Critically assess the utility of the DMPP in planning contemporary MDOs

Can the ADF’s new Defence Military Planning Process deliver the speed and integration needed for multi-domain operations—or will doctrine alone fall short in contested conflict?

03/08/2026

<30 min

Introduction: Planning for the Multi-Domain Battlespace

Contemporary military operations are increasingly characterised by the deliberate integration of effects across all warfighting domains - land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and the information environment. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) aim to orchestrate and synchronise these effects to achieve operational and strategic objectives with greater speed, precision, and adaptability than single domain efforts approaches. Modern conflicts, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine, demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of this approach, with Ukrainian forces utilising space-based ISR, cyber disruption, and precision fires to offset conventional methods disadvantages. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept¹ asserts that integrated capabilities across space, cyber, air, maritime, and land are vital in high-intensity warfighting against peer adversaries, with Ukraine demonstrating the operational impact of coordinated cross-domain effects.² This imperative aligns with Clausewitz’s principle that the unpredictability and non-linearity of war demand adaptability, as no amount of planning can anticipate all enemy actions or emerging opportunities.³ In this context, seamless and integrated planning is not a luxury but a doctrinal and operational prerequisite for mission success.

Traditionally, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) used the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) for campaign and operational planning. Although JMAP offered a well-organised and reliable problem-solving framework, it was progressively regarded as too linear, aligned with specific services, and lacking the flexibility needed to address the speed, scope, and complexity of today's multi-domain operations.⁴ As Jackson (2020) observes, such technically rationalist planning frameworks often falter when confronted with the ‘wicked problem’ of contemporary conflict, where ambiguity and rapid change are the norm.⁵ In response, the ADF introduced the Defence Military Planning Process (DMPP), an integrated, commander-centric planning framework that unifies single-service and joint planning into a single doctrine.⁶ The DMPP seeks to overcome earlier processes’ rigidity by empowering commanders to tailor planning to operational tempo, incorporate emerging capabilities from the outset, and encourage adaptive thinking across all domains.⁷ In doing so, it aims to address JMAP’s limitations, accelerating planning cycles, strengthening cross-domain integration, and fostering agility across all operational levels.⁸

This essay argues that the DMPP marks a significant doctrinal step towards achieving integrated, multi-domain planning within the ADF. It offers structural unification, early domain integration, and a commander-centric approach that can improve operational tempo and joint force cohesion. However, it suggests that the DMPP’s success still depends on its consistent application throughout the force and the development of cross-domain expertise, and the ability to adapt planning to degraded, high-tempo, and contested environments. Drawing lessons from conflicts, exercises, and operations, the analysis assesses how the DMPP facilitates joint force synchronisation while highlighting ongoing challenges—such as cognitive overload, reliance on centralised command-and-control, and institutional inertia—that must be addressed. Ultimately, the discussion presents the DMPP as an essential but not sufficient factor in achieving lasting multi-domain advantage, with its success hinging on aligning doctrinal ambitions with the cultural, technological, and procedural enablers necessary for effective operationalisation pressure.

From JMAP to DMPP: Reforming for Joint Effect

While the JMAP provided a solid and well-understood foundation for planning, it exhibited significant shortcomings in complex, fast-evolving operations. Its linear, sequential nature often encouraged a reductionist, prescriptive aapproach that was ill-suited to environments requiring rapid adaptation.⁹ Planners frequently applied JMAP as a rigid checklist; a ‘clunky process-driven procedure’- which could stifle creative thinking and delay responses to emerging problems.¹⁰ Moreover, information flow in JMAP was largely top-down, with limited feedback loops, fostering siloed efforts between different staff and levels of command. Historically, the ADF compounded this challenge by maintaining separate planning processes at joint and single-service levels (JMAP for joint, with staff/individual planning variants for each service), further fragmenting planning and slowing the integration of efforts. This fragmentation, combined with JMAP’s step-by-step rigidity, meant that incorporating new technologies or multi-domain concepts was often reactive rather than proactive. For example, as warfare expanded into cyber and other domains, planners found that JMAP’s one-dimensional focus struggled to account for the volatile, ambiguous environment of grey-zone conflict.¹¹ These limitations were reinforced by operational experiences in irregular and hybrid warfare, where strictly linear planning proved unable to anticipate or outpace the adaptive tactics of adversaries. This analysis of JMAP’s shortcomings establishes the benchmark against which the DMPP’s enhancements will be measured, highlighting the doctrinal shift required to achieve multi-domain integration.

