Introduction

The Clausewitzian principles of friction and chance highlight that uncertainty is an intrinsic characteristic of war.^[1] The best-laid plans rarely survive first contact with the enemy as human factors, enemy actions, and our reactions cause the operational environment (OE) to shift continually. The complexities of modern warfare, including multidomain operations, grey-zone activities, and interdependency associated with globalisation, have enhanced potential areas of friction and uncertainty. Furthermore, advancing technologies and the volume and speed in which we can gather and communicate information have reduced the time and space in which commanders must make decisions to maintain their freedom of action. Consequently, these issues raise the question of whether existing models for organising the application of military violence are suitable across the modern spectrum of competition.^[2]

This paper will argue that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) must place greater emphasis on nonlinear thinking and methodologies to enable a more holistic understanding of the contemporary operational environment and develop the intellectual edge required to outsmart, out-innovate, and outmanoeuvre its adversary. While linear and reductionist models like the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) model remain useful tools for military planning, such models must be nested within a larger, nonlinear understanding of warfare and the battlespace. This paper will be broken into three sections. The first section will define key concepts necessary for understanding its argument. The second section will evaluate several strengths and weaknesses of the JMAP for organising the application of military force, including considering the utility of supporting concepts such as Centre of Gravity constructs and endstates. Finally, this paper will highlight nonlinear alternatives to the JMAP for consideration by the ADF and the methods the organisation could adopt.

Linearity, Systems Theory, and Complex Adaptive Systems

Understanding several key concepts and how linearity, systems theory, and complex adaptive systems relate to military operations is essential. The first key concept is linearity. In simple mathematical terms, linearity is often expressed as a straight line; there are directly proportional changes between two related variables. Linear thinking is similar to a straight line; it is a systematic thought process involving sequential progression from a set start point to a solution. Conversely, non-linearity exists when independent variables are not proportional and do not lie in a straight line. Nonlinear thinking is, therefore, non-sequential and multi-dimensional. This concept is important for understanding two things. First, militaries have historically employed fundamentally linear models for organising the application of military violence. For example, they are organised in rigid hierarchical structures where direct command lines can be drawn from the lowest to the highest-ranked individual. Missions are designed across lines of operation, where a series of sequential steps are undertaken to achieve the desired end state. Militaries have literally even fought in line formations. The second reason is that war is inherently nonlinear; it is unpredictable, often chaotic, and therefore doesn’t prescribe linearity principles.^[3] While neither of these concepts is new, the increasing complexity of the modern world lends itself towards commanders needing a greater appreciation for non-linearity and its potential effects on the operational environment.

The second key concept is Systems Theory and its relationship to reductionism. Systems Theory suggests that a system comprises many interacting parts that work together in complex ways and function as a whole.^[4] In a system, changes in one part affect all other parts. Reductionism attempts to understand a system by breaking it down into smaller, more manageable parts to identify patterns to predict system outcomes. Conversely, Systems Theory contends that many systems resist reductionism. Instead, it looks at a system holistically to model behaviours.^[5] This concept relates to military operations in two ways. First, Systems Theory argues that many systems exhibit nonlinear characteristics, with warfare being one such system.^[6] This implies that a level of systems thinking is required to understand an operational environment during conflict. Secondly, military planning doctrine arguably applies a reductionist methodology to problems, which introduces an element of risk when applied to complex and changing systems.^[7] Ultimately, both approaches have utility, and finding the right balance is necessary for planning future operations.

By approaching war through the lens of a systems approach, war itself can be understood and modelled as a complex adaptive system across the spectrum of competition. Complex adaptive systems are systems characterised by unpredictability and interactive behaviour.^[8] They are comprised of large networks of interconnected, autonomous components constantly interacting, learning, and adapting to their environment.^[9] In a military context, conflict modelled as a complex adaptive system represents an intellectual shift in how militaries “conceptualise, examine and contend with the threats and missions within the contemporary operating environment”.^[10] Furthermore, “it is reasonable to postulate that warfare can better be executed by those who understand complex adaptive systems than those who focus on simple, linear, transparent classically logical Newtonian constructs.”^[11] Overall, these concepts help to understand the basis for analysing relative strengths and weaknesses of existing models used by the ADF when planning and conducting military operations.

