Introduction

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, igniting the most significant conflict Europe has experienced since the end of the Second World War.^[1] Many politicians, defence leaders and military analysts expected the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) to be ruthlessly effective, with a meticulously planned military campaign proportionate with the immense risk the campaign imposed on Russia, not only in the theatre of operations, but also within the international community.^[2]  However, the size, scale and extent of the military failures experienced by the RFAF in the nine months since it commenced this historic invasion have left many in the international community surprised.^[3] Shortcomings have included poor equipment; low morale; ineffective communications; breakdowns in logistics support; confusing command and control; a divergence from basic doctrine and military principles and serious failures of military planning.^[4] As the Russia-Ukraine War enters its tenth month, analysts worldwide work to evaluate the RFAF military campaign, its objectives, shortfalls, and successes. This paper will focus on the first thirty days of the invasion, as it is assessed that these initial days are critical to achieving operational and military campaign objectives. This raises the question of how effective was the initial RFAF campaign? And what can the Australian Defence Force (ADF) learn from their failures when planning future military operations and campaigns?

This paper argues that the RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in operational planning. This will be demonstrated through an examination of three of the eight elements for the arrangement of military operations,^[5] which are assessed as having the greatest impact during the initial phase of a military campaign: risk, operational reach, and culminating point. First, it will be important to establish the initial objectives of the RFAF so that the selected elements of military operations can be utilised to evaluate and demonstrate how ineffective the initial military campaign was. Second, this paper will examine the importance of understanding and planning for potential risk, demonstrating that the RFAF either did not identify or blatantly ignored identified risk resulting in needless casualties and destruction of equipment. Third, this paper will examine the importance of understanding and determining when a military force will reach its culminating point, as this is critical for planning sequencing, phasing, resources and risk. The RFAF did not understand their culminating point, forcing them to withdraw from one of their key operational objectives. Finally, this paper will discuss the importance of understanding the ability to successfully project and sustain military forces and capabilities, which will demonstrate that the RFAF afforded little consideration to their supply lines, limiting their ability to sustain operations and the overarching military campaign. Throughout each of these elements, this paper will demonstrate why understanding these key concepts is important to current ADF planners. These arguments show that a lack of flexibility and foresight in operational planning caused the RFAF initial military campaign to become ineffective.

Objectives of the Initial Campaign

To evaluate the RFAF initial military campaign as ineffective, it is important to first understand the initial objectives. This will then allow the selected elements of military operations to be utilised to evaluate and thus demonstrate that due to a lack of flexibility and foresight, the RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective. When the RFAF commenced their invasion on 24 February 2022, President Putin declared Russia’s strategic objectives as “the denazification and demilitarisation of Ukraine”^[6]. Whilst the objectives of the RFAF military campaign may never truly be known, from the outside, it seemed as if the RFAF planned the campaign to be a short blitzkrieg-style operation, in which the RFAF would seize and capture the centre of national power, Kyiv, allowing for the deposal of the Ukrainian president and key leadership.^[7]

After months of build-up on Ukraine’s borders, the RFAF invaded on several fronts with what seemed to be two distinct operational objectives. In the east and southeast, the objective was capturing the Donbas region, which would establish a land corridor between Crimea and Donbas; on the northwest, the objective was to capture Kyiv. After thirty days, Russia had secured neither of these objectives. Operations in the Donbas region appeared to progress much slower than the RFAF anticipated, and the Kyiv campaign was an outright failure. This led the RFAF to withdraw from the Kyiv region and reinforce operations in the Donbas region. The RFAF’s failure to achieve these objectives will now be examined, utilising the previously selected elements for the arrangement of military operations.

