Future Workforce 2025 - Scherger Group

Under the auspices of the ‘Scherger Group’, a small gathering was held in Canberra to discuss some of the challenges of building a future workforce for the RAAF.

06/09/2019

<5 min

Compiled by Wing Commander Jo Brick ¹

"One constant across all of military history is the critical role of people. Far more than technology, platforms, or luck, human assets have always been the single biggest determinant of military success or failure. As such, attracting, developing, retaining, and empowering skilled personnel is the biggest challenge for the modern military."
Ref: J. Furman Daniel III, 21st Century Patton – Strategic Insights for the Modern Era

Air Forces are generally techno-centric organisations, and often express themselves through technology. The more advanced, the better! Consequently, much of the discussion about the future of the Air Force centres on artificial intelligence – in either an autonomous or human-machine variant; the networked strike fighter with its sophisticated sensors and weapons suites; advances in technology related to intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance; and electronic or cyber warfare. In other words, the focus is on technologies rather than on the humans who will need to lead and fully exploit these capabilities as part of a larger joint force.

There is a need for specific work to create a culture where creativity and innovation, balanced against the discipline for military operations, prepares people to prevail in the uncertainty of future warfare, which inevitably involves pushing the boundaries between peace and war. The challenge for Air Force is to create a level of specificity to provide useful guidance in recruitment, training, education, and development of its workforce to maximise the high end capabilities hat are coming into service in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and to use those capabilities in a joint and integrated context that is ambiguous and dynamic.

Under the auspices of the ‘Scherger Group’, a small gathering was held in Canberra to discuss some of the challenges of building a future workforce for the RAAF. ² The discussion from those gathered was both energetic and insightful. While the discussion was based on developing RAAF personnel, it became clear early in the conversation that the same general considerations for developing the human intellectual edge also apply to the Army and the Navy. The intention of this gathering was to have an open discussion on some broad workforce issues, while acknowledging that these problems are going to require significant consideration and framing – to ensure the right questions are being asked, and to look at possible ways ahead. ³

The issues discussed were focused on several key questions:

What does future conflict look like?
What will the future Air Force workforce need to look like?
What skills / knowledge / attitudes do these personnel need?

Future conflict?

Any forecasts that attempt to predict, in detail, the future of conflict and warfare is bound to be wrong. This is reminiscent of the point made by Sir Michael Howard who said: ‘No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the nature of future conflict. The key is not to be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed’. For this reason, the development of bespoke designs for the future workforce are not likely to be useful.

Contemporary literature and discussions about the future of war commonly refer to a taxonomy of warfare and competition that includes multi-domain battle, hybrid war, cyber war, war in space, the use of artificial intelligence, human-machine teaming, dependency on integrated networks for communication and decision-making; the centrality of time and speed as key features of the future battlespace. This makes prognostication about the future of war incredibly difficult, with any detailed predictions destined to be off the mark.

One characteristic of the contemporary security environment that is likely to continue is the need for cooperation and coordination across government. As Rosa Brooks argued, the military cannot be everything, and the military must continue to work with other government departments – like Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Federal / State / Territory police, and the National Intelligence Community – to create a continuity of security and defence efforts to span the ‘grey zone’. A corollary to coordination is to ensure that advice to the Minister for Defence, the Chief of Defence Force, and other Service Chiefs and Defence principals is cognisant of the limits of the military option, and an appreciation of the nuances of strategic environment. If we can acknowledge these requirements, then we can consider some of the broad characteristics required of personnel in the future workforce.

Future workforce considerations

Traditional models, traditions, and the profession. Personnel management for the contemporary Air Force, as all military organisations, is based on stability and certainty, which facilitate long term workforce planning – determining the numbers for recruitment, retention, and retirement. Yet the future Air Force will need more flexibility – to obtain access to the required expertise or services to support the delivery of air power, as directed by the Chief of Air Force on behalf of the CDF / Minister. The flexibility required is analogous to modern fighter aircraft which has a level of inherent instability that enables it to be agile and responsive but has a sophisticated flight control system that provides the stability and control to correct course and trajectory when needed.

The customs and traditions of the profession of arms are important foundations for military forces. The military profession implies rights and obligations in relation to the state, in exchange for the privilege to use of lethal force in times of war. These customs and traditions and the mantle of ‘profession’ are sometimes seen as obstacles to change and the construction of an agile workforce, due largely to the authoritative and hierarchical structures that characterise military organisations. New ways of thinking are required around command and control to establish a culture in which creative / disruptive / heretical thinking is necessary to address novel problems faced in an operational environment.

