Ancient Carthage – Power and Strategy in the Punic Wars

Carthage rose through a powerful grand strategy—then collapsed when it could not adapt. What happens when the foundations of success become strategic constraints?

22/03/2026

<30 min

The Punic Wars represented a cycle of conflict between Carthage and Rome that culminated in Carthage’s complete destruction. As the Roman General Scipio looked upon the burning ruins of his enemy’s capital, he reflected that ‘all cities, nations, and authorities must, like men, meet their doom; that this happened to Ilium, once a prosperous city, to the empires of Assyria, Media, and Persia, the greatest of their time, and to Macedonia itself, the brilliance of which was so recent.’¹ Thinking on the inevitable and inescapable fate of his own homeland, he quoted the Iliad: “A day will come when sacred Troy shall perish, And Priam and his people shall be slain.”²

This case study explores why Carthage, a wealthy, powerful and expansive regional hegemon, failed to meet the threat represented by Rome’s rise. It examines how a state that had grown in power and stature for seven centuries could be destroyed in one. In doing so, it provides a broader lesson to students of strategy: the foundations of a state’s power that underpin its strategic framework may also constrain its ability to effectively respond to a changing external environment. Put another way, the factors that allow a state to attain power may not enable it to retain power when circumstances change. Perhaps this may account for Scipio’s keen observation. Students of strategy might reflect on how this lesson applies to other historical case studies, and to contemporary international relations. Employing a neoclassical realist analytical framework, the case study argues that Carthage developed and applied a discernible, coherent and successful grand strategy from its establishment in the ninth century BC to the outbreak of the Punic wars in the third century BC. This strategy aligned with Carthage’s internal political, economic and cultural structures, underpinned its rapid growth, and supported a high degree of strategic stability in the Western Mediterranean for centuries. However, the rise of Rome represented a significant change to the external environment. This dislocated Carthaginian power, ultimately resulting in the failure of Carthaginian grand strategy during the First Punic War. Carthage attempted to evolve it strategy in the Second Punic War, but adaptation and strategic choice were constrained by the structural and ideational foundations of Carthaginian power. This contributed significantly to Carthage’s defeat and ultimate destruction.

Can Ancient Carthage be said to have had a grand strategy? While the language of grand strategy dates from the nineteenth century, the concept of grand strategy provides a way to explore the relationship between enduring strategic conditions, capabilities, objectives, preferences and choices, and has served to illuminate a range of historical cases.³ Discernment of a Carthaginian strategic culture, world view or policy outlook is complicated by the paucity of sources, and the bias inherent in the Greek and Roman sources from which the modern understanding of Carthage derives.⁴ However, there is strong evidence that provides confidence in the broad outline of historical events of this period, supporting inductive analysis of motivations and policy.⁵ One further challenge: the concept of grand strategy is contested, and definitions abound.⁶ This case study adopts Posen’s definition of grand strategy as “a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.”⁷ An effective grand strategy identifies threats to state security and devises “political, economic, military and other remedies for those threats.”⁸ Schmidt echoes this, describing grand strategy as “the overall vision of a state’s national security goals and a determination of the most appropriate means by which to achieve those goals.”⁹

Posen and Schmidt emphasise security as the principle goal of the state, and the basis for grand strategy. This is precisely the formulation employed by neoclassical realism, which contends that states function to deliver security needs.¹⁰ While classical realism treats the state as a ‘black box’ that acts in its own rational self-interest, neoclassical realism recognises the internal factors that moderate strategic choice, including political, economic and social structures.¹¹ These moderate competition and conflict between states that result from external drivers including the emergence of threats and competing economic interests drive military action.¹² This analytical framework provides a start-point for understanding Carthaginian strategic interests, capabilities and choices, as well as those of its adversaries.

