This essay was written before the Ukrainian recapture of Kherson in the South in October 2022.

The invasion of another nation is a complex and dangerous endeavour. Due to this, military planning has been an obsession of military leaders since humankind developed complex civilisations. In modern conflict, the addition of new domains such as air, space, and cyber make detailed planning and coordination crucial for success against a determined adversary.

Australian doctrine discusses the arrangement of military operations via eight elements. This essay will evaluate the efficacy of the 2022 Russian military campaign in Ukraine through the lens of the first three elements: risk, culminating point, and operational reach.  This essay will focus on the first phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which spans the period 24 Feb – 7 Apr 2022. This phase is useful for evaluating Russia’s planning as it illustrates Russia’s approach to risk management in the planning phases and how rapidly Russian forces reached their culminating point due to their limited operational reach. The period’s conclusion also culminates with Russia abandoning its primary aim of seizing Kyiv and removing the elected Ukrainian government. Due to these factors, the first phase is highly illustrative of Russian planning failures.

This essay's thesis is that Russia failed to achieve its primary objective due to inadequate operational risk management. This operational risk, combined with failures in combined arms warfare and logistical problems, led to Russian forces failing to maintain sufficient operational reach and reaching their culminating point before achieving their operational objective. As the conflict grinds on with momentum on the side of the Ukrainians, these early failures have proven difficult for Russia to recover from, even with their less ambitious, scaled-down objective of control of the Eastern Ukraine Donbas region.

Risk

As the planning doctrine highlights, risk is an unavoidable element of military operations. As such, risk management is crucial to achieving the best chance of fulfilling strategic and operational objectives. There are various methods for managing risk. In the Australian doctrine, the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) requires planners to identify, analyse, evaluate and treat/monitor risk. Risk is considered across all domains, including cognitive and information, not merely weapon/personnel capabilities and quantities.^[1]

Since 2008, Russian approaches to risk assessment have been heavily influenced by the Soviet-era approach of ‘the Method.’ The Method is a tool used to assess risks associated with the correlation of forces and means. This model, dating from the 1980s, attempts to mathematically quantify the Russian forces’ capability when compared to a potential adversary, incorporating expert opinions and metrics (such as numbers of personnel and weapon systems).^[2] A RAND Corporation analysis of the Method highlighted weaknesses in the approach that make it ill-suited to modern warfare. Some examples include that the Method has historically accounted very little for intangible factors such as public opinion and fighting forces’ morale.^[3] Furthermore, a common criticism is that “the Method does not consider specific combat conditions of military formations or the synergies between them in a sophisticated way.” It is telling that Russian researchers of the Method found that Command and Control (C2) in particular was deemed by the Method to be “very insignificant.”^[4]

The three above weaknesses in the Russian risk assessment methodology have manifested as severe deficiencies in the Russian campaign. The intangibles not assessed by the Method such as public opinion and adversary morale have been pinpointed by experts as key factors in the unexpected Ukrainian success. For example, international opinion towards the conflict has resulted in weapons flowing to Ukraine from the West, and Ukrainian morale and will to fight has been a force multiplier compared to Russian forces.^[5] The Method’s lack of specificity regarding particular combat conditions of formations and the synergies between them is exposed in Russia’s poor performance when it comes to combined arms warfare in complex environments such as urban terrain.^[6] Finally, the Method’s assessment that C2 was not a significant factor to consider when assessing risk has been exposed as fallacious. The loss of many high-ranking generals early in the conflict and the fact that Russia lacks a professional non-commissioned officer corps have severely degraded Russia’s performance on the battlefield.^[7] In short, Russia’s methodology for assessing and managing risks on the modern battlefield against a determined adversary had flaws from the outset, which have illustrated themselves starkly during the Ukrainian conflict.

In the Australian doctrine, operational risk management requires three aspects: risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation.^[8] To conduct these steps, or even a modified or simplified version, an essential input is accurate data on the opposing force (required at all stages). Additionally, planners must be aware of and account for inherent bias, which will affect the quality of the analysis and evaluation. Assessment and evaluation require some level of subjective judgement. Assumptions of superiority, wishful thinking, and fear of repercussions from reporting the truth all serve to distort the reality of the situation. Furthermore, Russian military leadership did not even have accurate data available on the numbers and readiness of their own forces; many Russian units were hollow, with shortages of personnel, and their leadership had been overstating their level of readiness to higher commands.^[9] The factors of inaccurate data on their own forces, combined with biases and an inability to deliver harsh truths to Putin, all served to magnify the level of risk inherent in the Russian planning of the invasion.

