Summary

This thesis addresses the question:

How would the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI) in the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) hydrographic capability impact workforce transformation?

Driven by the strategic imperatives of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) for a 'Strategy of Denial' in the Indo-Pacific, the RAN is shifting from traditional crewed survey ships to a future capability reliant on uncrewed systems and AI-driven data analysis. The thesis argues that this technological leap necessitates a profound and disruptive workforce transformation that extends beyond mere retraining.

This transformation involves a fundamental shift in the professional identity of the hydrographic specialist from a traditional mariner to a technologist, which is, a systems operator and data analyst skilled in robotics and AI interpretation. This evolution creates significant challenges in skill acquisition, training, recruitment, and retention. Success is contingent on the RAN's ability to create new career pathways, foster a culture that values technical mastery, develop new operational concepts for Human-Machine Teaming, and align naval doctrine with this new reality. Ultimately, the thesis concludes that successfully navigating this change is a prerequisite for realising the full operational potential of an autonomy-enabled hydrographic capability.

Introduction

The strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region is characterised by increasing complexity and contestation, demanding that the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and specifically the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), leverage technological advancements to maintain a capability edge.¹ The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and the subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) unequivocally mandate the adoption of disruptive technologies, with Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI)² identified as a critical priority to support a 'Strategy of Denial'.³ Within this broad strategic directive, the modernisation of the RAN’s hydrographic capability (i.e. the science of measuring and describing the physical features of oceans, seas, coastal areas, lakes, and rivers⁴), emerges as a foundational enabler for maritime operations and national security. This thesis confronts the pivotal challenge accompanying this technological leap: the profound impact on the RAN’s specialist hydrographic workforce.

The core research question guiding this inquiry is: How would the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI) in the Royal Australian Navy's hydrographic capability impact workforce transformation? The central argument presented is that the introduction of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs), and AI-driven data analytics into the Navy's hydrographic survey missions and data processing—a direction already set by strategic guidance and capability development plans⁵—necessitates a fundamental and potentially disruptive transformation of the RAN’s workforce. The RAN’s own RAS-AI Strategy 2040 and its accompanying RAS-AI Campaign Plan 2025 articulate a vision for harnessing these technologies across the fleet, including for hydrographic and geospatial support functions.⁶ This transformation extends beyond mere technical retraining; it involves a shift in roles, responsibilities, career pathways, and the very conceptualisation of hydrographic expertise within a naval context. The level of detail required to address and operationalise such matters will not be dealt with in this thesis however, broad principles and themes will.

Hydrography, traditionally a discipline reliant on crewed survey vessels and meticulous manual data collection and processing, provides the essential geospatial intelligence for safe navigation, maritime trade, resource management, disaster relief, and, critically for Defence, the geospatial intelligence enabling naval operations. As the Australian Hydrographic Office (AHO) notes, ‘hydrographic information underpins every activity that occurs on, under or over the sea.’⁷ The accuracy and timeliness of hydrographic data are paramount for anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, mine countermeasures, and ensuring access for naval forces. However, traditional methods are often resource-intensive, time-consuming, and can expose personnel to risk in contested or hazardous environments.

The allure of autonomous systems⁸ and AI in this domain is compelling; in fact, autonomous hydrographic and mine-counter-measure systems acquisition (Project SEA 1905) was underway until it was cancelled due to competing funding pressures.⁹ AUVs and USVs offer the potential for persistent, wide-area surveillance, rapid data acquisition in denied or dangerous waters, and reduced personnel exposure. AI and machine learning (ML) algorithms promise to accelerate data processing, identify anomalies, and potentially automate aspects of chart production, thereby compressing the ‘data acquisition to user’ timeline and enhancing decision support.

However, any transition from established, human-centric methodologies to an autonomy-enabled hydrographic capability has its challenges, particularly concerning the workforce. This thesis posits that the successful integration of these advanced technologies is not merely a matter of procurement and technical implementation. Instead, successful integration would hinge on the RAN's ability to effectively manage a complex workforce transformation. It would involve shifting hydrographic personnel from traditional hands-on surveying roles to new functions centred on remote system supervision, mission planning for autonomous assets, advanced data analysis, interpretation of AI-generated outputs, and the maintenance of complex software-intensive systems.

Several corollary questions flow from the central research question. How effectively can the RAN manage the transition from legacy platforms, such as the recently decommissioned Leeuwin and Paluma class survey vessels,¹⁰ to a more distributed and (in the future) autonomous system-based capability, given current workforce structures, training pipelines, and skill demographics? How does the increasing reliance on industry partnerships, exemplified by the Hydrographic Industry Partnership Program (HIPP), impact the development and retention of sovereign military hydrographic expertise and the overall workforce composition? Furthermore, while this thesis will focus primarily on workforce transformation due to word constraints, it acknowledges the interconnectedness of policy, doctrine, and regulatory frameworks: are these existing structures sufficiently agile and aligned to support this rapid technological shift and the new operational concepts it enables?

Research Method

This thesis employs a qualitative research methodology, utilising a combination of document analysis, and comparative case studies of allied experiences. This approach is well-suited to exploring the complex, multifaceted nature of workforce transformation in a technologically evolving military organisation.

To address gaps in understanding within the existing policy and academic scholarship, this thesis synthesises insights from primary and secondary sources, including strategic policy documents,¹¹ legal sources,¹² technical literature,¹³ academic journals,¹⁴ reports and publications from defence research institutions and think tanks.¹⁵ It will also draw upon publicly accessible statements and information released by Defence and industry stakeholders,¹⁶ including reports from parliamentary committees and the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) as well as publications from national and international hydrographic bodies.¹⁷ These insights are then combined with empirical and theoretical insights derived from the experiences of allied countries and organisational theory to illuminate the path ahead.

With respect to the comparative case study, this is undertaken later in Chapter 4 and will focus on the experiences of key allied navies, specifically the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy (RN) and the United States Navy (USN). These two navies were selected because they are significantly investing in autonomous systems for hydrographic and related mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities. Examining their approaches to workforce adaptation, training reforms, integration challenges, and lessons learned can, therefore, provide valuable insights and potential best practices relevant to the RAN's context.

A few caveats are worth noting here. First, this research relies almost entirely on publicly accessible information. While this presents a limitation in terms of accessing classified or commercially sensitive internal Defence planning documents, the wealth of available public information, including detailed strategic guidance and reports on technological advancements (including in the commercial hydrographic surveying industry), provides a robust foundation for this thesis’s inquiry. Second, the rapidly evolving nature of autonomous systems technology and the dynamic strategic environment mean that this analysis will necessarily represent a snapshot in time, current as of October 2025. Engaging in an accurate assessment of the long-term effectiveness of initiatives like HIPP is also constrained by their relative novelty and associated commercial sensitivities. Finally, this thesis’s scope is deliberately focused on the RAN's hydrographic capability and its associated workforce transformation. It excludes detailed technical analysis of specific autonomous platforms or the broader complexities of international maritime law governing autonomous vessels, beyond their contextual relevance to workforce roles and training.

Aims and significance

This research aims to provide a holistic analysis of the complex workforce transition needed to coordinate and align people, processes and technology for future strategic readiness. It seeks to move beyond a purely technological or strategic assessment to explore the human dimension of hydrographic modernisation. The significance of this thesis lies in its direct relevance to current Defence priorities and its potential to inform policy and practice within the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The workforce implications of the Navy's shift from traditional hydrographic platforms to deployable capabilities, managed by small teams known as Deployable Geospatial Support Teams (DGSTs), have been substantial. Utilizing equipment and capabilities acquired through Project SEA 1770 (Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA)), understanding these workforce implications is crucial to avoiding capability gaps and ensuring the full realization of the promised benefits of autonomy. Regarding the acquisition and use of future autonomous capabilities, such as those under potential future projects like the cancelled Project SEA 1905 - Maritime Mine Countermeasures and Hydrographic Capability, understanding the workforce implications will become even more critical to prevent capability gaps and ensure the promised benefits of autonomy are fully realized.

This thesis’s originality further lies in its specific focus on the RAN's hydrographic workforce transformation within the broader context of autonomy and AI adoption. While existing the literature (as reviewed in Chapter 1) often addresses the technological aspects of AUVs/USVs or the strategic implications of RAS-AI, a comprehensive analysis of the human capital challenges confronting a specialised branch like hydrography in the RAN remains significantly less developed. Practically, the findings of this research aim to be of value to Defence planners, capability managers, human resource specialists, and training authorities involved in shaping the future of the RAN’s hydrographic service and, by extension, its overall operational effectiveness.

