Case Study 1 – New Plan, Same Pattern: Australian Grand Strategy Since 2020

Based on the article’s central argument: the National Defence Strategy is new as military strategy, but Australia’s broader grand strategy remains a long-standing pattern of balance.

28/06/2026

<30 min

Australian policymakers have favoured pursuing a balance of power
favourable to our interests in the Indo-Pacific, as ambitious as that
objective is, because good alternatives are in short supply.

Richard Maude, March 2025¹

Since 2020, the Australian Government has identified—and in some cases, purported to respond to—a deteriorating strategic situation.² These efforts range from declarative strategy to articulations of Australia’s approach, and evoke the language of grand strategy, deliberating on all elements of national power in pursuit of long-term interests and acknowledging trade-offs between these interests. The existence of such a grand strategy however remains contested, with some commentators arguing that proposed changes remain insufficient, while others doubt the feasibility of grand strategy for a middle power like Australia entirely.³

This piece will explore whether Australia has developed a distinct grand strategy since 2020, concluding that where strategy is distinct, it is not grand—and where it is grand, it is not distinct. To do so, it will first detail what exactly grand strategy is, relying on Silove’s framework that distinguishes between the concept’s manifestations as grand plan, grand principle and grand behaviour.⁴ Rather than privileging a single form, this approach focusses on the constituent elements and necessary characteristics of grand strategy: the inclusion of ends, ways and means, and consideration of long-term scope, holistic use of resources, and importance in prioritisation of national interests respectively.⁵ This approach will enable consistent evaluation of differing interpretations of Australian grand strategy.

The framework will then be applied to assess different manifestations of Australian grand strategy. First, the National Defence Strategy (NDS), as a leading aspect of the Government’s response to a deteriorating strategic environment, will be examined. While the NDS will be found to contain all elements of strategy and be distinct, its narrow military focus will preclude its characterisation as grand strategy. The framework will then be applied to infer a grand strategic pattern from Australian statecraft. This approach will reveal an enduring pattern of balance of power, or strategic equilibrium which satisfies all criteria of grand strategy, especially when considered in contrast to proposed alternative strategies.⁶ Having established the long-term presence of this strategy, however, the piece concludes by showing that it is not distinct—with changes since 2020 reflecting continuation of the strategy, rather than deviations from it.

What Is Grand Strategy?

Freedman describes the promise of grand strategy as the ability to get “more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest”, but there is no authoritative definition of the term.⁷ Drawing on an extensive survey of relevant literature, Silove shows that the label “grand strategy” alludes to three distinct phenomena: grand plans, grand principles and grand behavior.⁸ Her typology focusses on identifying the common aspects of grand strategy across these forms, allowing for consistent comparison between them. This piece adopts this framework, rather than selecting from more concrete definitions arbitrarily, or simply selecting a convenient definition.

The framework first addresses the forms of grand strategy. Grand plans are the deliberate, usually documented, approaches that prioritise goals based on states’ interests, and coordinate how all tools of statecraft will be applied to achieve them.⁹ Grand principles and grand behaviour, by contrast, infer grand strategies from long-term patterns in state behaviour. The difference between the two lies in whether a central idea or principle drives such patterns—but identification of causation is not necessary for this analysis. As such, this piece will focus on grand strategy as pattern, aiming to distill an Australian grand strategy from long-term patterns in its distribution and employment of resources toward its ends.

Regardless of the category, the typology defines grand strategy as having constituent elements and necessary characteristics. To constitute strategy, there must be ends and means, with the addition of ways (the methods by which means are employed) often used.¹⁰ For such strategy to be grand, it must be long-term in nature, holistic in consideration of all of a state’s resources, and important in that it involves trade-offs among a state’s highest priorities.¹¹

A further component, drawn from Cornish and Dorman, will be used to assess distinctness, focussing on “the level of adjustment of change … embodied in the document [or strategy], rather than the form of words used in their titles”.¹² A grand strategy will be considered distinct then, if there is meaningful change in the substance of its ends, ways and means.

A final important distinction is that between the existence of a grand strategy and its quality. While characteristics of balance and coherence are often associated with definitions of grand strategy, insisting on these as definitional risks excluding flawed grand strategy from analysis.¹³ As this paper is focused on identifying whether a distinct grand strategy exists, rather than evaluating its quality, it will address balance and coherence only indirectly as they impact on the aspects of the framework detailed above.