The ADF responded by overhauling its planning doctrine, introducing the DMPP as a comprehensive, integrated, and flexible framework. The DMPP now serves as the single, standardised planning doctrine for the ADF, replacing the previous JMAP and Service-specific MAPs.¹² This reform significantly reduced the procedural and cultural silos of the old system, with one process now guiding both joint and single-Service planning across all domains. Crucially, the DMPP elevates the active role of the commander throughout the planning cycle, a role that earlier doctrine had not sufficiently emphasised.¹³ Decision-making is reaffirmed as a commander’s responsibility, with commanders expected to provide continuous guidance, make timely decisions, and shape planning tempo at key points.¹⁴ By enabling commanders to steer planning iteratively - rather than waiting for staff to complete sequential steps - the DMPP increases responsiveness to dynamic conditions. The doctrine is deliberately less prescriptive about specific techniques for each staff function, allowing planners to integrate emerging capabilities earlier, adopt best practices from coalitions, and tailor the process to operational realities.¹⁵ In essence, the DMPP addresses JMAP’s limitations by fostering a more integrated, agile, and commander-centric approach to planning.¹⁶ These reforms mark a deliberate move toward a more adaptive planning culture, which is central to the essay’s contention that structural change must be matched by institutional and cognitive change to achieve sustained MDO effectiveness.

Integrating Domains: How the DMPP Enables Joint Operations

Multi domain operations showing Space, cyber, Air, land and marine domains as a layered structure. — Screenshot of motion graphic by William Norris, US Army Training Support Center

Building on its integrative foundation, the DMPP’s commander-centric architecture directly enables joint force integration by aligning planning tempo, decision-making, and cross-domain synchronisation across land, maritime, air, cyber, and space.¹⁷ Unlike earlier linear, staff-driven models such as JMAP, the DMPP repositions the commander as the primary architect of operational design, providing continuous guidance, iterative decision points, and early integration of emerging capabilities throughout the planning process.¹⁸ This approach aligns with mission command principles, decentralising authority and empowering subordinate initiative while ensuring that actions in all domains remain coherently aligned with strategic objectives.¹⁹ By embedding the commander’s role across all phases, the DMPP fosters rapid adaptation to changing conditions - particularly in fluid environments such as cyber and space, where operational windows are often measured in minutes rather than days.²⁰ From a joint integration perspective, this adaptability shortens the OODA loop, enabling synchronised maritime and air manoeuvres, supported by space-enabled ISR and cyber disruption, to be coordinated in near real-time.²¹ Comparative experience from NATO’s COPD shows similar benefits when commander’s guidance is embedded early, accelerating cross-domain decision cycles in exercises such as Trident Juncture.²² ADF operational experiences reinforce this enabling function: during Operation Bushfire Assist (2019–2020) and Operation COVID-19 Assist, as well as Operation OKRA, the ADF’s ability to integrate joint capabilities and coordinate with civilian agencies hinged on timely, commander-led direction that unified land logistics, maritime lift, air mobility, and information support. These cases illustrate how the DMPP’s decision-focused design sustains unity of effort and strategic coherence under high operational tempo, validating research that adaptive, decision-centric planning frameworks consistently outperform rigid processes in contested, coalition, or complex environments.²³