In its early years, Carthage was unremarkable – one of many small Phoenician colonies dotted along the shores of the Mediterranean.¹³ Within two centuries, it had become the wealthiest and most powerful polity west of Greece.¹⁴ The reasons for Carthage’s success lie in its character as a mercantilist sea power.¹⁵ Carthage’s greatest advantage was its strategic location, which allowed it to control the narrow straits between North Africa, Sicily and Sardinia from its protected harbours. This enabled it to dominate and exploit lucrative north-south and east-west trade routes. Reflecting its Phoenician roots, operated as part of a vast maritime trading network of Phoenician colonies and trading posts stretching from Spain to Tyre. Carthage protected and expanded its mercantile maritime economy through two primary means – political control and military power. Eschewing conquest, Carthage extended its power through a federated network of allies, client states, trading posts and military fortifications across Spain, Sardinia, Malta, and western Sicily, assuring dominance of the western Mediterranean.¹⁶ Reflecting history, culture, geography and economic interests, Carthage’s fleet was the mainstay of its hard power. Carthage developed cutting edge naval technology, fielding fast, light and manoeuvrable vessels that demonstrated superior performance against Greek and later Roman craft.¹⁷ The fleet maintained sea control, protected trade, disrupted piracy, and harried competitors. Notably, Carthage’s maritime force was comprised of citizens, while its army relied almost exclusively on mercenary units commanded by Carthaginian officers.¹⁸ The use of mercenaries enabled Carthage to field substantial land forces despite the relatively small number of Carthaginian citizens.¹⁹

By the sixth century BC, an established Carthaginian elite exercised control of government, the military and foreign policy. This polity inherited a grand strategic framework founded on mercantilism, enabled by federated colonies and trading posts that extracted resources from across the region, and maintained through sea control based on maritime power. This then was Carthage’s “theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.”²⁰ These structural and ideational factors bounded Carthaginian strategic choice. Carthage’s success or failure would depend on the efficacy of these grand strategic capabilities and assumptions in the context of a changing external environment, or on its ability to adapt to new contexts, threats and opportunities.

The first significant test for Carthage’s grand strategy came through a challenge to its control of vital ports in Sicily. Like the Phoenicians, the Greeks had established colonies and trading networks across the Mediterranean from the ninth century BC, including on Sicily. Expanding Greek power represented a threat to Carthaginian hegemony, and in the fifth century BC mounting tensions spilled into open conflict.²¹ For two hundred years, Carthage and the Greek city states of Sicily fought a series of inconclusive wars.²² Although costly, these did not constitute an existential threat to Carthage, and they did not invalidate Carthaginian grand strategy. Rather, they represented a pattern of sustainable strategic competition, accommodated within Carthage’s strategic assumptions.²³ Throughout the Sicilian Wars, Carthage continued to establish new colonies in northern Africa, Tunisia and Spain and to expand its reach into the Atlantic. Its political, economic and military power continued to grow. By the beginning of the third century BC, Carthage had restored strategic stability in Sicily, exercising effective control of the western and central regions of the island, enabling it to maintain its trade routes and colonies. It remained the most powerful state in the Western Mediterranean.²⁴ However, it would soon face an unprecedented threat to its security and its very survival.

The Punic Wars were an existential power struggle between established Carthage and an expanding Rome. On the eve of hostilities Carthage was undoubtedly the more powerful of the two belligerents in material terms. It had a stronger and more diversified economy, a broader network of territories and bases, a larger population, superior naval forces, and control of the western Mediterranean Sea.²⁵ Why then did its ancient citadel lie in ruins 120 years later, its people dead or in chains, its books and statues destroyed? The remainder of the case study explores this question. It demonstrates that the character of the Carthaginian state delimited its strategic choices and actions, contributing to failure against the very different type of power brought to bear by Rome. When Carthage’s grand strategy became untenable, attempts to adapt to the new international environment were constrained by structural and ideational factors and were ultimately unsuccessful.

Founded in 753 BC, Rome grew more slowly than Carthage. Preferring conquest to trade, the early Roman state gradually gained control over the Italian peninsula through war and diplomacy.²⁶ Following establishment of the Republic in 509BC, Rome fought a series of land wars with Gauls and Etruscans in northern Italy, and with Greek colonies in the south. In this latter campaign, Roman and Carthaginian interests coincided. From the earliest days of the Roman Republic, its relations with Carthage were governed by a series of treaties that agreed to refrain from hostilities and defined spheres of influence and trading arrangements.²⁷ These treaties gave Rome a free hand on the Italian peninsula. They also supported Carthage’s grand strategy, preserving critical trade routes, denying expansion of Roman settlements into Carthaginian territories, and enabling Carthage to focus its attention on the threat posed by Greek forces in Sicily.²⁸ An approach of mutual accommodation endured for over two hundred years. By the beginning of the third century BC, Rome has established control over all of Italy, and was rapidly growing in economic and military power.²⁹