In addition to the Method's weaknesses, system issues ensured that the two preconditions for effective risk assessment and management were not met, raising the inherent risk for Russian forces. Firstly, Putin had well and truly fallen into the ‘dictator trap.’ This term refers to when autocrats make errors of judgement that people around them are too afraid to correct.^[10] Putin believed that Ukraine’s society was fragile and would crumble under pressure. This belief was reinforced by his own intelligence services, despite them having access to data disproving the hypothesis.^[11] Similarly, Putin’s intelligence agencies reinforced his incorrect assessment that his forces were far superior to Ukraine’s and would overwhelm them within days.^[12] Such errors of fact are inevitable in a system that punishes dissent - indeed, the arrest of Russian Federal Security Service chiefs highlights how quickly Putin will retaliate against officials who deliver unwelcome information to him.^[13] Even if this factor were not present, the Russian army’s officer corps has no tradition of self-critique or methodology to address bias.^[14] These aspects cumulatively served to distort the truth and deliver shaky foundations upon which to assess and manage risk.

Finally, operational risk was magnified by the lack of surprise. Russia’s well-reported, months-long build-up of forces on the border eliminated the element of surprise and allowed Ukraine time to adjust their mindset and prepare their forces.^[15] The US provision of high-quality intelligence to Ukraine also provided their forces a significant advantage.^[16] This lack of surprise magnified the risks to Russian forces and manifested in them meeting determined and well-prepared Ukrainian forces when they crossed the border.

Culminating point

The culminating point is defined in Australian doctrine as “the point in time and location/space where a force will no longer be stronger than the adversary and risks losing the initiative.”^[17] The doctrine further posits that understanding the culminating point of the friendly force is critical to planning and sequencing of later phases. Once the culminating point is reached, the force can only maintain the current state and is unable to further advance, due to factors such as logistics exhaustion, adversary action, loss of combat power, or strategic and political shifts. Reaching a culminating point presents a risk to the commander’s ability to achieve their objectives. In the Australian JMAP, culminating points may be identified in centre of gravity analysis, as well as course of action development and analysis.^[18] It is crucial that planners realistically forecast and plan for culminating points, in order to ensure the operation can still press for a military advantage and achieve mission success. For success, the operation must achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point.^[19]

Russian strategy was to seize Kyiv in a ‘coup de main’ assault.^[20] A coup de main is defined in US terminology as “an offensive operation that capitalises on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke.”^[21] This style of assault historically yielded positive results for the former Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979.^[22] According to an accidental leak from a Russian news agency, Putin planned to accomplish the seizure of Kyiv within two days – an astonishing timeline by any reasonable measure.^[23]

The coup de main assault was contingent on a Russian paratrooper assault on Antonov airfield, reinforced by the rapid deployment of three separate armoured columns. This failed when it encountered the fierce Ukrainian resistance that the Russian forces did not anticipate. The armoured columns required to reinforce the airfield assault were rendered slow or immobile by enemy action as well as maintenance issues and lack of fuel. Ukrainian air defences had not been effectively neutralised and as a result, the Russian Air Force provided inadequate ground support to advancing troops, either due to unwillingness to expose their aircraft to danger or a lack of capability.^[24] Personnel shortages (particularly infantry), exacerbated their inability to press forward through Ukrainian defences.^[25] Battlefield topography impeded the effective use of Russian artillery, and Russian forces became trapped on two routes, unable to retreat or advance effectively. Rendered immobile, their forward forces were in range of Ukrainian artillery while their own artillery and supplies were trapped behind congested friendly forces.^[26] The forward elements of the Russian advance had outrun their logistic supply, and were no longer an effective fighting force.^[27] Three of the elements identified in JMAP as causes of culmination – loss of combat power, adversary action, and logistics exhaustion – prevented the Russians achieving their primary operational objective of seizing Kyiv.^[28] In retrospect this appears to have been unavoidable; an inevitable outcome of the failure to articulate and understand the risk in such an audacious plan.

