Introduction
The German Blitzkrieg of 1940 is one of the great examples of modern military campaigning. The overwhelming speed and force of the German offensive meant that after six weeks of fighting, the Germans had decimated the French, British, Dutch, and Belgian armies, rendering them ineffective.[1] To achieve this success, the Germans had meticulously planned the campaign where the tactical actions (ways) were well-resourced (means) to support strategic objectives (ends).[2] Campaign planning is the doctrinal process developed to translate strategy into operational concepts. ADF doctrine defines a campaign as “a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.”[3] To assist planners in determining the “tempo of activities in space and time”, the ADF doctrine outlines eight elements of a military campaign—risk, culminating point, operational reach, sequencing, phasing, main effort and supporting efforts, branches and sequels, and assessment.[4] These elements ensure “that the effects, decisive actions and objectives are appropriately sequenced to enable the progress towards the end state.”[5]
On 24 February 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin announced as a “special military operation.”[6] The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces was a significant escalation of ongoing tension and conflict between the two countries. This essay will evaluate three elements of military campaign planning against Putin’s strategic objectives. Noting the Russia-Ukraine War is still ongoing, an assessment of ‘success’ will not be made; instead, Russian-Ukraine War campaigns conducted between 24 February 2022 to September 2022 (Ukraine retakes 2400 square miles, including the city of Kharkiv) will be used to evaluate military campaign planning effectiveness[7]. This essay is in three parts; first, it evaluates risk as an element of military campaign planning; second, it evaluates operational reach as an element of military campaigns; and third, it evaluates branches and sequels as an element of military campaigns.
Before evaluating the military campaign of either the Russian Federation Armed Forces or the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the 2022 phase of the Russia-Ukraine War, it is valuable to understand what a military campaign is and what it will be evaluated against. According to the ADF, a military campaign “is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area.”[8] What is significant about this definition is that the success of a military campaign should be measured by how effective the military campaign was in achieving the government’s strategic objectives. So what are Russia’s strategic objectives? Putin has offered up all manner of reasons for his invasion of Ukraine. At various times, Putin has blamed the war on everything from NATO expansionism to the rise of Nazism within Ukraine, from Western plots to invade Russia to Ukrainian nuclear weapons. One common grand strategic thread seems to appear in most academic writings on the Russian-Ukraine War: Putin’s endeavour to reestablish Imperial Russia and create a buffer between Western democratic nations and itself. The Russia-Ukraine War has undergone two distinct phases, each with strategic objectives to facilitate Putin’s grand strategy. The first phase ran from February to April 2022 and had several strategic objectives, including political alignment of Ukraine with Russia, neutralising Ukraine’s military power, recognition of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and the integration of Ukraine, economically and culturally into the Eurasian Economic Union.[9] The second phase ran from April to June 2022 and had several strategic objectives, including recognising LPR and DPR as separate nation-states, recognising the Russian sovereignty of annexed states, and neutralising Ukrainian military power. The following sections will evaluate three elements of military campaigning—risk, operational reach and branches and sequels, in achieving Russia’s strategic objectives.
Risk
Every activity comes with a certain level of risk, and not all risk is bad. Someone may trip and break their neck getting out of bed in the morning—that does not mean people should stay in bed all day. Staying in bed all day comes with the possibility of unanticipated consequences, such as bed sores and muscle atrophy. Taking risks can have a positive side, such as helping an individual or organisation learn, it can be exciting and, when well-considered, can provide an edge. Even Clausewitz understood the importance of effective risk management in military campaign planning, citing, “Danger is part of the friction of war. Without an accurate conception of danger, we cannot understand war.”[10] Arguably, assessing risk is the most challenging step in the military campaigning planning process. Military planners need to link military ways (the campaign) to achieve political ends (strategic objective) using the resources (means) available to them. This process needs to consider the possible risks to be effective.[11] The ADF-P-5 Planning doctrine defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”[12] Viewing through the lens of military campaign planning, risk could be defined as the likelihood of an unintended action occurring. One way military campaign planners try to reduce the fog of war and account for all possible risks is through war gaming conducted as part of Course of Action (COA) Analysis conducted as part of the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP). War gaming simulates the proposed campaign and answers the ‘What if’ question. War gaming aims to enhance the friendly force, identify new enemy vulnerabilities, “further define the threats and hazards, expand on mitigation strategies, and articulate the residual risks remaining.”[13] Russia has demonstrated what can occur when military planners do not adequately consider risk as part of the campaign plan.