New Plan: The National Defence Strategy

Despite the well-accepted concept of grand strategy as grand plan, plausible historical contenders have rarely been explicitly labelled as such.¹⁴ More often, such documents have taken the form of national security or defence plans that were prioritised over other aspects of government due to perceived existential threats.

Since 2020, the Australian Department of Defence has conducted a series of reviews identifying a deteriorating strategic environment, gradually shifting from “inputs to strategy”¹⁵ through to a fully-fledged NDS.¹⁶ In contrast, equivalent documents from elsewhere in Government have not been updated: neither the 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper or 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper have been revised, and the recent Australia in the World: 2025 Snapshot is less aspirational than these predecessors.¹⁷ If Australia has developed a distinct grand plan since 2020, the NDS is the leading candidate.

The NDS satisfies the constituent elements of strategy. It clarifies strategic ends

—changing the previously equally-weighted triad of Shape, Deter and Respond to one which prioritises deterrence—and specifies the aims of this deterrence as deterring conflict, preventing coercion, and maintaining regional security and balance.¹⁸ Its ways are structured around denial, which is enacted through increased range and lethality, national resilience, and international engagement to improve collective deterrence.¹⁹ The means include changes to force design, posture and basing as well as capability investments, elaborated on in the accompanying Integrated Investment Program.²⁰ The presence of these elements sees the NDS comfortably qualify as strategy.

To assess whether the strategy is grand, it must meet criteria of long-term orientation, holistic scope, and importance in prioritisation of interests. On the first criterion, it largely succeeds. The strategy promises a “generational uplift in Defence capabilities” extending beyond 2031, with the AUKUS Optimal Pathway extending into the 2040s.²¹ Doubts have been cast over the long-term viability of the plan—especially in light of the substantial reversals seen in similar past plans, and only three years of funding confirmed in the Forward Estimates.²² Despite this, the presence of a “fully costed, detailed development plan” which retains bipartisan support, credibly satisfies the long-term criteria.²³

The NDS’s claim to holistic scope is less convincing. The document acknowledges dependence of National Defence upon an array of other aspects of statecraft.²⁴ Despite this, its content focuses narrowly on the military domain. While claiming the lofty aspiration to be “a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests”, the document essentially adheres to the Clausew-+*itzean concept of military strategy rather than a comprehensive national approach.²⁵

This narrow focus is even more apparent in an assessment of the criterion of importance—whether the strategy makes trade-offs to prioritise between high-level national interests. While once again making rhetorical tribute to the interdependence of Australia’s security and prosperity, it fails to genuinely grapple with this trade-off.²⁶ The document’s handling of AUKUS Pillar 1 is reflective of this. Even within the Defence domain, the NDS does not address potential downsides of the initiative—be they financial opportunity cost on other capabilities, escalatory pressure or regional disapproval.²⁷ This extends to its consideration of trade-offs on other Government priorities, with the document’s triumphant celebration of historically high Defence funding not questioning where funding comes from, or meaningfully engaging with Eisenhower’s warning that “every arms dollar we spend above adequacy has a long-term weakening effect upon the nation and its security.”²⁸

This narrow approach extends beyond Defence-specific issues. Despite claiming to address the “most consequential security risks we face”, the document is notably far narrower in scope than the 2013 National Security Strategy, which remains unrevised.²⁹ The document’s framing of National Defence as the Government’s primary responsibility is reflected in its omission of other existing security strategies, such as those focusing on cybersecurity, counter-terrorism or civil maritime security.³⁰ It also largely overlooks non-military threats to Defence’s mission such as import dependence, foreign interference and domestic resilience concerns.³¹ In failing to consider trade-offs within Defence, in the broader security sphere, and across Government to more expansive national interests, the NDS falls short of qualifying as grand strategy.

The NDS substantially updates the ends, ways and means of Australian military strategy, and in doing so reflects a distinct strategy since 2020. However, despite its rhetorical acknowledgement of the many dependencies of Defence, the strategy remains fundamentally focused internally. In this instance, the title of the document concords with its contents—the NDS’s lack of meaningful integration with whole-of-government resources or reconciliation of conflicting national priorities sees it fail to meet the standard not only of grand strategy, but even of integrated national security strategy.

Old Pattern: The Strategy of Balance

If Australia has a grand strategy, it is more likely to be found in consistent patterns of state behaviour than in explicit plans. Such a pattern has been variously described—as hedging, fence-sitting, indecision or not having to choose, a balance of power strategy, or its most recent official formulation of strategic equilibrium.³²

While differing in emphasis, these labels converge on a core theme of balancing economic benefits against security assurances, with a current focus on China and the United States respectively.³³ Additional balancing dynamics exist in the pattern, between realist and liberal conceptions of international order, as expressed in Australia’s pursuit of multilateralism and regional bilateral diplomacy and support of the so-called rules based order.³⁴ This section will evaluate whether such a pattern meets the threshold to be grand strategy.

