Clausewitz and Adaptive Leadership

Clausewitz’s teachings have stood the test of time—but do they still apply today? We uncork the “old wine” of his insights and pour them into the “new bottle” of adaptive leadership.

11/03/2025

> 30 min

Obviously, this is an act of the imagination. Things are perceived, of course, partly by the naked eye and partly by the mind, which fills the gaps with guesswork based on learning and experience, and thus constructs a whole out of the fragments that the eye can see.

Clausewitz, On War^[1]

Introduction

In many contemporary leadership courses^[2] students are often told that the leadership environment in which they now find themselves is new and different from that which existed prior to the end of the Cold War^[3]. This new environment is characterised by Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA) and requires an adaptive leadership approach to succeed and thrive^[4].

The notion of VUCA was introduced by the US Army War College in the 1990s.^[5] The assumption being that military leadership was facing greater VUCA challenges after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR. The concept of VUCA related to an emerging and particularly destructive type of warfare^[6], the proliferation of nuclear weapons. With the demise of the ‘Eastern Bloc’ as ‘the one enemy’, the challenge was to find and implement new ways of seeing and responding under conditions of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity.^[7]

While nuclear arms certainly raised the level of threat and risk, the idea that war itself has become inherently more VUCA in the intervening years is debateable. Carl von Clausewitz, an officer in the Prussian army of the 1800s, wrote extensively on the nature of war between the years 1815 and 1830. His seminal study on the practice of warfare, On War was published posthumously in 1832. Throughout his extensive discourse, he addressed the unpredictability inherent in war. Indeed, ‘early in his studies Clausewitz recognised that the missing factor [between theory and reality] was the uncertainty, unpredictability, and friction of war’.^[8] He proposed that: ‘The various concepts of chance, uncertainty, probability, friction, the fog of war, and genius are all strongly related and interconnected.’^[9] These elements appear, at least prima facie, almost identical to the elements of VUCA.

So where does this leave us as students of Leadership? Do we throw out the old and adopt the new without question? Or should be consider both VUCA and adaptive leadership against the writings of von Clausewitz? Either way, how should we lead in today’s world? The ongoing challenge for military leaders is not that VUCA is in any way new, but how to pursue success in an enduring, uncertain, environment of military operations.

This paper will firstly consider the characteristics of a VUCA environment, before offering an explanation of Adaptive Leadership. It will then switch to considering the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and how these compare to VUCA attributes and the leadership techniques of Adaptive Leadership. Some rudimentary conclusions will then be drawn.

Characteristics of a VUCA environment

As stated above VUCA is the acronym for volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, and is used to describe a highly dynamic chaotic environment. VUCA combines four types of challenge that demand four different responses. An explanation of the components of VUCA are as follows.

Volatility – Where volatility is present, the challenge is unexpected or unstable and may be of unknown duration, but it is not necessarily hard to understand; knowledge about it is often available.^[10]

Uncertainty – Despite a lack of other information, the event’s basic cause and effect are known. Change is possible but not a given^[11]. There can also be the lack of predictability, the prospects of surprise, and the sense of awareness and understanding of issues and events.

Complexity – Where the situation has many interconnected parts and variables. Some information is available or can be predicted, but the volume or nature of it can be overwhelming to process^[12]. There is no apparent cause-and-effect chain that can be analysed and causes and effects may be separated by time and space.

Ambiguity – Causal relationships are completely unclear. No precedents exist; you face “unknown unknowns.”^[13] There can be a haziness of reality, the potential for misreads, and the mixed meanings of conditions.

If we accept that VUCA characteristics exist, what then are the strategies to manage and lead in such an environment?