Thesis Structure

This thesis proceeds in eight chapters, including the Conclusion. Chapter 1 examines the evolving context for the RAN’s hydrographic capability, with Chapter 2 then examining the strategic drivers that underlie the need to modernise hydrography. Chapters 3 and 4 provide examinations of the various new technologies relevant to modern hydrography and allied experiences with such technologies. Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of the workforce transformation challenges, with Chapter 6 reflecting on what the supporting ecosystem needs to look like, before turning in Chapter 7 to how this workforce transformation should be supported by stronger policy, doctrine and regulatory alignments. Here, achieving productivity gains from the integration of new technologies requires significant adaptation in workforce structures, including how the RAN plans, trains, and develops its people. The Conclusion summarises the key findings of this thesis, reiterating the importance for the RAN to ensure that advances in technology are not viewed as replacements for personnel but as tools to enhance their capabilities and productivity.

Chapter 1: The Evolving Landscape of RAN Hydrographic Capability

This chapter details the historical mandate of the Australian Hydrographic Service (AHS), and its evolution. It also examines traditional platforms and methodologies of collecting hydrographic data,¹⁸ focusing on the recently decommissioned Leeuwin and Paluma classes.¹⁹ These classes represent the last of ship or platform centric hydrographic capability. A significant portion of this chapter is dedicated to analysing the RAN’s strategic decision to transition towards new capabilities, including a brief account of the role and implications of the Hydrographic Industry Partnership Program (HIPP) and the divestment from sovereign survey platforms.

Literature Review

The existing body of literature underscores the transformative potential of autonomous systems and AI in the maritime domain. Studies on AUVs and USVs highlight their increasing sophistication, endurance, and ability to gather high-resolution data in diverse and challenging environments.²⁰ The strategic impetus for adopting such technologies is well-documented, particularly in the context of great power competition and the need for persistent maritime domain awareness.²¹ The RAN’s strategic documents, including the DSR, NDS, and RAS-AI Strategy, clearly articulate this imperative.

Existing scholarship also touches upon the challenges of integrating these new technologies. These include technical hurdles, data management complexities, ethical considerations (particularly for AI in decision-making), and the need for new operational concepts.²² However, a specific and in-depth focus on the workforce transformation required within a niche capability like naval hydrography is less prevalent. While some works discuss the general need for upskilling personnel for an AI-enabled future,²³ or the challenges of Human-Machine Teaming (HMT),²⁴ the granular detail of how a specific naval specialisation like hydrography must adapt its recruitment, training, career progression, and organisational structure is an area ripe for further investigation. This thesis aims to address this specific lacuna (in publicly available information), focusing on the RAN's unique context, including its reliance on the HIPP and the operational demands of the Indo-Pacific region.

History and evolution

The RAN Hydrographic Service was formally established on 1 October 1920.²⁵  Its origins, however, are intertwined with the British Admiralty Hydrographic Office, which undertook extensive surveys of Australian waters throughout the 19th century to support both colonial defence and burgeoning commercial development.²⁶ While the RAN assumed responsibility for hydrographic surveys in 1920, the formal responsibility for the publication of charts was taken on in 1942. Early survey work, even predating the official formation, was conducted by vessels such as HMAS Una in 1915, followed by pioneering efforts by ships like HMS Fantome and HMAS Geranium.²⁷

The Australian Hydrographic Office (AHO)²⁸ is the nation's primary hydrographic authority, shouldering the immense responsibility of charting an area that covers more than one-eighth of the world's surface.²⁹ This mandate encompasses a critical dual function: supporting civil maritime safety under international conventions such as the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and national legislation like the Navigation Act 2012 (Cth), while simultaneously providing essential geospatial intelligence for Australian Defence Force (ADF) operations.³⁰ The AHO's mission explicitly includes enabling safe navigation, supporting Australia's defence and national infrastructure, and fulfilling international obligations for navigational safety and marine environmental protection.³¹

The strategic importance of this capability was starkly demonstrated during the Second World War. The RAN Hydrographic Branch underwent a significant expansion, playing a vital role in supporting Allied operations in the South West Pacific Area by producing over 1.5 million chart impressions and conducting surveys, often under hazardous conditions.³² This historical precedent underscores hydrography's long-standing criticality to national defence. The enduring dual-purpose nature of Australian hydrography—serving both national civilian requirements for trade, resource management, and safety, and critical military operational needs—highlights its foundational importance.

For decades, the RAN's hydrographic capability was delivered through traditional methodologies, primarily reliant on crewed survey vessels undertaking meticulous, often protracted (many months), data collection and manual processing campaigns. These methods, while foundational, are inherently resource-intensive in terms of personnel, time, and operational costs, and could expose naval personnel to risks, particularly in contested or hazardous maritime environments.

The backbone of the RAN's inshore survey capability for over three decades was the Paluma-class Survey Motor Launch. Four of these 36.6-metre catamarans—HMAS Paluma (A01), Mermaid (A02), Shepparton (A03), and Benalla (A04)—were commissioned between 1989 and 1990.³³ Designed specifically for hydrographic operations in the shallow waters of northern Australia, including the Great Barrier Reef, their twin hulls offered stability, high manoeuvrability, and a shallow draught of approximately 2.2 to 2.65 metres, which allowed access to reef-strewn and coastal areas. They were equipped with sensors such as the ELAC LAZ 72 side-scan sonar and a Skipper 113 hull-mounted scanning sonar. Beyond routine surveys, these vessels conducted wreck searches, supported the installation and maintenance of shore-based tracking stations, participated in United Nations operations in East Timor, and provided aid to civil communities.³⁴ The progressive decommissioning of the Paluma class (HMAS Paluma and Mermaid in September 2021, followed by HMAS Shepparton and Benalla in June 2023) marked a significant step in the transition towards new systems, which was (until cancelled) explicitly linked to the introduction of modularized deployable capabilities able to be deployed on future vessels (such as the Offshore Patrol Vessel) under Project SEA 1905-1.³⁵ Due to the cancellation of Project SEA 1905 and the acquisition of advanced autonomous capabilities that project promised, the RAN (and Defence) has effectively delayed its hydrographic (and mine-counter-measures) technological transition to autonomy.

For deeper and more extensive offshore survey tasks, the RAN operated two Leeuwin-class Survey Ships (AGS): HMAS Leeuwin (A245) and HMAS Melville (A246), both commissioned in May 2000.³⁶ These 71.2-metre monohulls were significantly more capable, equipped with multi-beam echo sounders (Atlas Fansweep), single-beam echo sounders (Atlas Hydrographic Deso), a C-Tech CMAS forward-looking sonar, and could embark and support an AS350B Squirrel helicopter and three 9-metre survey motor boats.³⁷ Designed to survey a combined 10,000 square nautical miles per annum, their roles extended beyond hydrography to include support for Mine Countermeasures (MCM) operations, maritime surveillance, disaster relief, Search and Rescue (SAR), and emergency medical assistance.³⁸ The strategic pivot towards new capabilities led to the decommissioning of HMAS Melville on 8 August 2024, leaving HMAS Leeuwin as the RAN’s sole remaining dedicated hydrographic survey ship.³⁹ This reduction in organic, crewed survey platforms underscores the commitment to a new operational model.

The divestment from these legacy platforms was driven in part by their inherent limitations in the context of evolving strategic demands and technological possibilities. While highly effective for their era, their operational tempo, reliance on substantial crews,⁴⁰ and the risks associated with deploying crewed platforms in potentially hostile areas became increasingly misaligned with the strategic direction emphasizing speed, persistence, reduced human exposure, and cost-effectiveness (especially when the national charting obligations can be met under the Hydrographic Industry Partnership Program (HIPP) discussed below). The decision to retire these vessels is thus a clear manifestation of a fundamental capability shift, moving away from traditional, human-centric survey methods⁴¹ towards a more distributed, agile team-based capability, autonomous (in the future) and industry-supported hydrographic enterprise.

The following table offers a comparative overview of the key characteristics of these legacy platforms against the attributes of the emerging autonomous systems that are central to the RAN’s (future) hydrographic modernisation:

A significant element in the evolving landscape of Australian hydrography is the Hydrographic Industry Partnership Program (HIPP). Prior to the introduction of the HIPP, the greatest changes to the conduct of hydrographic surveying were in tactical efficiencies flowing from technological change, such as the introduction of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which enabled the rapid and accurate positioning of hydrospatial data. The HIPP program however, represents a strategic shift in how Australia meets its national hydrographic survey obligations,⁴⁵ moving towards a model of increased collaboration with commercial industry (whatever the technologies in use). HIPP is a commercial initiative through which the Department of Defence partners with specialist hydrographic survey companies to ‘undertake focused survey activities that contribute to national charting priorities.’⁴⁶ The stated vision for HIPP is to establish ‘an efficient, effective and sustainable hydrographic survey, oceanographic and marine geophysical data collection program through a partnership with Industry to deliver a true nation-building effort.’⁴⁷ Compared to the divested/divesting RAN ship based surveying capability, industry partners are generally able to achieve three times the rate of effort (i.e., three times the amount surveyed). This is largely due to the high degree of specialization in task (i.e., surveying is not diluted by non-surveying military activities and taskings) and the ability of industry to utilize the most cost effective and efficient technologies available and suitable for a given tasking. A key objective is to achieve full, high-quality bathymetric coverage of Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by 2050.⁴⁸ Industry is also well placed to test and evaluate commercial off the shelf autonomous systems and machine learning software and associated systems in a very agile way.

