Introduction

The Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) is the ADF’s primary planning and decision-making tool for domestic and international exercises and operations. Whilst the Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1 – Joint Military Appreciation Process (ADFP 5.0.1) is uniquely Australian, the doctrinal planning process closely aligns with many other Western nations.^[1] JMAP’s similarities promote international interoperability and efficiencies when planning alongside allied nations. Ultimately, the JMAP guides planning teams to “translate higher command’s intent and desired end state into concrete mission, tasks, objectives, and lines of operation,”^[2] in a sequential and rational way. It has proven to be a highly effective tool, contributing to the successful achievement of various mission outcomes and effects across a wide range of mostly traditional-style military campaigns.^[3]

The 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) provided broad strategic guidance that shifted the ADF’s focus towards a more competitive model.^[4] This new strategic guidance directs ADF planners to tackle less traditional scenarios, requiring them to adapt to any number of military activities contained within the spectrum of competition. This includes everything from civil-military cooperation and political leader engagements to military deception and destruction tasks.^[5] As a result, planners must now continually formulate and execute appropriate military responses to an ever-changing and highly complex environment. These complex adaptive systems present a real challenge to ADF planners who continue to rely heavily on the highly linear JMAP planning tool.

This article evaluates the principal strengths and weaknesses of the ADF’s Joint Military Appreciation Process when used in the planning and execution of operations against complex adaptive systems. Firstly it emphasises some of the key strengths of the JMAP, highlighting the way that interoperability with partner organisations creates efficiencies when working in multiagency or international planning teams. Additional strengths that are explored include the many benefits of the framing phase when applied to complex adaptive systems, the ease of teaching a linear process to new planners, and the way the process is highly adaptable to those who understand JMAP in depth. It then reveals some of the key weaknesses of the JMAP, including the way that its linear nature makes it less adaptable to complex adaptive systems than other systems thinking models. Weaknesses also include how JMAP limits information flow up and down, and how its phased approach blocks natural human intuition by driving a clunky process-driven procedure. The final section presents two plausible solutions for the ADF to best combat deficiencies within the JMAP system. It proposes that the ADF could either scrap the JMAP process altogether and move to an existing and more suitable framework for complex adaptive systems, or continue to use the JMAP in conjunction with these more adaptive reiterative systems.

Strengths

The greatest strength of the JMAP is that it creates a formally agreed framework that aligns large joint and combined planning teams with a common doctrinal sequence of events. ADFP 5.0.1 provides a common planning doctrine for everyone, taking a step-by-step approach that defines the way each person can contribute with their subject matter knowledge and relevant information to the larger planning process.^[6] The ADF has been credited with being “the first to publish a comprehensive analysis of the new conflict environment and its implications,”^[7] and many of the major JMAP principles have been subsequently adopted by many Australian emergency services planning teams along with some other Western nation’s militaries. The similarities between planning doctrines have created many benefits and efficiencies when operating within interagency task forces, such as during OP Bushfire Assist, OP Flood Assist and OP COVID-19 Assist.^[8] In all these cases, interagency planning teams were able to come together and develop operational plans based on their similar planning tools to successfully conduct civil-military cooperation activities. Whilst these activities sit at the far left end of the spectrum of ADF activities, similar efficiencies have been experienced when operating with other allied militaries, such as the United States (US) defence force during disruption and destruction operations in conflict zones such as the Middle East Area of Operations. Admittedly there are some significant weaknesses that will be addressed later when applying the JMAP to complex adaptive and evolving systems, however, the benefits of having one common process that can be adapted to the entire spectrum of operations, using linear logic to reduce any problem to its core elements, cannot be understated.