The ends of this putative strategy are described succinctly by Gyngell as maintenance of the post-war order.³⁵ He elaborates this as relying on a stable security framework underpinned by US primacy to benefit from unprecedented global growth, while still representing liberal values in multilateral institutions. The stability of these ends over time has contributed to a perception of Australia as pragmatic rather than strategic, tinkering with ways and means under the ongoing assumption that in the face of potential disruptions, “the status quo is comprehensively superior to any alternative.”³⁶

This pattern-based approach to grand strategy naturally entails a wide range of ways and means, necessitating analysis of the full array of national resources. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade enumerates 18 “arms of our national power, including economic, strategic, diplomatic, development and military” instruments—many of which have their own discrete strategies.³⁷ While often developed in isolation, that such formal strategies often contain and drive recurring themes and priorities supports the concluding remarks in Silove that plans, principles and behaviour are not necessarily entirely independent.³⁸ This interdependence between deliberate plans and emergent national behaviour is evident in the economic domain, where official trade deals have enabled record outcomes—such as $1.3 trillion in two-way trade in 2023-2024.³⁹ Regardless of such links, however, both means and ways are evidently employed in the balancing patterns of Australian statecraft.

To be considered holistic in the employment of these tools, clear patterns must be identified across a nation’s use of resources. Such patterns can be found, with one such characterisation by Gyngell describing Australia’s foreign and defence strategy as adhering to three persistent trends: seeking out a great power alliance, regional engagement and support for a rules-based order.⁴⁰ Aside from being officially declared as the “three pillars” of Australian foreign policy under Labor and not being substantially altered by subsequent governments, these three trends also form the departure point for many other more detailed characterisations of Australia’s approach.⁴¹ These general trends, and consistent strategic ends over time, reflect a coherent mobilisation of national resources across various means of state power, indicating that the approach meets the holistic threshold.

The criteria of importance—requiring prioritisation between competing national interests—is also evident in both real-time policymaking and longer-term adjustments to policy. In real time, such balancing is evident in debates between economic and national security interests. A recent example can be seen in China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) negotiations, with Australia strongly resisting People’s Republic of China (PRC) efforts to relax Foreign Investment Review Board oversight—especially relating to State-Owned Enterprises and perceived non-commercial objectives of their investments.⁴² Conversely, the current Government’s “stabilisation” approach reflects a careful balance between reestablishing communications and trade, while resisting Beijing’s calls for increased engagement.⁴³ In this sense, the apparent tensions in policy typically reflect the strategy of balancing, rather than contradicting it.⁴⁴

Such balance is also evident in the evolution of the strategy over time, supporting its satisfaction of the long-term criterion. The ChAFTA case above, despite attempts at real-time balancing, came to be seen as too permissive, and lead to subsequent tightening of foreign investment screening.⁴⁵ The current stabilization approach is also such a rebalance, away from a period of perceived excessive securitisation and unproductive tension with Beijing.⁴⁶ Strategic adjustments of this type are evident throughout the post-war period Gyngell identifies.⁴⁷ Longer-term examples include shifts—though none fundamental—in the expeditionary posture of the ADF, as well as evolution in trade openness and trade partner preferences.⁴⁸ While absent a similar security dimension, present concerns about the PRC’s economic dominance echo similar balancing approaches taken towards Japan in the 1970s.⁴⁹ The substantial continuity over a long duration suggests that the strategy of balance meets all criteria for grand strategy.

The case for a strategy of balance, and for including fluctuations since 2020 as part of this strategy, can be reinforced by examining these developments in comparison to proposed alternative strategies. Calls for such alternatives have increased recently—as they did during the first Trump presidency—although notably many such calls are better understood as criticisms of the current approach rather than substantive alternatives.⁵⁰ In public descriptions, official responses to the current strategic turbulence typically involve no structural changes, only increased costs and lowered expectations, foregoing strategic equilibrium in pursuit of a “messier, less grand … US-led military deterrence of China”.⁵¹ Such adjustments have rightly been characterised as “Plan A-Minus” rather than as genuine “Plan B’s”.⁵²