The program was initiated with a $150 million government investment over five years from 2020, and the 2024 Integrated Investment Plan indicates a further commitment of approximately $1 billion over the decade from 2024 for HIPP to continue collecting data for nautical charts and publications.⁴⁹

The AHO (as part of the Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation (AGO)) manages HIPP on behalf of the Department of Defence, with stakeholder agreement on survey priorities and areas facilitated through the Hydrographic Review Board, which includes representatives from the AHO, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), the Australian Antarctic Division, and Geoscience Australia.⁵⁰ The implementation of HIPP, which has been in full operation for over five years, has had profound implications for the RAN’s hydrographic capability and its workforce. By transitioning a significant portion of the national surveying responsibility to industry partners, the Navy’s organic survey capability has been redeveloped and refocused on specialised military environmental information collection and the provision of military-specific geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).⁵¹

The shift of national charting data collection to HIPP aligns directly with the DSR recommendation and the NDS directive for a more ‘focused force.’ However, this shift also raises important questions concerning the long-term development and retention of sovereign military hydrographic expertise and the overall composition of the naval hydrographic workforce. While a detailed analysis of HIPP's efficacy is beyond the scope of this chapter, the findings of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) regarding broader challenges within Defence in maximising Australian Industry Participation and ensuring effective contract management provide a critical contextual consideration for the program's long-term impact on sovereign capability.⁵² HIPP, therefore, is not merely an outsourcing mechanism but a fundamental restructuring of Australia's hydrographic enterprise, a choice that aims to leverage commercial capacity for broad area surveying, thereby theoretically freeing scarce Defence resources for uniquely military hydrographic tasks, often involving advanced autonomous technologies. However, based on publicly available information, it is not clear that any increased efficiencies garnered by HIPP contracted solutions has resulted in increased charting. It is understood that the AHO did not ask for or receive an increased budget or workforce to process and quality assure the increase in data collected—perhaps increased use of AI in processing and assurance will alleviate this issue in time.

Project SEA 1770 (a Department of Defence acquisition program), focused on Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA), has delivered a suite of deployable systems designed to enhance the ADF's ability to rapidly collect, process, and disseminate tactical maritime environmental information.⁵³ The capability acquired for hydrography was survey equipment useable by (small) deployable survey teams. This capability is crucial for supporting amphibious operations, disaster relief, and ensuring safe access for naval forces in unfamiliar or dynamic littoral environments. Key deliverables under SEA 1770 included the 9.5-metre Survey Craft System (SCS), which was aimed at gathering high-quality survey data and was anticipated to be deployable from shore and larger vessels, and also transported by road and air.⁵⁴ Complementing the SCS are the Fly Away Survey Kits (FASKs), designed for rapid deployment on vessels of opportunity, and Remus 100S Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs).⁵⁵ These systems collectively provide a flexible and rapidly deployable REA capability, enabling hydrographic and oceanographic data collection in a manner significantly different from traditional platform-centric approaches. The principle difference is that the operators do not need the same level of training and experience on the operation of the traditional platforms—consequently, the operators are more focused and specialised.

The evolving landscape of RAN hydrography, shaped by a rich history of service, the inherent limitations of now-retiring legacy platforms, overriding strategic imperatives as articulated in the DSR and NDS (discussed in greater detail in the next chapter), new models of industry partnership like HIPP, and the active procurement of advanced autonomous technologies through projects such as SEA 1770 and the possible future ambitions of a project similar to the cancelled project SEA 1905, exerts undeniable pressure for profound workforce transformation. This chapter has sought to establish the historical context and the primary drivers—the ‘why’ and ‘what’—of this change. The strategic imperative for hydrographic modernization is dealt with in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2: The Strategic Dimensions Impacting Hydrography in the Indo-Pacific

This chapter connects the drive for autonomous hydrography to Australia’s strategic imperatives in the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in the DSR and NDS – and as also reflected in the country’s strategy of denial. This concise discussion is necessary for better contextualization of the operational advantages (e.g., enhanced reach, persistence, reduced risk) and challenges (e.g., data security, system reliability, command and control (C2)) associated with employing autonomous systems in hydrographic surveys within the complex Indo-Pacific environment, as well as the implications for interoperability with allies under frameworks like AUKUS.

Any modernisation of the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) hydrographic capability is not a technical exercise undertaken in isolation. Rather, it is a direct and necessary response to a fundamental reshaping of Australia’s strategic environment. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and the subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) unequivocally state that Australia faces its most complex and challenging security landscape since the Second World War.⁵⁶ This assessment, driven by the erosion of the ten-year strategic warning time for major conflict and the scale of military expansion in the Indo-Pacific, has compelled a radical departure from previous defence postures.⁵⁷ The DSR judges the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as no longer ‘fit for purpose’ and mandates a transition from a ‘balanced force’, designed for a range of contingencies, to a ‘focused force’ optimised for deterrence in the maritime domain.⁵⁸

At the heart of this transformation is the adoption of a ‘strategy of denial’ as the new cornerstone of Defence planning.⁵⁹ This represents a profound philosophical shift. Where previous doctrine gave equal weight to shaping the strategic environment, deterring aggression, and responding with force, the NDS explicitly elevates deterrence to the primary strategic objective.⁶⁰ As Harshita Dey’s observes, the strategy aims to deter conflict before it begins by denying a potential adversary any confidence that it could succeed in projecting force against Australia or its interests.⁶¹ In the maritime domain, this translates into an imperative to hold an adversary’s assets at risk at the greatest possible distance, particularly within Australia’s northern approaches and across its critical sea lines of communication.⁶² The ability to achieve this effect is fundamentally dependent on superior knowledge of the operating environment. Effective anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare—the very means of enacting military denial at sea—are impossible without the detailed, timely, and accurate geospatial intelligence that military hydrography provides.

This strategic imperative is amplified by the character of modern maritime competition, which is increasingly conducted in the ‘grey-zone’—the contested space between peace and war.⁶³ Grey-zone operations employ coercive statecraft, such as the use of maritime militias and coast guard vessels (by China), to assert control and achieve strategic gains through ambiguity and incrementalism, deliberately remaining below the threshold that would provoke an overt military response.⁶⁴ Deploying high-value, crewed naval platforms like frigates into such scenarios to counter harassment creates a disproportionate risk of miscalculation and unwanted escalation, however, may still be required in activities such as freedom of navigation operations as conducted by the US.⁶⁵ To gain the necessary geospatial intelligence, including hydrographic data, the operational advantages of uncrewed systems—persistence, scalability, and the removal of personnel from harm’s way—therefore offer a compelling intelligence gathering solution.⁶⁶ AUVs and USVs can conduct the persistent surveillance and hydrographic data collection necessary to maintain domain awareness and (perhaps) assert presence without the same escalatory risk, shifting the burden of escalation back to the aggressor. Even in areas such as the high seas where the risks of contestation are low, the persistence and scalability of uncrewed systems are in themselves compelling.

However, the operationalisation of a denial strategy is not a unilateral endeavour; it is inherently a strategy of collective deterrence reliant on deep integration with allies. The AUKUS security partnership is the critical framework for this integration, with its Pillar 2 workstream focused on accelerating the joint development of advanced capabilities in areas central to maritime denial: undersea systems, AI, and autonomy.⁶⁷ Initiatives like the AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS) project and joint exercises focused on protecting critical undersea infrastructure are tangible evidence of this collaborative approach.⁶⁸ Yet this reliance introduces a new strategic vulnerability: capability dependency. The successful execution of Australia’s national strategy is now contingent on overcoming long-standing legislative and bureaucratic barriers to technology sharing, most notably the United States’ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).⁶⁹ While reforms are underway, delays in delivering interoperable, AUKUS-enabled capabilities could create a dangerous capability gap, particularly as legacy platforms are divested (such as the hydrographic ships) in anticipation of their autonomous replacements.⁷⁰ For the RAN’s hydrographic service, this means the transition to an autonomous future is not only a technological and workforce challenge but also a strategic gamble on the timely success of the AUKUS enterprise.

Chapter 3: Autonomous Technologies and AI in Modern Hydrography

This chapter provides an overview of the key technologies transforming hydrography. It also reviews the capabilities, limitations, and operational considerations of AUVs and USVs relevant to naval hydrographic tasks. In so doing, the application of AI and machine learning (ML) to hydrographic data processing, analysis, and product generation is explored, including the significance of the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) S-100 data standard.