Relations between Carthage and Rome began to change during the Pyrrhic War. In 280 BC, the Greek tyrant Pyrrhus launched an invasion of southern Italy and prepared to cross into Sicily. Recognising this mutual threat, Carthage and Rome signed a new treaty, agreeing that Carthaginian shipping might transport Roman troops into combat in either Italy or Sicily.³⁰ Pyrrhus invaded Sicily but was eventually repulsed. The treaty had little practical effect, but it provides insight into the strategic approach of both states.³¹ From a Carthaginian viewpoint, the agreement leveraged its maritime strengths and its tradition of using mercenaries or proxies to fight on land. But for the Romans, the treaty hinted at the limits of Carthaginian power, and the vulnerability of its armies on the rich agricultural lands of Sicily. At around the same time, Roman elites began debating the threat posed by Carthage through its control of the Western Mediterranean. Polybius records that “they were beginning … to be exceedingly anxious lest, if the Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find them very dangerous and formidable neighbours … occupying a position which commanded all the coasts of Italy.”³² Through the lens of classical neorealism, Carthaginian and Roman desires for economic and territorial security would put the two powers on a collision course.

The First Punic War between Carthage and Rome began in 264 BC when Roman forces landed in Sicily on the pretext of assisting a minor ally. The Romans achieved early tactical success, but lacking sufficient strength and supplies to achieve decision, they soon withdrew. From Carthage’s viewpoint, this fitted with the well-established pattern of operations in Sicily. Carthage would – it supposed – maintain the balancing strategy it had employed successfully for over two centuries. ³³ Its mercenaries would fight to retain its foothold in Sicily, while its maritime forces would keep the war at a distance and maintain prosperity through trade, enabling it to fund ongoing military operations.³⁴ For a time, this proved successful. Rome resumed offensive operations, but the war settled into strategic stalemate, grinding on through a series of indecisive battles, sieges and naval engagements that lasted for almost a decade.³⁵

Unable to achieve decision in Sicily, Rome determined to break the familiar strategic pattern by challenging Carthage’s control of the seas, raising a powerful new fleet. Carthaginian defeat at the naval battle of Mylae (260 BC) was a devastating blow to Punic confidence.³⁶ With Carthage’s sea control now contested, Rome launched an audacious invasion of Africa. In 256 BC the Roman invasion fleet broke Carthage’s maritime defences at the Battle of Cape Ecnomus before devastating Carthage’s surrounds.³⁷ When Carthage finally halted the Roman campaign at the Battle of Tunis (255 BC), the action shifted back to Sicily where the war of attrition continued for another fourteen years.³⁸ Costs mounted on both sides. Eventually Rome achieved a decisive victory at sea, destroying the Carthaginian fleet at the Battle of the Aegates (241 BC).³⁹ The exhausted Carthaginians sued for peace, agreeing to surrender Sicily to Roman control and pay a substantial indemnity. Carthage’s reliance on mercenaries would haunt it when its unpaid armies turned against it during the brutal Truceless War.⁴⁰ This enabled Rome to coerce a weakened Carthage to surrender Sardinia and Corsica also.⁴¹ With the loss of these territories and the devastation of its fleet, the foundations of Carthage’s maritime strategy suffered irreparable damage.

Carthage’s grand strategic framework had proven unable to cope with the rise of Roman power. The Carthage polity sought to adapt to the new international environment through changes to its strategic approach. It shifted focus to the west, expanding its settlements in Iberia to access additional manpower and raw materials.⁴² Meanwhile Rome, having consolidated its control of the central Mediterranean Islands, established its own foothold in Iberia.⁴³ This would become the next flashpoint as the two great powers sought to establish supremacy. Recognising the security threat posed by Roman encroachment into Iberia, and motivated by a desire to redress the ignominy of the First Punic War, Hannibal – Carthage’s most famous General – laid siege to the Roman settlement of Saguntum in 219 BC, marking the beginning of the Second Punic War.⁴⁴

