Introduction

When attempting to predict the future the basic idea is to derive the widest collection of possibilities, rather than just a narrow set of misleading or inevitable options.^[1] The future environments for military operations could include an environment that is data-centric, all-domain, and uses a kill-web. As such the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and other militaries are working to use their current acquisition models to obtain systems to this end. The ADF currently employs a Service-, platform-, and network-driven approach to capability development and acquiring new systems. Research and public discourse indicate that the ADF needs to reform its acquisition and force design processes to make acquiring military power a faster process.^[2] Many within the national security space continue to ask whether the current system can support the development of military technologies in an all-domain kill-web environment.

Within such an environment, the strengths of the ADF’s current capability development model provide it flexibility that will allow it to overcome any weaknesses or threats within the approach. What follows is not an analysis of what the future will hold for warfare but an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in how the ADF currently conducts capability development to support the future. To expand upon this argument the first section explores how the current model provides flexibility to create opportunities that the ADF can exploit to best position itself. The second section then identifies the key weaknesses of the current model to underscore the threats these weaknesses present in the ADF’s approach to organising the application of military violence in the future operating environment. Both sections build upon themselves by looking at three aspects of the current capability development model; Service, platforms, and networks. By looking at these aspects separately one can best see the system as a whole and understand the overall opportunities it creates across the widest range of possible futures.

Before moving on it is important to define data-centric all-domain kill-web environment. The best way to define the concept is to break it into three sub-phrases. In the first sub-phrase, data-centric, the military focuses on systems of distributed computing components that help it store, manipulate, and use information.^[3] The concept of "data centricity" may not mean the same thing to everyone, but the basic function of creating value from data remains the same. All-domain refers to activities of the armed forces in the physical and electromagnetic spaces and currently consists of the land, sea, air, space, and cyber dimensions of warfighting. The term can be traced back to the early 2000s from discussions around what comes after the ‘joint’ operations of the Gulf War. US Training and Doctrine Command developed the current operational concept in 2014 in order to win in complex environments.^[4] Throughout this article, the phrase kill-web environment will indicate highly resilient nodes of distinct functions that create a mosaic concept of elasticity that can adapt to individual losses absorbed by the system.^[5] To synthesise these separate definitions into one. A data-centric all-domain kill-web environment is a distributed and resilient environment of information that links multi-domain sensory inputs to designated systems to deliver effects in the land, sea, air, cyber, and/or space domains.

Strengths of the Current Capability Development Model

A Service-, platform-, and network-driven approach provides certain opportunities for the application of military effects using a data-centric all-domain kill-web environment. An understanding of a particular domain's input into all-domain sensing, command and control, and strike capabilities is possible in a Service-driven system.^[6] As a result, the ADF as a whole can benefit from individual services' capabilities to detect adversaries, deliver effects, and assess effects' impacts by maintaining a Service-driven approach to acquiring systems. "The rapid evolution of distributed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) [technology]” by Air Force capability demonstrates how the Army benefited from another Service's acquisitions.^[7] Not only did persistent ISR enable Army targeting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but modernized airborne ISR capabilities continue to enable a multi-layered approach to generate data for the kill-web environment. Of note, some critics have identified that the current Service-driven model requires a prioritization for a higher level of convergence and cooperation from the Services than what currently exists.^[8] However, over the past 50 years, the ADF has reorganised with a joint focus and the 2016 Defence White Paper refocused capability towards a joint and integrated approach to increase synergy from projects.^[9] A Service-driven model enables the ADF to apply military violence in future operations because it allows for the Services to excel within their specialities within the idea of all-domain convergence.

Unlike Service-driven, a platform-driven system can focus on specific joint capabilities like the Joint Strike Fighter or Joint Light Tactical Vehicle platforms, which seek to provide a service-agnostic capability. A platform-driven system provides the ADF with the most flexibility when acquiring capability because it allows for the incorporation of Commercial/Military-off-the-Shelf (COTS/MOTS) components.^[10] The platform model allows for an overarching vision of larger platforms to efficiently incorporate off-the-shelf components, which require less development time and enable an evolutionary approach to upgrading subsystems on the platform.^[11] The advantage of MOTS/COTS has been shown to provide a better understanding of the initial costs for procurement because a traditional purpose-design process can swing by 40%.^[12] So not only does a platform-driven model provide a potentially shorter acquisition schedule, but also reduces developmental risk with off-the-shelf systems while allowing for more accurate cost estimates. Notwithstanding, focusing on platforms can inhibit how ADF systems integrate, which reduces their ability to deliver force-multiplying effects because it was not a goal for the system from the onset to enable the entire kill-web.^[13] However, frameworks and interoperability standards like ADF environment policy and the Information Security Manual (ISM) ensure that a platform-driven model maintains secure linkages with the nodes and other platforms.^[14] The strength of such a system provides platform flexibility with joint and off-the-shelf capabilities that can plug into the kill-web environment to increase the efficient use of military violence.