AUVs and USVs are the primary platforms driving the transition from traditional, crewed survey platforms to a distributed and agile hydrographic capability. It is predicated on the maturation of two key technological streams: autonomous maritime systems for data acquisition and artificial intelligence for data processing and analysis. Their principal advantages are persistence and endurance; freed from the constraints of crew fatigue, they can operate for extended periods, from days to months, collecting vast datasets over wide areas. This makes them ideal for tasks such as seafloor mapping, environmental monitoring, and infrastructure inspection.⁷¹ Critically, they can be deployed into hazardous or contested environments—such as under polar ice or within denied littoral zones—without placing personnel at risk, a key consideration for military operations.⁷² Equipped with a suite of high-resolution sensors like multibeam echosounders and side-scan sonars, these platforms can acquire hydrographic data of a quality and density that often surpasses that of surface vessels, particularly in deep water.⁷³

However, their operational utility is constrained by significant limitations inherent to the maritime environment. Finite power endurance remains a primary challenge, with battery life dictating mission duration. Furthermore, the physics of the underwater domain severely restricts communication: radio waves do not penetrate water effectively, forcing AUVs to rely on low-bandwidth, high-latency acoustic communication or to surface to establish satellite links, complicating real-time command and control.⁷⁴ Consequently, navigation in GPS-denied underwater environments depends on dead reckoning, aided by systems like Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Doppler Velocity Logs (DVL), which accumulate positional errors over time.⁷⁵ Further, satellite based sensor systems, and laser airborne depth sounding systems⁷⁶ have limitations due to the depth of penetration resulting from the ‘hard’ physics which rapidly attenuate electromagnetic waves when penetrating water.

The proliferation of autonomous survey platforms creates a secondary challenge: a data deluge. It may be relatively easy for a small team to deploy many autonomous platforms, which exponentially increases the data collected with the concurrent need for storage, analysis and quality control. A single autonomous system can generate terabytes of raw sonar data in one mission, creating a volume of information that is difficult to process and analyse efficiently through manual, human-centric methods. This is where AI and ML become critical enablers.⁷⁷ AI-powered algorithms are being developed to automate many of the most time-consuming aspects of the hydrographic workflow. This includes data cleaning—using ML models to automatically detect and remove ‘noise’ and anomalies from bathymetric datasets—and feature extraction, where algorithms can be trained to identify and classify specific seabed features, such as rock, sand, vegetation, or man-made objects like shipwrecks and pipelines.⁷⁸ The application of these ‘GeoAI’⁷⁹ techniques promises to dramatically compress the timeline from data acquisition to the generation of actionable intelligence, a key requirement for military hydrography.⁸⁰

However, this reliance on AI introduces new vulnerabilities, most notably the risk of ‘data poisoning’, where an adversary could deliberately corrupt the training data used to build an ML model, causing it to misclassify features or fail at critical moments.⁸¹ This, along with broader ethical considerations,⁸² underscores the imperative of maintaining ‘meaningful human control’ over autonomous systems and subsequent processing of data: that is, ensuring that human judgement remains central to the decision as to where an AUV may be deployed and able to rely on the data collected. It warrants note that such considerations are different from those raised in relation to autonomous systems that can exert lethal force (e.g. a lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS)): for such weapons systems, one might ethically expect greater human involvement in decision-making before and during deployment.⁸³ Further discussion of LAWS is beyond the scope of this thesis, even though it is not inconceivable that future autonomous hydrographic data collection platforms may also have lethal capabilities.

Underpinning this entire technological ecosystem is the International Hydrographic Organisation’s (IHO) S-100 Universal Hydrographic Data Model.⁸⁴ S-100 is a framework designed to replace the legacy S-57 standard, which was too rigid to support the dynamic, data-rich environment of modern navigation.⁸⁵ S-100 is not a single product but a framework that allows for multiple, interoperable data layers to be used simultaneously. This enables a user to overlay a base S-101 Electronic Navigational Chart (ENC) with dynamic, near-real-time information such as S-102 high-resolution bathymetry, S-104 water levels, and S-111 surface currents, all within a single system.⁸⁶ Crucially, the S-100 framework is designed to be machine-readable and plug-and-play, making it the foundational digital architecture for the future of navigation. Its ability to standardise and integrate diverse hydrographic and oceanographic data streams is a fundamental enabler for both autonomous maritime systems and the AI-driven applications that process their data, effectively heralding a future of smarter and safer seas.⁸⁷ A warfighter with such data, and the ability to use such data will be at a tactical advantage compared to those without. Data that is analysed becomes ‘intelligence’,⁸⁸ intelligence which is relevant and can be readily used by warfighters creates a tactical, and in some cases, strategic advantage.

Chapter 4: Integrating Autonomy: A Comparative Analysis of RAN and Allied Experiences

The strategic and technological imperatives set out in the preceding chapters are driving a fundamental shift in how navies conduct hydrographic (and mine countermeasures (MCM)) operations. Accordingly, this transition from crewed platforms to autonomous systems is not unique to the RAN but is now a common challenge faced by its closest allies. This chapter examines the RA’s nascent efforts to integrate autonomy, focusing on its key operational units and acquisition projects (e.g., the Deployable Geospatial Support Teams (DGSTs) initiative) and relevant acquisition projects (e.g., SEA 1770)). It then provides a comparative analysis of the approaches being taken by the RN and the USN, drawing out pertinent lessons that can inform the RAN’s own workforce transformation. The RAN’s practical integration of autonomous systems is spearheaded by its DGSTs. These small, agile teams are designed for rapid deployment into operational areas to conduct a ‘rapid environmental assessment’ (REA)⁸⁹, a capability crucial for amphibious operations and disaster relief.⁹⁰ During humanitarian assistance operations in Tonga and multinational exercises like RIMPAC, DGSTs have demonstrated their ability to use portable systems, such as inflatable boats equipped with multi-beam echo sounders, to survey beach approaches and landing zones, ensuring safe access for larger assets.⁹¹

It warrants note that this operational concept was formalised and equipped through acquisition programs like SEA 1770, which delivered a suite of REA tools including REMUS 100 Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and purpose-built Survey Craft.⁹⁴

The RN is pursuing a remarkably similar trajectory. Under its Mine Countermeasures and Hydrographic Capability (MHC) program, the RN is also divesting from traditional survey ships like HMS Echo and Enterprise.⁹⁵ In their place, the newly established Hydrographic Exploitation Group (HXG) operates as a specialised unit focused on deployable hydrography. Like the RAN’s DGSTs, the HXG uses a combination of small survey boats (Vahana-class), AUVs, and other ‘flyaway’ kits to conduct rapid surveys. This transformation, driven by Project HECLA, is designed to make hydrographic support more agile and responsive.⁹⁶ The key lesson from the RN’s experience is organizational: the decision to separate the hydrographic and meteorological specialisations into two distinct units (the HXG and the Metoc Information Warfare Group) suggests that developing deep expertise in autonomous systems requires a dedicated and focused organisational structure.⁹⁷ It is noteworthy that the RAN never did amalgamate in a way that required the meteorological and hydrographic categories to be cross-trained. In the RAN both categories gather and analyse different types of maritime geospatial intelligence (i.e. one hydrographic, one meteorological) requiring vastly different training, although they are led and administered together.

The US Navy, while also heavily investing in uncrewed systems, offers a different model of integration, not so much for its hydrographic systems, but its MCM capabilities. Rather than a platform-agnostic, deployable toolkit (which the RAN has for hydrographic, and will likely pursue for MCM), the USN’s primary MCM capability is being integrated into a specific platform: the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Countermeasures Mission Package (MP).⁹⁸ This package employs a suite of uncrewed systems, including the Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MCM USV), which acts as a mothership for both the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) for detonating mines and the AN/AQS-20 sonar for minehunting.⁹⁹ At this juncture, it is important to understand that the technologies in use for MCM, particularly the ‘detection phase’ is fundamentally the same as hydrographic surveying technologies. It is simply the case that the ‘risk’ they are seeking to mitigate against is of a different nature. The UISS and AN/AQS-20 sonar is complemented by the Knifefish, a heavyweight AUV designed to detect buried and high-clutter mines.¹⁰⁰ The USN’s experience provides a cautionary lesson in the complexities of systems integration. While highly capable, the LCS MCM MP has faced significant delays and challenges during operational testing, highlighting the difficulty of fielding a reliable ‘system of systems’.¹⁰¹ The overarching direction is managed by the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command (CNMOC), which sources data from a vast array of uncrewed platforms to provide environmental awareness.¹⁰²

