New Zealand’s Strategy of ‘Deterrence Through Denial of Opportunity’

New Zealand’s deterrence strategy may depend less on military power than on presence, partnership and being the preferred Pacific partner.

16/07/2026

<15 min

Introduction

The United States Under-Secretary of Defense, Elbridge Colby, laid the foundations for current American strategy in the Indo Pacific in his 2021 book, on The Strategy of Denial.² The 2024 Australian National Defence Strategy is also focused on a strategy of deterrence through denial.³ Without American military might — or even middle-power Australia’s capabilities — New Zealand, through its Defence Capability Plan (DCP), seems to seek to catch up with these strategies by attempting to deny hostile actors any opportunities to pursue their objectives in the Pacific.⁴ Arguably, New Zealand recognises it cannot deter threats by power or punishment. Thus, it seeks to proactively beat hostile actors to the most accessible situations, partners, and openings to progress any strategic goals. But assuming the primary adversary is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), can a nation of five million people possibly keep every available avenue for strategic-objective progress closed to a nation of 1.409 billion people?

This essay argues New Zealand’s form of ‘deterrence through denial of opportunity’ is not an independent strategy of deterrence. Instead, it functions as a form of foreign policy designed to embed New Zealand more deeply into the allied strategies of deterrence through Australia, and through them the United States. Historically, New Zealand defence policy emphasised contribution, as seen through coalition deployments, peacekeeping diplomacy, and maintaining a careful balance between security and economic ties, especially with China.⁵ The DCP updates this logic by suggesting New Zealand can complement Australian and American strategies by working with Pacific partners to prevent adversarial influence. The DCP is also a domestic-politics signalling tool intended to convince the New Zealand public the strategic environment has deteriorated and that greater defence investment is required. Far from a muscular deterrent posture, ‘denial of opportunity’ appears to be a diplomatic and political positioning exercise designed to reassure allies and persuade New Zealanders to join multilateral efforts to deter China from pursuing its strategic objectives.

Defining ‘Deterrence Through Denial of Opportunity’

Deterrence through denial is one of two classical deterrence logics. Thomas Schelling distinguished deterrence, namely dissuading adversaries from their intended actions, from compellence, whereby adversaries are forced to change their plans.⁶ Deterrence by punishment threatens retaliation (an option New Zealand is unlikely to pursue given strategic culture, identity, and resources). Deterrence by denial attempts to prevent an actor from achieving their objective in the first place. If the aggressor sees no plausible path to success, deterrence is effective. This leaves open the option for resource-constrained New Zealand to focus on removing planning considerations and options from an adversary’s thinking pre-emptively. In line with New Zealand’s DCP definition of ‘deterrence through denial of opportunity’, NZDF and partners’ actions could remove possibilities for adversaries to gain physical and political footholds or influence in the Pacific.⁷

This suggests three core (and ambitious) assumptions. Firstly, there should be no ungoverned space (physical, diplomatic, informational, or economic) left open for adversaries to insert themselves and take advantage or initiative. Secondly, New Zealand or its partners must be present to have influence — presence becomes prevention.⁸ Thirdly, deterrence is achieved when others doubt they will succeed. This third element matters particularly for New Zealand. The NZDF’s limited mass means New Zealand cannot deter by threat of force, but it can make the path to influence more difficult and costly in the South Pacific through its deep diplomatic and cultural networks, history, and legitimacy.⁹ From early Polynesian migration and settlement, to 19^th Century South Pacific trading and common World War service with several Pacific states, New Zealand’s lineage is enmeshed in Pacific identity. In practice, this means deterrence is delivered less through force and more through pre-emption of opportunities. If New Zealand has the closest relationships, deepest presence, and most reliable partnerships in the Pacific, then adversaries like China are denied paths to influence.¹⁰

This overlaps with Richard Maass’s emerging theory of ‘legal deterrence by denial’, where states prevent grey-zone coercion by strengthening legal and institutional frameworks to reduce rivals’ ability to exploit ambiguity.¹¹ In the Indo-Pacific, where great power competition currently occurs mostly below the threshold of open conflict, such non-military denial is increasingly relevant — and can be achieved by military elements through the other instruments of national power. This approach is echoed in wider strategic scholarship, such as Santoro and Glosserman’s analysis that contemporary deterrence must be geometric, not linear, and rely on networked minilateralism through small, flexible state groupings¹² – again through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power. In this way, denial of opportunity is not about defeating aggressors, but rather about preventing conditions under which aggression could succeed.

