Introduction

The evolution of military operations from a domain perspective has been through several iterations throughout history. During the First World War, Airpower introduced a new domain of conflict that required coordination with the other domains to maximise effects.^[1] More recently, the importance of satellite and cyber technologies in support of military operations led to these environments becoming formally recognised as domains.^[2] Moreover, the space domain is becoming increasingly competitive, and both offensive and defensive cyber operations are likely to occur long before kinetic hostilities begin. Indeed, actions in these domains occur daily under the guise of grey zone operations.^[3] Accordingly, the complexity surrounding all five domains, their strengths and weaknesses, and how capabilities complement across domains continues to challenge Commanders and Operators who seek to utilise all-domain operations most efficiently and effectively.^[4]

Historically, the United States and Allies have been capable of countering threats by having a technological ‘edge’ over their competition.^[5] Indeed with the combination of a technological edge along with mass in the form of military platforms and personnel, the United States has remained hegemonic. On the other hand, Australia does not have the mass of military platforms and personnel; and with the United States remaining Australia’s principal ally, platform interoperability is crucial.^[6] However, as adversaries acquire advanced technologies and the technological ‘edge’ becomes less pronounced, the search for even more complex and capable systems and platforms has become as much of a weakness as a strength. Accordingly, the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP) and Defence Strategic Update (DSU) outline system and platform acquisitions in response to the changing strategic environment. However, within the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the challenge of how these systems and platforms interact to produce a cohesive, lethal, and protected joint warfighting capability across all domains will require a significant cultural shift, specifically regarding capability development and system design.^[7]

This paper argues that the ADF requires network-driven system design to maximise the effects of platforms and capabilities across all domains. System design through platform or Service is a relic of the past. First, this paper will define key terms and evaluate how the ADF has historically completed system design and acquisition. The section will also outline the weakness of Service or platform system design and how the ADF structure can support network-driven system design. Then it will evaluate how a multi-layered network design will enable the ADF to realise a true data-centric all-domain kill-web capability in a contested environment. It is acknowledged that data-centric, all-domain operations must support the full spectrum of military operations; however, this problem set is too significant to attack in this paper. Accordingly, it will address system design and networks utilised at the tactical and operational levels that provide target data for prosecution during a high-end conflict.

ADF System Design and Acquisition

It is essential to understand relevant terminology before discussing the organisation of military violence in a data-centric all-domain kill-web environment. The Australian Military Power doctrine defines all-domain as incorporating ‘every agency, department or Service into a single cohesive network… designed to enable decisions to be made within minutes, rather than hours, at the speed required to compete with an adaptive advanced adversary’.^[8] Although the doctrine acknowledges that all-domain operations are an aspiration, this vision supports the argument that single domain operations are inadequate against a peer threat. Furthermore, coordinated operations through all-domains present ‘multiple dilemmas for an adversary at an operational tempo they cannot match’.^[9]

For an organisation to be data-centric, data must remain the primary asset through which the implementation of a system architecture can support all-domain operations. Supporting this notion, the definition of data-centric is a ‘data model [that] precedes the implementation of any given application and will be around and valid long after it is gone’.^[10] In contrast, the ADF has historically acquired capabilities and platforms as individual systems. These individual systems make the ADF a data-driven organisation, whereby there is little to no attempt to harmonise the data derived from systems, and the organisation remains reliant on ‘middleware that periodically schleps data from one database [capability or platform] to another’.^[11] Importantly, the ADF data-driven vis data-centric philosophy toward system design is extremely difficult to change once implemented, requiring ‘makeshift’ upgrades and increasing program/project risk, cost and timeline for implementation.  