Team of teams. An important question discussed was: Who is in the team? How do we determine who / what is in the team? One suggestion is to consider ‘Team of Teams’ approach, where the membership of the team changes according to who/what is required to add value to the goals of the team? A ‘team of teams’ approach is one involving a network based on trust relationships that has a shared consciousness / a shared mission. The concept was articulated by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, based on his Joint Special Operations Command experience. It is one that can perhaps best accommodate inter-agency / industry partnership / inter-governmental approaches to national security problems in a much better way than traditional hierarchical organisations. To establish this approach, relationships of trust and habits of cooperation and coordination are essential to ensure that the team of teams is agile, adaptable, and responsive.

Trust and teaming. ‘Trust’ in teams is essential to creating a culture of agility and adaptability in a human workforce. The introduction of machines to the ‘trust’ proposition also becomes important when considering the future workforce. The issue of human-machine teaming is one that is the subject of considerable contemporary discussion, and one that will only become more important as capabilities with varying levels of artificial intelligence are developed. How will the future workforce interact with these sophisticated capabilities as other team members? What kind of people do we need to develop, maintain, and use these technologies? In a networked team of teams, who is accountable and responsible for decision-making – where does ‘command responsibility’ reside?

Buy / build / borrow. Relationships with industry are becoming stronger today, due largely to the increased reliance on highly specialised skills for maintenance, the difficulties of managing ‘commercial-in-confidence’, and foreign military sales restrictions relating to intellectual property and security classifications as part of capability sustainment. This raises the question of proportion of workforce required in uniform, versus the numbers of contractors from industry partners, for the sustainment of RAAF platforms like the Joint Strike Fighter. It is likely that the JSF experience will become the norm, and will likely dictate the need for skilled uniformed workforce required for sustainment of such sophisticated weapon systems. The ‘team of teams’ approach will therefore likely involve these industry partners.

An associated issue is ‘supply and demand segmentation’ as a driver for RAAF workforce planning. The questions underlying this issue are: What will contractors do? What will military personnel do? Some people take time to ‘build’ and ‘grow’ because of their specialist skill sets in a military context. However, some skills can be ‘bought’ via industry partnerships or contractor support because there is a significant civilian sector market for these people. What proportion of the RAAF can be ‘bought’ or contracted, and which ones do we need to ‘build’?

One example provided related to the doctors and medical staff that were incorporated into the British military from the British National Health Service. This was considered a more efficient and effective means to access highly experienced and skilled doctors, nurses, and other medical specialists in a limited time frame for a particular operation, particularly when considering the significant lead time in ‘growing’ these personnel within the military. The NHS also obtained benefits from this arrangement, as their personnel gained unique experience in handling battlefield injuries and trauma.

Considering all the factors discussed above, perhaps the RAAF must be guided by the Lego approach – that ‘people don’t have to work for us to work with us’. However, this ‘open innovation’ approach taken by Lego was the result of declining profits that necessitated change. Military organisations lack the imminence of such signalling to advance reform, with dire security situations leading to conflict manifesting in short time frames when such reforms are too little too late. ‘Open innovation’ requires risk taking and novel approaches that are underwritten by leadership that recognises that we cannot wait for the dire security circumstances to drive change, and that some trial and error of innovative approaches are required now to address the challenges of the future.

What skills / knowledge / attributes do future personnel need?

As flagged at the start, the future is likely to have similarities to the contemporary context. Addressing future challenges require cooperation and coordination outside the military domain, particularly if a ‘team of teams’ approach is to be taken. This demands personnel who are adaptable, resilient and innovative networkers who can operate on the basis of intent in a decentralised context. Assuming the organisational structures and cultures are in place (noting the complexities of workforce structure discussed above), what skills / knowledge / attributes does the future Air Force member need? In broad terms, intelligence, creativity and innovation, as well as strategic thinking and the ability to work in diverse teams (emotional intelligence) were considered to be the foundational skills / knowledge / attributes for future personnel.

Ender. In discussions with fellow sci-fi loving military officers, Ender Wiggin – the protagonist in Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game, is often heralded as the epitome of the creativity, innovation, and resilience that is desirable in a future military personnel. In their National Defense University paper, ‘Finding Ender’, Bryant and Harrison explain that Ender’s Game is ‘also a parable for defense policymakers who are confronting the multifaceted problem set of recruiting, training, educating, and retaining military personnel capable of fighting and winning the Nation’s wars in a time of technological change and international volatility.’ Bryant and Harrison argue that fundamental changes to the military organisation’s process and culture are necessary to find the Enders, and propose the development of sophisticated talent management systems to do so.