Foreign Policy Behaviour, Not Military Strategy

Zack Cooper highlights that persistent shortcomings in the American Indo-Pacific strategy—insufficient resources, lack of a positive trade agenda, and an overly China-centric focus—have undermined regional trust in the US as a reliable partner.¹³ Could New Zealand’s diplomatic presence remedy these shortcomings and modify perceptions of narrow and transactional diplomacy? New Zealand will always prioritise cooperation with Australia and public acceptance thereof. But Australia’s alliance and current investment in relations with America suggest foreign-policy alignment should be cognisant of American intentions and strategy. Given the impact of New Zealand’s rhetoric supported by unequivocal actions in the Indo-Pacific (from military cooperation with India, new and renewed defence agreements with Philippines and the FPDA members, and active military operations patrolling Korea’s EEZ from Japan), New Zealand could gain favour with the US by aligning security initiatives with a multilateral approach to deterrence. New Zealand gains little by acting independently from the faraway Southwest Pacific. But by achieving deterrence milestones coordinated with the US and Australia, New Zealand validates both countries’ approaches and reduces perception of transactionalism or paternalism. After all, Kori Schake notes, ‘No dominant power has ever had so much assistance from others in maintaining its dominance [as the US]’.¹⁴ Perhaps New Zealand policymakers plan on America responding positively to initiatives that enable their strategy of denial,¹⁵ given ‘a central tenet of Colby’s argument is that denying hegemony requires a militarily robust league of states sufficiently capable of exerting balancing power through the establishment of an anti-hegemonic coalition’.¹⁶

Although framed as defence strategy, ‘deterrence through denial of opportunities’ in New Zealand’s context is primarily foreign policy. The strategy relies on diplomatic, not solely military, levers primarily through a whole-of-government approach and building regional relationships as first steps in deterrence.¹⁷ This matches New Zealand’s National Security Strategy¹⁸ and how it sees itself as a Polynesian nation following the Pacific Way.¹⁹ As such, New Zealand seems intent on building relationships with Pacific Island states so they do not see value in other external actors. This precedes steps to work hard to hamper adversary influence taking effect; to have the military capabilities to hold adversaries at risk; and only then to take military action against adversaries.²⁰ This is a foreign-policy approach, not a military strategy.

Deterrence by denial depends on presence, trust, and habit, not simply the threat of more lethal effects. The DCP’s sequencing demonstrates this, first prioritising forces’ presence, not force projection. Ashok Kuper warns that without persistent presence, denial becomes a hollow concept and that capability without relationships creates gaps adversaries can exploit.²¹ In this way, New Zealand deters not by comparatively limited military equipment, but rather by being preferred. This seems to naturally align with the DCP’s second priority of aligning with allied deterrence strategies.²²

Nicholas Smith posits New Zealand’s foreign policy behaviour is primarily driven by regional geopolitical settings.²³ Consideration of joining AUKUS Pillar II, joining new Indo-Pacific groupings (like NATO’s Indo-Pacific 4), and boosting defence spending are all evidence of external factors pressuring New Zealand to align more with Western partners. In 2024, foreign ministers Winston Peters and Anthony Blinken in a joint diplomatic statement said there are ‘powerful reasons for New Zealand engaging practically with [minilateral groupings]’, like AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.²⁴ New Zealand’s participation is framed here as enhancing deterrence, not through military power but through policy alignment.

Deterrence therefore requires not only material posture, but habitual cooperation that makes deterrent capacity visible and credible.²⁵ Oriana Mastro argues deterrence by denial is increasingly achieved through minilateral partnerships that curb Chinese coercion by demonstrating to them and Pacific leaders China’s aggressive pursuit of strategic objectives will not succeed.²⁶ Nicholas Khoo makes the same point more bluntly, arguing deeper New Zealand technological-security cooperation with Australia (and thus the US via ANZUS and AUKUS) through formal or informal memberships in any initiatives would bolster New Zealand’s deterrence capability precisely because it embeds New Zealand inside allied regional security architectures.²⁷ Even Colby indicates operationally effective coalition cohesion would inevitability impact the adversary’s perception of coalition deterrence effectiveness.²⁸ This almost creates a concept of ‘deterrence by ally/partner proximity’.

