarding-subsea-cables-protecting-cyber-infrastructure-amid-great-power-competition

Smith, Cameron. “Countering China’s Grey-Zone Diplomacy.” 2022. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/countering-chinas-grey-zone-diplomacy/

Snyder, Glenn H. “Deterrence and Defense toward a Theory of National Security.” Princeton University Press, 1961. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=5bd036b2-3de4-340b-80f3-96b7e11d2605.

Snyder, Glenn, “Deterrence by denial and punishment.” Princeton University Press, 1959. #5 - Deterrence by denial and punishment / by Glenn H. ... no.1. - Full View | HathiTrust Digital Library

Nouwens, Veerle. “Above the Law: Holding China to Account in the South China Sea.” 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/research/above-the-law-holding-china-to-account-in-the-south-china-sea#_edn29

Zilincik, Samuel, and Sweijs, Tim. “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects.” Contemporary Security Policy 44, no. 2 (April 1, 2023): 248–75. doi:10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970.

176 The Australian War College – Geddes Papers

Footnotes

¹ Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy, Canberra, ACT, 2024: 7, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program

² Glenn H Snyder. Deterrence and Defense toward a Theory of National Security. Princeton University Press, 1961. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=5bd036b2-3de4-340b-80f3-96b7e11d2605.

³ Samual Zilincik, and Tim Sweijs, (2023) “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects.” Contemporary Security Policy 44, no. 2 (2023): 248–75. doi:10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970.

⁴ Chris Rahman and Prakash Gopal. “The Role of Deterrence in Australian Strategic Thought: Implications for ANZUS.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 7, no. 6 (2024):87. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=bd10e6c5-48ee-3ba0-8a4a-5a81c4f9cfe1.

⁵ Snyder. Deterrence and Defense toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton University Press, 16

⁶ Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects,” 252

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Amir Lupovici. “Deterrence through Inflicting Costs: Between Deterrence by Punishment and Deterrence by Denial.” International Studies Review 25, no. 3 (2023): 7. doi:10.1093/isr/viad036.

⁹ David Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin. “Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941.” In Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn, 93. RAND Corporation, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1287m9t.15.

¹⁰ David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” cited in Jon Lindsay. “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare.” Security Studies 22 no. 3 (2013): 369. doi:10.1080/09636412.2013.816122.

¹¹ Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects,” 254

¹² Snyder. Deterrence and Defense toward a Theory of National Security. Princeton University Press, 9

¹³ Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects,” 254

¹⁴ Lupovici. “Deterrence through Inflicting Costs: Between Deterrence by Punishment and Deterrence by Denial.”, 13

¹⁵ Imperial War Museum, “How Radar Gave Britain The Edge In The Battle Of Britain,” https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-radar-gave-britain-the-edge-in-the-battle-of-britain

¹⁶ Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects,” 255

¹⁷ Ibid., 256

¹⁸ Glenn Snyder, “Deterrence by denial and punishment.” Princeton University Press, 1959. #5 - Deterrence by denial and punishment / by Glenn H. ... no.1. - Full View | HathiTrust Digital Library, 2

¹⁹ Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects,” 256

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 258

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 259

²⁴ Zilincik and Sweijs, “Beyond Deterrence: Reconceptualizing Denial Strategies and Rethinking Their Emotional Effects,” 259

²⁵ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, Canberra, ACT: 2023, 10, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program

²⁶ Luke Gosling. “Deterring at a distance: The strategic logic of AUKUS.” Lowy Institute. 2024. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/deterring-distance-strategic-logic-aukus

²⁷ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, 81

²⁸ Sam Goldsmith. “Achieving ‘deterrence by denial’ will be a major challenge for Australia.” 2022. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/achieving-deterrence-by-denial-will-be-a-major-challenge-for-australia/

²⁹ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, 48

³⁰ Ibid., 48

³¹ Gosling. “Deterring at a distance: The strategic logic of AUKUS.”

³² Goldsmith. “Achieving ‘deterrence by denial’ will be a major challenge for Australia.”

³³ Gosling. “Deterring at a distance: The strategic logic of AUKUS.”

³⁴ Snyder. Deterrence and Defense toward a Theory of National Security. Princeton University Press, 134

³⁵ Andrew Dowse. “Australia’s Defense Strategy.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 7, no. 6 (2024): 12. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=8348d33b-712a-3d78-95d2-2871f6ad6596.