To expand upon the linkage of platforms on the network, the main advantage of a network-driven system is its ability to allow connectivity to the kill-web environment regardless of device or weapons platform. Within the ADF, the network enables a function or mission task and uses a platform agnostic approach to create resiliency because the network can “automatically push and pull mission-relevant and timely information to assist the user.”^[15] When US Army artillery engaged a target detected by a satellite in a matter of seconds at the Project Convergence 2020 (PC 20) exercise it demonstrated the strength of a platform agnostic network.^[16] As more systems integrate into the network the kill-web environment gains nodes and data-inputs increasing the number of paths and connections, which gives the ADF flexibility and speed to organise all-domain military operations. It is important to acknowledge that this level of connectivity creates vulnerabilities—specifically cyber risks—because the interconnectedness allows for threat actors to pivot within the network to escalate their privileges and access other platforms.^[17] However, since 2017 the ADF has begun to revolutionize its staffing, training, and policy to enable the acquisition of cyber-secure joint capabilities.^[18] The current system provides strengths like Service specialization and network/platform agnostic nodes within the kill-web environment to aid in the application of military violence.

The strengths of the current model also provide opportunities for the future employment of all-domain military operations. A Service-, platform-, and network-driven system provides two specific opportunities. Firstly, it provides the opportunity for the ADF to leverage joint and cross-domain effects. An example of this would be a cyber system crossing into the physical domain to degrade an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system.^[19] Secondly, the current model provides the ADF with access to the global supply chain and provides increased options or speed.^[20] These two opportunities highlight the flexibility of the current model to move between different areas to enable more robust solutions from industry. Project Convergence 2022 (PC 22) demonstrated these two opportunities.^[21] The exercise allowed the ADF, Australian researchers, and industry partners to demonstrate “new robotic devices, sensors, imaging, and fires capabilities in a field setting” alongside UK and US forces.^[22] PC 22 experimented with larger scenarios and larger formations to demonstrate the capacity of the current technologies to incorporate a more joint and multinational aspect to modern warfighting. However, PC 21 experimented with various connections to support a dynamic kill-web environment but identified that joint situational awareness struggled to reach its goals to enable a commander to “see” the battlefield.^[23] This “sight” will be crucial in the ADF’s search for capabilities operating in a data-centric environment. As such, the technology demonstrations by the ADF at PC 22 and future exercises will be crucial in understanding how flexible the current acquisition model can be in learning from the struggles and moving forward.

Weaknesses of Current Capability Development

Using flexibility, the previous section highlighted the strengths of the existing acquisition model, and the following section will highlight some of its weaknesses. A Service-driven system's primary weakness is its focus on a single domain of warfare. While this does allow for specialization and mastery it creates a weakness in creating joint, let alone multinational, effects through all domains. This specialization effectively has become stove-pipes at Russel where Service chiefs end up being the main “touchpoint between different projects and Services.”^[24] Acquisition works to efficiently procure a capability for the ADF. As such, the evolving character of war towards converged effects utilizing various domains requires an appreciation for a whole-of-ADF approach to system development. The US military’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept presents a way to possibly break down the traditional stovepipes to allow a ride-share approach to sharing data seamlessly amongst the Joint force to support the kill-web environment.^[25] While still in the concept phase, such a model for the ADF would allow it to work within its current acquisition system to better organise the application of military violence as a Joint force. However, command and control are only one aspect of military operations and the ADF would still need to rework the Service-driven model for a fully Joint all-domain vision to secure strike, lift, or other warfighting functions to overcome this weakness.

Along the lines of its single domain focus, the ADF has excelled at providing platforms but struggles to ensure that those systems are integrated into the overall mission or system of system(s) (SoS/s). A unique characteristic of the model is its ability to develop and field exquisite platforms while incentivizing industry to lobby for large contracts with backend maintenance support. However, the development of an interconnected web environment to support the military has “not always [been] seen as lucrative from an industry perspective.”^[26] This was demonstrated at PC 21 where the experimentation team expected situational awareness to be the easiest problem in creating the all-domain kill-web, but found it to be the hardest.^[27] The nebular and non-platform nature of such an environment is novel for industry. Like a cloud-based service, the ADF is seeking the infrastructure and software necessary to enable its platforms to align the appropriate forces and shooters against all the targets it has trapped in its kill-web. This type of capability lacks the concrete effects of traditional platforms such as tanks, ships, or planes, which increases the difficulty in assessing a capabilities overall effectiveness and suitability for its mission. Nonetheless, the ADF must overcome this struggle if it wants to achieve interconnectedness in a data-centric kill-web environment that embraces all domains.