The causes of such a dramatic example of culmination prior to achieving the primary objective are complex. A coup de main requires surprise – which as already outlined was completely neutralised. As previously discussed, planners had an overly optimistic estimate of the combat power of their own forces. The Russian peace-time military (and remember Russia at this point was not in a war-time footing – this was merely a ‘special military operation’) is structured for and well-suited to short, high-intensity campaigns characterised by heavy use of artillery.^[29] Conversely, it is ill-suited to prolonged, attritional conflict against a determined and well-armed adversary, which is precisely the situation it found itself in after its failed coup de main assault against Kyiv.^[30] Significantly, Russian forces failed to concentrate the substantial forces available on the border on their main objective. The invasion proceeded on several disparate axes, without a clear focus and without unity of effort.^[31] No single commander oversaw ground forces; instead, each district commander led his own forces, complicating coordination and reducing the effectiveness of the disparate units on the ground.^[32] To summarise, although a short, sharp operation to seize Kyiv was the primary objective, Russian forces reached their first operational culminating point well before achieving this aim.

Operational reach

Operational reach is defined in Australian doctrine as “the distance and duration across which a force element can successfully employ military capabilities.” Many factors influence and affect operational reach, including weather, terrain, population response and availability of resources from the occupied territory. Operational reach can be extended “through forward positioning of capabilities and resources.”^[33] This was not possible for Russia, however, as they were invading a nation hostile to their stated military objectives. Furthermore, due to inadequate planning time for lower-level echelons (likely due to the deception of the own people– many units still believed they were merely conducting an exercise), Russian forces struggled to move materiel into forward positions to support ongoing operations.^[34] Due to these preconditions, achieving sufficient operational reach necessitated Russian forces controlling occupied terrain and maintaining logistics lines of communication. The first phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that Russia failed to achieve these two conditions, and as a result their operational reach fell short of that required to achieve their objective.

As previously highlighted, in the early phases of the invasion, Russia bet heavily on a short, sharp, coup de main assault. This strategy saw Russia use nearly all its soldiers simultaneously and rapidly enter Ukraine to fight along multiple fronts. This not only failed to concentrate force on the main objective, but in their rush to seize Kyiv, Russian forces also skipped protective measures, such as clearing routes of explosives.^[35] Significantly, Russia did not achieve air superiority, having failed to substantially degrade the Ukrainian Air Force or conduct effective suppression of air defence.^[36] Russian forces advanced at an unsustainable pace, outrunning supply lines. Simultaneously, the melting snow created boggy conditions, confining the Russian armoured columns to highways, making them easy targets to teams of Ukrainian anti-tank missile operators.^[37] The tanks and armoured vehicles themselves performed poorly, due to poor maintenance and lack of spare parts, clogging up roadways.^[38] Ironically, the armoured columns were both too slow to reinforce the initial assault, and too slow to avoid presenting attractive targets to Ukrainian forces, but too fast for the logistics train to effectively support. As a result of these factors – the dispersion of forces, the slow speed of the logistics supply, the lack of air superiority, and the weather effects, Russian troops were highly vulnerable to ambushes, counterattacks, and severe logistical shortfalls.^[39] This drastically reduced the extent of their operational reach, meaning they reached the end of it and culminated prior to achieving their objective.

Lawrence Freedman supports these assertions, arguing that the Kyiv offensive was thwarted mainly due to Russian forces stretching their supply lines too thinly, and forward deployed units losing air cover.^[40] These problems resulted in very high casualties and extensive losses of equipment that Russia has struggled to recover from.^[41] The initial costs of the failed coup de main have limited Russia’s operational reach into other areas of Ukraine, where they now have shortages of personnel and equipment. Aggravating this problem is that personnel reinforcements appear to be poorly trained, operating in cobbled-together units short of leadership and experience. The result is poor cohesion and a reluctance to prosecute attacks. This is displayed in Russian forces lacking offensive momentum on the ground, being ill-placed to exploit opportunities and limiting their advance.^[42]