Convincing New Zealanders

‘Deterrence through denial of opportunity’ also fulfils a political function of domestic persuasion. The DCP’s politically timed delay to quickly follow a major perceived threat (Chinese Task Group 107’s Tasman-Sea transit)²⁹ indicates politicians’ tact in optimising social licence in support of the plan. Historically, New Zealand public support for defence investment has been weak. Deterrence through denial of opportunity gives the Government a vocabulary that justifies defence spending without appearing aggressive. It also allows the Government to frame its stance as intent on protecting Pacific sovereignty rather than preparing for war. The DCP elaborates on this theme by emphasising an approach to prevent gaps that others might exploit, consistent with the National Security Strategy’s approach of ‘acting early’.³⁰ Thus, rather than focusing on ‘defeating a threat’, the Government offers a reassuring message that defence investment is focused on ensuring the Pacific is not left vulnerable to foreign military incursions.

The New Zealand Government has publicly noted the deteriorating strategic environment in which its interests lie.³¹ Reuben Steff argues New Zealand’s shift towards ‘active balancing’ reflects increased acknowledgement of China’s assertiveness, while still managing domestic and trade sensitivities.³² But Professor David Capie notes New Zealand foreign policy often moves ahead of public opinion,³³ requiring careful framing and rhetorical positioning. While recent national risks public surveys found 80% of New Zealanders felt the world had become more dangerous,³⁴ this does not automatically equate to a public desire for greater defence investment nor more assertive foreign policy. The DCP, however, creates a narrative of inevitability based on analysis of Chinese strategic objectives—timed following ballistic-missile launches and naval task group deployments in New Zealand’s immediate region. Thus, the DCP offers tools to, firstly, engage with Pacific partners and deny adversary access to opportunities for furthering their objectives; and secondly, to hold adversaries at risk ahead of taking military action. Both uses thus justify greater public support.

By describing the more contested environment and portraying New Zealand as a preferred Pacific partner that needs to step up, the DCP’s concept of ‘deterrence through denial of opportunity’ emphasises sovereignty and partnership over mere power politics. In this way, the NZDF becomes a contributor to greater regional resilience by addressing the opportunities that may otherwise be exploited by adversaries. Accordingly, deterrence through denial of opportunity becomes morally positive and focused more on protecting something—Pacific sovereignty, stability, and relationships—than simply deterring a single adversary. The DCP thus reads as a blueprint for New Zealand becoming an indispensable (if small) member of Australian-American geometric deterrence networks. It reassures voters that investment is defensive, relational, and sovereignty-affirming.

Conclusion

‘Deterrence through denial of opportunity’ in the 2025 Defence Capability Plan reflects a strategic, diplomatic, and political recalibration. On paper, it is a deterrence strategy that seeks to prevent adversaries from exploiting opportunities to gain influence or presence in the Pacific—albeit within New Zealand’s tight fiscal constraints. In practice, it is a foreign-policy alignment tool intended to embed New Zealand’s defence within an allied architecture of deterrence led by Australia and the US.

New Zealand is not attempting to independently deter China. It is signalling that it will support allied denial strategies by ensuring the Pacific does not become a seam or vacuum China can easily exploit. Through ‘denial of opportunity’, deterrence becomes something New Zealand contributes to collectively, rather than executes alone. Domestically, the language of denial helps justify defence spending in a risk-averse culture. Internationally, it communicates reliability to allies and reassurance to Pacific partners. Thus, deterrence becomes something New Zealand contributes to by being present and preferred.

Bibliography

Australian Government, National Defence Strategy, 2024, 2024 National Defence Strategy and 2024 Integrated Investment Program | About | Defence, accessed 21 October 2025.

Capie, David, ‘New Zealand’s Tilt Towards Southeast Asia: More than Rhetoric?’ Fulcrum.sg, 21 June 2024, New Zealand’s Tilt Towards Southeast Asia: More than Rhetoric? | FULCRUM, accessed 22 October 2025.

Colby, Elbridge, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (Yale University Press, 2021).

Cooper, Zack, ‘IP25086 | Rethinking the Rebalance - RSIS’ IDSS Paper, 05 September 2025, accessed 22 October 2025.