When substantive alternatives are offered, they typically require radical departure from established policy and entail substantial cost. A range of such proposals have been made, with one category including drastic increases to military spending, either towards conventional self-reliance, regional alliances or doubling down on the US alliance.⁵³ Other options call for major accommodations to Beijing, or even withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty to enable an Australian nuclear deterrent capability.⁵⁴ Such alternatives receive very little official attention: aside from the substantial financial and other costs associated with them, they highlight the phenomena highlighted by Gyngell as Australia’s “fear of abandonment”.⁵⁵ Such considerations are anathema, because considering such “Plan[s] B … would call into question the reliability of Plan A.”⁵⁶

In this context, the persistence of the strategy of balance reflects not inertia, but lack of better alternatives. While changes have occurred since 2020, it is evident in contrast to more radical alternatives that these changes are reflective of the strategy of balance, rather than evidence against it. Having established balance of power as Australia’s long-term grand strategy however, it cannot be argued that such a strategy is distinct.

Conclusion

The new plans produced by the Australian Government since 2020 have proactively recognised a changing strategic environment and altered aspects of Australia’s strategy. The novel means of AUKUS, ways centered on denial and ends framed around deterrence constitute a distinct military strategy, captured in a deliberate, documented plan. Yet despite the broad aspirational language of the National Defence Strategy, the novel military strategy does not qualify as grand strategy. To the extent that a distinct strategy exists in this plan, it is not grand.

Instead, these shifts represent familiar fluctuations in Australia’s long-standing grand strategy of balance, or strategic equilibrium. Its ends have endured, and its ways and means adjusted regularly over time—exactly as expected in such a strategy. Distilling this strategy takes a descriptive approach, similar to that employed by Luttwak to characterise the grand strategy of Byzantium and claim that “all states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not.”⁵⁷ In this sense, the existence of an Australian grand strategy of balance is clear, reinforced further by both the continuity of the approach and the stark contrast of proposed alternatives. Given this continuity, however, it is clear that this grand strategy cannot be considered distinct.

While this descriptive approach best captures Australian statecraft, it will frustrate those who seek to wield grand strategy to drive action. The framework’s focus on the existence, rather than the quality, of grand strategy means that conceding an Australian grand strategy of balance says little about whether it is, or will continue to be, effective. Just as this strategy emerged from a rupture in the international order, growing turbulence may necessitate its replacement—though whether this too will be visible only in hindsight remains to be seen. Silove highlights an often unstated assumption in the literature: that plans, principles and patterns are causally linked.⁵⁸ Should this link exist, the efforts of frustrated practitioners may not be wasted, as today’s new plans may yet give rise to tomorrow’s patterns. Until then, however, the strategy of balance will continue to define Australia’s grand strategic posture.

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Silove, Nina. “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy.’” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 27–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073.

Smith, Stephen. National Defence: Defence Strategic Review: 2023. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2023.

Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security. Canberra: The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013.

Tillett, Andrew. “Trump Lashes Turnbull on Eve of Tariff Call.” Australian Financial Review, March 10, 2025, online edition. https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/weak-ineffective-trump-lashes-turnbull-20250310-p5liaf.

Ullman, Harlan. “Start Thinking Now about Alternatives to AUKUS Pillar 1.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, April 30, 2024. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/start-thinking-now-about-alternatives-to-aukus-pillar-1/.

Uren, David. “It’s been Done before: Pay for More Defence Spending with Debt.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 17, 2025. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-been-done-before-pay-for-more-defence-spending-with-debt/.

Voon, Tania, and Dean Merriman. “Is Australia’s Foreign Investment Screening Policy Consistent with International Investment Law?” Melbourne Journal of International Law 23, no. 1 (March 23, 2022): 49.

Wallace, Andrew. “Not Just Defence: We Need a National Security Strategy.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, May 1, 2024. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-defence-we-need-a-national-security-strategy/.

White, Hugh. How to Defend Australia. Carlton, VIC, Australia: La Trobe University Press, in conjunction with Black Inc, 2019.

Wong, Penny. “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power.” National Press Club Address, Australian National Press Club, April 17, 2023. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-press-club-address-australian-interests-regional-balance-power.

Xinhua. “Chinese Ambassador Calls for Greater Progress in Sino-Australian Bilateral Ties.” Xinhua, February 27, 2025. https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20250227/f92f5e6399174cbb923cecf3c65a6c01/c.html.

Zhou, Weihuan. “Chinese Investment in Australia: A Critical Analysis of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement.” Melbourne Journal of International Law 18, no. 2 (December 29, 2017):407–35.

