“Time flows at a constant speed; your heart beats in your chest; your eyes blink as you read each word in this sentence.”^[1] Together, sentences create a paragraph that begins forming the structure of the essay, progressing in a predictable, linear way. Tactical-level actions align closer with this linear reality, but as the intensity of the competition or conflict and the intricacy of the environment increases, this linear framework becomes less relevant. Countless Staff College submissions and pieces of academic theorising across the globe have contemplated frameworks on the interplay between the nature and character of war or the art and science of strategy. Social science and neurological models, such as Daniel Kahneman’s model of system one and system two thinking, are included to help explain this framework in the military realm. System one is fast and intuitive, unconsciously based on prior operational and planning experiences and best suited to functioning with complex problems. While system two is precise, logical, and methodical, a deliberate and slow process better suited for low-pressure and time-rich environments.^[2] The ever-changing battlefield, non-traditional warfare, diverse support requests placed on the military and the threat of terror are all factors creating a complex environment where conventional approaches and solutions are becoming insufficient. Furthermore, asymmetric and hybrid forms of war are prevalent, while the threat of conventional war hangs heavy in many places worldwide. It is not being concluded that the strategic environment today is more difficult than in previous generations. However, new threats, technologies and theories are developing, which require equally complex approaches to overcome.

This essay argues that linear planning processes are the most effective method for the Australian Defence Force to communicate with the Government and justify capability development to apply military violence in the complex adaptive system of war. Furthermore, linear planning processes allow commanders to build up a system two thinking foundation to draw upon in high-stress system one thinking environments. First, what constitutes a complex adaptive system will be discussed in parallel with the Australian Defence Force’s framework of the spectrum of competition. This will transition to consideration of Australia’s contemporary strategic environment to highlight how it can be considered a complex adaptive system in and of itself. Second, the weaknesses of linear processes will be discussed through a focus on the process of Operation Design to allow commanders and planners to understand the underlying linearity of such processes. Third, the strengths of linear military planning will be examined to acknowledge its benefits and justify its use. It is important to note that both the strengths and weaknesses sections have been developed based on the experiences and perspectives of the author and, therefore, cannot hope to cover the entire scope of this subject. Finally, the discussion will contemplate the more appropriate levels and situations to use less-linear divergent planning models. This section will highlight that military planning systems require both hard and soft thinking; the art of planning is knowing when each is best used to generate options for commanders and therefore have adaptable plans.

Complex adaptive systems and Australia’s contemporary strategic environment

This section will investigate what constitutes a complex adaptive system and how the concept of the ‘spectrum of competition’, as explained in ADF-C-0 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, attempts to navigate it. Additionally, the contemporary strategic environment and modern warfare will be discussed to highlight the breadth of complex adaptive systems and how they are the new normal for commanders and planners.

An archetypal example of a complex adaptive system is war, where internal and external agents interact to form unpredictable and non-linear outcomes. The study of complex systems is a relatively novel scientific field that considers how constituent pieces and their interactions impact the system's overall behaviours and, in turn, how it interacts with its surroundings. Complex systems include “the brain formed out of neurons, molecules formed out of atoms, and the weather formed out of air flows.”^[3] The capacity to learn from interactions transitions complex systems into complex adaptive systems.^[4] Emergent, non-linear and unpredictable behaviours are defining features of all complex adaptive systems. Additionally, the system’s overall structure is shaped by the self-organisation of constituent elements, or agents, as they interact.^[5] An agent is a distinct entity that performs in a particular way within its surroundings. The relationship between adversaries in battle, and even that of a unit commander and their soldiers, are examples of what makes war a complex adaptive system. Military history is replete with examples of commanders and soldiers making decisions based on local, inaccurate, or out-of-date information, with the interactions resulting in patterns that cannot be predicted or estimated in advance.^[6] These military examples have a nonlinear nature, where a given input could result in anything from a disproportionately massive effect to none, with the outputs potentially changing over time.^[7] Implementing a solution to a complex problem will have ripple effects over a long, potentially unlimited period of time.^[8] Furthermore, the breadth of the consequences is extremely difficult to trace, as the full ramifications cannot be assessed until the waves of consequences have subsided. Tactical actions occurring in the early phase of an operation can create ripples that shape the latter stages of a two-decade-long campaign.

Figure 1: The 'spectrum of competition' ADF-C-0^[9]

Australia’s contemporary strategic environment is a vast, complex adaptive system. Novel and creative approaches to conflict are being combined with conventional weaponry's enhanced range, speed and lethality. Lethal and non-lethal tactics, including non-attributable cyber warfare, are being used by state and non-state actors in an environment that is more than competition yet less than open war.^[10] Within this environment, the Australian Defence Force continues to be pulled in new directions, being allocated tasks that go beyond the traditional remit of militaries. The modern Australian Defence Force supports civil authorities in various roles, from disaster relief to countering piracy, while also overseeing peacekeeping, providing humanitarian aid, fighting insurgencies, training foreign militaries, and assisting with reconstruction efforts.^[11] The Australian Defence Force, through ADF-C-0 Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, attempts to explain this environment, and its place in it, through the ‘spectrum of competition’ concept (Figure 1). The model’s use is explained as follows; “War and warfare are complex. Consequently, models may assist in understanding this complexity through simplifying complicated issues.”^[12] This explanation speaks to the crux of the problem; can a simple linear model adequately encapsulate and explain a complex adaptive system?

