Conceptual Frameworks Defence Values

Applied Ethics – Considerations for ADF Personnel

What happens when doing the right thing puts you at odds with your peers or superiors? Explore the ethical pressures facing ADF personnel and the dangers of looking away.

03/11/2026

<30 min

Introduction

In the mid-1980s, when one of the authors was a junior officer at an ADF training establishment, the unit was experiencing disciplinary issues with a couple of foreign NCO students - not under the jurisdiction of the DFDA. The unit requested an officer from their nation counsel them about their responsibilities. In the process of this ‘counselling,’ the officer became visibly angry and slapped and yelled at the NCOs while the Australian Commanding Officer (CO), Warrant Officer Discipline and the author looked on, dumbfounded. This incident was both culturally and ethically confusing and the Australians present were poorly trained for either.

In discussions after the event they wondered if they had been complicit in the ‘assault’ on the two NCOs; who, by the way, were unhurt (other than pride) by the mild slaps of their officer. Or was the dignity and authority of the officer, whom they had invited to fix the problem, the higher priority? At the end of the dressing down, the international officer instantly returned to his calmer self and simply apologised for the behaviour of his countrymen, and assured the CO similar problems with the NCOs would not happen again.

Was doing nothing in this instance actually the right thing to do? Or should one of the ADF members in the room diplomatically intervened? Back in the 1980s we did not have the benefit of ethics or culture education to help guide this kind of decision making, let alone doctrine on the subject. Even so, it would have been difficult to determine the precise balance between cultural appropriateness and ethical reasoning in this scenario. Fortunately, it is unlikely a similar situation would occur in 2026. Most international exchange officers are now provided cultural awareness training about Australian cultural norms, making such behaviour in an Australian context very unlikely, and ADF doctrine education and training offers tools for Defence members navigating this kind of complexity.

This paper is about doing the right thing when you are under pressure from your team, circumstances, or expectations, and the potential cost of not doing the right thing.

Now that the ADF does have explicit statements on behaviour, standards, and decision-making, how useful are they in providing guidance in discharging our duties on a daily basis? This paper considers the utility of philosophical doctrine ADF-P-0 - Military Ethics, published in 2021 and ADF-P-0- Culture in the Profession of Arms, published in 2024, to ADF personnel in garrison and operational settings. During deployed operations, ADF members confront ethical and cultural dilemmas on an almost daily basis. It is in these situations that the theory of military ethics and the reality of working with other nation’s military/police forces come together, sometimes in confronting ways. Even so, the ethical standards that apply in garrison should be no different to those that apply on deployment, hence why they are blended together in this paper.

To enable clearer understanding, the paper begins with brief explanations of the concepts to be discussed. It should be noted, we define ethical decisions as any decision where there is a clear risk of harm to oneself or others. An ethical dilemma is a decision where any path taken will have negative consequences for others.¹ A test of integrity is where there is no doubt about what is the ‘right’ thing to do, but making the decision may have negative consequences for oneself.

Cognitive Dissonance

In order to understand the pressure inherent in dealing with an ethical dilemma, it is helpful to understand the theory of cognitive dissonance² Cognitive dissonance is what we experience when faced with inconsistent information on an issue of importance – it is literally the anxiety of not knowing what to do. In a high stakes situation, making any decision can reduce anxiety and this can sometimes override other considerations (e.g., doing the right thing). Leon Festinger³, who first coined the term cognitive dissonance, argued that people reduce this anxiety via the following steps:

Make a definitive choice – no option to turn back

Avoid information that suggests the choice was wrong – e.g., confirmation bias – only attending to information that conforms with an already formed opinion

Seek information (and social support) that reinforces the choice made – e.g., herd bias – befriending people who all believe the same thing

Reduce the value of the unchosen alternative – e.g., moral disengagement (see below), diminish, blame, dehumanise

Raise the value of the choice made – e.g., moral disengagement (see below), zealotry, call to ‘rights’, seek praise⁴.

Cognitive dissonance is more likely to occur when we find ourselves in culturally unfamiliar situations where it is not clear what the correct course of action is. This does not necessarily need to be in foreign lands. Our Culture doctrine explicitly recognises that Services, Groups, units etc. have their own distinctive cultures which means that ADF personnel are going to encounter cultural differences in their own domain. Culturally unfamiliar situations create uncertainty about what is right to do, and this uncertainty is deeply uncomfortable. In order to reduce this discomfort, people are vulnerable to making choices that can diminish the value of doing the right thing. This is the slippery slope towards moral disengagement.