Carthage’s strategy during this conflict represented a marked departure from its long-standing grand strategic framework. Having lost maritime supremacy, it embarked on a continental strategy.⁴⁵ Carthage sought to peel away Rome’s allies and to inflict decisive defeat on its armies, thereby forcing Rome to renegotiate terms.⁴⁶ Hannibal marched his army from Iberia across the Alps and into Italy, building alliances with local tribes to secure his lines of communication and strengthen his numbers.⁴⁷ This was a new way of warfare for Carthage. Tactically, it was highly successful. Within two years, Hannibal inflicted crushing defeats on the Roman Legions at Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae.⁴⁸ However, tactical success could not translate to strategic victory.⁴⁹ For eleven years, Hannibal fought through the Italian countryside, but could not achieve decision against an enemy operating with strategic depth, short supply lines, and a strong recruiting base.⁵⁰ Rome continued to raise levies and to harry the invader while avoiding open battle.⁵¹ Rome’s control of Sicily denied Hannibal easy resupply, while Carthage’s allies and mercenaries’ loyalties were to prove fragile.⁵² In 205 BC, Rome leveraged its control of Sicily to launch another invasion of the Carthaginian homeland. Hannibal was forced to return to Carthage to defend the capital, marking the end of his Italian ambitions. Carthage suffered a final defeat at the Battle of Zama in 202BC, forcing it to agree to humiliating terms. Carthage was stripped of its overseas possessions, forbidden to possess war elephants, and its fleet was restricted to ten warships. It was required to pay a crushing indemnity to Rome, and its foreign policy was subordinated to Roman oversight.⁵³

The treaty ended Carthage’s status as a great power.⁵⁴ For six hundred years, Carthage had grown in power and influence through a grand strategy predicated on mercantilism and sea control. In the First Punic War, Carthage’s grand strategy failed when it lost the ability to exert unchallenged maritime power in the Western Mediterranean. The Second Punic War represented an attempt to adapt to changed strategic circumstances through application of an emergent strategy of continental warfare and alliance-building. This failed due to Rome’s strategic depth and control of sea lines of communication, the limits of Carthaginian manpower and its overreliance on allies and mercenaries. Carthage’s final strategy was one of accommodation. It sought to accept its degraded political and military status, focussing instead on its economic interests. Through trade, it rebuilt and maintained unsurpassed wealth. This attracted Roman attention, nor had Rome forgotten the trauma of Hannibal’s invasion.⁵⁵ Shortly after Carthage had paid the indemnity, Rome, exhibiting a combination of greed and fear, embarked on the Third Punic War – a short, brutal campaign that culminated in Carthage’s annihilation.⁵⁶

This case study demonstrates a key lesson for strategists: the foundations of a state’s power that underpin its strategic framework may constrain its ability to effectively respond to a changing external environment. Neoclassical Realism suggests that Carthaginian grand strategy was motivated by a quest for security – territorial security of its homeland and of the ports that enabled it to control the Western Mediterranean, and economic security through the protection of its trading networks. Carthage’s grand strategy – its theory about how to cause security for itself – was based on structural and ideational factors including politics, history and geography, which contributed to critical capabilities including the ability to develop and apply maritime power, and to leverage trade to build economic power. It sought to expand its security through alliances, client states and colonies. These represented a virtuous circle – security begat security. When its security was threatened, Carthage was ready to go to war to protect its interests. For six hundred years, Carthage’s strategic approach and capabilities suited its times, supporting its rise to pre-eminence in the western Mediterranean. The rise of Rome – surely one of the most significant changes to the international order in world history – dislocated Carthaginian grand strategy. Following a period of mutual accommodation, the two powers came into conflict. Both would come to depend on the Mediterranean Sea for both their security and prosperity, and both were willing to fight to protect and advance their interests. Carthage anticipated that this conflict would conform to established patterns of strategic competition. However Rome represented a new and unforeseen threat – an enemy that sought total domination, and that had the population, resources, technology and ideology to impose its will. Rome’s destruction of the Carthaginian fleet and seizure of the Mediterranean Islands unwound Carthage’s grand strategy. When Carthage responded with an emergent strategy of continental warfare, it lacked the resources and capabilities to win. Rather, it only succeeded in confirming in Roman minds that Carthage itself represented an intolerable threat to security: “Carthago delenda est” – Carthage must be destroyed.⁵⁷ Students of strategy should consider the key finding of this case study – that the foundations of power may constrain a state’s ability to respond to changing circumstances. Building on this conclusion, a wider survey of historical and contemporary case studies might explore the prevalence and significance of this observation in the experience of empire, and its potential implications for the contemporary international system.

Bibliography

Ameling, Walter. “The Rise of Carthage to 264.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Beck, Hans. “The Reasons for the War.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Billau, Daneta, and Donald Graczyk. “Hannibal: The Father of Strategy Reconsidered.” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 4 (January 2003): 335–53.

Brawley, Mark R. Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009.

Champion, Craige B. “Polybius and the Punic Wars.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Edwell, Peter. “War Abroad: Spain, Sicily, Macedon, Africa.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Elman, Colin, and Michael Jensen. The Realism Reader. Routledge, 2014.