Like the 1940 German Blitzkrieg, Russia expected that, through speed and force, it would successfully achieve two of its phase one strategic objectives (political alignment of Ukraine with Russia and neutralising Ukraine’s military power) by capturing Kyiv and implementing a new puppet government. It assumed that Ukrainian forces would flee at the sight of the invading Russian force—this was far from the truth. The Russians made several key assumptions that incorrectly shaped their risk profile before the war’s commencement, alluding to campaign success and managing key risks. However, some crucial assessments and estimations quickly proved incorrect or entirely insufficient.[14] Firstly, the lack of international response to Russia amassing troops near the Ukrainian border with little or no backlash.[15] The second was the belief that Ukraine would capitulate and Europe not intervene due to its heavy reliance on Russian gas, oil and coal resources.[16] Whilst energy prices have risen in Europe, Putin’s risk assumptions have not been as anticipated. Europe’s reliance on Russian gas has dropped from 40 per cent to 9 per cent in just a few months, and its winter gas supplies are already at 84 per cent.[17] Even if some areas of Europe face energy challenges, they are unlikely to present a significant political impact. COA Analysis, through war gaming, should have answered the ‘So What’ and the ‘what if’ questions. What if Ukraine does not capitulate? So what if Europe finds alternate sources of oil and gas? Another example of Russia’s inability to identify risk occurred on 04 July 2022, when Sweden and Finland applied for NATO membership. One of Putin’s grand strategic goals was to build a NATO buffer. As a result of the invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and Finland felt compelled to apply for NATO membership.[18] Having operational end states aligned with the strategic objectives that are considerate of risk could have identified this eventuality. Including an operational end state such as ‘safeguard against any further NATO expansion’ during the Scoping and Framing step of campaign planning, coupled with robust war gaming during COA Analysis, may have prevented this risk from being realised. Understanding the ends, ways and means during a campaign plan is not enough. To achieve strategic objectives, planners must understand each element of the military campaign’s cost versus benefit (risk). During the period examined, Russia could not achieve all its strategic objectives as the risk was not adequately considered during campaign planning.
Operational Reach
A robust sustainment system promotes flexibility of movement, increases operating range, prolongs endurance, and keeps the capacity to respond skilfully to the unexpected. Operational reach is “the distance and duration across which a force element can successfully employ its military capabilities”, providing the Commander with increased freedom of manoeuvre. [19] The geography and distance that separates the two belligerents have an impact on operational reach. Military campaign planners can increase operational reach by advancing forces, bases, and supplies, enhancing weapon system capabilities, efficiently using transportation networks, and creating effective lines of communication. The limit of a force’s operational reach is its culminating point. [20] When an assaulting force’s fighting power is equal to or less than the defending force’s, or when the offensive momentum is no longer maintainable, the offensive reaches its culminating point. A historical example of a campaign that reaches its culmination point due to operational reach is the invasion of Egypt.
Due to their requirement for resources with set characteristics or availability, certain COA may be constrained in their capacity to act and be agile. The invasion of Egypt by Rommel in 1942, which culminated in the battle of El Alamein in late June, illustrates a force extending beyond its operational reach. Rommel’s logistical supply chain’s inability to supply fuel, his army’s exhaustion after nearly five weeks of continuous fighting, high attritional losses and extensive lines of communication stretching over 2,000 kilometres were among the contributing factors. In comparison, the British lines of communication extended approximately 150 kilometres. [21] To limit operational reach, logistical limitations in terms of restraints and restrictions must be considered during Mission Analysis. The operation must consider immutable physical constraints in addition to the number of tanks or infantry companies needed, such as weather patterns, aircraft payload and range, land transportation networks, runway pavement classifications, repair capabilities, or the availability of commercial sealift. [22] Operating beyond the culmination point, the operation risks overextending, becoming exposed, and potentially facing defeat. The size of the area of operations, the distances that must be travelled, long and fragile communication links, dispersing a force across a large area, geography, weather, pace of the operation, and fatigue can restrict the operational reach. Increasing operational reach and preventing force elements from reaching their culminating point can be accomplished by phasing, adjusting the tempo, employing operational pauses, and limiting the campaign’s scope. [23] During the first two phases of the war, Russia demonstrated inadequate operational reach when evaluated against its strategic objectives.
Given its vast area, Russia relies heavily on its rail network to support domestic military operations and campaigns abroad. Delivering food, water, fuel and ammunition to force elements is crucial in mobile offensive combined arms operations. The tyranny of distance only compounds this issue as lines of communication are stretched. Ukraine military campaign planners had identified the Russian rail network as one of Russia’s critical vulnerabilities and destroyed several rail lines early in the campaign. Russia relied on trucks to move its logistic supplies around the battlespace without a rail network. [24] To sustain all of its combined arms armies, Russia lacked the necessary number of logistical brigades, and these brigades lacked the vehicles necessary to distribute and stockpile the supplies required to support forces engaged in mobile operations. Without access to rail transportation, trucks carrying fuel, weapons, supplies, food, and other items clogged the highways. Russia’s capacity to logistically assist the invasion has proven to be woefully insufficient. Additionally, high rates of artillery fire meant that ammunition was prioritised over other supplies, such as food. This suggests that the military planning assumptions made by the Russians were incorrect. Russia’s inability to secure lines of communication significantly contributes to several tactical failures that have contributed to strategic objectives not being met as planned. As the Russian-Ukraine War is still ongoing, history will tell if Russia has overextended its operational reach resulting in key strategic objectives not being achieved. However, during the period examined, Russia’s failure to fully utilise a robust logistical network over long lines of communication has undoubtedly contributed to key operational end states not being achieved.