Moral Disengagement

A particular threat to maintaining our personal and institutional values in a culturally complex situation is to become morally disengaged from the situation and the people involved. Albert Bandura⁵ highlighted eight cognitive processes that increase the likelihood of becoming detached from one’s personal moral compass and doing something one would never do otherwise:

Moral justification: Minimising purposeful harm done to others on the grounds it is morally justifiable – e.g., for the greater good or for their own good
Euphemistic language: Using morally neutral language (e.g., ‘domestic violence’, ‘collateral damage’, ‘enhanced interrogation’, ‘water-boarding’, ‘freedom fighter’) to disguise reprehensible conduct
Advantageous Comparison: Comparing one’s own unethical behaviour to even more harmful behaviour by others to make one’s own behaviour appear more acceptable
Diffusion of Responsibility: Individual responsibility for immoral behaviour diffused between a collective
Distorting Consequences: Downplaying the effects of unethical behaviour to make it appear less harmful
Displacement of Responsibility: Arguing one’s behaviour was the direct result of authoritative dictates
Dehumanisation: Emphasising an us versus them mentality by using demeaning stereotypes or language
Attribution of blame: Exonerating oneself by placing the blame for unethical behaviour on the target of the behaviour⁶.

A person does not have to use all of these processes to become morally disengaged; just one could create the moral justification for doing the wrong thing or doing nothing.

Normalised Deviance

In response to the crash of the Challenger Space Shuttle in 1986, Diane Vaughan identified a related phenomenon to moral disengagement in corporate culture; she labelled this 'normalised deviance.'⁷ Normalised deviance refers to the general acceptance of small deviations from normal procedures, which, if not corrected, may eventually result in a disaster. While normalisation of deviance can be a cause of accidents in the workplace, it differs from moral disengagement in terms of intent, the people making slight deviations from the norm do not intend to harm anyone in the process. By contrast, mechanisms of moral disengagement are used to justify purposeful harm. Nevertheless, knowingly allowing normalised deviance to continue would be an example of an ‘intentional’ risk of harm.

Common Ethical Dilemmas

Chapter 6 of ADF-P-0 Military Ethics recognises there are many risks to maintaining one’s ethical compass in war, with moral disengagement and the normalisation of deviance mentioned specifically. The question is, how do we prepare ourselves for the ethical challenges of war? As our doctrine tells us, it is the capacity for restraint, compassion and above all ethical reasoning that distinguishes a ‘just’ military.⁸ Consequently, every ‘just’ military has an obligation to educate its personnel, especially leaders, in the importance of ethical decision-making in military operations.

In our experience⁹, the issues listed below are common scenarios that have occurred within the ADF; both while on deployment or in barracks. Discussing each in terms of mechanisms of moral disengagement is a useful way of highlighting for readers how these processes work, and how we can prevent ethical drift and ethical failure from happening.

Misuse of official resources
Attitude to ‘troop discipline’ – AKA bastardization
Cultural biases revealed in terms of race, gender, colour, etc
Support of regimes that demonstrate questionable ethical standards
Attitudes to bribery as a way of conducting business
Lack of common standards or the enforcement of them including work ethic and operational discipline
Attitudes to the wellbeing of subordinate personnel
Attitudes to managing complaints.

Misuse of official resources and Moral Justification

Being a witness to the misuse of official resources is less of an ethical dilemma for a person in authority. Authority provides the institutional power to intervene and hold someone accountable for the misuse, or to redefine the parameters of use and misuse via command authorisation. This is very different for a subordinate who witnesses such behaviour, especially by a superior. It can be even more difficult for newcomers, perhaps on an exchange posting or posted into a new unit, who are confronted by unethical practices, apparently condoned. People in these challenging situations face an ethical dilemma between loyalty to, or fear of, the superior (or peers, unit, institution) and doing the right thing. This dilemma creates a contest between ‘letting it go’ and doing nothing, or taking action to stop what is happening and risking a backlash. Arguably, this is a much harder dilemma to manage while deployed.