Kill-webs employ an adaptable warfare construct providing ‘a decision aid for mission commanders to assist them with rapidly identifying and selecting options for tasking – and retasking – assets within and across organisational boundaries’.^[12] Therefore, a kill-web enables the selection of the best resource or service across all domains to deliver the desired effect while providing ‘a way to compare them rapidly and select the “best” option’.^[13] Additionally, kill-web options provide resilience, security, and data assurance for the joint force while remaining unpredictable to the adversary, a concept understood by Australia, its Allies, and potential adversaries such as China.^[14] However, like all-domain operations, kill-webs remain an aspiration for the ADF, which currently relies on multiple kill-chains with pre-defined data exchanges between platforms or capabilities, which, at best, can be classified as cross-domain.

The Weakness of Service and platform driven design

Recent changes to the ADF structure could enable a transition from an organisation that acquires platform-centric capabilities through Service and platform system design to a network driven capability development process. However, there are several contributing factors and weaknesses as to why, although being a joint force since 1975, the ADF will not realise a data-centric, all-domain kill-web architecture without changing to a network driven system design.^[15] The first contributing factor is the maturity of organisations within the ADF tasked with joint force design and joint force integration. Until the creation of the ADF Headquarters (ADFHQ) and the Joint Capabilities Group (JCG) in 2017, there was little priority or oversight across the Organisation regarding all-domain operations.^[16] With the creation of the ADFHQ Joint Force Design and Joint Force Integration divisions and the Joint Command and Control division within JCG, the ADF is foundationally built to direct a network driven capability development process. However, given the relative immaturity of these divisions from a time perspective, currently deployed systems and capabilities originally built through Service or platform system design will be challenging to impact throughout their sustainment lifecycles.

The second contributing factor and weakness is that the ADF is a data driven fighting force, not a data-centric fighting force. Like the strategic organisation tasked with force design and force integration, the Defence Data Strategy is in its infancy and ‘data requirements are often not considered in the initial design and development of capability’.^[17] Moreover, data has only recently been included under Command and Management as a Fundamental Input to Capability (FIC).^[18] Additionally, although the current data environment is fragmented, there has been insufficient strategic direction leading up to the release of the Defence Data Strategy surrounding the importance of data within network design. Consequently, the ADF has historically completed system design within Service and platform ‘stovepipes’ that require retrofitting, creating additional risk and cost to projects/programs.

Due to a lack of strategic oversight towards joint design and integration, the ADF currently relies on multiple kill-chains that are data driven and only cross-domain in nature. More concerning is that Service and platform driven system design requires ‘a buffering system or median that can take various data inputs and convert them into an interface understood by all weapon systems and sensors’.^[19] However, poor translation and/or truncation of data through the conversion process occurs far too often and renders the data unusable. For example, the Royal Australian Air Force fields capabilities centred around utilising the Link 16 tactical datalink. The Royal Australian Navy, who also utilises Link 16, has fielded bespoke kill-chain architectures such as Hawklink on the MH-60R helicopter and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) on the Hobart Class Destroyers but not on other ships. The Australian Army currently employs the Tiger helicopter, a capability that does not have a built-in digital kill-chain architecture that communicates with other capabilities. Finally, the Australian Army’s understanding of the importance of all-domain operations and datalinks is well behind timeline, as proven by the Army Digitisation program, which is still not complete after fifteen years.^[20]

The strength of the ADF successfully organising the application of military violence in a data-centric all-domain kill-web environment is resident within the current ADF structure. The weaknesses can be summarised around the notion of time. The structure is immature and requires an entirely new holistic view of system design and capability development to be prepared to wage conflict in a deteriorating strategic environment.^[21] The goal looks similar to a United States Department of Defence concept called Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The objective of JADC2 is to produce a ‘warfighting capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels and phases of war, across all domains, and with partners, to deliver information advantage at the speed of relevance’.^[22] Although many believe that ‘a seamless web across domains, services, and legacy and new systems remains an aspiration, not a reality’, the ADF is well positioned and, in consultation with the United States, could research and develop the network design architecture required to realise the objectives of JADC2.^[23] Based on experience gained from multiple theatres and positions over more than ten years, a multi-layered network design is recommended to meet this objective.