Fronda, Michael P. “Hannibal: Tactics, Strategy and Geostrategy.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Glaser, Charles L. “The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism.” In The Realism Reader, edited by Colin Elmand and Michael Jensen. London: Routledge, 2014.

Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146BC. Hachette UK, 2012.

Groitl, Gerlinde. “Strategic Choices: Neoclassical Realist Model of Order and Revisionism.” In Russia, China and the Revisionist Assault on the Western Liberal International Order, by Gerlinde Groitl, 79–123. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023.

Hoyos, Dexter. Carthage: A Biography. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

———. “Carthage in Africa and Spain, 241-218.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Little, Charles E. “The Authenticity and Form of Cato’s Saying ‘Carthago Delenda Est.’” The Classical Journal 29, no. 6 (1934): 429–35.

Lomas, Kathryn. “Rome, Latins, and Italians in the Second Punci War.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Luttwak, Edward. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third. JHU Press, 2016.

Meijer, Fik. “Carthage as a Maritime Power.” In Carthage: Fact and Myth, edited by Roald Docter, Ridha Boussoffara, and Pieter ter Keurs. Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2015.

Miles, Richard. Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization. Penguin, 2011.

Milevski, Lukas. The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Mineo, Bernard. “Principal Literary Sources for the Punic Wars.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Müller, Marcus. “A View To A Kill: Egypt’s Grand Strategy In Her Northern Empire.” Brill, 2011.

Murariu, Mihai. “Perspectives on Seapower and International Systems. The Case of Rome and Carthage.” Research and Science Today 22, no. 2 (2021): 37–46.

Platias, Athanassios, and Constantinos Koliopoulos. Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today. Oxford University Press, 2017.

Polybius. The Histories. Translated by F.W. Walbank. Loeb Classical Library. Vol. VI. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1927.

———. The Histories of Polybius. Translated by F Hultsch and Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. Vol. 1. London: Macmillan and Co, 1889.

Posen, Barry. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars. Cornell University Press, 1984.

Rankov, Boris. “A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264 - 241 BC.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Rawlings, Klaus. “The War in Italy, 218-203.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Rehman, Iskander. “Great-Power Success in Protracted Warfare: Key Drivers and Core Components.” Adelphi Series 62, no. 496–497 (2022): 33–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2022.2274678.

Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72.

Salmon, Edward Togo. “The Strategy of the Second Punic War.” Greece & Rome 7, no. 2 (1960): 131–42.

Schmidt, Brian C. “The Primacy of National Security.” In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, and Cases, 3rd ed., 206–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Serrati, John. “Neptune’s Altars: The Treaties between Rome and Carthage (509–226 BC).” The Classical Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2006): 113–34.

Taylor, Michael J. “Generals and Judges: Command, Constitution and the Fate of Carthage.” Libyan Studies, no. 54 (2023): 37–44.

Yun, Bee. “Persia and Pericles’ Grand Strategy. Was the Peloponnesian War a Bipolar Hegemonic War?” The International History Review 44, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 206–24.

Zimmerman, Klaus. “Roman Strategy and Aims in the Second Punic War.” In A Companion to the Punic Wars, edited by Dexter Hoyos. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Footnotes

¹Polybius, The Histories, trans. F.W. Walbank, Loeb Classical Library, vol. VI (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1927), 439.

²Polybius, VI:439.

³See, for example, Marcus Müller, “A View To A Kill: Egypt’s Grand Strategy In Her Northern Empire” (Brill, 2011); Bee Yun, “Persia and Pericles’ Grand Strategy. Was the Peloponnesian War a Bipolar Hegemonic War?,” The International History Review 44, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 206–24; Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy: Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and Their Relevance Today (Oxford University Press, 2017); Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third (JHU Press, 2016).

⁴Craige B Champion, “Polybius and the Punic Wars,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 95–110; Bernard Mineo, “Principal Literary Sources for the Punic Wars,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 111–27.

⁵For an overview of Carthage historiography see Adrian Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146BC (Hachette UK, 2012), 19–24.

⁶Lukas Milevski, The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (Oxford University Press, 2016), 143–53.

⁷Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Cornell University Press, 1984), 13.

⁸Posen, 13.

⁹Brian C. Schmidt, “The Primacy of National Security,” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, and Cases, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 215.

¹⁰Gerlinde Groitl, “Strategic Choices: Neoclassical Realist Model of Order and Revisionism,” in Russia, China and the Revisionist Assault on the Western Liberal International Order, by Gerlinde Groitl (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023), 91.