Weaknesses of linear military planning

This section will discuss the weaknesses of logical and linear military planning processes in the environment of modern warfare through a focus on the process of Operation Design. By highlighting the potential shortcomings of the process, commanders and planners can enter each scenario and situation with their eyes wide open and avoid potentially fatal mistakes.

Operational design is the military attempt to promote flexibility within the constraints of a linear process in response to complex adaptive systems. However, the process is fundamentally linear and constrained by the commander's or planners' inherent biases and creativity. Institutionalised military habits emphasise rational, logical and linear models without reflexively examining the ‘why’ of underlying thought pathways. Furthermore, minimal consideration is given to whether there are other possible methods of thought, particularly in time-poor situations.^[13] This form of linear reasoning combined with a poor understanding of complexity results in reverse-engineered approaches and solutions when planning at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. While adequate for many straightforward and routine problems, implementing a "one size fits all" cognitive approach to every situation, consciously or subconsciously, can put a military force on the back foot in the 21^st century.^[14] Many Defence organisations across the globe have attempted to address this issue by introducing less strict terms such as ‘design’ into linear military planning doctrines. However, this does not change the equation. Truly divergent thinking frameworks approach problem sets and situations in fundamentally different ways than linear military planning processes.^[15] The Australian Defence Force has chosen operational design to promote flexibility of thought. However, commanders and planners must be cognisant that by simply adding less linear terms, the Military Appreciation Process’s ability to manage complex adaptive systems has not miraculously increased.

Time factors and the diverging nature and profile of threats on the contemporary battlefield are additional complex factors that pressure traditional reductionist planning cycles. Even with the prevalence of information-gathering assets and near-instantaneous communication systems, the Napoleonic-era conundrum of commanders making decisions on obsolete information remains. Where orders became irrelevant in the time it took aides to deliver them to frontline commanders.^[16] When considered a complex adaptive system, war is self-organising and emergent, incessantly changing due to major or minor interactions between internal or external agents and the environment itself. Threat-based planning is by its very nature reactive, and analysts may find it extremely challenging to adjust to abrupt shifts in the global environment. A further issue of a threat-driven approach is the reliance on quantitative data, for example, population sizes, consumption rates, or the types and numbers of units or weapon systems.^[17] A key feature of complex adaptive systems is that their output is potentially more than a calculation of its constituent parts would suggest. Furthermore, interactions can result in unpredictable patterns that cannot be estimated in advance. A similar flaw is the superficial evaluation of military power. War is an incredibly complex interaction of states, organisations, individuals, and assets with physical and non-physical effects. Distilling this complexity into the simplistic threat assessments required of linear planning processes using crude numerical comparisons, like division versus division or jet versus jet, is flawed.^[18] Unfortunately, the world is not as impressionable as reductionist planning processes expect and assume it to be. While complex adaptive systems cannot be completely controlled, they can be coped with and influenced.

Strengths of linear military planning

This section will examine the strengths of the logical and linear military planning process by focusing on the following aspects: communicating capability development priorities with the Government and providing numerous viable options for commanders to draw upon. This list of strengths has been developed from the author’s military planning experiences and education at the Australian Command and Staff College; therefore, it only encapsulates a particular perspective. The scope of strengths discussed does not cover all levels and situations in which military planning and the spectrum of competition are pertinent.

To apply military violence against a complex adaptive system, the Department of Defence and, in turn, the Australian Defence Force requires capabilities to be developed, acquired, sustained and replaced. Capability development demands funding and resources that are inevitably under pressure across national strategic demands. The rising cost of living, volatile energy prices, housing affordability concerns, climate-related recovery costs, and an overburdened healthcare system increase the pressure and complexity of the Government’s system. This increasing pressure translates to diverging priorities.^[19] Within this environment, the Department of Defence must communicate successfully with the Government to justify the resources and capabilities required to carry out its assigned tasks and objectives. The Australian Defence Force posits that planning is the most effective method to translate “national interests and political objectives into a series of specific and attainable military objectives” to inform the required capabilities.^[20] However, overly divergent planning can dilute objectives and produce an unconvincing message, a reality of Australia’s current strategic environment. Consensus eludes the country’s strategic thinkers, with many arguing for increased maritime and long-range strike capabilities, others are aligned with Australia’s traditional force structure, and some recommend radical change.^[21] Typically, for both governments and individuals, wants outweigh means. A nation must decide between conflicting needs and mutually exclusive options. Appropriately allocating resources, choosing which goals and actions are most crucial, and determining military priorities are essential parts of strategy and force planning.^[22] A linear planning process with easily communicated outputs is required to inject the Australian Defence Force’s requirements into Government decision-making cycles so that the national ends, ways and means calculations can be completed.