The Principles of Adaptive Leadership

‘Adaptive leadership is the practice of mobilising people to tackle tough challenges and thrive.’^[14] It acknowledges that the environment is one where there is continual change and leadership needs to consider this change to remain effective. From a military, albeit a US, perspective, an adaptive leader is defined as, ‘one who influences people within a complex context of uncertainty to both accomplish the mission and improve the organisation.’^[15]

To bring the context closer to home, the Australian Department of Defence offers the following definition: ‘The adaptive leadership model goes against traditional problem-solving methods… Adaptive challenges depend on dynamic, people-focused solutions.’^[16] Indeed, Defence offers a training program^[17] called ‘Journey: Leading Transformation’, which explores ‘the pushes and pulls of leadership roles in Defence, the workings of the Defence system and the VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity) context.’^[18]

Since 2016, the Heifetz and Linsky Adaptive Leadership model has been adopted by Defence and purports to be a useful tool for addressing the instability inherent in a VUCA environment. The Journey: Leading Transformation course unpacks the Heifetz and Linsky ^[19] adaptive leadership model emphasising the following six steps:^[20]

Get on the Balcony – This refers to leaders taking a step back from working in the system to observe patterns from a distance, with the assumption being that it can be difficult, if not impossible, to see the context for change if you are fully immersed in it.

Identify the Adaptive Challenge – This stage requires leaders in an organisation to understand the challenges that are facing it. The operating environment is constantly changing and unless an organisation can adapt to these environmental changes it risks extinction.

Regulate Conflict/Distress and create the holding environment – The role of the adaptive leader involves regulating the distress that is caused in an organisation facing adaptive challenges. This distress is caused as there are no ready solutions to the challenges. Staff need to learn new ways, often rapidly, and this can create stress. When overloaded, this becomes distress. Part of regulating distress is to create a holding environment where people can share their discomfort and emotions in determining a way ahead. Adaptive leaders must provide direction, protection, orientation, manage conflict and shape norms.^[21] Finally, the leader must be present and reassuring so as to support the organisation and its staff through the adaptive challenges.

Maintain Disciplined Attention – The senior leadership must model adaptive work. Further, the leader must counteract distractions to the main aim or vision. Distractions must be called out and the focus of the adaptive work reframed and realigned through collaboration.

Give the Work Back to People – Personnel within an organisation must be empowered to act on their special knowledge for the organisation to adapt. Senior leaders need to support staff to take responsibility and become active agents in the change process rather than passive passengers waiting for senior leaders to provide the answers. Leaders must instil confidence in their people to be active and take responsibility.

Protect Voices of Leadership from Below – Employees who are outspoken, or whistle blowers, need to be listened to and their ideas explored and investigated. The natural tendency of leaders is to quell dissent and restore equilibrium and, notwithstanding the method of communication adopted by outspoken employees or whistleblowers, the content of their message needs to be examined, as there may be clues for meaningful change. Leaders need to ask, ‘is there something we’re missing?’^[22]

So in considering the above six steps, the question must be whether these techniques are new and unique in leadership practice? Similarly, as stated in the introduction, is VUCA largely just another set of words for Clausewitz’s ‘chance, uncertainty, probability, friction, the fog of war, and genius’?

Clausewitz’s ‘On War’

Alan Beyerchen^[23]argues that Clausewitz viewed war as an exemplary non-linear phenomenon which is related to the more modern fields of complexity theory and non-linear dynamics.^[24] What this means is that Clausewitz viewed war in all it messiness where events are not sequential nor straightforward. ‘Real war is an inherently uncertain enterprise in which chance, friction, and the limitations of the human mind under stress profoundly limit our ability to predict outcomes.’^[25]

In terms of friction, Clausewitz listed eight sources of tremendous friction that made planning difficult in war. These included such things as a lack of knowledge of how the enemy may react; how your own forces will perform; logistics and supply issues; and realising when it is time to amend the plan.^[26] Tremendous friction is composed of all manner of difficulties, whether they be fatigue, command incoherence, adverse weather conditions, insufficient provisions and more: Clausewitz stated that it would take volumes to cover them all.^[27] Friction, like chance, is not something to be prevented or forestalled—one can only attempt to limit its effects and be mindful of its universal presence.^[28] One of the most significant aspects of friction is the impact of weather on operations. Indeed the D-Day landings in WWII were delayed by days due to weather patterns that did not support effective amphibious landings.