¹¹Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 144–72; Colin Elman and Michael Jensen, The Realism Reader (Routledge, 2014), 243; Charles L. Glaser, “The Necessary and Natural Evolution of Structural Realism,” in The Realism Reader, ed. Colin Elmand and Michael Jensen (London: Routledge, 2014), 82.

¹²Mark R. Brawley, Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View (Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), 4.

¹³Walter Ameling, “The Rise of Carthage to 264,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 40.

¹⁴Dexter Hoyos, Carthage: A Biography (Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 11.

¹⁵Mihai Murariu, “Perspectives on Seapower and International Systems. The Case of Rome and Carthage,” Research and Science Today 22, no. 2 (2021): 44.

¹⁶Ameling, “The Rise of Carthage to 264,” 48–51.

¹⁷Hoyos, Carthage, 35–36.

¹⁸Hoyos, 37.

¹⁹Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 31.

²⁰Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 13.

²¹Hoyos, Carthage, 54–56.

²²Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 27–28.

²³Hoyos, Carthage, 63.

²⁴Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 28.

²⁵Iskander Rehman, “Great-Power Success in Protracted Warfare: Key Drivers and Core Components,” Adelphi Series 62, no. 496–497 (2022): 33–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2022.2274678.

²⁶Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 36–38.

²⁷Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, trans. F Hultsch and Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan and Co, 1889), 185–87.

²⁸John Serrati, “Neptune’s Altars: The Treaties between Rome and Carthage (509–226 BC),” The Classical Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2006): 113–34.

²⁹Hoyos, Carthage, 64–65.

³⁰Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, 1:185–87.

³¹The only known instance of cooperation under the treaty occurred in XXX, when Carthaginian vessels transported Roman troops along the Italian peninsula to attack a rebellious Roman garrison.

³²Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, 1:10.

³³Michael J. Taylor, “Generals and Judges: Command, Constitution and the Fate of Carthage,” Libyan Studies, no. 54 (2023): 38.

³⁴Richard Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization (Penguin, 2011), 179.

³⁵Boris Rankov, “A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264 - 241 BC,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 151–55.

³⁶Fik Meijer, “Carthage as a Maritime Power,” in Carthage: Fact and Myth, ed. Roald Docter, Ridha Boussoffara, and Pieter ter Keurs (Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2015), 67.

³⁷Rankov, “A War of Phases: Strategies and Stalemates 264 - 241 BC,” 155–57.

³⁸Rankov, 157–62.

³⁹Rankov, 163–64.

⁴⁰Dexter Hoyos, “Carthage in Africa and Spain, 241-218,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 206–10.

⁴¹Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 136.

⁴²Hoyos, “Carthage in Africa and Spain, 241-218,” 214–16.

⁴³Hans Beck, “The Reasons for the War,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 235–37.

⁴⁴Beck, 228–31.

⁴⁵Edward Togo Salmon, “The Strategy of the Second Punic War,” Greece & Rome 7, no. 2 (1960): 136.

⁴⁶Michael P. Fronda, “Hannibal: Tactics, Strategy and Geostrategy,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 250; Daneta Billau and Donald Graczyk, “Hannibal: The Father of Strategy Reconsidered,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 4 (January 2003): 341–42.

⁴⁷Hoyos, Carthage, 72.

⁴⁸Klaus Rawlings, “The War in Italy, 218-203,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 300; Hoyos, Carthage, 72–73.

⁴⁹Billau and Graczyk, “Hannibal: The Father of Strategy Reconsidered,” 349.

⁵⁰Fronda, “Hannibal: Tactics, Strategy and Geostrategy,” 252–53.

⁵¹Klaus Zimmerman, “Roman Strategy and Aims in the Second Punic War,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 285–90.

⁵²Peter Edwell, “War Abroad: Spain, Sicily, Macedon, Africa,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 330; Rawlings, “The War in Italy, 218-203,” 313; Kathryn Lomas, “Rome, Latins, and Italians in the Second Punci War,” in A Companion to the Punic Wars, ed. Dexter Hoyos (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 354; Rehman, “Great-Power Success in Protracted Warfare,” 36.

⁵³Hoyos, Carthage, 76.

⁵⁴Hoyos, 77.

⁵⁵Hoyos, 84–86.

⁵⁶Hoyos, 79–83.

⁵⁷The famous phrase attributed to Cato the Elder. See Charles E. Little, “The Authenticity and Form of Cato’s Saying ‘Carthago Delenda Est,’” The Classical Journal 29, no. 6 (1934): 429–35.

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.