Most people are afraid of ‘rocking the boat’, and often believe making a complaint will cause more harm than good. This becomes a moral justification for doing nothing, with arguments like it is ‘for the greater good’ of our mission/unit/Service/ADF. But the strongest justification for an individual to turn a blind eye is self-interest, e.g., ‘it is none of my business.’ Bringing wrongdoing to light is a high-risk activity, which is why Defence supports a Public Interest Disclosure Act. There is a risk people could make false, or malicious accusations, but this is the lesser of two evils in this situation. An innocent person has less reason to worry about an investigation than someone doing the wrong thing.

Just because we can find a way to justify doing the wrong thing or doing nothing, especially while deployed, does not make the harm of the wrong any less. Not doing the right thing because of fear is moral cowardice – it is also evidence of a morally weak organisation.

Attitude to troop discipline AKA Bastardization and ‘Euphemistic Language’

Bearing witness to the mistreatment of a junior colleague under the guise of ‘troop discipline,’ can be extremely troubling for both the victim and also for bystanders. Sometimes, observers are enlisted by lead perpetrators to take part in this abuse, even when they know it is wrong and want no part of it. Leaving aside the obvious damage to the victim, this will create enormous dissonance for an unwilling bystander. This is why perpetrators often diminish the cruelty of their behaviour with the use of euphemistic language, e.g., “it’s just a bit of fun,” “we were only letting off steam”, or the behaviour is “corrective discipline.” By sanitising the intent to harm, cruel behaviour can seem less damaging and even okay, removing the guilt associated with being involved.

Euphemistic language is a convenient device for masking reprehensible activities, such as torturing prisoners in the guise of ‘enhanced interrogation,’ or political kidnapping being called ‘extraordinary rendition’ and may even confer a respectable status on this conduct.’¹⁰ Euphemistic language should be called out for what it is, just as torturing a junior subordinate or peer for fun should be called torture and punished as such.

Racial or Gender Biases – ‘Advantageous Comparison’ and ‘Dehumanisation’

There are occasions when ADF personnel have done the wrong thing while deployed. Most of us will be aware of the Afghanistan Inquiry, but this is not the only case where Australians have committed unethical acts while overseas. However, in considering the need to hold our own people accountable, it is not uncommon to hear the excuse that our adversaries did worse things, which may be true but is also irrelevant. This is the moral disengagement mechanism of advantageous comparison. It is sometimes combined with attribution bias¹¹, e.g., ascribing more negative intentions or characteristics to those we regard as different to ourselves. When attribution bias is in play, the moral disengagement processes that follow are dehumanisation and blaming the victim.

By contrasting an evil act with an even more evil act, we are actively attempting to diminish the seriousness of doing purposeful harm ourselves. ‘The more outrageous the contrasted actions, the more likely it is that one’s own destructive conduct will appear trifling or even benevolent.’¹² Absolving ourselves of responsibility for purposeful harm does not diminish our guilt, it only diminishes our right to say we are good.

A more prevalent challenge for ADF personnel working in culturally diverse environments is dealing with attitudes towards the role of women. In some cases, ADF gender norms and local expectations do not align. Female ADF members attempting to be ‘heard’ in these contexts may face serious cultural and ethical dilemmas. The ADF does not tolerate discrimination on any grounds, but this is not the case in every context where we deploy. In order to be culturally respectful we may feel forced into treating our members in a discriminatory fashion, by denying them the opportunity to participate in an equivalent way to their peers. While this problem requires careful reflection and deep sensitivity, it should also be understood that seeing women in powerful roles being treated respectfully by their male colleagues is important in achieving Australia’s goals in any environment we operate in.

Support of unethical regimes – ‘Displacement’ and ‘Diffusion of Responsibility’

There is probably no more difficult moral dilemma for ADF personnel than working with foreign governments, warlords or militaries where ethically questionable behaviour is normalised. And yet, given the nature of conflict and war, this is more likely to be the situation than the reverse. While our own ethics doctrine makes it clear that we have a responsibility to act in accordance with Australian values and ethical principles, the difficulty is making this happen without becoming morally disengaged. Familiarity with ADF-P-0 Culture in the Profession of Arms¹³ (see Ch, 3, pp. 17-25) will assist readers in maintaining an openness to cultural differences. Even so, every ADF member needs to be forewarned and forearmed for the personal risk of moral disengagement in these settings.