Branches and Sequels
The purpose of branches and sequels is to allow commanders to plan appropriately for ‘what if’ and ‘what next’ scenarios.[25] Branches are “an option at a commander’s decision point along a line of operation that allows the commander flexibility to anticipate decisive actions by deviating from, and returning to, that line of operation.”[26] Whilst a sequel is “an option at a commander’s decision point along a line of operation, initiated by a significant shift in direction, which identifies a new line of operation to achieve a revised or new objective.”[27] The importance of branches and sequels is that they enable operational commanders to quickly determine at a crucial moment whether to influence the operation to account for the friction of war and any unforeseen events. The Pacific Campaign of the Second World War demonstrates the effective use of branches and sequels.
The preparations for the landings in Leyte during the Pacific Campaign provide an excellent illustration of branches and sequels effectively employed in military campaigning. Following talks in Hawaii in July 1944 between General MacArthur (Southwest Pacific), Admiral Nimitz (Central Pacific), and President Roosevelt, the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued instructions for the authorised invasion of Leyte to start the liberation of the Philippines. The CJCS required the islands of Morotai and Yap to be occupied by 05 October 1944, followed by Mindanao by 15 November 1944. In order to offer land-based air support for the Leyte landings planned on 20 December 1944, these islands were designated as Decision Points (DPs). [28] The Japanese troops used these islands as air bases, and after their capture, offensive actions would weaken the Japanese aviation capabilities and lessen their impact on the final Leyte landings. Before the Leyte landing, Task Force (TF) 38 attacked Japanese air and ground objectives on Mindanao and the nearby Bonin Islands under Admiral Halsey’s command. After finding little to no resistance from the Japanese Air Force, Halsey advised Nimitz (and subsequently MacArthur) that the planned invasions of “Yap, Morotai, and Mindanao be cancelled as unnecessary, and that the troops which were to be used at these targets, as well as TF38 be made available to General MacArthur for an immediate seizure of Leyte.” [29] Consequently, the assault on Leyte was accelerated by eight weeks and significantly contributed to achieving the campaign’s strategic objectives.
Key Russian strategic objectives (political alignment with Russia and neutralising Ukraine’s military power) may not have been achieved during phases one and two of the Russian-Ukraine War due to the apparent lack of branches and sequels implemented during the campaign planning. The seizure of Kyiv and Homostel Airport were key operational end states to achieve political alignment with Russia and neutralise Ukraine’s military power. [30] The attack was linear and appeared to not account for the resolve of the Ukrainian forces or the international logistic support for the Ukraine campaign. During Mission Analysis, the Russians should have identified the risks (‘what if’ and ‘what next’ scenarios), the resources required and implemented branches and/or sequels within the lines of operation that could have accounted for different contingencies. [31] These lines of operation, including the branches and sequels, could then be war-gamed during COA Analysis to identify any residual risk. The apparent lack of branches and sequels may be a result of Putin and his military commanders being unwilling to delegate authority to their subordinate commanders. Putin’s dogmatic control over the Russian forces meant that Commanders could not make decisions that affected lines of operation and the operational flexibility that branches and sequels provide. Hardly surprising, given the images of Ukrainian farmers stealing Russian tanks. [32]
Conclusion
This essay has evaluated three military campaign planning elements—risk, operational reach and branches and sequels—against Russia’s strategic objectives during the initial stages of the Russia-Ukraine War. The evaluation identified that the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ ability to effectively execute military operations during its invasion of Ukraine between February 2022–June 2022 was sub-optimal, resulting in several strategic objectives (political alignment with Russia and neutralising Ukraine’s military power) were not achieved. The three elements that most contributed to the failure of strategic objectives were risk, operational reach and branches and sequels. The lack of risk management demonstrated by the Russians resulted in them making key assumptions about Ukraine’s willingness to fight and the response by the international community. Underestimating risk had a follow-on effect in Russia, over-extending their operational reach due to long lines of communication and sub-optimal logistic networks. Finally, an apparent lack of branches and sequels resulted in linear actions that could not react to operational changes. When conducted correctly, the JMAP allows planners to link strategic objectives with tactical operations, utilising all available resources while considering risk. Every activity comes with a certain level of risk, and not all risk is bad. Arguably, assessing risk is the most challenging step in military campaign planning. Russia has demonstrated what can occur when military planners do not adequately consider risk as part of the campaign plan. A robust logistic system promotes flexibility of movement, increases operating range, and prolongs endurance. Russia relies heavily on its rail network to support domestic military operations and campaigns abroad. Ukraine military planners identified this rail network as one of Russia’s critical vulnerabilities and destroyed several rail lines early in the campaign. Russia then had to rely on trucks to move its logistic supplies around the battlespace, consequently significantly hampering its operational reach and, ultimately, strategic objectives. The seizure of Kyiv and Homostel Airport were key operational end states to the strategic objectives—political alignment with Russia and neutralising Ukraine’s military power. The attack was linear and appeared to not account for the resolve of the Ukrainian forces or international logistic support in Ukraine. During the Mission Analysis step, the Russians should have identified the risks (‘what if’ and ‘what next’) and implemented branches or sequels within the lines of operation. The Russian-Ukraine War is not over, and Russia is still a global hegemony with vast resources. This essay does not presume the war’s outcome; instead, it evaluates elements of military campaign planning against Russian strategy across a small snapshot in time.