Footnotes

¹ Richard Maude, “Australia’s Indo-Pacific Destiny Up For Grabs in a New World Order” (The Asia Society, March 11, 2025), https://asiasociety.org/australia/australias-indo-pacific-destiny-grabs-new-world-order.

² Australian Government, Australia In The World: 2025 Snapshot (Barton ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/australia-world-2025-snapshot; Stephen Smith, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review: 2023 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2023); 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2020); National Defence Strategy: 2024 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2024).

³ “Turnbull, a fierce critic of the AUKUS deal, will host a conference in Canberra on March 31 calling for a “fundamental rethink” of the deal” per Andrew Tillett, “Trump Lashes Turnbull on Eve of Tariff Call,” Australian Financial Review, March 10, 2025, Online edition, https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/weak-ineffective-trump-lashes-turnbull-20250310-p5liaf; Graeme Dobell, “The End of the Old Order Shakes Australia’s Grand Strategy” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 1, 2021), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-end-of-the-old-order-shakes-australias-grand-strategy/.

⁴ Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 27–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073.

⁵ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 56-57.

⁶ Penny Wong, “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power” (National Press Club Address, Australian National Press Club, April 17, 2023), https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-press-club-address-australian-interests-regional-balance-power.

⁷ Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), xii; Henry Mintzberg, “The Strategy Concept I: Five Ps for Strategy,” California Management Review 30, no. 1 (October 1987), https://doi.org/10.2307/41165263, 21–22; Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 29-30.

⁸ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 56-57.

⁹ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 49.

¹⁰ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 45-46.

¹¹ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 46-47.

¹² Paul Cornish and Andrew M. Dorman, “Breaking the Mould: The United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010,” International Affairs 86, no. 2 (March 2010): 395–410, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00888.x.

¹³ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 47-49.

¹⁴ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 37-38.

¹⁵ Rory Medcalf, “Inside the Defence Strategic Review: A Conversation with Secretariat Co-Lead, Professor Peter Dean,” The National Security Podcast, n.d., https://nsc.anu.edu.au/podcasts/inside-defence-strategic-review-conversation-secretariat-co-lead-professor-peter-dean.

¹⁶ 2020 Defence Strategic Update; 2020 Force Structure Plan (Canberra: Australian Government, Department of Defence, 2020); Integrated Investment Program: 2024 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2024); National Defence Strategy; Smith, National Defence.

¹⁷ Australian Government, ed., Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper (Canberra, 2012); Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Opportunity, Security, Strength (Barton ACT: Executive Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017); Australian Government, Australia In The World: 2025 Snapshot.

¹⁸ “This approach aims to deter any conflict before it begins, prevent any potential adversary from succeeding in coercing Australia through force, support regional security and prosperity and uphold a favourable regional strategic balance” per National Defence Strategy, 7.

¹⁹ Further detailed in the ADF’s five operational tasks to “defend Australia and our immediate region; deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches; protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world; contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order” per National Defence Strategy, 7.

²⁰ Integrated Investment Program; National Defence Strategy, 27-58.

²¹ National Defence Strategy, 18-19; Australian Submarine Agency, “Pathway to Australia’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine Capability” (Australian Government, October 2, 2024), https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus/optimal-pathway.

²² Geoffrey Barker, “The Raison d’état behind Australia’s Submarine Decision” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, September 30, 2021), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-raison-detat-behind-australias-submarine-decision/; Harlan Ullman, “Start Thinking Now about Alternatives to AUKUS Pillar 1” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, April 30, 2024), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/start-thinking-now-about-alternatives-to-aukus-pillar-1/; Assistant Secretary Budgeting and Reporting, “Defence Portfolio - Portfolio Budget Statement 2024-2025,” Portfolio Budget Statement, Budget Related Paper (Department of Defence, 2024), https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/2024-25_Defence_PBS_00_Complete.pdf

²³ “FACT SHEET: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS)” (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government, September 15, 2021), https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/AUKUS-factsheet.pdf; Australian Submarine Agency, “Nuclear Powered Capability Fact Sheet”; Harlan Ullman, “Start Thinking Now about Alternatives to AUKUS Pillar 1”.

²⁴ In particular, “integrated statecraft, national resilience, industry resilience, supply chain resilience, innovation, science and technology, a workforce and skills base, and a robust national intelligence community” per National Defence Strategy, 18-19.

²⁵ National Defence Strategy, 6, 17; Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 46.