For the RAN, the experiences of its allies validate its strategic direction while offering crucial insights. The parallel evolution of the RN’s HXG confirms the operational logic of creating specialised, deployable teams. The RN’s size and hydrographic capability is also more akin in size to the RAN’s hydrographic capability. By contrast, the USN’s size vastly outweighs both the RN and RAN. Consequently, the USN is able to continue to operate platforms that are specialized, thus introducing the complexity of ‘systems in systems’¹⁰³ issues. The USN’s journey with the LCS MCM package underscores the immense technical and programmatic challenges of integrating multiple complex autonomous systems, reinforcing the value of the RAN’s more incremental, ‘evergreening’ approach outlined in its RAS-AI Campaign Plan.¹⁰⁴ Ultimately, the success for all three navies hinges on interoperability. The AUKUS Pillar 2 framework, with its focus on undersea capabilities and autonomy, provides the critical mechanism for this collaboration.¹⁰⁵ Joint exercises, such as the Maritime Big Play series, are essential for developing the common data standards and operating procedures needed to ensure that the autonomous systems of all three nations can operate as a cohesive force, turning technological potential into a collective strategic advantage.¹⁰⁶ Although beyond this thesis’s scope, beneficial insights can also be gained from further research that engages in a comparative analysis of the hydrographic capabilities of India, France and Canada.¹⁰⁷ 

Chapter 5: Workforce Transformation for an Autonomous Future: The Core Analysis

The preceding chapters established the strategic and technological imperatives driving the modernisation of the RAN’s hydrographic capability. The strategic context of the Indo-Pacific, mandates a shift towards a 'strategy of denial' enabled by disruptive technologies, while the maturation of autonomous systems and AI offers the means to achieve this.¹⁰⁸ This chapter forms the core of the thesis, directly addressing the central research question by arguing that the successful integration of these technologies is contingent not on procurement alone, but on a profound and deliberate workforce transformation. It moves from the ‘what’ (technology) and ‘why’ (strategy) to the ‘who’ and ‘how’ of the human dimension, dissecting the multifaceted nature of this evolution—from individual skills and professional identity to the organisational culture required to field a truly hybrid human-machine force.

The Evolving Identity of the Hydrographic Specialist: From Mariner to Systems Operator

The fundamental identity of the naval hydrographic specialist is undergoing a paradigm shift. The traditional role, rooted in seamanship and the meticulous, hands-on survey work conducted from the decks of dedicated platforms like the now-decommissioned Leeuwin and Paluma classes, is becoming obsolete.¹⁰⁹ The future specialist is a technologist first: a multi-domain systems operator, data scientist, and AI interpreter whose value is defined by their ability to manage a distributed network of autonomous assets, rather than (necessarily) a deep proficiency in the full range of traditional mariner skills.¹¹⁰ This conceptual evolution is driven by tangible capability decisions. The divestment of platform-centric assets and the move towards deployable, containerised ‘tool-kits’ under projects such as SEA 1770 and the now cancelled SEA 1905 physically severs the surveyor from a specific ship, necessitating a new identity founded on the capability they wield, not the vessel they serve in.¹¹¹

This transition is not unique to the RAN. The Royal Navy’s parallel shift away from traditional survey ships in favour of the deployable, autonomous-equipped Hydrographic Exploitation Group validates this conceptual model, demonstrating an allied move towards a capability-centric workforce.¹¹² The RAN itself signals this change in its recruitment material, which now highlights the ‘adoption and delivery of leading edge Geospatial Autonomous systems’ as a rewarding and central aspect of the role.¹¹³ This shift, however, fundamentally alters the social contract between the Navy and its sailors. Historically, a sailor's career progression was intrinsically linked to accumulating sea time on commissioned hydrographic ships, which are specialised warships. The new model, exemplified by the Deployable Geospatial Support Teams operating from shore or vessels of opportunity, disrupts this pathway.¹¹⁴ A hydrographic specialist may now accumulate less ‘traditional’ sea time, potentially disadvantaging them under legacy sea-time accrued pay allowance models. This creates a critical challenge for Navy's personnel management: it must redefine what constitutes valuable operational experience. Is it days at sea, or can it be the successful execution of a complex autonomous survey mission from a shore-based control centre? Failure to adapt these cultural and policy frameworks risks devaluing the very personnel who are essential to the future fight.

Building the New Workforce: Skillsets, Training, and Career Pathways

To generate this future workforce, the RAN must fundamentally adapt its approach to training, recruitment, and retention. The required competencies extend far beyond traditional hydrography into domains of robotics, data science, AI and machine learning, and systems engineering.¹¹⁵ Personnel must be skilled not only in operating autonomous vehicles but also in managing the vast datasets they produce, critically evaluating AI-driven analysis, and understanding the systems engineering principles of complex, software-intensive platforms.¹¹⁶ This necessitates a training and education pipeline that prioritises advanced technical acumen. The RAN must deepen its partnerships with institutions like the Australian Maritime College and establish clear pathways for its personnel to attain postgraduate qualifications.¹¹⁷

Recruiting and retaining this talent presents a formidable challenge. The ADF is already facing significant recruitment shortfalls in a competitive labour market, particularly for skilled individuals.¹¹⁸ The skills required for an autonomy-enabled hydrographic workforce are precisely those in high demand by the civilian technology sector, which can offer more lucrative compensation. While the introduction of a continuation bonus scheme is a positive step, a generic financial incentive may be insufficient to retain highly specialised personnel.¹¹⁹ The career pathway itself must be compelling, offering unique operational experiences, continuous professional development, and a clear trajectory to appropriate leadership positions that industry cannot replicate. The profound nature of this skills transformation is best illustrated through a direct comparison of the legacy and future roles, as detailed in Table 5.1.

Human-Machine Teaming in the Littoral: A New Operational Paradigm

The effective employment of these new systems operationalises the concept of Human-Machine Teaming (HMT) in the hydrographic context. HMT is more than a technological interface; it represents a new way of working that demands new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), robust models of trust, and a redefinition of the human’s role as a supervisor and mission commander (and ‘troubleshooter’), rather than a direct operator. As an offset strategy, HMT aims to improve sensing, analysis, and decision-making while removing personnel from harm's way (or when not in a conflict area, at least away from the elements)—a direct alignment with the DSR’s strategic imperatives.¹²⁰ The RAN’s RAS-AI Campaign Plan 2025 explicitly identifies increasing the understanding of HMT as a key line of effort.¹²¹

This paradigm shift presents significant human factors challenges. Operators must build calibrated trust in the reliability of autonomous systems and the validity of their AI-generated outputs, maintain situational awareness while physically removed from the sensors, and manage the cognitive load of supervising multiple complex systems simultaneously.¹²² This requires a new ‘language’ of command and control. Traditional naval command is hierarchical and direct. An operator cannot manually pilot multiple AUVs simultaneously; therefore, the interaction must evolve from direct control (e.g., ordering ‘steer 10 degrees to port’) to mission-based command (e.g., ‘survey this area, avoid these threat zones, maintain this data quality, and report anomalies’).¹²³ This requires the human operator to develop a deep, intuitive understanding of the AI’s decision-making logic, its capabilities, and its limitations. This is the essence of ‘teaming,’ and it necessitates a new training focus: teaching personnel how to team with an AI, a cognitive and psychological skill that transcends mere technical operation.

Organisational and Cultural Adaptation for a Hybrid Force

Ultimately, the full potential of an autonomy-enabled hydrographic capability cannot be realised within the RAN’s existing organisational and cultural constructs. While the Navy has laudably articulated a need to foster a culture of innovation and agility, large military organisations are often inherently resistant to disruptive change.¹²⁴ The experience of allied navies shows that successful technology integration requires evolving acquisition strategies and a willingness to challenge established processes; systems that are not deemed ‘fit for purpose’ by the end-user will face resistance, undermining trust and hindering adoption.¹²⁵ The creation of specialised units, such as the RN's HXG or the RAN's own Maritime Deployable Robotic and Autonomous Systems Experimentation Unit, is a logical step, suggesting that deep expertise may need to be nurtured in focused cells before being integrated more broadly.¹²⁶

Although not mutually exclusive, this technological shift risks creating a cultural rift between the traditional ‘warrior’ class, whose careers are defined by operational command at sea, and a new ‘technologist’ class, whose expertise is analytical and systems-based. If these new specialists are perceived merely as a ‘support’ function, their influence on operational planning may be limited, and the Navy will struggle to retain them. This presents a critical leadership challenge that extends beyond the hydrographic community. Senior leadership must actively champion the value of these new specialists by creating viable career pathways to senior ranks (perhaps broadening their experience beyond hydrography), integrating them fully into operational planning, and fostering a culture where data-driven insights from an AI-enabled team are valued as highly as a commander’s intuition. At the higher ranks individuals will have strengths not necessarily leveraged off at the tactical level, such as strategic insight and empathy. These too should be fostered, and talent identified early, particularly for officers. Failure to bridge this cultural divide risks creating a two-tiered workforce and devaluing the very skills the Navy needs to maintain its edge in future conflicts.