What can be seen, prima facie, is that the attributes of a VUCA environment are very similar to what Clausewitz wrote of in the 1800s. The next paragraphs take this further, noting that the elements of VUCA overlap much of Clausewitz’s writings.

Clausewitz and VUCA

What did Clausewitz say about each of the VUCA terms?

Volatility – In terms of Volatility and its unknown duration, Clausewitz refers to the need for endurance in addressing prolonged resistance^[29]. While he was understandably referring to actions against adversaries, it highlights the instability of any given situation. Clausewitz is credited with highlighting the importance of friction in all human endeavours, particularly war, stating that friction is what differentiates real war from war on paper, or the war plan. The concept of friction ‘is usually interpreted as a form of "Murphy's Law": whatever can go wrong, will, and at the worst possible moment.’^[30] While friction also impacts other VUCA elements, namely Complexity, Ambiguity and Uncertainty, in terms of Volatility friction may be unexpected.

The likelihood of the unexpected occurring was also addressed by Clausewitz in his discussion of chance. Beyerchen notes that Clausewitz drew on the work of French mathematician Henri Poincare who considered one of three reasons for chance was ‘amplification of a microcause’ which is inherent in any system: ‘It arises from the fact that in certain deterministic systems small causes can have disproportionately large effects at some later time.’^[31] Chance and friction are explained by Clausewitz thus:

Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties tend to accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable. Countless minor incidents combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal. This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance. ^[32]

Uncertainty – Clausewitz states: ‘War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.’ ^[33] This fog of war suggests that accurate information is both an objective impossibility and a dangerously deceptive fantasy.^[34] As mentioned previously, Clausewitz’s observations regarding chance makes everything even more uncertain. Any military commander faced with these aspects of uncertainty is faced with information and assumptions that are open to doubt and events will generally not unfold as expected. As new information becomes known this often makes us more, rather than less, uncertain.

The information upon which assessments are made in war is, for Clausewitz, ineluctably deficient.^[35] A military commander must rely on unreliable intelligence of what the enemy is doing. ‘Moreover, it is likely that the enemy will be doing his level best to deny us knowledge of its intention, or even actively attempting to deceive, fool, and surprise us.’^[36] Clausewitz was therefore sceptical with regard to the reliability of information available to commanders. It also remains largely unobtainable for leaders in public and private enterprise.

Clausewitz’s famous metaphor of the ‘fog’ of war relates to the issue of friction, but was an acknowledgement that the amount of information and its distortion created overload, or ‘noise’, for the commander that, in itself, created uncertainty.^[37] ‘Once all information has been collected it still has to be comprehended, interpreted and acted upon.’^[38] Despite changes in available technology, complete information remains unattainable for the modern commander, as does the prevalence of too much information, or noise.

Complexity – Beyerchen^[39] states that On War is full of references to war being inherently nonlinear in a way that events cannot be analytically predicted. He states that Clausewitz is therefore ‘willing to accept uncertainty and complex interaction as major factors in order to cope with what is happening. Facing up to the intrinsic presence of chance, complexity, and ambiguity in war is imperative.’^[40] Clausewitz believed that one of the challenges faced by commanders was in their attempt to understand the whole, entire picture [see opening quote]. Too often, he argued, we take pieces of the whole as our field of analysis but can be blindsided by other factors that make up the whole.

Ambiguity – On the issue of cause and effect, Clausewitz writes of the elements of time and space in the engagement. He stated that cause and effect is often blocked by some external obstacle meaning that the true cause is quite unknown. ^[41] Further, he stated that the greater the distance between the event and the cause, the greater the number of other variables that must be considered.^[42] Waldman ^[43] also notes Clausewitz’s emphasis on the ‘vast, almost infinite distance there can be between cause and effect’.

So, notwithstanding the ‘invention’ of VUCA in 1987, we can see from the writings of Clausewitz that military commanders in the late 1700s were experiencing the same attributes of Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity, although they did not articulate them in these terms.