Another issue that PC 21 highlighted was the lack of a data fabric to weave together the information into a salient stream. The current acquisition model and the network-driven system generally rely on Service acquisitions of networks which limits interoperability across the domains. Such an acquisition strategy does not enable the procurement of the kill-web environment needed to organise the efficient application of military violence. The networks of old lack the data fabric to link “disparate systems and technologies for a more seamless flow of information.”^[28] A key example of this within the ADF is the sporadic interoperability of radios. Specifically, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter with a closed architecture comes with radio hardware that is tightly coupled with its software package and lacks the modularity for adding new systems.^[29] The future data fabric requires an open architecture like Link-16. It is important to note that while there are benefits in coalition interoperability by closely following the US development of JADC2 and its future military concept there are some drawbacks for ADF networks. The scale and specific mission set of the ADF may require the procurement of a different network to enable the unique geographical and infrastructure of Australia’s strategic environment. Due to this, the ADF's network-driven system stove-piped along Service lines limits its ability to acquire the right systems to support a data-centric all-domain kill-web environment.

The weaknesses in the current model highlight disintegrated communications along Service lines. However, the weaknesses emphasise how quantum computing can threaten the ADF’s goal of efficiently controlling military violence in the future operating environment. Quantum computing can significantly impact “communications, sensing, navigation and guidance systems, clocks, resource exploration, hazard detection,” and encryption.^[30] The proposed speed and efficiency of future computing could present an evolutionary shift in military operations equivalent to views of the 1991 Gulf War. If quantum can enable more secure communications, navigation, and encryption while allowing the near-instantaneous decryption of enemy communications there could be a significant change in the relative powers and current views of dominance. This has been demonstrated in how a data-centric approach has enhanced the all-domain military operations. Thus, the dominance or control of the data will provide a marked advantage to those who can most efficiently collect, process, exploit, and disseminate the data to provide understanding and options to military leaders.

Quantum computing has the potential of supercharging current machine learning and leading to other breakthroughs in cryptography. One must understand that this “revolution” is still n years away and it is still not understood what is hype and what might be achievable. It may be the case that quantum computing will only serve to aid in the execution of a limited number of applications or fields.^[31] Although quantum was highlighted as a threat to the ADF’s current model other relevant technologies—such as applied artificial intelligence, robotic automation, and additive manufacturing—pose a similar risk to operating in the future environment. Regardless, the current acquisition process must remain as flexible as possible to account for the impacts of future disruptive technologies. This will enable the ADF to continue to acquire the most efficient systems to enable its application of military violence.

Conclusion

The current model for ADF capability development provides three key strengths that allow it flexibility in acquiring systems for a data centric all-domain kill-web environment. Firstly, a Service-driven system's specialized nature means expertise from one domain can propagate into other domains and Services for mutual benefit. Secondly, the platform-driven aspect of the model allows the use of MOTS/COTS equipment that provides flexibility in using coalition equipment and benefits from cost savings in development. Lastly, the network model enables a data- and platform-agnostic approach to flexibly choosing the best nodes within the kill-web to prosecute a mission. As a whole, these strengths give the ADF the flexibility in development to acquire capabilities that can move across the domains so that a cyber system can have physical effects within the kill-web.

The weaknesses in the system demonstrated that Service biases and stovepipes can severely hamper the ADF’s ability to maximize the effectiveness in organizing the application of military violence. These stovepipes coupled with disruptive technologies, like quantum computing, threaten the data processing advantages currently within the ADF and coalition partners. As the ADF's capability development model currently stands, it provides it with flexibility that enables it to overcome any of these weaknesses or threats.

The two main implications of this research are ensuring flexibility in a Service-, platform-, and network-driven approach and understanding with as much warning time as possible the impacts of future disruptive technologies. Hence, future studies into this topic should try to understand what technologies or future concepts might most degrade the flexibility in the ADF’s approach. This cannot be limited to just technologies, but expanded to tactics like the anti-access and area denial (A2AD) concept or the current use of dual-use technologies in Ukraine.^[32] Such studies will further highlight more opportunities for the ADF to take advantage of and threats to avoid within the current capability development model. With this more complete understanding and a persistent eye on the future operating environment, the ADF stands the best chance of positioning itself correctly to enable its organization of military violence regardless of what environment it encounters.

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government. Examples of analysis performed within this article are only examples. They should not be utilized in real-world analytic products as they are based only on very limited and dated open-source information. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity.

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.