Risk

Australian Defence Force Philosophical Doctrine -5 Series – Planning (ADF-P-5 Planning) clearly articulates that “all military action involves risk”.^[8]  For this reason,  “risk management is a necessary component of military planning”.^[9] Whilst it may never be known what the RFAF assessed as risks to their operations and overall campaign, it is highly likely that the RFAF underestimated Ukraine’s cohesion and will to fight,^[10] and thus did not effectively plan for a lengthy campaign, resulting in needless casualties and the destruction of equipment. As repeated attacks on Kyiv were thwarted, and the RFAF in Donbas could not break through the Ukrainian defences, it become clear that Ukraine forces had prevented the RFAF from achieving the quick victory it had planned.^[11] By not identifying or blatantly ignoring this key risk, the RFAF failed to treat this risk. There were no subsequent branch plans or sequels, just a rinse and repeat of the same assault. In essence, they continued with their original plan for a short sharp invasion that would achieve its objectives within the first month. By failing to identify or treat the risk, it became apparent that the RFAF had no plan B. Ultimately, the RFAF failed to identify key risks whilst conducting their planning and as such, they failed to achieve their main objective, and are now still engaged in a military campaign nine months after the initial invasion.  By not identifying key risks, militaries will produce an operational plan that is unable to achieve its identified objectives due to limited flexibility and foresight. What can the ADF learn from the RFAF failure to identify and effectively plan for potential risks in future operations?

The ADF is a small defence force with a finite number of unique capabilities. If planners do not adequately identify risks to commanders during the conduct of planning, not only will the operation fail, but there is the potential that niche and finite capabilities, such as bulk fuel assets or tanks, will be destroyed. Planning for failure is a hard concept for many ADF officers to understand and adapt to, but this is essential when identifying risk. Arguably, our training systems are not established to engrain a culture of tolerating failure.^[12] Staff officers want to present a gold-plated solution to their commander, and the current training environment allows planners to ‘wish away’ some of the potential risks. However, as demonstrated by the RFAF operation and overall campaign, if planners fail to identify potential risks as described in ‘ADF-P 5 Planning’, it will result in a plan that lacks flexibility and foresight and ultimately will not be effective.

Culminating Point

ADF-P-5 Planning states that “a successful campaign or operation should achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point”.^[13]  But what is meant by the term culminating point? And how can it cause your operation to become ineffective? By understanding this term and its importance to achieving success in military operations and campaigns, observers of the Ukraine conflict can deduce the RFAF did not understand nor effectively plan for their culminating point, forcing them to withdraw from one of their key operational objectives within thirty days. Military doctrine defines a culminating point as “the point in time and space beyond which a force lacks the means to achieve an objective or the desired end state”.^[14] Whilst this may be due to “reduced combat power, attrition, or dwindling national support”,^[15] this paper will focus on logistics, as without fuel, ammunition, rations, and medical support, a force will have no ability to continue offensive actions. This is what happened to the RFAF; with shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations widely reported before their withdrawal from Kyiv.^[16]

Twenty-five days after the RFAF commenced its invasion of Ukraine, Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Mark Hertling reflected, “all indicators are that Russia has not kept up with their operations. If they don't keep up logistically, the operation stalls. That's where we've come to. It's called, in military terms, a culminating point of the offense”.^[17] With forces culminating within the first thirty days, Russia had planned for a short war, shaped around rapid operations conducted by elite combat units.^[18] The operational plan was focused on speed with limited consideration given to logistics, affecting the RFAFs ability to resupply or sustain further tactical actions once they were delayed. This ultimately caused culmination and withdrawal from Kyiv. The culmination of RFAF, whilst attempting to capture Kyiv demonstrates that a campaign will be ineffective if there is no flexibility or foresight in its operational plan. Further, it illustrates that logistics and understanding your forces culminating point are highly critical. What then can the ADF learn from this?

General Dwight D. Eisenhower reflected, “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” Stated during the Second World War, his message remains highly relevant for the ADF today and demonstrates the importance of understanding where and when your force will culminate.  The Defence Strategic Update 2020 acknowledges that whilst the chances of Australia contributing to a high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific Region are unlikely, the chances are less remote than ever before.^[19] As such it behoves ADF planners to ensure they understand not only the ADF force structure but likely culmination points during an operation or campaign. Whilst there is no doubt that ADF doctrine clearly articulates the requirements to do so,^[20] an all too familiar theme that runs through the ADF is that training exercises never fully test or push their forces to culmination.