Linear military planning processes offer commanders an understanding of the possible occurrences and outcomes of a specific time slice of war and provide potential implementation options. Freeman and Burns concluded that there are “no scientifically acceptable metrics, in the military or other domains, which would validate current efforts to train or develop adaptability.”^[23] The Australian Defence Force cannot simply accept this thesis, disregard all efforts to conduct planning, enter a conflict with no preparation and interact with the system to merely react to its manifestations. How, then, should the Australian Defence Force train its commanders and planners to survive and win in the complex adaptive system of modern war? Planning is vital to successful military campaigns, operations and engagements as it provides a level of understanding across the force and several potential options for commanders. Because there is a limit to how much cognitive load a human brain can carry, divergent thinking works best in a low-pressure, time-rich atmosphere. With the addition of personal danger, this cognitive load capacity is reduced, and the brain automatically reverts to quick, logical thought processes to understand the complexity. The innate ambiguity, constant evolution and adaptive characteristics of complex adaptive systems render complete understanding and, more importantly, absolute control unachievable.^[24] War is complex and imperfect. The operational design process intends to provide the commander with “enough structure to an ill-structured problem” to plan and connect lower-level actions to higher objectives.^[25] A simple benefit of logical and reductionist planning models is not that they fully understand complex adaptive systems but simplify the complex just enough so that friendly forces can make decent, not perfect, decisions on time.

The art and science of military thinking systems

This section concludes the essay with a pontification on the concepts of system one and system two thinking in the military context and links this to the age-old art versus science of war debate to highlight the benefit of current linear military planning processes.

System two thinking, the science of tactics, is the foundation of theoretical experience that commanders revert to when system one thinking, the art of tactics, is engaged in high-pressure situations. Crunching numbers or evaluating operational reach through logistics calculations work towards the mastery of understanding of your force, the enemy and the operational environment in slower, deliberate scientific system two thinking. However, relying on this thinking style during stressful situations will introduce significant hazards due to a reduction in situational awareness, rendering a commander less likely to make good and timely decisions.^[26] This style of disciplined analysis must be integrated into the experience, intuition and ability of commanders to quickly understand a tactical situation to defeat an adversary. Divergent design style theories are highly suitable for low-pressure and time-rich environments. However, lower-level operational and tactical force elements face a complex, dynamic reality. Tactical units seldom have the luxury to ponder and conduct divergent thinking. The higher commander's intent must be worked towards; otherwise, the friendly agents in the system will cancel each other out and potentially increase risk. Overly divergent theories don't align with this scenario. Design is creating something that doesn't currently exist that the organisation needs tomorrow, however, there will still be planning to do it. Planning is extending what worked yesterday into today, and that works most of the time.^[27] Divergent thinking processes, such as design thinking, seem helpful in generating ideas or novel thinking, but planning is useful for making that idea executable. Increasingly, planners are urged to be unconstrained by conventional techniques and instead use them as the framework for more flexible procedures.^[28] Historically, great commanders could draw on extensive battlefield experience as the basis of their intuitive decision-making and planning. This is no longer the case. Modern commanders do not have the opportunity to hone their military knowledge and skill on a live battlefield. Deliberate systems two thinking must be paired with divergent design processes to prepare commanders before facing a live, high-risk scenario.

Conclusion

This essay argued that linear planning processes are the most effective method of justifying capability development to the Australian Government to then apply those capabilities as military violence in the complex adaptive system of war. Furthermore, linear planning processes are beneficial in providing commanders opportunities to build up a system two thinking foundation to draw from in high-stress system one thinking environments. Complex adaptive systems were defined before being discussed alongside Australia’s contemporary strategic environment. This highlighted that modern war itself is a complex adaptive system, and the diverging role and objectives of the Australian Defence Force in the strategic environment contribute to the emergent system. The weaknesses of linear processes were then contemplated through a focus on the process of Operation Design and the risks of simply rebranding linear processes with divergent terms such as ‘design’. Time and the diverging nature of threats on the contemporary battlefield are further complex factors placing pressure on traditional reductionist planning cycles. The strengths of linear military planning were then examined, highlighting the easily communicated outputs of linear planning models with the Government and the direct benefit of simplifying the complex just enough so that friendly forces can make decent, not perfect, decisions on time. Finally, the art and science of tactics were contemplated to highlight how deliberate systems two thinking must be paired with divergent design processes to prepare commanders before being faced with live, high-risk system one scenarios, as modern commanders do not have the opportunity to hone their military knowledge and skill on a live battlefield as previous generations did.

Disclaimer

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

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Footnotes