JMAP is a tool that provides a comprehensive list of steps and planning considerations that mimic human thinking.^[9] It encourages divergent and convergent thinking at different stages of the planning process to ensure that no relevant information or considerations are overlooked. It also creates a mechanism to consolidate and capture the most important data to better inform overall command decision-making. Time-constrained planning cycles often require rapid decision-making with limited information based on a number of assumptions.^[10] The best way to capture these assumptions is to utilise a comprehensive list of steps and sub-steps to ensure nothing is missed. Whilst JMAP does not necessarily provide a list of boxes that must be ticked, it does dictate a process that should be followed, that can be modified based on the unique requirements of the operation, whilst focusing staff effort where it is most needed.

The most important phase of the JMAP is the framing phase. The inclusion of framing into JMAP in 2015, has encouraged planners to think divergently from the outset, enabling them to later narrow their focus toward the right problem.^[11] Should the framing phase identify a new problem frame that was not previously considered, the framing phase provides planners with an opportunity to challenge the wider strategic guidance provided and reshape the problem from a completely different angle.^[12] In some cases, these amendments may even lead to changes to the strategic level end state. With the inclusion of the framing phase, the JMAP provides a robust foundation for planners to build on, even when faced with more complex scenarios. The linear JMAP process ensures all elements of the problem are considered to best inform decision-making from the beginning, promoting the greatest chance of mission success. It also allows time-constrained planning cycles to rapidly come to an appropriate Course of Action (COA) that can later be modified during subsequent planning cycles if required. By ensuring due diligence is given to the framing phase, planners will be encouraged to critically think and thoroughly analyse both the problem set and operational environment, ultimately building a strong foundation of understanding for all subsequent phases. This process will lead to a greater appreciation of the situation and superior decision-making.

The JMAP sequence is not set in stone, and those with higher levels of planning experience can adapt the linear process to become a more adaptive and appropriate tool to be used against complex adaptive systems. The JMAP has been around long enough that experienced planners can use it as just one of many planning tools in their tool chest rather than the only tool that must be used in every situation. When applying JMAP to complex adaptive systems, these experienced planners do not see the linearity of the process, rather they are able to move freely between the different components at their leisure.^[13] They can review and revisit any element at any time without having to restart the whole JMAP process or wait for subsequent planning cycles to address any unpredicted situational developments. However, JMAP is taught linearly at all levels for ease of understanding. Junior or inexperienced planners are forced down a path of linearity to create a foundation of understanding in planning, and without it, more complex “operational design will prove too difficult to teach.”^[14] Whilst a complex adaptive systems approach to military planning could become a more appropriate tool for the increasing complexity of operations within the spectrum of competition, decades of institutional learning of the various iterations of the JMAP still leaves it “well suited for scenarios involving ‘traditional’ interstate conflict.”^[15] So overall, nothing in the JMAP prevents using additional resources, or adapting the steps within the process to suit individual or complex applications. JMAP does however rely on experienced planners to make it more adaptive, to avoid its doctrinal linearity. Additionally, for the ease of initial learning, JMAP provides a strong planning foundation from which to build and adapt concepts to more complex adaptive systems as one’s experience increases.

Weaknesses

The greatest downfall of the JMAP is that it tends to encourage linear thinking. Whilst the linear process makes it easy to understand and provides a simple process to follow, the world is not inherently linear, rather it is complex, and in a constant state of flux.^[16] Complex adaptive systems require a planning system that is constantly testing and adjusting critical assumptions and key observations. JMAP does not do this. Rather it uses a series of phases, with sub-step that guide the planners toward completing a process for a single actionable solution. Only then are planners encouraged to circle back to assess changes, if there is time within any subsequent planning cycles.^[17] Furthermore, JMAP focuses on the enemy’s centre of gravity and labels it as the key targetable element of the enemy force.^[18] This suggests that all military operations have a single point of control and therefore, “by addressing one or two things the solution to all other problems will follow automatically.”^[19] This simplistic mechanical process does not directly counter the unpredictability of complex adaptive systems. JMAP assumes that one can fully comprehend any given problem before action is taken, whereas circular and adaptive planning models encourage evolutionary thinking, continuously considering change, and adapting plans to the operating environment right up until the moment of execution.^[20] Because of its linear nature, JMAP planning is only as good as when the initial scoping and framing phase was conducted. Ultimately, whilst linear thinking makes a problem easy to conceptualise, its biggest downfall is that it does not continually adapt to the changing operational environment throughout the planning process. Therefore, any COA that is developed using a linear planning process like JMAP, may not have adequately adjusted to accommodate for changes that have occurred since the planning cycle commenced.