 In 2017, the 3^rd Brigades Ready Battalion Group spent 12 days ‘in the box’ on Exercise Talisman Sabre. They deployed with 10 days of combat supplies and were easily resupplied on the tenth day, just in time for the final assault. Whilst this exercise has its merits and is highly important for deepening interoperability with foreign partners, ‘bounded’ timeframes and significant logistical pre-positioning (outside the exercise scenario) do not promote the requirement for flexibility or foresight in operational planning. If current ADF training does not work to truly stretch and force culmination of our forces, not only is the ADF failing to provide challenging real-world issues to their logisticians, but they will also never establish where the weak points lie in the ADF logistic system. Ultimately there will be no ability to truly fix and improve the system. It befits the ADF to break the logistics system and force logisticians to not just ‘make it happen’ in support of the manoeuvre plan, despite knowing that it is not feasible. Staff planners must be forced to identify culminating points, otherwise as demonstrated in the Russian-Ukraine War, any future military campaign will be ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight.  “Fundamentally linked to a force’s culminating point”^[21] is operational reach, which is the next element to be discussed.

Operational Reach

Carl von Clausewitz observed, “There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war”.^[22] As the RFAF conducted their operational planning for the assault and capture of Kyiv, did they truly consider their operational reach? The pictures of a Russian logistic convoy, backed up for over sixty kilometres on a road to the south of Kyiv, that were famously flashed around the world by media outlets, demonstrates they did not. What is operational reach and why is it so important? By defining operational reach, it will demonstrate the importance of this key element in arranging military operations whilst also highlighting the limited consideration the RFAF gave to this element, which affected their ability to effectively sustain their military campaign. Operational reach is defined as “the distance and duration across which a force element can successfully employ military capabilities, whilst it is possible to extend a force’s operational reach through the forward position of capabilities and resources”,^[23] this is not always achievable, as was the case for the RFAF. It is clear the RFAF had a focus on quickly capturing their objective, demonstrating they did not effectively consider nor quantify their operational reach.

With limited access to rail and roads congested with RFAF vehicles, the RFAF was unable to push fuel, rations, or ammunition to its ground forces, resulting in an ability to adequately resupply troops forcing them to culminate. The failure to achieve operational reach has arguably increased the RFAF death toll unnecessarily, as there is limited ability to transport wounded and ill soldiers to the required level of health care.^[24] Arguably, this has been a contributor to declining morale amongst the RFAF, further compounding problems with combat effectiveness. The inability of RFAF to resupply its forces throughout the area of operations demonstrates the importance of understanding and effectively planning the ability to achieve operational reach. As demonstrated by the RFAF in the Russian-Ukraine War, if this is not achieved, a military campaign will be ineffective due to limited flexibility and foresight in its operational plan. What then, can the ADF learn from this?

The Russian-Ukraine War has highlighted the importance of logistics in military planning, yet arguably the ADF still does not train as it would be required to fight. Further examination of Exercise Talisman Sabre provides examples of our inability to actually test our operational reach, but also opportunities to achieve this. Every time the ADF deploys on Exercise Talisman Sabre, it not only force projects overwhelming reliant on ground lines of communication, but it ‘white boxes’ the deployment and redeployment. Why is the ADF not deploying how it would deploy to a region within the Indo-Pacific? Why is the ADF not using ADF sea and air assets to arrive at the exercise area? This would also stop units from stockpiling and hoarding stores and combat supplies, placing stress on the logistic chain and forcing planners to consider in detail its operational reach.

Finally, a key factor in operational reach is distance. In every Talisman Sabre, the majority of the ADF's logistic capabilities are placed within fifty kilometres of the exercise area, with the Brigade Maintenance Area never more than twenty kilometres from the fighting force. The Russian-Ukraine War has demonstrated that this is not always practical and potential, and not always achievable. Australia is a massive island; why is the ADF not utilising this geographic size to their advantage and testing the abilities of their logistics systems and units to achieve operational reach? As an organisation, the ADF must not just identify operational reach in doctrine and then provide exercises that do not truly force planners to produce flexible plans that have the required foresight to achieve this. Future military exercises must force the ADF to truly test its operational reach, otherwise as demonstrated in the Russian-Ukraine War, any future military campaign will be ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in its operational planning.  

Conclusion

This paper has argued that RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in operational planning, and narrowed its focus to the initial thirty days, as it assessed these initial days as the most critical, and ultimately contributed to and continues to affect the RFAFs shortcomings. First, this paper established that the initial objective of the RFAF campaign was to overrun Ukraine in a blitzkrieg military operation, allowing them to swiftly capture the capital city and depose the Ukrainian Government. This paper then utilised three of the eight elements for the arrangement of military operations to demonstrate that the initial military campaign had been ineffective. Second, it discussed the importance of identifying risks to the commander when planning. This allows the commander to treat the risk, the will of the people to fight was clearly not identified by the RFAF in their planning, and as such, they failed to achieve their main objective and are still engaged in a military campaign nine months after the initial invasion.