Ipsos 2024 National Risks Public Survey, commissioned by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 12 September 2024, 2024-National-Risks-Public-Survey-All-Threats-and-Hazards-Key-Findings-Summary.pdf accessed 29 October 2025.

Garrett, Daniel, Bridging the Ditch: Reassessing the Australia-New Zealand Alliance for a more contested Indo-Pacific, unpublished manuscript, October 2025

Jackson, Van, ‘The Risks of Australia’s Solo Deterrence Wager’, War on the Rocks, 20 July 2020, The Risks of Australia’s Solo Deterrence Wager – War on the Rocks, accessed 08 July 2025.

Kapur, Ashok, Geopolitics and the Indo-Pacific Region (2nd ed.) (London: Routledge, 2024) https://doiorg.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/10.4324/9781032709727

Laurs, Rob, ‘In the Same Boat—a Case for Trans-Tasman Strategic Integration’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 78 (5), 2024: 567–81. Doi:10.1080/10357718.2024.2402994

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New Zealand Government, Secure Together: To Tatou Korowai Manaaki, New Zealand’s National Security Strategy 2023-2028, August 2023, available at: https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf, accessed 22 October 2025.

Norrie, Adam, ‘New Zealand Defence Policy Developments’, Lecture to New Zealand Command and Staff College, 08 October 2025.

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Peters, Rt Hon Winston, ‘Joint US and NZ declaration’, Joint US and NZ declaration | Beehive.govt.nz 11 April 2024, accessed 22 October 2025.

David Santoro & Brad Glosserman, (2024, April), ‘A Heavy Lift: Making collective deterrence and defense work in the Indo-Pacific’, Issues & Insights, Vol. 24, WP 2, Pacific Forum International, Copie de I&I Covers (Interns), accessed 28 October 2025, accessed 28 October 2025.

Schake, Kori, ‘Dispensable Nation: America in a Post-American World’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2025, Dispensable Nation: America in a Post-American World, accessed 22 October 2025.

Seabrook, Jack, Deterrence through Detection: Script for STRA519 Oral Presentation, New Zealand Command and Staff College, 15 October 2025.

Steff, Reuben, ‘The strategic case for New Zealand to join AUKUS Pillar 2’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 78(5), 2024, 630-638. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2399338

Steff, Reuben, ‘Our region is now a strategic theatre’: New Zealand’s balancing response to China. The Pacific Review, 37(6), 2024, 1120–1151. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2024.2314764

Stewart, Courtney, Think Bigger, Act Larger: A U.S.-Australia Led Coalition for a Combined Joint Deterrence Force in the Indo-Pacific, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 02 October 2024: Think Bigger, Act Larger: A U.S.-Australia Led Coalition for a Combined Joint Deterrence Force in the Indo-Pacific | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 23 October 2025.

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Footnotes

¹ The views in this article are the author’s own and do not represent New Zealand Government or NZDF views or policy.

² Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021).

³ Australian Government, National Defence Strategy, 2024, 2024 National Defence Strategy and 2024 Integrated Investment Program | About | Defence.

⁴ New Zealand Government, Defence Capability Plan 2025, April 2025, Defence-Capability-Plan-25.pdf, 21.

⁵ David Capie, “New Zealand’s Tilt Towards Southeast Asia: More than Rhetoric?” Fulcrum, 21 June 2024. New Zealand’s Tilt Towards Southeast Asia: More than Rhetoric? | FULCRUM.

⁶ Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

⁷ New Zealand Government, Defence Capability Plan 2025.

⁸ Jack Seabrook, Deterrence through Detection: Script for STRA519 Oral Presentation, NZCSC, 15 October 2025.

⁹ Rob Laurs 2024. “In the Same Boat—a Case for Trans-Tasman Strategic Integration.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 78 (5), 2024, 575.

¹⁰ Causal wager formula based on “if (X), then (Y), by (Z - how),” as articulated in Van Jackson, “The Risks of Australia’s Solo Deterrence Wager,” War on the Rocks, 20 July 2020, The Risks of Australia’s Solo Deterrence Wager – War on the Rocks.

¹¹ Richard Maass, “Legal Deterrence by Denial: Strategic Initiative and International Law in the Gray Zone,” Texas National Security Review, Vol.8, Iss. 3, Summer 2025, 54-73.