There are at least three moral disengagement mechanisms that prevent taking action in this situation. One mechanism is termed displacement of responsibility, where ‘people view their actions as springing from the dictates of authorities rather than from their own personal responsibility.’’¹⁴ If we can convince ourselves that as the Australian Government, and our Defence hierarchy, approved of the operation, then we might also convince ourselves the occurrence of the ethically questionable behaviour is sanctioned and/or not our problem. Similarly, if we convince ourselves that as the behaviour is more common in the country we are operating in, we might also believe the behaviour isn’t, in fact, unethical, which diffuses our responsibility. Both of these mechanisms are moral justifications for doing nothing, and yet neither absolves us from the responsibility to try and do something.

By behaving in accordance with our own values and ethical standards we can at least avoid becoming complicit in the unethical behaviour of those around us. Moreover, recording and reporting behaviour that breaches our ethical standards helps keep our government informed of the situation on the ground. Any sanctioning of unethical acts by a partner military or host country could be grounds to end ADF involvement in a coalition arrangement. The reporting of such behaviour is important, both for the reputation of Australia and the moral and mental wellbeing of ADF personnel.

Attitudes to bribery and ‘Distorting Consequences’

Another common challenge working with foreign militaries and/or on deployment is the issue of bribery. Bribery is a relatively prevalent behaviour in many parts of the world, and often starts with the paying of small sums of money to ‘grease the wheel’ to make things easier. It can be a simple matter to distort the consequences of such behaviour when it appears that this is the way things are done around here. However, where there is pressure to achieve a mission in a short timeframe (‘can do’ attitude) bribery can result in a murky slide into corruption and abuse, with all manner of gifts and ‘services’ being provided, e.g., to get the ship refuelled quicker so as to pursue the mission. Bribery may seem harmless in the beginning, but engaging in it only makes us vulnerable to exploitation and moral drift.

As Bandura argues, ‘As long as the detrimental results of one’s conduct are ignored, minimized, distorted, or disbelieved, there is little reason for self-censure to be activated.’¹⁵ Further, the exchange of gifts is often viewed as a common aspect of developing and maintaining relationships¹⁶.

The ADF does not allow bribery, but does actively engage in programs for locals that support communities and build trusting relationships. These programs are not bribes, but they also ‘grease the wheel’ by providing valued assistance. ADF personnel are strongly encouraged to support these programs, and show a generosity of spirit towards local people as part of our overall mission. Building connections and trust is a more productive and equitable means of gaining the support of local people, and military partners, and does not require us to compromise our values.

Lack of common standards and ‘Displacement of Responsibility’

Issues associated with double standards and the abuse of power are common complaints raised by people on deployment. However, this problem often causes more angst between ADF units, where there is a belief that everyone should be treated the same, than between Australian and international contingents, and can involve almost any issue, including the wearing of uniform, work hours, the availability of alcohol, and different rules applying to different groups in apparently unfair ways. Because junior personnel are rarely privy to the reasons for double standards, it is often this group who feels most victimised by them.

Because authority is needed to permit a double standard, the moral disengagement process is not always clear to see. Perhaps there is a displacement of responsibility, a belief that because the unfairness has been sanctioned it is no longer an issue. However, the real issue in this scenario is not taking responsibility for an apparent injustice of a situation where people suffer as a result of higher level direction that is not challenged.

It is beyond this paper to attempt to address the hierarchical structure of the military itself, where rank and prestige do confer privileges unavailable to junior personnel. It is up to leaders of all ranks to ensure that double standards and abuse of power are minimised in all settings, to ensure ADF members, and especially junior personnel, do not feel mistreated and abused. We cannot harp on about low recruitment and high wastage if we create morally unsafe and unfair working environments.

Attitudes to subordinate wellbeing and ‘Dehumanisation’

As noted above, dehumanisation can be a mechanism used to justify inequality in the wellbeing of subordinate personnel. The idea that a subordinate is less entitled to our consideration and respect because they do a particular job, or have a certain status in our organisation is unacceptable under ADF values. Although there are different statuses conferred on different groups in Australia, in international contexts differences in status can be stark where there can sometimes be cruel behaviour directed at subordinates by superiors.

Before we judge others, it is important to remember Australia has its own terrible history in this regard. The treatment of junior Air Force personnel during the F-111 Deseal-Reseal program must always remind us of the importance of care as an ethical principle in the military. For 20 years, young men were knowingly¹⁷ exposed to toxic jet fuel and cancer causing sealants in their role as F-111 deseal-resealers, leading to long-term health problems and many premature deaths. While one might argue that the mission required it, it was the dehumanisation¹⁸ of this group of RAAF personnel that allowed it to continue.