Talent management is in its nascent form in the RAAF, which is founded on the development of officers and airmen in specific specialisations – pilot, mission aircrew, logistician, engineer, aviation technician, clerk, imagery analyst, personnel specialist, legal officer, medical officer, intelligence officer, and so on. The talent management system is intended to find the ‘Enders’ amongst the specialists – perhaps as a way of finding those to develop outside of their ‘stovepipes’ for broader roles including strategic level leadership. The difficulty is the habitual and cultural sentimentality and assumptions attached to certain specialisations – primarily aircrew – that place them at the centre of the organisation. Each of the Services has their own similar type of biases. The problem with this approach, and one that talent management may be able to mitigate, is that creativity, innovation, and resilience – the ‘Ender traits’ – are fundamentally human ones that are not exclusively bound to the DNA of certain specialists. To maximise the ‘human’ capital of the current and future Air Force, then the personnel development and talent management systems need to focus on the ‘humans’ rather than the specialists.

Education / learning / play and failure. A fundamental aspect of preparing the current and future workforce for the challenges of future competition and conflict is professional military education. This ‘Intellectual Edge’ is considered to be important in maximising the technological advantages that may accrue to a smaller force. Traditionally, education raises connotations of traditional classroom lectures and discussion. While this is still the case, there is also a place for learning through play / testing and managing failure via wargames and wargaming as being a regular part of individual and collective training and education. Such mechanisms provide for a safe place to push concepts to breaking point, find weaknesses in plans, and to develop ways of thinking and strategic acumen.

Culture. Finding Ender is only half the solution. The other half is to create an organisational culture where such individuals can thrive. In traditional, hierarchical, military organisations, uniformity and conformity are prized and oddities are assimilated or discarded. These traditional ways of thinking about developing personnel naturally come into conflict with the need to grow people who are creative and innovative, and are expected to consider and develop novel approaches to the complexity of future competition and conflict.

Established norms and status quo policies and practices must either evolve or ‘break’ to allow the novel idea or concept to take hold. This is perhaps the traditional tension between Daedalus and Icarus, which is often discussed in air power circles. In his Air & Space Power Journal article, Trew argues that ‘air mindedness’ for the future Air Force will require holding the characteristics of Daedalus (experience and wisdom) and Icarus (passionate, rebellious artist) together in creative tension. Leadership is necessary for this to be successful – leadership provides the guidance /intent / direction and underwrites the risk of Icarus’ creativity and drive, which are both broadly considered necessary to address future competition and conflict.

Next steps?

In a recent CAF Directive (10 May 2019), Air Marshal Davies identified a number of ‘Fifth-Generation Behaviours’ that highlights the attributes of personnel that are necessary to support the Fifth-Generation Air Force. AIRMSHL Davies said that these behaviours ‘will ensure Air Force can successfully operate in a complex environment where airmen will need to work with high volumes of data, understand and embrace new technology and easily integrate with Army, Navy and Coalition partners to create a joint effect’. He also mentioned the need for agility to use these behaviours . A ‘People Capability Attributes and Behaviours’ diagram depicted the five core attributes for a Fifth-Generation Workforce – Agile / Informed / Collaborative / Resilient / Integrated.

These characteristics form a good foundation on which to build the future workforce – it is an aspirational goal for the Air Force to work towards in dealing with its personnel. However, as discussed in the group, the difficulty will be in the transition – in changing the existing structures, culture, and attitudes within the Air Force and the wider Defence organisation, to get to where CAF needs us to be.

As a final thought, we also need to think outside of ourselves if we are to be successful in transitioning to a new structure and culture that cultivates the personnel we need. As renowned educator and advocate for reform of the education system, Ken Robinson, stated in Out of Our Minds ‘Employers say they want people who can think creatively, who can innovate, who can communicate well, work in teams and are adaptable and self-confident.’ The Air Force and the ADF want the same characteristics in people as employers in the civilian sector. There needs to be a recognition that the Air Force, and the other Services / Defence generally, cannot expect to create the people to enable a Fifth-Generation Air Force alone. The ADF and the Defence Department are constituted of people from wider Australian society. This means we are subject to wider societal and demographic factors that impact on how Australians live and work. We are also at the whim of factors we cannot fully control: we are reliant on advances in technology and expertise in the civilian sector and we need to stay in touch with such developments. Perhaps more importantly, the ADF is reliant upon the broader education system as a feeder for our membership – we cannot build our future workforce on poor foundations.

Footnotes

Facilitator for this session of the Scherger Group.
2 The ‘Scherger Group’ is a network of individuals motivated to constructively engage with key strategic issues to improve the depth of understanding and quality of advice to senior decision-makers. The Group provides a mechanism, independent of existing organisations, to bring together a diverse array of individuals with the specific expertise, qualities, and motivation to cultivate professional depth in areas of strategic importance and provide alternative perspectives to those developed through existing institutional norms.
This note is based on the key points raised in the course of discussing the questions below. I have attempted to group together the key points based on the notes I took during the discussion. Any errors are mine. I have also added additional material and references where I have considered that they may contribute to the ideas discussed at the workshop.

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.