Complementing these domain and command advantages is the DMPP’s unification of previously fragmented Service-level planning frameworks into a single, cohesive doctrine.²⁴ Historically, the ADF operated under a dual structure, using JMAP for joint planning and Service-specific methodologies such as the Army’s Military Appreciation Process (MAP) for single-Service efforts. This bifurcation led to inconsistent planning outputs, communication breakdowns, and doctrinal friction in joint or coalition environments.²⁵ By replacing these legacy systems with a single, standardised process, the DMPP establishes a shared planning language and common procedural architecture applicable across all Services and levels of command. This mirrors coalition lessons from NATO and combined operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where unified planning constructs not only accelerated interoperability but also improved shared situational awareness among partners. Although only formally released in late 2024 the DMPP is built upon lessons from earlier planning experiences under JMAP and related processes. For example, during Australia’s COVID-19 response and Operation OKRA, joint planners successfully integrated effects across land, maritime, air, and information domains despite doctrinal fragmentation and varied Service planning cultures. These cases demonstrate the type of interoperability, interagency coordination, and cross-domain awareness that the DMPP now seeks to institutionalise from the outset.²⁶ In effect, these earlier operations serve as a proof of concept for the integrative outcomes that DMPP aims to deliver more consistently. Moreover, this unified approach strengthens Australia’s Integrated Campaigning concept, aligning military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments toward strategic objectives.²⁷ By drawing on these operational lessons, the DMPP has the structural foundations to function as a fully enabling tool, one capable of integrating effects across domains, empowering command, and harmonising planning at all levels of war. By addressing previous structural fragmentation, the DMPP has laid the foundation for consistent cross-domain coordination. However, its ultimate success will depend on how these principles perform under contested, high-tempo conditions.

Enduring Challenges: Constraints in Applying the DMPP

While the DMPP delivers important doctrinal and structural improvements, its integration of all warfighting domains introduces a level of complexity that creates both cognitive and procedural challenges. Modern multi-domain operations require the orchestration of kinetic and non-kinetic effects across distributed geographies, timeframes, and domains - including cyber, space, electromagnetic warfare, and the information environment. This scope significantly increases the information-processing demands on commanders and planning teams. As Sălăvăstru and Rațiu (2024) argue, the MDO construct creates a span-of-control dilemma in which human planners struggle to process the sheer volume of cross-domain intelligence, risk assessments, and planning variables within compressed timelines.²⁸ ADF-P-5 (2021) acknowledges this tension, noting that operational planning must strike a balance between conceptual creativity and procedural discipline.²⁹ The ADF’s Integrated Planning framework similarly warns that expanding situational awareness across multiple domains inevitably increases the volume, velocity, and variety of information that must be processed.³⁰ While the DMPP’s design embeds cross-domain considerations early in mission analysis, this breadth of scope risks overloading planning staff when decision windows are measured in hours or minutes rather than days. Without advanced decision-support tools, collaborative planning technologies, and targeted professional development to enhance cognitive agility and prioritisation skills, the integrated framework intended to accelerate tempo may instead slow it. This constraint is particularly evident in scenarios where cross-domain data fusion is partial, degraded, or contested - a challenge observed in complex coalition exercises and multinational operations even under earlier systems.³¹ The DMPP’s success in such environments will depend on whether doctrinal intent is matched by enabling capabilities that allow planners to filter, prioritise, and act decisively. This highlights the central tension of the DMPP: the same integrative breadth that promises operational advantage can, without the right enablers, become a source of friction that slows tempo.

A second critical limitation of the DMPP lies in its implicit dependence on centralised, protected command-and-control (C2) environments - an assumption increasingly untenable in peer or near-peer conflict. The doctrine presumes access to stable planning cycles, continuous communications, and secure headquarters infrastructure, all of which are now highly vulnerable in contemporary threat environments. The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated how persistent ISR, precision fires, and electronic warfare have rendered traditional, static C2 nodes high-payoff targets vulnerable to rapid detection and strike.³² The ADF’s Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force (2023) acknowledges that survivability, mobility, and decentralisation must become defining features of future C2 postures.³³ Yet the DMPP’s planning model still privileges a structured, centralised sequence from mission analysis to COA development - highlighting a doctrinal gap between planning methodology and operational necessity. Wille (2019) emphasises that effective MDO requires not just convergence of effects, but resilient, distributed, and reconfigurable C2 networks capable of functioning under disruption.³⁴ If adversaries can deny or degrade access to key planning hubs, the DMPP may struggle to support responsive decision-making or adaptive re-planning. NATO’s experience during Exercise Steadfast Cobalt has shown that distributed C2 architectures, coupled with pre-delegated authorities, can sustain operational tempo in degraded communications environments.³⁵ In this area, DMPP’s procedural guidance remains underdeveloped. Similarly, during combined training in Exercise Indo-Pacific Endeavour, ADF planners faced constraints when rehearsing operations under communications-denied conditions, exposing the need for planning frameworks more attuned to dispersed and mobile command and control (C2) realities. While the doctrine acknowledges contingency planning, it provides limited procedural detail for operating under persistent disruption. These lessons underscore that without procedural depth for degraded environments, doctrinal intent alone will not guarantee resilience in coalition or contested operations.