³⁶ Ibid., 5

³⁷ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, 77

³⁸ Ibid., 51

³⁹ Ibid., 43

⁴⁰ Ibid., 62

⁴¹ Ibid., 53–54

⁴² Veerle Nouwens. “Above the Law: Holding China to Account in the South China Sea.” 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/research/above-the-law-holding-china-to-account-in-the-south-china-sea#_edn29

⁴³ Cameron Smith. “Countering China’s Grey-Zone Diplomacy.” 2022. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/countering-chinas-grey-zone-diplomacy/

⁴⁴ Susannah Patton. “Australia must take Southeast Asian reactions to AUKUS seriously.” 2021. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-must-take-southeast-asian-reactions-to-aukus-seriously/

⁴⁵ Department of Defence, Defence Strategic Review, Canberra, ACT: 2023, 25, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review

⁴⁶ Malcom Davis. “Building integrated air and missile defence for Australia.” 2023. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/building-integrated-air-and-missile-defence-for-australia/

⁴⁷ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, 67–68

⁴⁸ Ibid., 44

⁴⁹ Ibid., 85

⁵⁰ Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy, 37

⁵¹ Gregory MacCallion and Stewart Courtney. “Australian Deterrence: Land Power’s Contribution to the Integrated Force.” Australian Army Journal 20, no. 2 (2024): 48–76. https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=a3b8aa9d-ba71-300c-8656-fa2379aa38db.

⁵² Dowse, “Australia’s Defense Strategy,” 5

⁵³ Davis. “Building integrated air and missile defence for Australia.”

⁵⁴ Daniel Runde, Erin Murphy and Thomas Bryja. “Safeguarding Subsea Cables: Protecting Cyber Infrastructure amid Great Power Competition.” 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/safeguarding-subsea-cables-protecting-cyber-infrastructure-amid-great-power-competition

⁵⁵ Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy, 29

⁵⁶ Dowse, “Australia’s Defense Strategy,” 6

⁵⁷ Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy, 15

⁵⁸ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, 48

⁵⁹ Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy, 41

⁶⁰ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, 47

⁶¹ Department of Defence, Integrated Investment Program, 61

⁶² Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy, 18

⁶³ Ibid., 33

⁶⁴ Dowse, “Australia’s Defense Strategy,” 12

⁶⁵ Ibid., 5

Cite Article

Harvard

APA

Footnote

RIS

(Rees, 2026)

Rees, D. 2026. 'Case Study 3 - Building a Force for Denial: Evaluating Strategy and Investment Alignment'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/case-study-3-building-force-denial-evaluating-strategy-and-investment-alignment (Accessed: 13 July 2026).

(Rees, 2026)

David Rees, "Case Study 3 - Building a Force for Denial: Evaluating Strategy and Investment Alignment", The Forge, Published: July 12, 2026, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/case-study-3-building-force-denial-evaluating-strategy-and-investment-alignment. (accessed July 13, 2026).

Download a RIS file to use in your citation management tools.

Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

Own Domain Awareness defence-poa-level1

Own Domain Mastery Joint Awareness defence-poa-level2

The Art of War Joint Competency defence-poa-level3

Military Power Joint Mastery defence-poa-level4

Integrated National Power defence-poa-level5

Critical and Creative Thinking defence-cognitive-level1

Complicated Problems defence-cognitive-level2

Complex Problems defence-cognitive-level3

Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level4

Multi-agency Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level5

National and Military Power awareness defence-nsps-level1

Operational Planning Military Science defence-nsps-level2

Campaign Planning Operational Art defence-nsps-level3

Theatre Operations Strategic Art defence-nsps-level4

Coalition Operations Political Acumen defence-nsps-level5

Technical Mastery

One Defence Capability System tech-corems-level3

Integrated Systems tech-corems-level4

Capability Leadership tech-ecat-level3

Joint Effects tech-ecat-level4

Social Mastery

Lead Teams Lead Leaders social-influence-level2

Lead Operating Systems social-influence-level3

Lead Capability social-influence-level4

Lead Integrated Systems social-influence-level5

Moral Leadership social-ethics-level3

Lead organisation through ethical concerns social-ethics-level4

Stewarding the Profession social-ethics-level5

Character Role Model social-character-level3

Generate Climates of Trust social-character-level4

Character Exemplar social-character-level5

Diversity Appreciation social-culture-level2

Cultural Stewardship social-culture-level3

Cross Cultural Leadership social-culture-level4

Cross Cultural Ambassador social-culture-level5

Biography

David Rees

Aviation Officer, Aviation Command Headquarters

Major

MAJ David Rees is an Aviation Officer and a graduate of the ACSC(MA)-PT class of 2025. He is currently posted to Aviation Command Headquarters, contributing to training and operational airworthiness for Army’s UH60M Blackhawk helicopter fleet.

Case Study 3 - Building a Force for Denial: Evaluating Strategy and Investment Alignment © 2026 by Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence). This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND Copyright logo