The transformation of the hydrographic workforce is a complex, multi-layered challenge that extends far beyond simple retraining. It demands a fundamental rethinking of professional identity, the creation of new career models to compete for talent, the development of novel operational concepts for HMT, and a deliberate, leader-led cultural adaptation. Successfully navigating this transformation is not merely a prerequisite for a modern hydrographic capability; it is a microcosm of the challenge facing the entire RAN as it seeks to become a truly capable, AI-enabled future force.

Chapter 6: The Supporting Ecosystem: Industry, Research, and Innovation

The profound workforce transformation detailed in the preceding chapter does not occur in a vacuum. It is both a response to and a dependency of a broader national (and international) ecosystem comprising industry partners, dedicated research and development (R&D) entities, and new innovation accelerators. The RAN’s ability to generate and sustain a future hydrographic workforce is inextricably linked to the health, agility, and collaborative capacity of this ecosystem. This chapter assesses the key components of this supporting structure, evaluating the strategic role of industry partnerships, the contributions of the national research base, and the potential of new mechanisms designed to accelerate capability delivery. It argues that while Australia possesses significant strengths in this ecosystem, realising the full potential of an autonomous hydrographic capability requires a deliberate and integrated approach to harnessing these national assets.

The Strategic Shift to Industry Partnership: HIPP as a Catalyst

A central pillar of the RAN’s evolving hydrographic capability model is the strategic decision to partner more closely with the commercial sector, a policy embodied by the HydroScheme Industry Partnership Program. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, HIPP outsources a significant portion of Australia’s national charting responsibility to a panel of specialist hydrographic survey companies.¹²⁷ This represents a fundamental restructuring of the national hydrographic enterprise, driven by a clear strategic logic. By leveraging the capacity and innovation of the commercial sector to conduct broad-area surveying, the RAN’s uniformed hydrographic workforce can be refocused on its core military function: the provision of specialised military geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in direct support of operations.¹²⁸ This aligns closely with the Defence Strategic Review’s recommendation for a more ‘focused force’.¹²⁹

This partnership model is a significant strength, stimulating the growth of a sovereign Australian hydrographic industry and encouraging the adoption of new technologies, including the use of AUVs and USVs for nautical charting surveys.¹³⁰ However, it also introduces a critical weakness and a long-term strategic risk. An over-reliance on industry for foundational survey tasks risks the atrophy of core military hydrographic skills within the permanent naval force. This creates a potential capability dependency, where the RAN might lose the organic ability to conduct large-scale or complex survey operations without commercial support. It could be argued that even without HIPP military hydrographic skills and experience was already atrophying due to tasking hydrographic surveying platforms with other unrelated high priority taskings such as border protection. The conduct of rapid environmental assessment (REA) military surveys is assisted when the ‘operators’ (i.e. the hydrographic surveyors) have a great deal of experience in surveying generally. Furthermore, the HIPP model places immense pressure on Defence’s ability to act as an ‘intelligent customer’—requiring a workforce skilled not just in surveying, but in complex contract management, quality assurance, and the verification of industry-provided data. The challenge for the RAN (and more directly, the Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation (AGO) to which the AHO is a part)¹³¹, therefore, is to strike a delicate balance: leveraging industry’s strengths without sacrificing the sovereign military expertise that is indispensable in a contested environment.

The National Research and Development Engine

Underpinning the technological advancement of the hydrographic capability is a national R&D ecosystem composed of government, academic, and collaborative research entities. At its core is the Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), the Australian government’s lead agency for applying science and technology to national security.¹³² DSTG provides impartial scientific advice and works closely with AGO, the RAN, industry, and academia to deliver capability enhancements, playing a key role in shaping and executing the RAS-AI Campaign Plan.¹³³ Its deep expertise in areas such as sonar technology, data processing, and systems integration provides the essential scientific foundation for acquiring and fielding complex autonomous systems.¹³⁴ Importantly it keeps abreast of international technological developments, both in industry generally and militaries.

Complementing DSTG is the Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre (TAS DCRC), a unique entity established to foster collaboration between industry, research organisations, and Defence.¹³⁵ TAS DCRC’s focus is not just on autonomy, but on trusted autonomy, addressing the critical HMT challenges central to the workforce transformation.¹³⁶ Its work on developing assurance methodologies and supporting the creation of regulatory frameworks, such as the Australian Code of Practice for Autonomous and Remotely Operated Vessels, is a vital enabler for the safe and effective operationalisation of these new technologies.¹³⁷ The opportunity presented by this R&D landscape is the potential to create a virtuous cycle: Defence defines the operational problems, DSTG and TAS DCRC facilitate the collaborative research to solve them, and industry partners commercialise and deliver the solutions.

Accelerating Innovation: From Concept to Capability

A persistent weakness in Australia’s defence innovation ecosystem has been the difficulty in transitioning promising technologies from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter—a challenge often referred to as the ‘valley of death’.¹³⁸ The establishment of the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator (ASCA) is a direct response to this systemic problem, created to fast-track the development and acquisition of disruptive capabilities.¹³⁹ With a mission-oriented approach and a mandate to move with speed and agility, ASCA represents a significant opportunity to overcome the institutional inertia that can stifle innovation.¹⁴⁰

ASCA’s relevance to hydrographic modernisation is already evident. Its inaugural ‘Mission Zero’ is the Ghost Shark program,¹⁴¹ which delivers three extra-large autonomous undersea vehicles (XL-AUVs), a clear investment in the future of maritime autonomy (although from publicly available information it is not clear they can collect hydrographic data).¹⁴² Furthermore, ASCA is actively leveraging the AUKUS Pillar 2 framework through initiatives like the Maritime Innovation Challenge, which focuses on undersea communications and the control of autonomous systems.¹⁴³ This mechanism provides a powerful pathway to not only accelerate sovereign capability but also to ensure deep interoperability with key allies. The primary threat to this model is structural/cultural. The success of ASCA will depend on its ability to challenge Defence’s traditional risk-averse culture and streamline cumbersome procurement processes, which have historically been barriers to rapid innovation.¹⁴⁴

In synthesis, the ecosystem supporting the RAN’s hydrographic modernisation is characterised by significant strengths and opportunities. It possesses a growing and increasingly capable domestic industry, a robust government-led R&D base, and new, agile mechanisms designed to accelerate innovation. However, it is also beset by weaknesses and threats, including the risk of eroding sovereign military skills through over-reliance on industry, a historically risk-averse institutional culture, and the immense pressure of a deteriorating strategic environment that demands capability delivery at an unprecedented pace. For the transformed hydrographic workforce, this ecosystem is the professional environment in which it must operate. Its ability to effectively partner with industry, collaborate with researchers, and leverage new innovation pathways will be the ultimate determinant of whether the promise of an autonomous future can be translated into a decisive capability edge for the RAN.

Chapter 7: Policy, Doctrine, and Regulatory Alignment: Supporting the Transformation

The successful transformation of the Royal Australian Navy’s hydrographic workforce, as analysed in the previous chapters, is not solely dependent on acquiring new technologies or developing new skillsets. It requires an equally profound evolution in the ‘soft infrastructure’ that governs naval operations: the policies, doctrine, and legal frameworks that provide the authority, guidance, and constraints for the employment of an autonomy-enabled capability. The strategic direction in the NDS and the technological potential of Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence create a powerful momentum for change.¹⁴⁵ However, this momentum risks being stalled by legacy doctrinal concepts and a regulatory environment designed for an era of exclusively human-crewed vessels. This chapter evaluates the alignment of the RAN’s existing policy and doctrine with the demands of its future hydrographic force and examines the significant challenges posed by the national and international legal landscape, arguing that without deliberate reform in these areas, the full potential of the transformed workforce and its advanced capabilities cannot be realised.

Aligning Naval Doctrine with a Transformed Capability

The RAN has demonstrated strategic foresight in its high-level policy documents, most notably the RAS-AI Strategy 2040 and its supporting RAS-AI Campaign Plan 2025.¹⁴⁶ These documents articulate a clear vision for leveraging autonomous systems to enhance combat power, increase mass, and reduce risk to personnel, directly aligning with the DSR’s ‘Strategy of Denial’.¹⁴⁷ The Campaign Plan explicitly identifies the workforce as a key line of effort, acknowledging the need for new training paradigms and a deeper understanding of HMT.¹⁴⁸ This represents a crucial top-down endorsement of the workforce transformation at the heart of this thesis.