It should also be recalled that the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide¹⁹ considered aspects of dehumanisation through ab initio training processes where recruits are ‘broken down’ to ‘build you up again’.

Attitudes to managing complaints and ‘Attribution of Blame’

It is fair to say the military has not always treated people who bring forward complaints, especially about abuse, unfairness or mistreatment, with much kindness. Complaining tends to be viewed as both disloyal and a sign of weakness, both of which go directly against the unspoken culture of the military. It was not uncommon in the past for people who complained to find themselves in a worse predicament than if they had said nothing at all.

Over the past 20 years, the military has worked hard to change this culture, and to encourage people to come forward about abusive behaviour in an effort to stop it. However, the tendency to blame the victim for their own mistreatment is still a common attitude. In situations where people have raised such complaints a number of moral disengagement mechanisms can operate at once. The abuse will be morally justified as just a normal part of military life, boys will be boys, the victim was lazy/selfish/overly sensitive, the perpetrators are good people, the abuse wasn’t all that bad, they are making a mountain out of a molehill, they behaved in some provocative way, and ultimately, they brought it on themselves.

Blaming the victim for their own abuse is about as unethical as it is possible to get, but it is common across society. The reality is, not all people who complain are perfect souls who gain immediate sympathy. Nevertheless, every person has a right to be treated with respect and an open mind, especially when they believe they have been abused. To rise above the avalanche of moral disengagement, people receiving complaints must imagine themselves in the shoes of the victim and practice empathy and sincerity. It is often the experience of callous disregard by those one expects will ‘care’ that entrenches the deepest wounds in the hearts of people who genuinely have been abused.²⁰

Avoiding Ethical Failures

The first step in avoiding the corrosive effects of moral disengagement is awareness. Just taking the time to read this paper will increase your awareness and provide a basis for disarming people who engage in unethical behaviour or turn a blind eye to it. Unlike those of us who joined the military a long time ago, ADF members now have access to the Ethos of the Profession of Arms doctrine, including, but not limited to, ADF-P-0 Military Ethics, and the Australian Defence Force Ethical Decision-making Framework (ADF EDM). ²¹ Moreover, ADF members are encouraged to discuss their views on ethical issues with peers, superiors and subordinates to check how they feel about ethically confusing situations. It only takes one person to raise an issue to create an environment for positive ethical change.

When making ethical decisions, most people rely on personal experience and general knowledge of a situation to decide what to do. While some people are good at looking at problems with objectivity and emotional detachment, some are not. Having a framework that prompts us to consider ethical risks acts as a bulwark against moral disengagement. The ADF EDM asks us to stop and reflect on the ethically challenging decision we are making. Just slowing down your thinking is an important step towards making the right decision. Slow thinking allows us to consider if we are responding to the situation or something we believe about the situation. Checking our thoughts and opinions for bias, or elements of moral disengagement also helps prevent ethical failure. Indeed, while the model provides individual guidance there is nothing to prevent decision-makers from discussing their concerns with mentors, subordinates, peers and superiors to enhance their perspective. The best solutions may stem from the hive brain where collaborative solutions are found.

Making Ethical Decisions when Deployed

Serving in Coalition environments presents numerous challenges, not least accommodating different cultural practices. Not all nation’s militaries treat their people the same way as we do here in Australia, and as discussed earlier in this paper, this can be very troubling for ADF personnel. The most important point to take away is, regardless of the differences we observe, we have an obligation to stand by our own ethical standards and not turn a blind eye or adopt practices that lower those standards – as per the following quote from ADF-P-0 Military Ethics:

The ADF acknowledges that others may have alternative perspectives to our approach to ethics. Allied partners, host nations and adversary forces are likely to have different approaches to ethics. As members of the ADF we respect that they hold different beliefs, but act in accordance with our own. ²²

Conclusion

The Australian public expect the ADF to operate in a manner which aligns with Australian values, including the ethical, legal, and strategic considerations of the Profession of Arms. Where members of the ADF behave contrary to our doctrine it reduces the credibility of the ADF as a ‘just’ military and a ‘force for good’. This demands more than just adhering to international humanitarian law, it requires us to set a high standard of ethical conduct in every engagement we undertake. There will be times when ADF personnel are faced with challenging circumstances that test our ability to remain ethically grounded, nevertheless, there is no excuse for allowing our standards to slip.