²⁶ “This National Defence Strategy acknowledges that Australia’s security and prosperity are inextricably linked. Australia’s future depends in large part upon protecting our economic connection to the world, upholding the global rules-based order, maintaining a favourable regional strategic balance and contributing to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific” per National Defence Strategy, 5.

²⁷ Tytti Erästö, Fei Su, and Wilfred Wan, “Navigating Security Dilemmas in Indo-Pacific Waters: Undersea Capabilities and Armament Dynamics” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2024), https://doi.org/10.55163/DKWB3559; Mingjiang Li, “ASEAN’s Responses to AUKUS: Implications for Strategic Realignments in the Indo-Pacific,” China International Strategy Review 4, no. 2 (December 2022): 268–87, https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-022-00121-2; National Defence Strategy, 13.

²⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace (1956-1961) (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1965), 620; David Uren, “It’s Been Done before: Pay for More Defence Spending with Debt” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 17, 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-been-done-before-pay-for-more-defence-spending-with-debt/

²⁹ Mick McNeill, “It’s Time for a New National Security Strategy” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, April 8, 2024), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-time-for-a-new-national-security-strategy/; Jim Molan, “Australia Needs a Clear National Security Strategy” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, October 12, 2018), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-needs-a-clear-national-security-strategy/; Jim Molan, “Australia Needs a Broad and Clear National Security Strategy” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, July 30, 2021), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-needs-a-broad-and-clear-national-security-strategy/; National Defence Strategy.

³⁰ Department of Home Affairs, Australian Government Civil Maritime Security Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2021), https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/civil-maritime-security; Department of Home Affairs, 2023–2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023), https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy; A Safer Australia Australia’s Counter – Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy 2025 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2025), https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/a-national-approach/australias-counter-terrorism-strategies.

³¹ John Blaxland, “ADAPTING TO POLY-CRISIS: A Proposed Australian National Security Strategy,” Occasional Paper, RSL Defence and National Security Committee (RSL Australia, May 2024), https://policybrief.anu.edu.au/national-security-is-getting-more-complex-and-australia-needs-a-plan/; Ben Scott, “Sharper Choices: How Australia Can Make Better National Security Decisions” (Lowy Institute, December 11, 2022), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/sharper-choices-how-australia-can-make-better-national-security-decisions; Andrew Wallace, “Not Just Defence: We Need a National Security Strategy” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, May 1, 2024), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/not-just-defence-we-need-a-national-security-strategy/.

³² Wong, “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power”; Geoffrey Barker, “The Raison d’état behind Australia’s Submarine Decision” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, September 30, 2021), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-raison-detat-behind-australias-submarine-decision/; Greg Colton, “US National Defense Strategy May Force Australia to Get off the Fence” (Lowy Institute - The Interpreter, January 23, 2018), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-national-defense-strategy-may-force-australia-get-fence; Alexander Korolev, “The End of Hedging in Australia’s China Policy and Its Implications” (Australian Institute of International Affairs, December 15, 2023), https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-end-of-hedging-in-australias-china-policy-and-its-implications/; Alexander Korolev, “Between Scylla and Charybdis: Hedging and Australia’s Foreign Policy Amid Intensifying US-China Rivalry,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs September-October 2024 (September 10, 2024): 64–83; Peter Layton, “The Defence Gaps in Australia’s Emerging Grand Strategies” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, October 5, 2023), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-defence-gaps-in-australias-emerging-grand-strategies/; Michael Pezzullo, “Gradually, Then Suddenly: In Geopolitics, Decades Can Happen in Weeks” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, January 11, 2015), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/gradually-then-suddenly-in-geopolitics-decades-can-happen-in-weeks/.

³³ Australian Government, Australia In The World: 2025 Snapshot; Wong, “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power.”

³⁴ Australian Government, Australia In The World: 2025 Snapshot; Wong, “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power.”

³⁵ Allen Gyngell, “The Year Ahead” (Australian Institute of International Affairs, February 19, 2021), https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-year-ahead/.

³⁶ Dobell, “The End of the Old Order Shakes Australia’s Grand Strategy”; Wong, “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power.”

³⁷ Australian Government, Australia In The World: 2025 Snapshot; Wong, “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power”; Nicholas Moore, Invested: Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040: A Report for the Australian Government (Barton, ACT: Economic Strategy Section, Southeast Asia Strategy, Communications and Maritime Security Branch, Office of Southeast Asia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2023); Australia’s International Development Policy: For a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Indo-Pacific (Barton, ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2023); Australia’s Sports Diplomacy Strategy 2032+ Strengthening Australia’s National Power Through Sport (Barton, ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025).