However, a gap persists between this high-level strategic vision and the development of detailed operational doctrine. The transition from a platform-centric to a capability-centric mindset, exemplified by the divestment of survey ships in favour of deployable ‘tool-kits’ under projects like SEA 1770 and the discontinued SEA 1905, requires a fundamental rewrite of the tactical-level doctrine that guides how hydrographic effects are delivered.¹⁴⁹ Traditional maritime doctrine is built around the ship as the primary unit of action. The new model, centred on agile, shore-based or vessel-of-opportunity-deployed teams like the DGSTs, demands new concepts of operation (CONOPS) that are not yet fully mature.¹⁵⁰ The experiences of allied navies, particularly the Royal Navy’s establishment of the HXG, provide a valuable template, but the RAN must develop its own doctrine tailored to its specific strategic geography and force structure.¹⁵¹ Without this doctrinal evolution, the transformed workforce will be equipped with revolutionary tools but constrained by evolutionary—or even archaic—rules of employment. The RAN DGSTs are equipped with conventional small boat technologies (e.g., multi-beam echo-sounders, and side-scan sonars) rather than AUV and RAS systems, with the exception of a small number of REMUS 100S AUVs that are being used to ‘explore’ the possibilities of such technology.

Navigating the National Regulatory Maze (other than warships/Defence vessels)

A significant handbrake on the operationalisation of autonomous maritime systems (particularly in the civilian sector)¹⁵² is the national and international legal framework, which was conceived entirely for crewed vessels. In Australia, the primary legislative instruments are the Navigation Act 2012 and the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012.¹⁵³ A fundamental challenge arises from the core definitions within these Acts. The definition of a ‘vessel’ is tied to its use in ‘navigation,’ a term traditionally interpreted as involving planned movement directed by a human navigator.¹⁵⁴ While a remotely operated vehicle with a human ‘in the loop’ may meet this definition, the status of a fully autonomous vessel operating on its own artificial intelligence is legally ambiguous.¹⁵⁵

This ambiguity extends to the concepts of ‘master’ and ‘crew.’ Both Acts define the master as the person with ‘command or charge of the vessel’.¹⁵⁶ It may be difficult to argue that a remote operator, potentially thousands of kilometres away, or a software programmer/operator who set the mission parameters weeks earlier, has command and charge in the traditional sense.¹⁵⁷ Similarly, the definition of a ‘seafarer’ implies a person working ‘on board a vessel’.¹⁵⁸ These definitional challenges are not merely academic; they have profound implications for assigning legal responsibility, liability, and accountability in the event of a marine incident. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) has adopted a pragmatic, risk-based policy to navigate these issues, using flexibility mechanisms like exemptions to allow for the operation of uncrewed systems.¹⁵⁹ However, this approach is a temporary solution to a systemic problem. Arguably, the law has not kept pace with technology, creating a ‘clunky’ and burdensome regulatory environment that relies on workarounds rather than providing clear, purpose-built guidance for the operators of these new systems.¹⁶⁰ I anticipate that such domestic ‘workarounds’ of the law, will become evidence of State practice that will ultimately ‘change’ the international customary law upon which such domestic law is based—but further analysis of this argument however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

For military (particularly Navy) AUVs and RAS vessels, they could be considered to be ‘warships’, thus exempting them from such domestic legislation and the application of relevant international law.¹⁶¹ Again, such legal detail required to articulate the application of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth), is beyond this thesis’s scope; however, the RAN would be required to construct a ‘seaworthiness’ system that meets the legislated work, health and safety requirements for eliminating or at least mitigating risk to the lowest practicable level.¹⁶² The Navy is well-versed in such ‘seaworthiness’ practices and application as this is what is pursued for the internal (to Navy) regulation of warships and other Defence vessels currently in operation.

The International Challenge: COLREGs and the Uncrewed Vessel

This regulatory friction is magnified at the international level by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs). These rules are the bedrock of safe navigation globally, but their application to uncrewed vessels is fraught with difficulty.¹⁶³ The most acute problem lies with Rule 5, which mandates that every vessel shall ‘at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means’.¹⁶⁴ The long-held interpretation of this rule is that it requires a human lookout. While an autonomous vessel’s sensors may provide a more comprehensive field of view than the human eye, they arguably cannot replicate the human act of ‘hearing,’ nor can they guarantee the infallible, continuous connection required to provide a remote operator with the same level of situational awareness as a person on the bridge.¹⁶⁵

Furthermore, the COLREGs are imbued with the concept of ‘good seamanship,’ a standard of prudent action that is qualitative and context-dependent.¹⁶⁶ Translating this subjective standard into machine-executable algorithms is a monumental challenge.¹⁶⁷ An autonomous system can be programmed with the explicit rules for head-on, crossing, and overtaking situations, but presently struggles with the nuanced, judgement-based decisions that human mariners make in complex traffic scenarios. This legal and practical impasse creates a significant liability risk, which can be relevant to Navy AUVs, particularly during peacetime.¹⁶⁸ In a collision, an uncrewed vessel could be deemed to have violated Rule 5 by default, placing its owner and operator at a distinct disadvantage, regardless of the other vessel’s actions.¹⁶⁹ This uncertainty poses a direct threat to the transformed workforce — and even more so to the Commonwealth of Australia — which could be placed in a position of legal jeopardy even if operating systems were to be in full compliance with the training and doctrine.

Ethical Considerations in Autonomy

While the primary role of the RAN’s hydrographic capability is data collection, not the application of force, the platforms it may operate would be inherently dual-use. The same autonomous systems used for seabed mapping could, with different payloads, be used for undersea surveillance (and part of the ‘targeting cycle’) and or the application of kinetic effects.¹⁷⁰ Therefore, the broader legal and ethical debate surrounding LAWS provides an essential context for the workforce transformation if such activities were to be contemplated. Australia’s position is that any use of autonomy in weapon systems must comply with international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.¹⁷¹ This necessitates a robust legal review of all new weapon systems and, crucially, requires a level of human involvement sufficient to ensure accountability.¹⁷²

The concept of ‘meaningful human control’ is central to this debate.¹⁷³ Even if such autonomous systems were not to be dual-purpose weapons, meaningful human control would be directly relevant to any future hydrographic specialist. This would ensure accountability and the quality assurance of data gathered. The future hydrographic operators transition to roles supervising multiple autonomous systems, requires their training and doctrine to equip them to exercise control effectively. They must understand the capabilities and limitations of the AI, recognise when to trust its outputs, and know when and how to intervene. This is the essence of effective HMT.¹⁷⁴ The ethical obligation to ensure human accountability for the actions of a machine cannot be delegated to the machine itself. Therefore, the doctrinal and regulatory frameworks must be designed not only to enable the technology but to empower the human operator, ensuring they remain the responsible and accountable agent at the centre of the system.

The path to a fully realised, autonomy-enabled hydrographic capability is paved with more than just technological and workforce challenges. It requires a concerted effort to modernise the doctrinal, legal, and ethical frameworks that govern maritime operations. The RAN’s strategic policies have set a clear and ambitious direction, but the detailed operational doctrine is still in development. More critically, the national and international legal systems are arguably lagging, creating ambiguity and risk for the very personnel tasked with operating these new systems. For a transformed hydrographic workforce to operate with confidence and effectiveness, they need more than just advanced skills and equipment; they need clear rules, modern laws, and a robust ethical framework that is fit for the autonomous age.

Chapter 8: Conclusion: Navigating the Future

The strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific, as redefined by the DSR and the NDS, has set the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) on an irreversible course towards a future defined by disruptive technologies.¹⁷⁵ The modernisation of the RAN’s hydrographic capability has emerged not as a niche technical upgrade, but should be seen as a foundational enabler for the nation’s maritime strategy of denial. This thesis has confronted the pivotal challenge accompanying this technological change, addressing the core research question: How would the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI) in the Royal Australian Navy's hydrographic capability impact workforce transformation? The central argument, substantiated through the preceding analysis and discussion, is that the introduction of autonomous platforms and AI-driven analytics necessitates a profound and holistic transformation of the RAN’s specialist hydrographic workforce. This transformation is not a simple matter of procurement and retraining; it is a complex, multi-layered challenge that demands a fundamental reimagining of professional identity, skills, career pathways, organisational culture, and the entire ecosystem that supports the capability.

Synthesis of Findings

This thesis began by setting out the inescapable strategic context. The DSR’s recommendation for a ‘focused force’ optimised for deterrence in Australia’s northern approaches places a premium on superior environmental knowledge.¹⁷⁶ As Chapter 2 argued, the ability to enact denial at sea through effective anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare is impossible without the detailed, timely, and accurate geospatial intelligence that military hydrography provides. The character of modern maritime competition, increasingly conducted in the ‘grey-zone’, further amplifies the need for uncrewed systems that can gather intelligence with persistence and scalability, without the escalatory risk of high-value, crewed platforms.¹⁷⁷ This strategic imperative is the primary driver of the modernisation effort.