Another major weakness of the JMAP process is that it does not promote seamless information flow to subordinate units throughout the planning process. The JMAP encourages planning to be conducted in isolation from subordinate units, only providing information or direction to units once an approved set of formal orders have been prepared.^[21] By doing this, planners miss opportunities to draw on subordinate units’ subject matter expertise which would help inform the decision-making process and contribute to an overall better operational design. Additionally, this limits the ability of these units to prepare themselves and their mission essential equipment, as it does not keep them appraised of the developing situation as things change. Therefore, when orders are eventually given, sub-unit command teams will be hearing just a snapshot in time of the scenario, rather than an update to their already well-informed understanding. Fragmentation orders are often provided to intermittently pass information to subordinate units, however, this is not a formal part of the JMAP process. The one-way flow of information may be appropriate in conventional warfare, however during modern complex operations, the seamless flow of information, up and down, is essential.^[22] Complex adaptive systems are only possible through concurrent command planning at multiple levels and are reliant on parallel planning teams to cover a range of possible scenarios.^[23] Therefore, a major weakness of JMAP is that it is a deliberately process-driven activity that suppresses the seamless flow of information between all levels of command, making it less adaptable and unsuitable for use against complex adaptive systems.

In an attempt to remove the array of natural biases which each individual planner may harbour, the JMAP generates a chronological process that blocks natural intuition rather than supporting adaptive decision-making. However, “the human brain is incapable of considering a problem one cognitive step at a time,”^[24] yet the JMAP deliberately prevents solutionising from the outset. It stops planners from jumping to conclusions by guiding their thought process down a deliberately defined sequence. The danger of this is that by the time COA development phase comes around, hundreds of potentially viable solutions based on intuition and experience may have been lost.^[25] Furthermore, whilst this linear process removes some elements of cognitive bias, it remains almost impossible for planners to avoid thinking of plausible solutions that solve the problem at hand. Having COAs developed later in the process may have the advantage of being better informed, however planners using JMAP may also become affected by new biases introduced during the planning process. These biases may include information and groupthink bias, which may actually have a greater negative impact on the final plan. The JMAP steps and sub-steps, whilst done separately, are intuitively done at the same time, and trying to separate them goes against what comes naturally to the human brain. Instinctive ideas may sometimes become the best solutions, and without a mechanism to capture these ideas from the outset, substandard COAs may inadvertently triumph. Breaking down a problem into chronological events may have proven suitable for traditional-style military campaigns and may appear to simplify even the most complex of problems, however “existing planning models do not do justice to the nonlinear complexity of real planning, and in many cases actually inhibit and degrade planning.”^[26] Therefore, the obstructive nature of the JMAP makes the process clunky and unsuitable for complex adaptive systems.