³⁸ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 55-56.

³⁹ Wong, “Australian Interests in a Regional Balance of Power”; Australian Government, Australia In The World: 2025 Snapshot.

⁴⁰ Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942 (Carlton, Vic: La Trobe University Press, 2017), 172.

⁴¹ Nicholas Bromfield and Thomas S. Wilkins, “Foreign and Defence Policy,” in Australian Politics and Policy, ed. Diana Perche et al. (Sydney University Press, 2024), Chapter 38, https://oercollective.caul.edu.au/aust-politics-policy/chapter/foreign-and-defence-policy/.

⁴² Weihuan Zhou, “Chinese Investment in Australia: A Critical Analysis of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 18, no. 2 (December 29, 2017), 8-11.

⁴³ Graeme Dobell, “Stabilisation of Relationship with China See-Saws after Five-Year Icy Age” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, February 9, 2024), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/stabilisation-of-relationship-with-china-see-saws-after-five-year-icy-age/; Kevin Magee, “Australia and the People’s Republic of China: Stabilisation and Contradiction” (Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney, November 28, 2024), https://www.uts.edu.au/news/2024/11/australia-and-peoples-republic-china-stabilisation-and-contradiction; Xinhua, “Chinese Ambassador Calls for Greater Progress in Sino-Australian Bilateral Ties,” Xinhua, February 27, 2025, https://english.news.cn/asiapacific/20250227/f92f5e6399174cbb923cecf3c65a6c01/c.html.

⁴⁴ Andrew Carr, “All Planned Out” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 13, 2019), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/all-planned-out/.

⁴⁵ Tania Voon and Dean Merriman, “Is Australia’s Foreign Investment Screening Policy Consistent with International Investment Law?” Melbourne Journal of International Law 23, no. 1 (March 23, 2022): 49.

⁴⁶ Richard McGregor, “China-Australia Thaw Reveals Limits of Beijing’s Economic Coercion” (Lowy Institute, October 26, 2023), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-australia-thaw-reveals-limits-beijing-s-economic-coercion; Magee, “Australia and the People’s Republic of China: Stabilisation and Contradiction.”

⁴⁷ Gyngell, “The Year Ahead.”

⁴⁸ Stephan Frühling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945 (Canberra: Australian Department of Defence, 2009), https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/4595979; “Australia’s Trade Through Time” (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), accessed March 21, 2025, https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/tradethroughtimegovau/site/index.html.

⁴⁹ Mark Beeson and Jeffrey D. Wilson, “Coming to Terms with China: Managing Complications in the Sino-Australian Economic Relationship,” Security Challenges 11, no. 2 (2015): 21–37.

⁵⁰ ASPI Strategist, “The Strategist on: ‘Australia’s Security-a Plan B’” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, April 2019), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/dinkus/australias-security-a-plan-b/; ASPI Strategist, “The Strategist on: ‘Trump’s Diplomatic Revolution’” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/dinkus/trumps-diplomatic-revolution/; Kim Beazley, “Former Defence Minister and Ambassador to the US: ‘If Trump Is Elected, Will Australia Need a Plan B?’” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 13, 2024), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/former-defence-minister-and-ambassador-to-the-us-if-trump-is-elected-will-australia-need-a-plan-b/; Michelle Grattan, “Donald Trump Calls Malcolm Turnbull ‘Weak and Ineffective’ in Spat with Former Prime Minister,” The Conversation, March 10, 2025, https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-calls-malcolm-turnbull-weak-and-ineffective-in-spat-with-former-prime-minister-251625; Darren Lim, “Incoming Government Brief, 2025 Edition,” Australia in the World, n.d., https://australiaintheworld.podbean.com/e/ep-151-incoming-govt-brief-2025-edition/.

⁵¹ Maude, “Australia’s Indo-Pacific Destiny Up For Grabs in a New World Order”; Gregory Brown, “Elbridge Colby’s Vision: Blocking China” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 20, 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/elbridge-colbys-vision-blocking-china/; Michael Pezzullo, “Australia’s Defences Must Be Ready in Two Years. Here’s What to Do” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 8, 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-defences-must-be-ready-in-two-years-heres-what-to-do/.

⁵² Lim, “Incoming Government Brief, 2025 Edition.”