Multi-Layered Network Design

Multi-layered network design is how the ADF will realise a true data-centric all-domain kill-web capability in a contested environment. Supporting the kill-web definition provided earlier, a multi-layered network must remain dynamic and adaptive where ‘flexible distributed killing network[s] and optimal killing channel[s] are formed’ to quickly and effectively prosecute dynamic threats.^[24] Major General Daniel Leaf described these high-quality data networks as ‘an exquisite efficiency’ and a central tenet of the compression of the kill chain, which has now expanded into the concept of the kill-web.^[25] The expansion of kill chains to kill-webs supports the premise that the limitations of individual platforms do not limit the force but that, more importantly, they make up one system in a system of systems approach. Kill-webs should be built from robust and reconfigurable networks enabling the prosecution of any target from a shooter with an appropriate weapon that can be re-targeted if required.^[26] Moreover, the most significant advantages that kill-webs provide, in addition to efficiency, are speed and manoeuvre by utilising asymmetric capabilities to deteriorate the adversary’s situational awareness.^[27] Thus, by remaining operationally and tactically unpredictable, the kill-web creates challenges and confusion within the adversary’s OODA loop, a concept first hypothesised by John Boyd.^[28]

Current ADF Construct

Link 16 is the only tactical datalink network that the ADF currently utilises which broadly supports all-domain kill-web operations. However, Link 16 is susceptible to adversary attack, which impacts the ADF's ability to remain operationally and tactically unpredictable.^[29] As discussed, the root cause of this lack of resilience stems from the ADF historically completing system design through Service or platform requirements. Developed in the 1970s, Link 16 is employed across a vast number of platforms worldwide and does meet most requirements of a kill-web.^[30] However, there are several concerns surrounding the ability of Link 16 to support such high demand for information transmission and assurance, especially from fifth-generation air platforms such as the F-35.^[31] Additionally, Link 16 networks are not flexible or dynamic and, once built, are rigid in their design and information exchange requirements. Finally, Link 16 operates in the 960-1215MHz frequency band, and although jam-resistant, it is susceptible to attack or jamming due to its reasonably small bandwidth.

Other datalink networks within the ADF that could support all-domain kill-web operations include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and the Multifunction Advanced Datalink (MADL); however, these networks are only fielded on the Hobart Class Destroyer and the F-35 respectively.^[32] Additionally, although the RAAF and RAN have been utilising Link 16 for several years, the Australian Army has very few Link 16 capabilities or platforms. Therefore, within the ADF, the networks that support the tactical prosecution of threats are decentralised, utilising Link 16 as the only all-domain kill-web network that is neither robust, dynamic, nor adaptable. To build resilience and assurance against a peer adversary, the ADF must create an all-domain kill-web that remains unpredictable and fielded across the force.

Proposed Future Construct

Enhancing all-domain kill-web resilience while supporting data-centric assurance can only be achieved by increasing the number and diversity of the means of transport across a larger span of the electromagnetic spectrum.^[33] In the future, the force will require networks that operate on much higher frequencies to support the increasingly large amount of data required to be transmitted.^[34] Additionally, by providing alternative solutions not in the same frequency band, the layered network construct provides asymmetric opportunities, creating challenges and confusion for the adversary. An analogy this author utilises draws from the film Monty Python and the Holy Grail and a scene when King Arthur is fighting a Knight protecting a bridge. King Arthur chops off one of the Knight’s arms, but the Knight continues to fight using his other arm. Then King Arthur chops off the Knight’s other arm, so the Knight starts using his legs to fight, and so the story continues. The importance of a layered network design is that if the force only has one kill-web network, then the force only has one limb to utilise in a fight. Therefore, the ADF must invest in network technologies to build resilience in the kill-web such as the Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) and future networks that utilise laser capabilities with characteristics like Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) and Low Probability of Exploitation (LPE).^[35] Ultimately, this layered network must deliver multiple redundant paths across a wider span of the electromagnetic spectrum that instantly and accurately delivers information.