Obviously, Clausewitz is not in a position to address the elements of VUCA directly nor to address the six steps of Adaptive Leadership more generally. He did, however, offer suggestions on how military commanders might address the reality of war. These suggestions are offered below, loosely grouped into the six Adaptive Leadership strategies, for comparison purposes.

Get on the balcony – In Clausewitz’s time (late 18^th Century) military commanders were generally separated from the ‘cut and thrust’ of frontline, tactical combat. Indeed, Clausewitz referred to a commander’s isolation, in understanding and in geographical terms, from front line, tactical action. This was also seen on the Western Front in World War 1 and since, where senior commanders positioned themselves generally away from the front line. It could therefore be argued that in Clausewitz’s time it was de rigueur for the commander to be ‘on the balcony’ to appreciate the big picture of military action, notwithstanding a lack of effective communication systems to afford timely direction based on what they were observing.

Notwithstanding the practice of the day, Clausewitz identified the need to paint a picture of the future you desire through thorough planning. He proposed that this picture, together, as a compass and for orientation, conferred meaning and sparked motivation, forged internal and external identity and effectiveness. Clausewitz was adamant, however, that reliable prediction is impossible.^[44] Perhaps following on from Clausewitzian thought, in the decades prior to 1914, planning became an obsession of European staffs, yet, as events were to reveal, brilliant execution of the wrong plan can be extremely dangerous.^[45]

Identify the adaptive challenge – Clausewitz acknowledged the dynamic nature of war and the fragility of plans once action commenced. Indeed, he stated that a commander might have to drop the original plan when it fails and work out an updated plan based on current information.^[46] This, however, would be the exception rather than the rule.

However, rather than dispense with planning Clausewitz argued that any leader engaged in undertaking a task ‘must form a precise idea of how it will develop through a series of connected actions from start to finish’.^[47] Even though this may seem contradictory, this linear approach enabled the leader to make considered changes from the first contact with the enemy and thereby continue to maintain control even though the outcome remains unpredictable and and/or non-linear. This is consistent with Clausewitz’s observations about theory versus reality.

In an effort to address this fluid environment Clausewitz suggested that plans consider ‘what if?’ questions to address acute problems or events that might unfold. He warned against lingering too long in this realm of ‘might-have-beens’—for things to have been different, the causes would also have had to be different. Nevertheless, consideration of alternative futures can impress upon the observer the great uncertainty that always confronts decision-makers.^[48]

Regulate distress – Clausewitz’s writings were offered largely as a guide to commanders. He believed commanders had to model the traits required of officers in the Prussian army. They were required to demonstrate sought-after traits of leadership. He stated that commanders must demonstrate the courage to be decisive and bold, and to have the presence of mind to deal with the unexpected.^[49] He believed commanders must ‘keep their nerve and show a strength of will in the face of anxiety and crushing responsibility. Lastly, they were required to demonstrate the ability to take risks and to trust in fortune.’^[50] ‘Since a mathematician of the likes of Newton or Euler is unlikely to be making military decisions, those in command have to rely on judgment rooted in intuition, common sense, and experience.’^[51] The assumption here is that soldiers would take confidence from the attitude and courage of their officers, thereby reducing their own distress.

Maintain Disciplined Attention – Clausewitz believed that commanders required determination to deal with the element of uncertainty. ‘War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.’^[52] This could be interpreted as counteracting distractions to the main aim or vision.

Give the Work Back to People – There is relatively little in On War that addresses personnel behaviour at lower levels of the organisation (eg, the junior soldier). Clausewitz’s focus was on the senior military commander and not his subordinates. This was consistent with the involvement of workers in their roles in the 1800s in industry. Nevertheless, he supported the conduct of informed experimentation, although noting that ‘peacetime maneuvers [sic] are a feeble substitute for the real thing.’^[53] He also acknowledged the inventiveness of the soldier in battle: ‘The need to fight quickly led man to invent appropriate devices to gain advantage in combat, these brought about changes in the forms of fighting. The first inventions consisted of weapons and equipment for the individual warrior.’^[54] It is unlikely, however, that a soldier’s actions would have influenced a Prussian officer’s strategic decisions.