Alternatives

The DSU has forced the ADF planners to consider new non-traditional operations where military forces are required to operate across the full spectrum of competition. It must now reconsider the suitability of the existing JMAP doctrine when it is applied to the multifaceted demands of complex adaptive systems. One solution for the ADF would be to turn away from the JMAP doctrine completely and embrace other existing models. Models such as adaptive campaigning, design thinking or another allied military’s decision-making process, could offer a far superior framework capable of being applied to modern complex adaptive systems. Adaptive campaigning, for example, is a model that responds to the evolutionary nature of warfare and creates a framework for solving complicated scenarios within a contested environment.^[27] Whilst this system is specifically designed around the land forces’ contribution to the whole of government approach, it could be further developed and suitably adapted to wider ADF planning requirements. Design thinking is another framework that encourages a much more reiterative planning process. Each step of the design thinking model is repeated more than once throughout the planning process and is “generally defined as an analytic and creative process that engages a person in opportunities to experiment, create and prototype models, gather feedback, and redesign.”^[28] These types of existing models would need to be adapted for wider ADF use, however they do address some of the many complexities expected to be encountered when planning military actions across the spectrum of competition. By moving away from monolithic planning processes like JMAP, and beginning to plan in repetitive fragments, planners are offered greater flexibility when it comes time to commit troops to task. There are obvious challenges and risks in fundamentally changing the ADF’s approach to planning, however “the rewards could include increased responsiveness and the ability to maintain a faster operational tempo.”^[29]

An alternative to altogether scrapping the JMAP planning model could be to allow greater flexibility within the ADF planning process, by incorporating various elements of multiple planning tools into the existing JMAP model. The framing phase of the JMAP has proven highly effective at stimulating divergent thinking and ultimately provides a deep appreciation of the problem, situation and operational environment. Unfortunately, from that point forward in the process, the JMAP’s primary purpose is to arrive at one final COA, which is to be briefed and executed. Alternatively, by having multiple planning frameworks available to follow on from the framing phase, planners could be afforded the flexibility to decide on the best-suited methodology for the unique nature of the environment.^[30] The US Army’s decision-making process was also linear in design, which proved to be found lacking when dealing with modern complex systems.^[31] As a result, the US Army developed a complementary planning design methodology that could work in parallel with their existing military decision-making processes. The ADF could learn from this process and implement parallel planning tools to best address complex adaptive systems. Additionally, with advancements in computer networking and information systems, collaborative planning is now becoming more accessible than ever before, and innovative parallel planning methodologies should be explored. Whilst ADFP 5.0.1 still has its place within planning for traditional interstate conflict, it is evident that future iterations of JMAP will need to shift away from its linear methodology. By transforming into a more reiterative and concurrent planning framework, JMAP could remain the tool of choice for military planning right across the modern spectrum of competition.

Conclusion

The JMAP is the primary framework used by the ADF to conduct planning across the spectrum of competition, and the highly linear process has proven its worth hundreds of times over within both domestic and international exercises and operations. However, the changing geopolitical environment and rapid advancements in technology across all warfare domains have spawned a massive increase in coercion and grey-zone activities. These complex adaptive systems now inject new problem sets for planners who need to plan within an environment that is constantly in a state of flux.

This article has highlighted several key strengths and weaknesses of the existing JMAP when applied to complex adaptive systems. Interoperability, ease of instruction and an all-encompassing process to follow to ensure nothing critical is missed, remains plagued by its doctrinally linear nature, making it difficult to apply to a complex and evolving operating environment. This clunky, process-driven system blocks both natural human intuition and limits the smooth transmission of information up and down to subordinate planning elements, ultimately making the JMAP alone, an unsuitable tool to tackle complex adaptive systems.

Ultimately, there will be flaws in any model that is applied to a complex problem set, however the most essential thing for any planner to do is to take the time to deeply understand the process offered to them by ADFP 5.0.1, so they can truly appreciate where any flaws in the process lay. Future iterations of the JMAP will eventually be released, and the ADF would be most advantaged by maintaining those existing phases of the JMAP design that provide value, such as framing, and then offer other system thinking design options to planners throughout the later stages of the planning cycle. This will enable planning teams to pick and choose the most appropriate framework for the unique nature of their operating environment. For the JMAP to remain applicable to all operations within the spectrum of competition, the JMAP itself will need to evolve and incorporate options that encourage planners to stray from its linear process. This will ensure that planners capitalise on the benefits of other adaptive systems thinking design frameworks when forced to deal with modern complex adaptive systems.

Disclaimer

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

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Footnotes