At a more fundamental level, Russia failed to set the preconditions that would allow their forces to maintain operational reach sufficient to seize Kyiv. Russia bet on armour as the means to rapidly overwhelm their adversaries. But Ukraine is a very large country, and armour must move quickly and be properly sustained to be effective. The armoured columns prosecuting the coup de main assault were light on infantry, due to persistent personnel shortages.^[43] The armoured column was plagued not only by logistic shortages, but the lack of infantry support made them vulnerable to anti-tank missiles.^[44] This issue is emblematic of a more serious underlying problem. The Russians forgot - or disregarded - basic lessons of combined arms that were forged in the earlier world wars. These are that tanks are vulnerable without infantry support, tanks and infantry are vulnerable without air cover, and air cover cannot be provided without effective suppression of air defences.^[45] Additionally, the Russian Army in previous campaigns typically advanced only after significant shaping artillery fires, which were ‘notably absent’ in the initial stages of the invasion.^[46] Russian forces failed at combined arms warfare, and these mistakes were skilfully exploited by Ukrainian forces, bringing the advance to a grinding halt.

Operational reach requires control of territory along supply lines. The ‘strength of the rear,’ long a fixation of previous Soviet leaders including Stalin, has been a consistent problem for the Russian forces.^[47] From early in the campaign, Ukrainian forces were able to infiltrate behind Russian lines and disrupt logistics flows, such as using anti-tank missiles to blow up a Russian train carrying fuel for forward-deployed armoured vehicles.^[48] Putin claimed areas of Ukraine in which Ukrainian forces continued to operate with impunity, and although Russian forces were able to seize cities and towns, they lacked the manpower to hold on to these gains.^[49] This fact illustrates that Russia’s ability to temporarily hold ground until counter attack or supplies run short is not sustained operational reach.

As a counterpoint, Russia has, from the early stages, employed long-range cruise and ballistic missiles against targets deep inside Ukraine. These capabilities have allowed Russia to kinetically affect the battlespace at large distances from their frontlines. However, while devastating to the victims of the strikes and damaging to the Ukrainian economy, this apparent extension of Russian operational reach has not manifestly aided them in controlling key terrain.^[50]

Conclusion

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine can be reasonably described as ‘bungled’ – poorly planned, poorly executed, and deficient in basic military concepts and elements such as surprise, coordination, and effective combined/joint warfare concepts. The planning of the operation with regards to risk management appears to have been badly deficient, likely due to outdated risk assessment methodologies, inadequate and inaccurate data on own force capability and readiness, and wishful thinking and/or blind ignorance to inconvenient facts. This magnified the operational risk which manifested itself as poor performance on the battlefield. Russian forces faced a much more determined, better prepared and more capable adversary that they had expected and planned for. This factor compounded their mistake in betting on a coup de main assault on Kyiv – a type of operation that requires surprise, speed, and effective coordination of forces to be successful. Russian forces did not possess surprise, their ground and air forces were poorly coordinated, and their three armoured columns, although too fast for their logistics train, were too slow to maintain the operational reach required to enter Kyiv with sufficient fighting forces. As a result, they reached their culminating point prior to achieving the primary military objective.

Russia’s failure from the outset to establish the necessary preconditions for effective joint warfare – air superiority, effective combined arms coordination, unity of command and effective logistics support – are key factors for their insufficient operational reach and early culminating point. These deficiencies likely relate back to insufficient planning and fundamentally, poor risk assessment and management. These are key lessons for all modern militaries conducting contingency or operational planning today in similarly contested and complex operating environments.

Disclaimer

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

Bibliography

Allin, Dana H. “Ukraine: The Shock of Recognition.” Survival 64, no. 2. 2022.

Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 5. Planning. Department of Defence, Canberra. 2022. 58

Australian Defence Force Procedures Plans Series 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process, Department of Defence, Canberra. 2019. 1C-4.

Bowen, Andrew. “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects.” Congressional Research Service 47068. Washington, 2022.

Carvin, Stephanie. “How not to war.” International Affairs 98, no. 5. 2022. 1714.

Cranny-Evans, Sam and Dr Sidharth Kaushal. ‘The Intellectual Failures Behind Russia’s Bungled Invasion.’ Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 1 Apr 2022.

Dalsjö, Robert, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg. ‘A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War.’ Survival 64, no. 3. 2022.