Protect Voices of Leadership from below – Outspoken employees and whistleblowers were not a feature of the Prussian Army in the 1800s, however Clausewitz discussed the personal virtues of those involved in war and indicates four virtues required: bravery, adaptability, stamina and enthusiasm.^[55] Of these, adaptability is the most relevant to address the condition of ambiguity found in dynamic environments. ‘Clausewitz himself displays no unease with ambiguity…’.^[56] Clausewitz also acknowledged the phenomenon of what he termed war of the people or insurrection. This is where common people, rather than trained regular soldiers, take up arms against an enemy.^[57]

So while it is evident that some Adaptive Leadership strategies map quite neatly with the teachings of Clausewitz, for some strategies this is less so. Specifically and expectantly, Clausewitz, writing in the 1800s, says little about the inclusion of subordinates in addressing these adaptive challenges.

Summary

From a comparison of VUCA attributes and Clausewitz’s writings there appears to be strong evidence that VUCA attributes pre-dated the 1980s. We can take from this that Clausewitz’s ideas remain relevant today, notwithstanding the changed technologies employed in modern warfare. Further, modern forces still address non-traditional adversaries, ie. terrorists, guerrillas, cyber attackers, etc. ‘Since war evolves through time, the best techniques available are historical, which offer an indication only of what is possible, not of what is necessary, in the future.’^[58]

From a comparison of the six Adaptive Leadership strategies and Clausewitz’s writings in the 1800s there appears to be moderate evidence that Clausewitz understood the strategies for coping with what we now call adaptive challenges. As noted previously, Clausewitz was writing in a different era with respect of employee participation in addressing change and adaptation.

So What?

That VUCA appears to be nothing new can bring us some comfort that it does not present unique challenges that we must face in our leadership today. Conversely, it reinforces to us that we have not yet developed effective strategies to deal with these challenges. Whereas the effectiveness, or otherwise, of Adaptive Leadership is yet to be fully appreciated, elements of this model may offer assistance to leaders addressing adaptive challenges.

Now What?

All military leaders would be well advised to become keen and active students of military history if they are not already so. A sound grasp of history, combined with contemporary strategies to address adaptive challenges, will provide the best preparation for reaping leadership effectiveness in the future.

Conclusion

This paper has challenged the thesis that contemporary leaders are faced with an entirely new environment requiring new and specific strategies to be successful. Through a comparison between the VUCA environment, Adaptive Leadership and the writings of Carl von Clausewitz there is strong evidence that VUCA attributes are not new. Further, the leadership strategies proposed for Adaptive Leadership resonate to a moderate degree with requirements for military leadership identified by Clausewitz, noting developments since the 1800s in employee participation. In some respects this is an acknowledgement of the timelessness of Clausewitz’s writings and in other respects it forms a timely reminder that, even with modern technologies of warfare, elements of VUCA first identified by Clausewitz remain timeless for the profession of arms.

Bibliography

Bennett, N. & Lemoine, G.J. (2014) ‘What VUCA Really Means for You’ Harvard Business Review. January-February 2014. p 27

Bennis, Warren, & Nanus, Burt (1985) Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge. New York, Harper and Row.

Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, 59-90

Cimbala, Stephen J., (2001) Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy. Westpoint, Connecticut. Praeger.

Clausewitz, C. On War (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans. 1976) abridged with an Introduction and Notes by Beatrice Hauser. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press.

Codreanu, A. (2016) ‘A VUCA Action Framework for a VUCA Environment. Leadership Challenges and Solutions’ Journal of Defense Resources Management Vol. 7 Issue 2 (13) 2016

Department of Defence. ‘What is Adaptive Leadership?’ at: http://drnet/PEOPLE/LEARNING-AND-DEVELOPMENT/Pages/Journey-Leading-Transformation.aspx accessed 29 Apr 2024
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Heifetz, R.A., and Laurie, D.L. (1997) The Work of Leadership Harvard Business Review, January-February 1997. Pp. 124-134.