The technological enablers for this new form of hydrography, as detailed in Chapter 3, are maturing rapidly. The dual streams of RAS for data acquisition and AI for data processing are fundamentally altering the nature of the work. AUVs and USVs offer the ability to operate persistently in hazardous environments, while AI and machine learning are becoming essential tools to manage the resultant ‘data deluge’ and accelerate the timeline from data collection to actionable intelligence.¹⁷⁸ This technological shift has catalysed a move away from the legacy, platform-centric model of the Leeuwin and Paluma-class survey ships, as outlined in Chapter 1. The RAN’s current trajectory, validated by the comparative analysis of allied experiences in Chapter 4, is towards a capability-centric model. This model is defined by small, agile, and deployable units like the Deployable Geospatial Support Teams, equipped with a ‘tool-kit’ of systems (yet to be fully optimized with scalable autonomous systems), but a concept remarkably similar to the Royal Navy’s Hydrographic Exploitation Group.¹⁷⁹

At the heart of this thesis, Chapter 5 argued that this new capability model is contingent upon a radical workforce transformation. The professional identity of the hydrographic specialist is evolving from that of a mariner, whose expertise was forged at sea, to that of a technologist—a multi-domain systems operator, data scientist, and AI interpreter. This shift creates profound challenges for the RAN’s traditional personnel management structures, which have long equated sea time with operational experience and career progression. The new model demands a workforce with advanced competencies in robotics, data science, and systems engineering, skills that are in high demand across the economy, creating significant recruitment and retention challenges.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, the effective employment of these new systems requires a new operational paradigm of Human-Machine Teaming, demanding new skills in mission-based command, calibrated trust in AI, and the management of cognitive load.¹⁸¹ This, in turn, risks creating a cultural rift between the traditional ‘warrior’ class and this new ‘technologist’ class, a divide that only deliberate, senior-leader-led action can bridge.

This transformation does not occur in isolation. As Chapter 6 assessed, it is dependent on a supporting national ecosystem of industry, research, and innovation. The HydroScheme Industry Partnership Program is a strategic strength, growing sovereign industrial capacity and allowing the uniformed workforce to focus on military-specific tasks.¹⁸² However, it also presents a strategic risk: the potential atrophy of core military survey skills if not carefully managed. The national research and development base, including the DSTG and the TAS DCRC, provides the essential engine for innovation, while new mechanisms like the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator offer a pathway to overcome the traditional ‘valley of death’ in defence procurement.¹⁸³ Finally, Chapter 7 highlighted the most significant constraint on this entire enterprise: the ‘soft infrastructure’ of policy, doctrine, and regulation. While high-level strategy is aligned, operational doctrine is immature. Further, the national and international legal frameworks, conceived for a world of crewed vessels, are lagging behind the pace of technology, creating legal ambiguity and operational risk.¹⁸⁴

Answering the Research Question: A Holistic Transformation

The integration of autonomy and AI impacts the RAN’s hydrographic workforce transformation across its entire structure. Due to the presently low uptake of autonomy in the service, the impacts and challenges are yet to be understood and absorbed. It is a holistic challenge that touches every aspect of the human capability, from the individual sailor to the strategic management of the specialisation. The impact is a fundamental shift from a workforce that operated equipment to one that commands systems; from a culture that valued time at sea to one that must value technical mastery; and from an organisation structured around platforms to one structured around deployable, mission-configurable capabilities. The transformation is therefore not merely technical, but cognitive, cultural, and organisational. Success is not guaranteed by the acquisition of AUVs; it will be determined by the Navy’s ability to cultivate the human talent to employ them effectively.

Recommendations for Navigating the Future

Based on the analysis conducted in this thesis, five high-level, principle-based recommendations are offered to guide the RAN in navigating this complex transformation. These are not prescriptive solutions but strategic lines of effort intended to address the core challenges identified.

1. Radically Reform Career Management for Technical Specialists. The RAN must ensure that legacy career models are adapted if ill-suited to a technology-centric workforce. It should design and implement a dedicated career pathway for technical specialists, including hydrographic personnel. This new pathway must value and reward demonstrated technical mastery, the attainment of advanced qualifications in fields like data science and robotics, and successful command of complex autonomous missions. This may involve creating specialist pay scales, offering continuation bonuses tied to specific skills, and establishing clear trajectories to senior leadership for those who excel in the technical domain, ensuring their expertise is retained and integrated at the highest levels of operational planning.¹⁸⁵
2. Champion a Deliberate, Leader-Led Cultural Shift. Cultural change cannot be delegated; it must be driven from the top. The senior leadership of the RAN must actively and visibly champion the value of the ‘technologist’ class. This requires more than rhetoric; it demands tangible actions. Senior leaders should ensure these specialists are embedded in operational planning staffs, that their data-driven insights are demonstrably valued in decision-making processes, and that their unique operational contributions—whether from a shore-based control centre or a vessel of opportunity—are recognised and celebrated with the same vigour as traditional feats of seamanship. This will be critical to breaking down the cultural friction between the ‘warrior’ and ‘technologist’ and fostering a truly integrated force.¹⁸⁶ This is arguably already underway in the information warfare and cyber workforces, so it is not a stretch to apply this across other fields.
3. Forge an Integrated and Advanced Training and Education Pipeline. Although the ad-hoc upskilling of personnel might be necessary in the short term to identify and optimize the most appropriate training and training pathways for technologists, it will be insufficient in the medium to long term. The RAN must establish a formal, integrated training and education pipeline that builds the hydrographic specialist of the future from enlistment/appointment to separation. This pipeline should blend foundational naval and mariner skills with a mandatory, career-long stream of advanced technical education. This requires deepening partnerships with academic institutions like the Australian Maritime College and creating funded pathways for personnel to attain postgraduate qualifications in critical fields. Given the civilian hydrographic sector is already grappling with autonomy and AI advances, it is anticipated that the civilian training and standards can be adopted to a large degree. Serious thinking will be required to ensure that the civilian standards remain appropriate to the militarized use of such technologies.
4. Lead the Modernisation of Maritime Law and Doctrine. The RAN cannot afford to be a passive observer in the evolution of maritime law. It must proactively influence, both nationally with the Australian Maritime Safety Authority and internationally through the International Hydrographic Organization and International Maritime Organization, the modernization of the regulatory frameworks governing autonomous vessels, particularly the COLREGs. Concurrently, but perhaps more importantly, it must accelerate the development of its own tactical-level doctrine and CONOPS for autonomous hydrographic operations. This requires a dedicated effort, potentially through a specialised experimentation unit, to wargame scenarios, test tactics, techniques and procedures, and rapidly codify the lessons observed into practical doctrine, such that they become lessons learned which empower the workforce to operate with legal and operational clarity.¹⁸⁷
5. Actively Manage the Sovereign Skill Base. The partnership with industry through HIPP is a strategic asset, but it must be managed with a clear-eyed view of its risks. The RAN must implement a formalised program to ensure its uniformed personnel retain and develop high-end, complex survey skills, particularly those required for contested military operations. The AHO needs to ensure there is a cadre of highly skilled ‘intelligent customers’ capable of sophisticated contract management and data quality assurance. It also requires ensuring that DGSTs and other military teams are regularly assigned complex survey tasks that maintain their proficiency, preventing the atrophy of the sovereign military expertise that remains the ultimate guarantor of the capability in a crisis.¹⁸⁸

Limitations and Areas for Future Research

This thesis has been constrained by its reliance on publicly available information, precluding access to classified Defence planning documents that could provide a more granular view of the workforce challenges and current workforce planning. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the analysis represents a snapshot in time in a field characterised by rapid technological and strategic change. Several areas warrant further, dedicated research. A detailed quantitative analysis of the current and projected skill gaps within the hydrographic workforce would provide invaluable data for planners. A longitudinal study of HIPP’s long-term impact on the RAN’s sovereign skill base would be critical to validating or adjusting the current industry partnership model. Finally, a comparative analysis of the workforce transformation strategies of other middle-power navies with advanced hydrographic capabilities, such as those of France or Canada, could yield further valuable insights and lessons for the RAN.

In conclusion, the RAN has correctly identified the strategic and technological necessity of modernising its hydrographic capability, albeit the acquisition project SEA1905 has been cancelled due to other priorities. Regardless, a bold and necessary transformation will be forced upon the hydrographic service, already having moved from the crewed platforms of the past to concentrate on purely military surveying, to leveraging off the autonomous systems of the future. However, this thesis has argued that the ultimate success of this endeavour will not be measured by the sophistication of the machines acquired, but by the Navy’s commitment to transforming the most critical component of its capability: its people. Navigating the complex currents of this change requires more than a new chart; it requires a new kind of mariner—a technologist, a data scientist, and a mission commander, empowered by a supportive culture, a modernised career structure, and a clear policy and, to a lesser extent, legal framework. The future of hydrography is human-machine teaming, and it is only by investing in the human as deliberately as the machine that the RAN will secure the decisive strategic advantage it seeks.