¹² David Santoro & Brad Glosserman, “A Heavy Lift: Making collective deterrence and defense work in the Indo-Pacific,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 24, WP 2, Pacific Forum International, April 2024, Copie de I&I Covers (Interns).

¹³ Zack Cooper, “ Rethinking the Rebalance,” IDSS Paper, 05 September 2025, IP25086 | Rethinking the Rebalance - RSIS.

¹⁴ Kori Schake, “Dispensable Nation: America in a Post-American World,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2025, Dispensable Nation: America in a Post-American World.

¹⁵ Winston Peters, “Joint US and NZ declaration,” Joint US and NZ declaration | Beehive.govt.nz 11 April 2024.

¹⁶ Courtney Stewart, Review: The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict by Elbridge Colby (Yale University Press, 2021), The Strategy of Denial | Australian Army Research Centre (AARC).

¹⁷ New Zealand Government, Defence Capability Plan 2025, 21.

¹⁸ New Zealand Government, Secure Together: To Tatou Korowai Manaaki, New Zealand’s National Security Strategy 2023-2028, August 2023, https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf.

¹⁹ Pacific Islands Forum, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, 14 March 2024, 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent | Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 10.

²⁰ Adam Norrie, “New Zealand Defence Policy Developments,” Lecture to NZCSC, 08 October 2025.

²¹ Ashok Kapur, Geopolitics and the Indo-Pacific Region (2nd ed.) (London: Routledge, 2024).

²² New Zealand Government, Defence Capability Plan, 16-17.

²³ Nicholas Smith, “Dependently Independent: Theorizing New Zealand’s “Independent” Foreign Policy via a Neoclassical Realist Lens,” Global Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, 15 June 2025.

²⁴ Peters, “Joint US and NZ declaration.”

²⁵ Daniel Garrett, Bridging the Ditch: Reassessing the Australia-New Zealand Alliance for a more contested Indo-Pacific, unpublished manuscript, October 2025

²⁶ Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, October 2022, 8-18.

²⁷ Nicholas Khoo, “Retooling New Zealand’s Independent Foreign Policy for the AUKUS Era,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 7.

²⁸ Courtney Stewart, Think Bigger, Act Larger: A U.S.-Australia Led Coalition for a Combined Joint Deterrence Force in the Indo-Pacific, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 02 October 2024: Think Bigger, Act Larger: A U.S.-Australia Led Coalition for a Combined Joint Deterrence Force in the Indo-Pacific | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,.

²⁹ New Zealand Defence Force, “Chinese Naval Task Group,” 04 March 2025, Chinese Naval Task Group - New Zealand Defence Force.

³⁰ New Zealand Government, Secure Together, 10.

³¹ Reuben Steff, “The strategic case for New Zealand to join AUKUS Pillar 2,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 78(5), 2024, 631. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2399338

³² Reuben Steff, “Our region is now a strategic theatre: New Zealand’s balancing response to China,” The Pacific Review, 37(6), 2024, 1122.

³³ Capie, “New Zealand’s Tilt Towards Southeast Asia”

³⁴ Ipsos 2024 National Risks Public Survey, commissioned by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 12 September 2024, 2024-National-Risks-Public-Survey-All-Threats-and-Hazards-Key-Findings-Summary.pdf

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(Seabrook, 2026)

Seabrook, J. 2026. 'New Zealand’s Strategy of ‘Deterrence Through Denial of Opportunity’'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/new-zealands-strategy-deterrence-through-denial-opportunity (Accessed: 22 July 2026).

(Seabrook, 2026)

Jack Seabrook, "New Zealand’s Strategy of ‘Deterrence Through Denial of Opportunity’", The Forge, Published: July 16, 2026, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/new-zealands-strategy-deterrence-through-denial-opportunity. (accessed July 22, 2026).

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Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

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A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

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Campaign Planning Operational Art defence-nsps-level3

Theatre Operations Strategic Art defence-nsps-level4

Coalition Operations Political Acumen defence-nsps-level5

Social Mastery

Cross Cultural Ambassador social-culture-level5

Biography

Jack Seabrook

Major

Since commissioning in 2009, Major Jack Seabrook has served at all levels of the New Zealand’s defence and security communities. He deployed overseas to support New Zealand’s contributions to Iraq; to contribute to the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI); and recently to serve as Deputy Director for Operation of Gallant Phoenix, a multinational, multiagency fusion centre based in Jordan, focused countering violent extremism.