Heifetz, R. and Linksky, M. (2017) Leadership on the Line Harvard Business Review Press. Boston, Massachusetts.

Holmes, Terence M. (2007) Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz’s On War in The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 30, No. 1, 129-151, February 2007. Routledge, UK.

Lindsay, D. and Woycheshin, D. (eds) (2014) Adaptive Leadership in the Military Context Canadian Defence Academy Press. Winnipeg, Canada.

Mahr, N. VUCA Environment. at: https://study.com/learn/lesson/vuca-environment-leadership.html#:~:text=VUCA%20stands%20for%20volatility%2C%20uncertainty,emerging%20demands%20on%20military%20organizations. Accessed 24 April 2024.

Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, 336-368.

www.vuca-world.org/where-does-the-term-vuca-come-from/ accessed 21 May 2024

Footnotes

¹ Clausewitz, C. On War (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans. 1976) Princeton: Princeton University Press

² Department of Defence Journey: Leading Transformation Program accessed at Pages - Journey: Leading Transformation on 05 Mar 2024

³ Mahr, N. VUCA Environment. at: https://study.com/learn/lesson/vuca-environment-leadership.html#:~:text=VUCA%20stands%20for%20volatility%2C%20uncertainty,emerging%20demands%20on%20military%20organizations. Accessed 24 April 2024.

⁴ VUCA is an acronym – first used in 1987, drawing on the leadership theories of Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus to describe or to reflect on the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity of general conditions and situations; The US Army War College introduced the concept of VUCA to describe the more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous multilateral world perceived as resulting from the end of the Cold War. More frequent use of the term ‘VUCA’ began from 2002 and derives from this acronym from military education. It has subsequently taken root in emerging ideas in strategic leadership that apply in a wide range of organisations, from for-profit corporations to education. From www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volatility,_uncertainty,_complexity_and_ambiguity accessed 28 Jul 2022

⁵ Mahr, N. VUCA Environment. at: https://study.com/learn/lesson/vuca-environment-leadership.html#:~:text=VUCA%20stands%20for%20volatility%2C%20uncertainty,emerging%20demands%20on%20military%20organizations. Accessed 24 April 2024.

⁶ Codreanu, A. (2016) ‘A VUCA Action Framework for a VUCA Environment. Leadership Challenges and Solutions’ Journal of Defense Resources Management Vol. 7 Issue 2 (13) 2016

⁷ www.vuca-world.org/where-does-the-term-vuca-come-from/ accessed 21 May 2024

⁸ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, p 342

⁹ ibid

¹⁰ Bennett, N. & Lemoine, G.J. (2014) ‘What VUCA Really Means for You’ Harvard Business Review. January-February 2014. p 27

¹¹ ibid

¹² ibid

¹³ ibid

¹⁴ Heifetz, Grashow and Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership, p14

¹⁵ John Burpo, “The Great Captains of Chaos: Developing Adaptive Leaders” quoted by Dr R. Jeffrey Jackson and Douglas R. Lindsay in Lindsay and Woycheshin (eds) Adaptive Leadership in the Military Context.

¹⁶ Journey: Leading Transformation Program, Department of Defence. At http://drnet/People/Learning-and-Development/Pages/Journey-Leading-Transformation.aspx accessed 6 march 2024

¹⁷ The Department of Defence PeopleConnect website states, ‘Designed in close collaboration with adaptive leadership founders Ron Heifetz and Marty Linsky of Harvard University, Journey helps you apply adaptive leadership practice in the unique context of the Australian Defence System.’

¹⁸ ibid

¹⁹ Heifetz, R.A., and Laurie, D.L. (1997) The Work of Leadership Harvard Business Review, January-February 1997. Pp. 124-134.

²⁰ Department of Defence. ‘What is Adaptive Leadership?’ at: http://drnet/PEOPLE/LEARNING-AND-DEVELOPMENT/Pages/Journey-Leading-Transformation.aspx accessed 29 Apr 2024. Note: Heifetz and Linsky propose six steps, whereas The Journey proposes seven steps which includes the step of ‘ create the holding environment.’ For the purposes of this paper, Heifetz and Linsky’s six step model is used.