⁵³ Pezzullo, “Australia’s Defences Must Be Ready in Two Years. Here’s What to Do”; Lim, “Incoming Government Brief, 2025 Edition”; Marc Ablong and Marcus Schultz, “Defence Budget Doesn’t Match the Threat Australia Faces” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 25, 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-budget-doesnt-match-the-threat-australia-faces/; Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, “Australia Needs Greater Defence Self-Reliance, and Extra Funding” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 20, 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-needs-greater-defence-self-reliance-and-extra-funding/; Euan Graham, “China’s Warships Reveal More than a Need to Strengthen the ADF” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 27, 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-warships-reveal-more-than-a-need-to-strengthen-the-adf/; Alice Nason, “Not yet Time for a Plan B. Australia Must Stick with AUKUS – for Better or Worse,” The Conversation, March 14, 2025, https://theconversation.com/not-yet-time-for-a-plan-b-australia-must-stick-with-aukus-for-better-or-worse-252166; Dougal Robertson, “More F-35s, More Tankers: A Reliable Way to Strengthen Australian Deterrence” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, March 27, 2025), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/more-f-35s-more-tankers-a-reliable-way-to-strengthen-australian-deterrence/; Sam Roggeveen, The Echidna Strategy: Australia’s Search for Power and Peace, 1st ed (Collingwood: Black Inc, 2023); Harlan Ullman, “Start Thinking Now about Alternatives to AUKUS Pillar 1” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, April 30, 2024), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/start-thinking-now-about-alternatives-to-aukus-pillar-1/; David Uren, “It’s Been Done before: Pay for More Defence Spending with Debt”; Hugh White, How to Defend Australia (Carlton, VIC, Australia: La Trobe University Press, in conjunction with Black Inc, 2019).

⁵⁴ Darren Lim, “Aussie Reactions to Trump, & PRC Warships; NZ-Cook Islands,” Australia in the World, n.d., https://australiaintheworld.podbean.com/e/ep-152-australia-s-response-to-trump-and-chinese-warships-nz-cook-islands/; Maude, “Australia’s Indo-Pacific Destiny Up For Grabs in a New World Order”; White, How to Defend Australia; Lim, “Incoming Government Brief, 2025 Edition.”

⁵⁵ Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment.

⁵⁶ Peter Jennings, “With Trump at Large, Australia Needs a Plan B for Defence” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, July 21, 2018), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/with-trump-at-large-australia-needs-a-plan-b-for-defence/.

⁵⁷ Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, 1st Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2011), 409.

⁵⁸ Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword”, 55-56.

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Hoffmann, T. 2026. 'Case Study 1 – New Plan, Same Pattern: Australian Grand Strategy Since 2020'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/case-study-1-new-plan-same-pattern-australian-grand-strategy-2020 (Accessed: 29 June 2026).

(Hoffmann, 2026)

Travis Hoffmann, "Case Study 1 – New Plan, Same Pattern: Australian Grand Strategy Since 2020", The Forge, Published: June 28, 2026, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/case-study-1-new-plan-same-pattern-australian-grand-strategy-2020. (accessed June 29, 2026).

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Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

The Art of War Joint Competency defence-poa-level3

Military Power Joint Mastery defence-poa-level4

Integrated National Power defence-poa-level5

Critical and Creative Thinking defence-cognitive-level1

Complicated Problems defence-cognitive-level2

Complex Problems defence-cognitive-level3

Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level4

Multi-agency Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level5

National and Military Power awareness defence-nsps-level1

Operational Planning Military Science defence-nsps-level2

Campaign Planning Operational Art defence-nsps-level3

Theatre Operations Strategic Art defence-nsps-level4

Coalition Operations Political Acumen defence-nsps-level5

Social Mastery

Lead Teams Lead Leaders social-influence-level2

Lead Operating Systems social-influence-level3

Lead Capability social-influence-level4

Lead Integrated Systems social-influence-level5

Moral Leadership social-ethics-level3

Lead organisation through ethical concerns social-ethics-level4

Stewarding the Profession social-ethics-level5

Character Role Model social-character-level3

Generate Climates of Trust social-character-level4

Character Exemplar social-character-level5

Cultural Stewardship social-culture-level3

Cross Cultural Leadership social-culture-level4

Cross Cultural Ambassador social-culture-level5

Biography

Travis Hoffmann

Major

Major Travis Hoffmann is an Australian Army officer with an academic background in strategy, cybersecurity and computer science who was awarded the Strategy Prize for ACSC (Military Art) - Part Time class of 2025. He is currently posted to the Military Science Academy of the Vietnamese People’s Army in Hanoi, where he is learning Vietnamese, building on his previous language training in Mandarin and Arabic.