The Good, The Bad, and The Alternatives

The Good

This section will review the strengths of the ADF’s primary model to organise military activities, the JMAP.^[12] This paper will focus on the four primary strengths of the JMAP as a planning tool. First, in recognition of the increasing complexity of the contemporary operational environment, the JMAP has incorporated elements of complex adaptive system theory and nonlinear thinking. For example, the JMAP includes circularity throughout the planning cycle through explicit feedback loops that allow planners to move backwards as new information becomes available. The JMAP also begins by scoping and framing a problem through a systems lens. Introducing these elements encourages an iterative and flexible application of the planning process, creating space for innovation. They also promote a more holistic appreciation of the problem, the operational enviroment, and components relationships, thereby creating an opportunity to contest planning constraints and limitations before developing solutions to problems.

However, the second strength of the JMAP is that, despite the above, it maintains a profoundly linear approach to planning which continues to make it acceptable to the wider military audience. This acceptance is likely the result of two things. First, cognitive psychology has shown that human brains are naturally inclined towards linear thinking and struggle to understand nonlinear relationships.^[13] Therefore, in high-pressure environments, such as during conflict, human brains default to linear thinking, and the JMAP supports these cognitive processes. The second reason is that, according to military historian Dr Christopher Bassford, overt attempts to introduce fundamentally new concepts into the military are often met with resistance.^[14] To mitigate this effect, military design thinking expert Ben Zweibelson suggested that a “Trojan Horse” approach to introducing nonlinear concepts may be necessary to reduce this resistance.^[15] The evolution of ADDP 5-0-1 in 2019 to include aspects of design thinking described above is a potential indication that this approach may already be occurring. The result is that rather than forcing a fundamental change, the JMAP has become marginally less linear without encountering resistance, thereby achieving a balance between both approaches.

A third strength of the JMAP is that its application helps to avoid intuitive decision-making while also being a relatively fast way of developing executable plans.^[16] One way to achieve a competitive advantage is to plan and execute military action quicker than an adversary. Doing so generates tempo that enables a belligerent to seize the initiative and maintain their freedom of action.^[17] However, faster decision-making alone does not guarantee tempo. For example, while intuitive decision-making is fast, it relies on experience and pattern recognition. This approach often means decisions are based on incomplete information, fail to consider potential alternatives, and tend to incorporate bias. The result is that associated plans will contain a potentially significant level of risk. Comparatively, while the JMAP is relatively slower, it generates higher-quality decisions that, when applied effectively, will overcome faster but less sophisticated ones.^[18] Therefore, the JMAP creates a balance between speed and risk in decision-making.

The final strength of the JMAP is that it is a scalable, modifiable, and adaptable framework that can be employed linearly until the point of diminishing returns.^[19] For example, the scalability of the process allows the JMAP to be used for campaign and operational-level planning and in multidomain and multinational situations. The principles of JMAP also permeate through to tactical level planning.^[20] The process is modifiable because steps can be repeated, reordered, compressed, or omitted.^[21] Finally, the process is adaptable because it can be adjusted to various situations ranging from war to humanitarian aid and peacekeeping, thus making it employable across the full spectrum of competition.^[22] These features mean that a single planning framework can be used across multiple situations, negating the need for the ADF to employ numerous models. Utilising a single framework reduces the training liability and costs associated with various approaches. It also creates a common language across all services and all levels of planning and reduces the risk of confusion that using multiple models may create.

Overall, these strengths highlight that the JMAP remains a valuable tool for organising military action. However, this process also has several weaknesses that stem from its linear nature, formulaic structure, and reductionist approach to planning.^[23]Four of these weaknesses will be explored in the following section, which will also touch on some supporting concepts that facilitate this model.