²¹ Heifetz, R.A. and Laurie, D.L. 1997 The Work of Leadership p 127

²² Ibid. p 130

²³ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, 59-90

²⁴ Cimbala, Stephen J. 2001 Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy. Praeger. Westport, Connecticut. p 6

²⁵ Robert H Scales Jr quoted in, Cimbala, Stephen J., (2001) Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy. Westpoint, Connecticut. Praeger. Clausewitz uses friction to describe general inefficiency in any undertaking; he did not imply the generation of heat caused by two surfaces rubbing together such that they eventually seize and halt completely.

²⁶ Cimbala, Stephen J. 2001 Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy. Praeger. Westport, Connecticut. See also Waldron p 253 on Incidental friction

²⁷ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, p 354

²⁸ ibid

²⁹ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, p 51

³⁰ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, p 76 quoting directly from Clausewitz, C. 1976. On War (M.Howard & P.Paret, Trans.) Princeton: Princeton University Press

³¹ ibid p 80

³² Clausewitz, C. On War (M.Howard & P.Paret, Trans. 1976) abridged with an Introduction and Notes by Beatrice Hauser. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp 119-120

³³ ibid p 46

³⁴ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, p 349

³⁵ ibid, p 348

³⁶ ibid

³⁷ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93. p 77

³⁸ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3. p 350

³⁹ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, p 61

⁴⁰ ibid p 76

⁴¹ Clausewitz, C. On War (M.Howard & P.Paret, Trans. 1976) abridged with an Introduction and Notes by Beatrice Hauser. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p 107

⁴² ibid p 110

⁴³ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, p 345

⁴⁴ ibid p 353

⁴⁵ ibid p 358

⁴⁶ Holmes, Terence M. (2007) Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz’s On War in The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 30, No. 1, 129-151, February 2007. Routledge, UK. p 146

⁴⁷ ibid. p 132

⁴⁸ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, pp 351-2

⁴⁹ Holmes, Terence M. (2007) Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz’s On War in The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 30, No. 1, 129-151, February 2007. Routledge, UK. p 145

⁵⁰ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, p 357

⁵¹ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, p 80

⁵² Clausewitz, C. 1976. On War (M.Howard & P.Paret, Trans.) abridged with an Introduction and Notes by Beatrice Hauser. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp 46-7

⁵³ Waldman, Thomas (2010) ‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of Chance in War, Defence Studies, 10:3, p 359

⁵⁴ Clausewitz, C. On War (M.Howard & P.Paret, Trans. 1976) abridged with an Introduction and Notes by Beatrice Hauser. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press. Book Two (On the Theory of War) Chap 1. p 73

⁵⁵ ibid p 145

⁵⁶ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, p 75

⁵⁷ Clausewitz, C. On War (M.Howard & P.Paret, Trans. 1976) abridged with an Introduction and Notes by Beatrice Hauser. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press. pp 184-190.

⁵⁸ Beyerchen, Alan. (1992-3) ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’ International Security 17/3 Winter 1992/93, p 88

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(Brown, 2025)

Brown, C. 2025. 'Clausewitz and Adaptive Leadership – old wine in new bottles?'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/clausewitz-and-adaptive-leadership-old-wine-new-bottles (Accessed: 14 March 2025).

(Brown, 2025)

Callum Brown, "Clausewitz and Adaptive Leadership – old wine in new bottles?", The Forge, Published: March 11, 2025, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/clausewitz-and-adaptive-leadership-old-wine-new-bottles. (accessed March 14, 2025).

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

The Art of War Joint Competency defence-poa-level3

Social Mastery

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Biography

Callum Brown

GPCAPT

GPCAPT Brown is a now a Reserve officer who serves in the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College. Numerous postings throughout his career in the Permanent Air Force have necessitated the supervision and management of contracts. His interests are organisational culture, human behaviours, leadership, and ethics.