Despite the DMPP’s strengths as a unified doctrine, its ability to deliver fully integrated multi-domain operations is constrained by uneven adoption across the ADF and the limited maturity of integration mechanisms in specific domains. While the DMPP formally replaced JMAP and service-specific models, many units remain more familiar with legacy frameworks, resulting in inconsistent implementation, partial compliance, and institutional inertia. Jackson (2020) notes that resistance to doctrinal transition often stems from misaligned PME curricula, unclear change-management pathways, and entrenched Service-centric cultures. These factors are particularly problematic in joint, multinational, or interagency contexts where shared mental models and standard planning lexicons are essential for synchronising effects across land, maritime, air, cyber, and space. Moreover, although the DMPP explicitly incorporates newer domains such as cyber, space, and the information environment, much of the supporting TTPs and domain-specific expertise remain immature compared to the well-established doctrine of traditional domains. As Jackson (2020) observes, doctrinal intent alone cannot guarantee cross-domain convergence; planners must have the requisite literacy, technical fluency, and integration mechanisms to translate emerging capabilities into coherent operational effects.³⁶ NATO’s experience in Exercise Trident Juncture shows the importance of joint experimentation, wargaming, and shared doctrine to achieve true convergence. Without investing in PME, experimentation, tools, and cross-domain education, integration risks becoming superficial, reducing the DMPP’s effectiveness as an enabler of multi-domain advantage. The essay's key point is that doctrinal, cultural, and technical convergence are essential for real MDO implementation.

Bridging Theory and Practice: Where the DMPP Must Improve

Taken together, the constraints outlined above highlight that while the DMPP marks a significant and necessary evolution in joint planning doctrine, its utility in contemporary multi-domain operations is tempered by persistent operational frictions. The cognitive burden placed on planners, the vulnerability of traditional command-and-control assumptions, and the inconsistent uptake across the ADF reveal systemic gaps that must be addressed for the doctrine’s promise to be fully realised. These challenges do not undermine the DMPP’s foundational value; rather, they underscore the need for iterative refinement, institutional embedding, and deliberate change management. The complexity of modern warfare and MDO; characterised by compressed decision timelines, contested information environments, and dispersed C2 structures, demands that planning frameworks be both conceptually robust and procedurally agile. In other words, bridging the gap between doctrinal ambition and operational delivery will require not only refinement of process, but sustained investment in the people, systems, and partnerships that make integration possible.

Both international and domestic exercises, operations, and conflicts provide insight into the utility and limitations of the ADF’s application of the DMPP, offering concrete lessons for its evolution. These activities demonstrate the potential for cross-domain integration (e.g., space-enabled ISR fused with maritime and air fires) but also expose recurring friction points — incomplete data fusion, contested communications, variable coalition interoperability, and slow decision cycles — that must be addressed through campaign-level experimentation, rigorous after-action review cycles, and doctrine-to-PME feedback loops. As the ADF adapts to an operating environment increasingly defined by compressed timelines, persistent ambiguity, and adversary disruption, the DMPP must remain a living doctrine — with explicit guidance for degraded/denied C2, distributed planning teams, pre-delegated authorities, and decision-support tooling — capable of adapting to strategic shocks while guiding coherent operational design and execution. These observations confirm the essay’s core contention: that the DMPP’s success will hinge less on the elegance of its design and more on how quickly and consistently its principles can be operationalised under pressure.