Dibb, Paul; “The Geopolitical Implications of Russia’s Invasion of the Ukraine.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2022.

Echevarria II, Antulio J. “Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies.” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 52, no. 2. 2022.

Freedmam, Lawrence. “Gradually- then all of a Sudden.” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 14 Sep 2022.

Freedman, Lawrence. Constantly Operating Factors: Stalin’s Lessons for Putin. Substack article 24 Aug 2022. https://samf.substack.com/p/constantly-operating-factors?utm_source=profile&;utm_medium=reader2

Friedman, George. “Evaluating Russia’s Performance in Ukraine.” Geopolitical Futures 2022. 1.

Jennings, Peter. “We Must – and Can – do More for Ukraine’ The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 23 Apr 2022.

Johnson, Rob. “Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine.” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 52, no. 2. 2022.

Johnson, Rob. “Ukraine is the latest disaster in a long history of Russian military dysfunction.” Engelsberg Ideas, 08 Apr 2022. https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/ukraine-is-latest-disaster-in-long-history-of-russian-military-dysfunction/

Kofman, Michael and Lee, Rob, ‘Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design’, War on the Rocks, 20 June 2022.

Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut, Jeffrey Edmonds, and Julian Waller. “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts.” Center for Naval Analyses. 2021.

Marlowe, Melanie, Christopher Preble, Zach Cooper. ‘Military Lessons from the War in Ukraine.’ Net Assessments Podcast, 29 Sep 2022.

Mary Ilyushina and Natalia Abbakumova, “Kremlin, Shifting Blame for War Failures, Axes Military Commanders.” Washington Post, 08 Oct 22.

Massicot, Dara. “Russia’s Repeat Failures.” Foreign Affairs. 15 Aug 2022.

Reach, Clint, Vikram Kilambi, and Mark Cozad. Russian Assessments and Applications of the Correlation of Forces and Means. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020.

Reynolds, Nick and Jack Watling. RUSI Special Report: Ukraine: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022.

Singh, Colonel Jaspreet. “The War Between ‘Russia & US’ In Ukraine: Key Lessons.” Issue Brief 357, Center for Land Warfare Studies. 5.

US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US Department of Defense, Washington. 2007.

Footnotes

¹ Australian Defence Force Procedures Plans Series 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process, Department of Defence, Canberra. 2019. 1-10.

² Reach, Clint, Vikram Kilambi, and Mark Cozad. Russian Assessments and Applications of the Correlation of Forces and Means. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. xi.

³ Reach, Clint, Vikram Kilambi, and Mark Cozad. Russian Assessments and Applications of the Correlation of Forces and Means. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. 10; 70.

⁴ Reach, Clint, Vikram Kilambi, and Mark Cozad. Russian Assessments and Applications of the Correlation of Forces and Means. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. 81.

⁵ Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies." The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 52, no. 2. 2022. 31.

⁶ Cranny-Evans, Sam and Dr Sidharth Kaushal. ‘The Intellectual Failures Behind Russia’s Bungled Invasion.’ Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 1 Apr 2022.

⁷ Mary Ilyushina and Natalia Abbakumova, Kremlin, Shifting Blame for War Failures, Axes Military Commanders. Washington Post, 08 Oct 22; Reynolds, Nick and Jack Watling. RUSI Special Report: Ukraine: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022.

⁸ Australian Defence Force Procedures Plans Series 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process, Department of Defence, Canberra. 2019. 1C-4.

⁹ Kofman, Michael and Lee, Rob, ‘Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design’, War on the Rocks, 20 June 2022.

¹⁰ Singh, Colonel Jaspreet. "The War Between ‘Russia & US’ In Ukraine: Key Lessons." Issue Brief 357, Center for Land Warfare Studies. 5.

¹¹ Freedman, Lawrence. Constantly Operating Factors: Stalin’s Lessons for Putin. Substack article 24 Aug 2022. https://samf.substack.com/p/constantly-operating-factors?utm_source=profile&;utm_medium=reader2

¹² Carvin, Stephanie. "How not to war." International Affairs 98, no. 5. 2022. 1714.

¹³ Johnson, Rob. "Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine." The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 52, no. 2. 2022. 12.

¹⁴ ibid. 18.