This paper set out to consider the utility of philosophical doctrine, in particular ADF-P-0 Military Ethics, for ADF personnel on deployed operations and to highlight the danger in becoming morally disengaged from the situation or the people. By looking more deeply at moral disengagement as a specific risk for ethical drift and failure, it is hoped readers will feel forewarned and forearmed in operational situations, and in garrison. The authors acknowledge, there are no easy answers when it comes to ethical dilemmas, and making ethical decisions, especially under the pressure of operational demands, is not a simple task. However, by taking steps to slow down your thinking, checking yourself for bias and moral disengagement, considering your own personal values and the values of the ADF, and checking in with the ADF EDM; it may be easier to make decisions you can live with.

Footnotes

¹ ADF-P-0 Military Ethics, p. 19 Pages - ADF Doctrine Library

² Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press, Stanford: California.

³ ibid.

⁴ Ibid p. 83.

⁵ Bandura, A. (1990). Selective activation and disengagement of moral control. Journal of Social Issues, 40/1, 27-46.

⁶ Bandura, Albert. 1990. Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control. in Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 46 No. 1. 1990. pp. 27-46

⁷ Normalised deviance is the gradual process through which unacceptable practice or standards become acceptable. Vaughan, D. (1997). The Challenger Launch Decision. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.

⁸ ADF-P-0 Military Ethics, p. 40 ADF Philosophical Doctrine - Military Ethics | Future Forge

⁹ The authors of this paper collectively hold over 60 years experience serving full-time in the ADF. It is this experience which informs our work at the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics where we often hear stories from current ADF members of ethical challenges they have faced.

¹⁰ Bandura, p 31

¹¹ To learn more about unconscious cognitive processes and bias see Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking Fast and Slow. Allen Lane, Penguin Books, Australia

¹² Ibid. pp 32-33

¹³ ADF-P-0 Culture in the Profession of Arms, p. 17-25 ADF Philosophical Doctrine - Military Ethics | Future Forge

¹⁴ Bandura, Albert. 1990. Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control. in Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 46 No. 1. 1990. pp. 27-46 p. 34 - note that Bandura uses the term displaced rather than diffused in this article.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 37

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 49 paragraphs 5.52 – 5.54 indicates how judgement is required in giving and receiving gifts.

¹⁷ The dangerousness of contact with petroleum based fuels was known and reported from as far back as the 1920s – see Huff, J. (2007). Benzene-induced cancers: Abridged history and occupational health impact. International Journal of Occupational Environmental Health, 13/2, 213-221.

¹⁸ RAAF personnel who worked on the program were called ‘the goop troop’ and were shunned by others due to the offensive odour of chemicals on their overalls.

¹⁹ Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide – Final Report, accessed at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Tabled_Documents/7262 on 27 Aug 2025 para 214.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 41

²¹ Ibid. p. 27

²² Ibid. p. 19

Cite Article

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Footnote

RIS

(Brown and Goyne, 2026)

Brown, C. and Goyne, A. 2026. 'Applied Ethics – Considerations for ADF Personnel'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/applied-ethics-considerations-adf-personnel (Accessed: 05 November 2026).

(Brown & Goyne, 2026)

Brown, C. & Goyne, A. 2026. 'Applied Ethics – Considerations for ADF Personnel'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/applied-ethics-considerations-adf-personnel (Accessed: 05 November 2026).

Callum Brown and Anne Goyne, "Applied Ethics – Considerations for ADF Personnel", The Forge, Published: November 03, 2026, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/applied-ethics-considerations-adf-personnel. (accessed November 05, 2026).

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Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Social Mastery

Conceptual Frameworks Defence Values social-ethics-level1

Ethical Philosophies social-ethics-level2

Resilient Moral Identity social-character-level1

Trust Development Through Consistency social-character-level2

Culture Alignment social-culture-level1

Diversity Appreciation social-culture-level2

Biography

Anne Goyne

CDLE

Anne Goyne the Senior Psychologist and Deputy Director Research at the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics (CDLE) at the Australian Defence College (ADC)

Biography

Callum Brown

GPCAPT

GPCAPT Brown is a now a Reserve officer who serves in the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College. Numerous postings throughout his career in the Permanent Air Force have necessitated the supervision and management of contracts. His interests are organisational culture, human behaviours, leadership, and ethics.