Conclusion: Planning for the Multi-Domain Battlespace

This essay critically assesses the utility of the Defence Military Planning Process (DMPP) in planning contemporary multi-domain operations, with a specific focus on how it enables or constrains joint force integration across land, maritime, air, cyber, and space domains. The analysis demonstrates that the DMPP is a strategically significant, doctrinally coherent, and forward-leaning planning framework, offering a structured yet adaptable approach to the complex demands of modern warfare. Through its emphasis on commander-driven decision-making, early incorporation of emerging domains, and an institutional push for jointness, the DMPP enables more cohesive, synchronised, and operationally integrated planning outcomes.

At the same time, the DMPP’s utility is conditional and context-dependent. The process imposes cognitive and procedural challenges that must be mitigated if it is to succeed in high-tempo, contested environments. Its reliance on traditional command-and-control assumptions, coupled with inconsistent adoption across the ADF, constrains its ability to serve as a fully effective enabler of joint force integration. These are not flaws in doctrinal design but signals of where implementation, training, and supporting systems must mature. In conclusion, the DMPP is both a strategically important and operationally necessary evolution in ADF planning doctrine. Its core strengths, integrated domain inclusion, joint force alignment, and doctrinal coherence, make it well suited to the realities of multi-domain operations. However, to fulfil its potential, conceptual ambition must be matched by sustained investment in PME, coalition interoperability initiatives, and the enablers required for distributed, resilient C2. If fully institutionalised, the DMPP will not only support joint planning; it will also shape how the ADF, alongside allies and partners, anticipates, integrates, and prevails in the contested, multi-domain battlespace of the future. This will thus meet Clausewitz’s enduring call for adaptability in the face of war’s unpredictability.

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Footnotes

¹ NATO, ‘NATO Strategic Concept’, 2022, 6, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

² Futoshi Takabatake, ‘NATO’s Approach to Multi-Domain Operations: From the Perspective of the Economics of Alliances’, Defence and Peace Economics 35, no. 3 (2024): 283, https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2235502.

³ Alan Beyerchen, ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War’, International Security 17, no. 3 (1992): 60, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539130.

⁴ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Planning Process (JMAP) Ed 2, AL3’, Joint Doctrine Directorate, 15 August 2019, 2–16.

⁵ Aaron Jackson, ‘Military Design Thinking; Contrasting Civilian and Military Innovation Methodologies’, Air University Press, 2020, 38.

⁶ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF-I-5 Decision-Making and Planning Processes (1)’, Directorate of Communication, Change and Corporate Graphics, 21 October 2024, iv.

⁷ Major General Krause, ‘Decision Making and Planning Processes’, ACSC, Australian War College, 5 June 2025, https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1s6NbZxJ2MVCi4qGqV1j145OI8SudEG7i/edit?slide=id.p2#slide=id.p2.

⁸ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Planning Process (JMAP) Ed 2, AL3’.

⁹ Ryan CMDR Post, ‘The Joint Military Appreciation Process: The Good, The Bad and Some Alternatives’, War College Papers 2022, n.d., https://theforge.defence.gov.au/war-college-papers-2022/joint-military-appreciation-process-good-bad-and-some-alternatives#:~:text=of%20the%20key%20weaknesses%20of,or%20continue%20to%20use%20the.

¹⁰ David Hindmarsh, ‘JMAP: Fit for Purpose’, War College Papers 2023, 2024, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/war-college-papers-2023/jmap-fit-purpose#:~:text=The%20ADF%20is%20not%20exempt,still%20follow%20divergent%20and%20convergent.

¹¹ Post, ‘The Joint Military Appreciation Process: The Good, The Bad and Some Alternatives’.

¹² Major General Krause, ‘Cove Talk- 5 Brigade: Decision Making and Planning Process’, Holsworthy Barracks Officers Mess, 25 February 2025, https://cove.army.gov.au/article/covetalk-5-brigade-decision-making-and-planning-process-0#:~:text=The%20DMPP%20aims%20to%20emphasise,4.

¹³ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF-I-5 Decision-Making and Planning Processes (1)’, 7.