Along with a layered network design, select ADF forces must understand the electromagnetic spectrum, how the force is utilising its wide range of networks, and how the adversary is attempting to disturb or deny the spectrum. The ability to monitor and assess the electromagnetic spectrum is severely lacking, not only within the ADF but across militaries more widely. A study into the Chinese Intelligent Radar Detection Network (IRDN) highlights that ‘intelligent analysis of big data generated by IRDN are conducted to achieve real-time response, dynamic adjustment and rapid decision-making’.^[36] The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) states that ‘advanced algorithms, software and human-machine interfaces are needed to help operators manage the scale and complexity of operations in near-peer contested environments’.^[37] Turning back to the Monty Python and the Holy Grail analogy, it follows that it is not enough to have multiple networks, but the force must know that one arm (network) is missing to decide to use the other arm (a different network). At the core of this debate are data assurance requirements and what the Defence Data Strategy 2021-2023 highlights as the ability to rate data quality against gold, silver, and bronze standards ‘so that our people know the reliability of the data they are using’.^[38] Ultimately, the goal should be to enable the transition from one network to the other while remaining transparent to the capability or platform prosecuting the threat.

Challenges

The realisation of a multi-layered network architecture that supports all-domain kill-webs has challenges concerning information security, approvals, and the cultural shift towards network design. Some capabilities within the cyber and space domains operate at classification levels above collateral, require long planning timelines, and hold capability approval authorities at very high levels.^[39] However, the security and approvals challenge is not unique to the space and cyber domains and includes tactical domain assets, including special access programs, whereby information protection is paramount.^[40] The risk of distributing highly classified information across networks could be mitigated through the rigorous capability development process utilising a network design approach whereby security mechanisms can be put in place much earlier during the project/program lifecycle. Ultimately, to maintain the advantages provided by such platforms, sacrifices to LPI and LPE cannot be accepted to maintain commonality and integration.^[41] The second challenge revolves around the cultural change required within the ADF to not just look at the project lifecycle but, more importantly, the required data assurance. To realise the vision within the Australian Military Power doctrine, the ADF must mature from its data-driven, cross-domain, kill-chain mentality to a culture that seeks to obtain data-centric, all-domain kill-webs. This risk can be mitigated through communication and direction from the ADFHQ through the Services and project/program teams. Consequently, and in an era of strategic uncertainty, the ADFHQ must implement this transformational change quickly.^[42]

Conclusion

A data-centric all-domain kill-web is required to support military operations during high-end conflict against peer adversaries. In order to realise this capability, ADF system design and acquisition through platform or Service must move toward network-driven system design, and the ADFHQ must take the lead role in implementation. The establishment of the ADFHQ and JCG set the foundation to ensure that system design and acquisition closely align with Government requirements outlined in the 2020 DSU and FSP; however, the organisations have not yet matured enough to impact acquisition timelines in an environment with little strategic warning.^[43] A network-driven design approach to a layered network system accompanied by situational awareness of the electromagnetic spectrum is the backbone of the ADF realising a data-centric all-domain kill-web.

The basis of this layered network system is the ability to synchronise and maximise the impact of both lethal and non-lethal military effects across and from all domains to meet military and strategic objectives.^[44] The ADF must act quickly and remain in lockstep with Allies, particularly the United States, through the JADC2 concept because, as a much smaller and refined military force, the ADF could provide the JADC2 concept with some significant benefits. To achieve this goal, the ADF must ensure that system design and capability acquisition is being looked at from a network perspective and built on the premise of network design and security. A layered network philosophy supported by spectrum analysis and management that supports data assurance, not just data distribution, would achieve the aim; however, based on complexity, it ‘must be tended to carefully if it is to achieve its objectives’.^[45]

Disclaimer

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

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