This paper then demonstrated that RFAF did not understand nor effectively plan for their culminating point, causing them to withdraw from one of their key operational objectives within thirty days. Finally, the importance of operational reach was discussed, which demonstrated that if this is not carefully considered and planned for forces will culminate.

Throughout these arguments, comparisons were drawn to the ADF to demonstrate that to successfully plan and execute operations or military campaigns in our near region, as specified in the Defence Strategic Update 2020, the ADF must learn from the hard lessons of the RFAF during this conflict. The ADF must develop a culture of failure tolerance, it must utilise exercises to break the logistic systems so that it can test the ADF's operational reach and culminating point; if they do not, like the RFAF, they will become ineffective in future operations and military campaigns. Finally, this paper demonstrated that the RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in its operational planning.

Disclaimer

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

Bibliography

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———. "Russian Military Logistics." (June 2022). https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2022/06/ICDS_Brief_Russias_War_in_Ukraine_No3_Ronald_Ti_June_2022.pdf.

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Footnotes

¹ Bobo Lo, Turning point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2022), Report.https://apo.org.au/node/317995.

² Michael Jonsson & Johan Norberg Robert Dalsjö, "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War," Survival, 63:3 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044; Ronald Ti, "Russia's War in Ukraine: Russian Military Logistics, "Series No.3 (June 2022); Phillips Payson O'Brien, "How the West Got Russia's Military So, So Wrong," (31 March 2022); Andriy Zagorodnyuk, "Ukrainian victory shatters Russia’s reputation as a military superpower," (13 September 2022 ).

³ Christopher Dougherty, "Strange Debacle: Misadventures in Assessing Russian Military Power," (16 June 2022); Holly Ellyatt, "Russia’s chaotic and confusing invasion of Ukraine is baffling military analysts," CNBC 04 March 2022.

⁴ Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War," Survival 64, no. 3 (2022/05/04 2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044; Rebecca Armitage and Lucy Sweeney, "Vladimir Putin's war has not gone to plan. Here are Russia's three biggest failures in Ukraine so far," (18 May 2022); Paul Dibb, "China will be watching and learning from Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine," Australian Strategic Policy Institute  (03 May 2022), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-will-be-watching-and-learning-from-russias-poor-performance-in-ukraine/; James Dwyer, "3 ways Russia has shown military ‘incompetence’ during its invasion of Ukraine," (14 March 2022); Seth G. Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine," (June 2022).

⁵ Australian Defence Force, ADF-P-5 Planning 15-18 (2021).

⁶ President of Russia Vladimir Putin, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation," (24 February 2022 ). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843.

⁷ Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine," 1-4.

⁸ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 56.

⁹ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 59.

¹⁰ Nigel Gould-Davies, "Putin's Strategic Failure," Survival 64, no. 2 (2022/03/04 2022): 7, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2055818.

¹¹ Dalsjö, Jonsson, and Norberg, "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War," 14-15.

¹² Darren Murch, "Learning from our Mistakes: Tolerating Failure versus Allowing Failure,"  (12 December 2019), https://cove.army.gov.au/article/learning-our-mistakes-tolerating-failure-versus-allowing-failure.

¹³ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 58.

¹⁴ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 58.

¹⁵ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 58-59.

¹⁶ Ronald Ti, "Russian Military Logistics," (June 2022): 1.https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2022/06/ICDS_Brief_Russias_War_in_Ukraine_No3_Ronald_Ti_June_2022.pdf.

¹⁷ CNN, "CNN Live Event/Special," (21 March 2022). https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2022-03-21/segment/01.

¹⁸ Lawerence Freedman, "Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power," (July 2022). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails.

¹⁹ Australia Government, The Defence Strategic Update, 1-16 (2020).

²⁰ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 10-60.

²¹ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 59.

²² Carl von Clausewitz, On war / Carl von Clausewitz; edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie; with a commentary by Bernard Brodie, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976).

²³ Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning

²⁴ Bonnie Berkowitz and Artur Galocha, "Why the Russian military is bogged down by logistics in Ukraine," Washington Post 30 March 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/.