The Bad

The first weakness within the JMAP is that, even though elements of nonlinear thinking and systems theory have been incorporated, it remains a fundamentally linear and reductive process. Such processes are largely understood to be inadequate for developing effective solutions to complex problems in the modern operational environment.^[24] There are many potential reasons for this dilemma. First, linear and formulaic processes typically constrain the development of innovative solutions because they encourage convergent thinking. Planners will inevitably seek to generate conventionally acceptable solutions to a problem.^[25] Second, by reducing a problem into simpler, easier-to-understand parts, planners essentially disconnect these parts from the overall system, removing them from interactions that would otherwise exist in reality.^[26] The resulting “intransparence” can generate unpredicted outcomes that impact the success of a plan.^[27] Finally, formulaic processes tend to afford less iterative engagement with the problem and the operational environment. While the JMAP theoretically incorporates circularity, planning often occurs within a single iteration of the process in practice. This outcome may be due to time constraints, concurrent work pressures, or departmentalism limiting the sharing of planning information. It may also be due to JMAP training. Training institutions may perpetuate this cycle by creating artificial time constraints and static problem sets promoting single iteration.

The second weakness is that the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) that feeds the JMAP is also essentially reductionist. The JIPOE steers the focus of planning toward defeating an adversaries Centre of Gravity.^[28] However, within a complex adaptive system, the nature of a problem can rarely be reduced to a single Centre of Gravity. This approach fails to appreciate the broader implications of doing so on the operational environment. For example, in pursuit of regime change in Iraq, the United States (US) planning process failed to appreciate the second and third-order effects of targeting the Saddam regime’s assessed Centre of Gravity. Therefore, while the plan was instrumental in achieving operational success, the mission resulted in strategic failure that continues to have ongoing consequences.^[29] Furthermore, focusing on defeating an adversaries Centre of Gravity can also limit the development of more innovative solutions to complex problems by constraining the lens through which plans are developed. This problem is similarly reflected in the third weakness evident within the JMAP.

This weakness is that Commander’s guidance can also constrain the development of creative solutions to complex problems. Much like Centre of Gravity, Commander’s guidance typically focuses planning towards a preconceived set of conditions that shape what a successful solution may look like. This effect can be problematic, especially when Commanders may lack a full appreciation of the complexity of the operational environment. Arguably, constraints and limitations imposed by a Commander may be challenged during the framing step of the JMAP. However, there is a limit to this contestability. Furthermore, planners often display an institutionalised propensity to give the Commander what they want.^[30] The result is that an entire campaign plan could be developed without the required amount of intellectual rigour to ensure it is the most effective.

The final weakness of the JMAP is that it is predicated on achieving an endstate. There are two potential flaws within this construct. Firstly, the concept of an endstate is poorly defined. This concept presumes that military planners, at any given time, can project into an uncertain future and reverse engineer a series of events along a linear pathway leading back to the present state.^[31] When dealing with a simple problem, this may be true. Yet complex adaptive systems are intrinsically unpredictable and highly resistant to this approach.^[32] The result is likely to be a futile plan that drives action in rigid and unrealistic ways towards an endstate that may no longer be achievable or relevant as the system changes.^[33] Secondly, endstates are primarily subject to hierarchical control, so they can be difficult to challenge from the bottom-up.^[34] The result is that plans may be erroneously perpetuated until they fail or are revised at higher levels. Overall, these weaknesses are not an exhaustive list, but they highlight that, as the ADF’s primary planning model, the JMAP has several limitations. These limitations suggest that the ADF should emphasise nonlinear thinking and methodologies to support a more holistic appreciation of modern operational environments and enhance innovation.

The Alternatives

Alternative nonlinear approaches to planning may provide the ADF with the tools it needs to address the complexities of contemporary operational environments. However, these alternatives are primarily conceptual rather than concrete processes that challenge how we think. Employing these concepts will likely make military planners uncomfortable because there is no “right” way of using them, and they seldom drive outputs. Therefore, introducing them into service represents a significant challenge for senior leadership.

One recent model that has gained traction is military design theory, specifically Military Design Thinking.^[35] There are two approaches captured under this umbrella term. First, a pragmatic approach will seek to modify traditional thinking methods for developing solutions to complex problems.^[36] This approach is already underway within the ADF, evident through the introduction of nonlinear design components into the JMAP and design discussions in training institutions. However, these changes represent minor adaptations to a fundamentally linear process. A slightly more radical concept is the Defence by Design framework.^[37] This process takes a design methodology and tailors it to the military, providing an alternative tool to the JMAP that could be readily incorporated into the ADF training continuum.