¹⁵ Friedman, George. " Evaluating Russia’s Performance in Ukraine." Geopolitical Futures 2022. 1.

¹⁶ Allin, Dana H. "Ukraine: The Shock of Recognition." Survival 64, no. 2. 2022. 202.

¹⁷ Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 5. Planning. Department of Defence, Canberra. 2022. 58.

¹⁸ ibid

¹⁹ ibid

²⁰ Johnson, Rob. “The First Phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022.” Changing Character of War Centre, Oxford University, 2022. 3-4.

²¹ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US Department of Defense, Washington. 2007.

²² Johnson, Rob. “Ukraine is the latest disaster in a long history of Russian military dysfunction,” Engelsberg Ideas, 08 Apr 2022.https://engelsbergideas.com/notebook/ukraine-is-latest-disaster-in-long-history-of-russian-military-dysfunction/

²³ Johnson, Rob. “The First Phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022.” Changing Character of War Centre, Oxford University, 2022. 2.

²⁴ Bowen, Andrew. "Russia’s war in Ukraine: Military and intelligence aspects." Congressional Research Service 47068. Washington, 2022. 4.

²⁵ Reynolds, Nick and Jack Watling. RUSI Special Report: Ukraine: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022. 13.

²⁶ Ibid 4.

²⁷ Ibid 3-4.

²⁸ Johnson, Rob. "Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine." The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 52, no. 2. 2022. 1.

²⁹ Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink, Dmitry Gorenburg, Mary Chesnut, Jeffrey Edmonds, and Julian Waller. Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts. Center for Naval Analyses, 2021; Kofman, Michael and Lee, Rob, ‘Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design’, War on the Rocks, 20 June 2022.

³⁰ Kofman, Michael and Lee, Rob, ‘Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design’, War on the Rocks, 20 June 2022.

³¹ Dalsjö, Robert, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg. ‘A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War.’ Survival 64, no. 3, 2022. 8-9.

³² Dalsjö, Robert, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg. ‘A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War.’ Survival 64, no. 3, 2022. 9.

³³ Australian Defence Force – Philosophical – 5. Planning. Department of Defence, Canberra. 2022. 59.

³⁴ Reynolds, Nick and Jack Watling. RUSI Special Report: Ukraine: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022. 8; Dibb, Paul; "The Geopolitical Implications of Russia's Invasion of the Ukraine." Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2022. 12

³⁵ Foreign affairs

³⁶ Jennings, Peter. “We Must – and Can – do More for Ukraine’ The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 23 Apr 2022.

³⁷ ibid

³⁸ Dibb, Paul; "The Geopolitical Implications of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine." Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2022. 12.

³⁹ Massicot, Dara. “Russia’s Repeat Failures.” Foreign Affairs. 15 Aug 2022.

⁴⁰ Freedmam, Lawrence. “Gradually- then all of a Sudden” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 14 Sep 2022.

⁴¹ Massicot, Dara. “Russia’s Repeat Failures.” Foreign Affairs. 15 Aug 2022.

⁴² Reynolds, Nick and Jack Watling. RUSI Special Report: Ukraine: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022. 14-15.

⁴³ Kofman, Michael and Lee, Rob, ‘Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design’, War on the Rocks, 20 June 2022.

⁴⁴ Friedman, George. " Evaluating Russia’s Performance in Ukraine." Geopolitical Futures 2022.

⁴⁵ Marlowe, Melanie, Christopher Preble, Zach Cooper. ‘Military Lessons from the War in Ukraine’, Net Assessments Podcast, 29 Sep 2022.

⁴⁶ Cranny-Evans, Sam and Dr Sidharth Kaushal. ‘The Intellectual Failures Behind Russia’s Bungled Invasion.’ Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 1 Apr 2022.

⁴⁷ Freedman, Lawrence. Constantly Operating Factors: Stalin’s Lessons for Putin. Substack article 24 Aug 2022. https://samf.substack.com/p/constantly-operating-factors?utm_source=profile&;utm_medium=reader2

⁴⁸ Johnson, Rob. “The First Phase of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine 2022.” Changing Character of War Centre, Oxford University, 2022. 6.

⁴⁹ ibid. 7.

⁵⁰ Reynolds, Nick and Jack Watling. RUSI Special Report: Ukraine: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022. 19.