¹⁴ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF-I-5 Decision-Making and Planning Processes (1)’, 15.

¹⁵ ‘PDF’, n.d.

¹⁶ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF-I-5 Decision-Making and Planning Processes (1)’, 49.

¹⁷ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF-I-5 Decision-Making and Planning Processes (1)’, 7.

¹⁸ Krause, ‘Decision Making and Planning Processes’, 10.

¹⁹ Claudiu-Marius Sălăvăstru and Aurelian Raţiu, ‘Mission Command in Multi-Domain Operations’, International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 30, no. 1 (2024): 161–65, https://doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2024-0022.

²⁰ Jeffery Harrigan, ‘Shaping the Future Multi-Domain C2’, 10.

²¹ Ferenc Fazekas, ‘Military Command in Multi-Domain Environment’, Land Forces Academy Review 29, no. 3 (2024): 312–21, https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2024-0034.

²² Karsten Friis and Rolf Tamnes, ‘The Defence of Northern Europe: New Opportunities, Significant Challenges’, International Affairs 100, no. 2 (2024): 822, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae019.

²³ Jackson, ‘Military Design Thinking; Contrasting Civilian and Military Innovation Methodologies’; William Gregor, ‘Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations’, Institute for National Strategic Security (PRISM) 1, no. 2 (n.d.): 99–114.

²⁴ Krause, ‘Decision Making and Planning Processes’, 2.

²⁵ Sam Maj Watts, ‘JMAP: Too Long, Too Linear and Lacking Tools’, War College Papers 2023, n.d., https://theforge.defence.gov.au/war-college-papers-2023/jmap-too-long-too-linear-and-lacking-tools#:~:text=No%20revolutionary%20differences%20can%20be,NATO%20Planning%20are%20Initiation%2C%20Mission.

²⁶ Krause, ‘Decision Making and Planning Processes’, 7.

²⁷ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF Capstone Concept APEX_ Integrated Campaigning for Deterrence, Edition 2’.

²⁸ Claudiu-Marius Sălăvăstru and Aurelian Raţiu, ‘Mission Command in Multi-Domain Operations’, International Conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 30, no. 1 (2024): 161–65, https://doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2024-0022.

²⁹ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF-P-5 - Philosophical - Planning’, Directorate of Communication, Change and Corporate Graphics, 1 February 2022, 8.

³⁰ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF Capstone Concept APEX_ Integrated Campaigning for Deterrence, Edition 2’.

³¹ Allied Command Transformation and NATO’s Strategic Warfare Development Command, ‘Multi-Domain Operations and Digital Transformation: Enabling Converged Effects in the Modern Battlespace’, 2 May 2025, https://www.act.nato.int/article/mdo-dt-enabling-converging-effects/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

³² Sălăvăstru and Raţiu, ‘Mission Command in Multi-Domain Operations’, 2024, 164.

³³ Australian Defence Force, ‘ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force’, Force Exploration Branch, 13 May 2019.

³⁴ Jackson, ‘Military Design Thinking; Contrasting Civilian and Military Innovation Methodologies’.

³⁵ Friis and Tamnes, ‘The Defence of Northern Europe’.

³⁶ Aaron Jackson, ‘Military Design Thinking; Contrasting Civilian and Military Innovation Methodologies’, Air University Press, 2020, 29–47.

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(Phelps, 2026)

Phelps, D. 2026. 'Critically assess the utility of the DMPP in planning contemporary MDOs'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/critically-assess-utility-dmpp-planning-contemporary-mdos (Accessed: 07 August 2026).

(Phelps, 2026)

Dani Phelps, "Critically assess the utility of the DMPP in planning contemporary MDOs", The Forge, Published: August 03, 2026, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/critically-assess-utility-dmpp-planning-contemporary-mdos. (accessed August 07, 2026).

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Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Biography

Dani Phelps

Staff Officer to the Head of Air Capability

Squadron Leader

Squadron Leader Dani Phelps is a Logistic Officer and graduate of the ACSC(MA) class of 2025. She is currently posted as the Staff Officer to the Head of Air Capability.