The second approach to military design thinking is a purist approach that aims to break away entirely from traditional ways of thinking.^[38] Examples of these philosophical purist approaches include assemblage theory^[39] and problematisation.^[40] The first seeks to enable design thinkers to court rather than reduce a complex adaptive system’s uncertainty and dynamic nature. The latter encourages individuals to confront institutional barriers through radical critical thinking, “developing destructively creative approaches to improving how the organisation functions.”^[41] The strength of military design thinking through either approach is that it reduces the risks associated with linear thinking and reductionism. Instead, military design thinking fosters a greater appreciation of a complex adaptive system and fosters creative agency and critical thinking by changing the way planners conceptualise a problem. The weakness is that these approaches challenge the default thinking pathways of the human brain and take significantly more time to develop solutions. Therefore, they are more likely to encounter resistance in the organisation and are less likely to be employed under pressure.

For military design thinking to be employed effectively, the ADF would need to undergo a significant cultural transformation, either gradually (as seems to be the current preferred method) or rapidly. The ADF would need to; develop a shared understanding of design thinking across all three services and interagency partners; acknowledge that the theory resists narrow codification into doctrine; and accept that uncertainty, experimentation, and risk are inherent parts of the approach. None of these factors come easily to large, bureaucratic organisations like the ADF. Therefore, any transformation would require two key things. First, the ADF senior leadership would need to collectively drive the change across all three services through clear and consistent messaging and action that reinforces their commitment to the process. Second, the ADF would need to incorporate military design thinking into its training continuum across all levels of the organisation to ensure that it can implement design methodologies critically and creatively.^[42]

Overall, this paper’s position supports a pragmatic approach to military design thinking. While greater emphasis should be placed on nonlinear models, linear models remain a useful means for organising the application of military power and should not be discarded. While purists might disagree, many of these linear models have proven necessary within a military context. This necessity is particularly evident at the tactical level, where problems are likely to be simpler. At this level, linear models such as hierarchical control, geospatial battlefield frameworks, and coordination of combined effects along operational lines help concentrate power in predictable ways to generate the desired outcome.^[43] Metaphorical theorising about the enemy and complex adaptive systems is perhaps less of a priority when dodging enemy bullets. Nevertheless, having the ability to think nonlinearly, even at the tactical level, can help to create opportunities that would otherwise be missed. Therefore, nesting linear models within a nonlinear appreciation of the operational environment across the spectrum of competition may help balance the relative strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches.

Conclusion

Linear thinking has underpinned the basic conceptualisation of the application of military power in the ADF since its formation. However, the complexities associated with multidomain operations, global interdependence, and non-conventional threats have transformed the contemporary operational environment. These complexities are driving senior leadership to pursue alternative approaches to traditional planning methodologies. Creativity and innovation have become critical characteristics of these desired alternatives as the ADF seeks a competitive advantage over potential adversaries. However, to date, the ADF’s introduction of nonlinear and systems thinking into its organisation appears perfunctory. Therefore, greater emphasis should be placed on these concepts if the ADF seeks a more holistic appreciation of its operational environment and a better balance between these two approaches.

In support of this position, this paper evaluated several strengths and weaknesses of the ADF’s linear and primary planning framework, the JMAP. Some of the strengths of the JMAP stemmed from its linearity; it aligned with typical cognitive processing and created a balance between speed and risk in decision-making. However, other strengths stemmed from the recent incorporation of nonlinear concepts, which facilitated a more holistic appreciation of an operational environment and better framing of the problem. Alternatively, the weaknesses of the JMAP predominantly stemmed from its linear and reductionist approach. These included encouraging convergent thinking, steering planners toward predictable solutions, and failing to appreciate broader system effects. This evaluation provided insight into why linear processes remain useful but unsuitable for coping with system complexity and why greater emphasis should be placed on nonlinear thinking and methodologies such as military design thinking.

Disclaimer

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

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