Disclaimer
This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.
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Footnotes
1 "History's Top 25 Greatest Campaigns," Paradox Forum, updated 30 August, 2004, accessed 20 October 2022, 2022,https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/threads/historys-top-25-greatest-campaigns.173029/.
2 Australian Defence Force, ADFP 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, 2 ed. (Canberra, ACT: Department Of Defence, 15 August, 2019), 1-3.
3 Australian Defence Force, ADF-P-5 - Planning, 1 ed. (Canberra, ACT: Department Of Defence, 2021), 126.
4 Force, ADF-P-5 - Planning, 55-56.
5 Force, ADF-P-5 - Planning, 55.
6 Kristen E Eichensehr, "Russia Invades Ukraine," American Journal of International Law 116, no. 3 (27 June 2022): 604, https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2022.26.
7https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/sep/12/russia-ukraine-war-zelenskiy-accuses-kremlin-of-terrorist-attacks-on-kharkiv-power-supply-live-updates
8 Australian Defence Force, ADF-P-3 - Campaigns and Operations, 2 ed. (Canberra, ACT: Department Of Defence, 27 September, 2021), 4.
9 Commonwealth of Australia, "An Operational Overview of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine February-June 2022," Spotlight Brief 2 (2022): 10.
10 Carl Von Clausewitz, ed., On war (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 114; Walter Anthony Grady, JR, The Moral Domain of War: A View from the Cockpit, Air University (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, May 1993), 11-12, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/27/2001861440/-1/-1/0/T_0001_GRADY_MORAL_DOMAIN_WAR.PDF.
11 Force, ADF-P-5 - Planning, 14.
12 Force, ADF-P-5 - Planning, 39.
13 Force, ADFP 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, 5-4.
14 Kalev Stoicescu, "Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions," (27 May 2022): 1, https://icds.ee/en/russias-war-in-ukraine-the-kremlins-aims-and-assumptions/.
15 Eichensehr, "Russia Invades Ukraine," 596.
16 Stoicescu, "Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions," 2.
17 Carl Bildt, "Winter is coming, and Putin is failing," The Strategist (21 September 2022): 2, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/winter-is-coming-and-putin-is-failing/.
18 Henri Vanhanen, "Finland and NATO: When Push Came to ShoveHenri Vanhanen," RUSI Journal (24 May 2022), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/finland-and-nato-when-push-came-shove.
19 William J Parker III, Basing and Operational Reach, Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 September 2012), ii; Force, ADFP 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, VIII.
20 Force, ADFP 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, 4-13.
21 Force, ADF-P-3 - Campaigns and Operations, 108.
22 Force, ADFP 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, 4-13.
23 Force, ADF-P-3 - Campaigns and Operations, 102-04.
24 Australia, "An Operational Overview of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine February-June 2022," 36.
25 Steve Pritchard, The Doctrinal Inflexibility Afforded a Branch: How to Break the Paradigm from Risk Avoidance to Opportunity Exploitation, Joint Maritime Operations, Naval War College (Newport, RI, 04 May 2009), 1.
26 Force, ADF-P-5 - Planning, 63.
27 Force, ADF-P-5 - Planning, 63.
28 Pritchard, The Doctrinal Inflexibility Afforded a Branch: How to Break the Paradigm from Risk Avoidance to Opportunity Exploitation, 8-10.
29 Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 12, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 11; Pritchard, The Doctrinal Inflexibility Afforded a Branch: How to Break the Paradigm from Risk Avoidance to Opportunity Exploitation, 9.
30 Australia, "An Operational Overview of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine February-June 2022," 3-4.
31 Force, ADFP 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, 4-10.
32 Austin Wright, "Why Russia Keeps Losing Generals," (20 July 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/20/why-russia-keeps-losing-generals-ukraine/.
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