Introduction

Competition and conflict between two nations is a clash of wills. To prevail in such clashes, ‘it is necessary to influence or coerce an adversary’s perceptions, behaviours, actions and decision-making’.^[1] This is achieved through the effective employment of operational art or ‘the skilful employment of military forces to attain military goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of military actions’.^[2] The planning model that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) employs to execute operational art is the Military Appreciation Process (MAP). However, the MAP’s utility is being tested as war becomes increasingly complex. This complexity results from technological advances, which have led to increasing interconnectivity and interdependencies. This has resulted in non-linear cause-and-effect relationships, where actions can have unpredictable and disproportionate reactions. In addition, adversaries will continually change and adapt to gain an advantage. The result is a complex adaptive system where all actors seek a superior fit within a competitive environment. This increased complexity has led several theorists to question the utility of traditional linear planning models, such as the MAP when dealing with non-linear complex adaptive systems. While not a perfect tool, the MAP has evolved to include elements of non-linear design thinking and remains a useful framework for organising the application of military violence against complex adaptive systems.

This essay will argue that despite its linear reductionist nature and the emergence of increasingly complex adaptive systems, the MAP continues to have utility as it provides a flexible, standardised framework for planning, which aligns with human heuristics and incorporates divergent and convergent thinking. Firstly, this essay will argue that technological advances have led to a more interconnected world, which has resulted in the ADF being required to compete against complex adaptive systems across the spectrum of competition. It will also provide an overview of the MAP and how design thinking has been incorporated into it. Secondly, this essay will evaluate the weaknesses of the MAP, including its linear reductionist nature, focus on products instead of critical thinking, and the diminishing relevance of its outputs in the face of complex adaptive systems. Finally, this essay will evaluate the strengths of the MAP, including its flexibility, alignment to heuristics, incorporation of divergent and convergent thinking, and the fact that it provides a common framework for planning and wargaming.

The Emergence of Complex Adaptive Systems and the Military Appreciation Process

Technological advances have led to a more interconnected and interdependent world, giving rise to a greater number of non-linear, complex systems. Founder of the World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab, identified the pervasive power of digitisation and information technology as critical drivers for several technological megatrends, which he argues is leading the world into a fourth industrial revolution.^[3] These technology trends include developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, the internet of things, and nanotechnology.^[4] When aggregated, these technologies are forging a more interconnected and interdependent world. One way of viewing this changing environmental context is through the Cynefin framework, which distinguishes between simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic systems.^[5] In the Cynefin framework, simple and complicated systems are considered ordered systems, where cause-and-effect relationships are linear and can be deduced through the analysis of facts. However, complex and chaotic systems are unordered, and the relationship between cause and effect is unclear. In complex systems, the interactions between the interconnected elements are non-linear, meaning that a minor change in one area of the system can produce disproportionate effects in another area.^[6]

A complex adaptive system arises when adaptive agents are present. Adaptive agents can sense their environment and proactively change their reactions to fit their conditions. Dynamic change in one part of the system causes adaptive agents in another part of the system to react in often unpredictable ways.^[7] When multiple adaptive agents interact with one another, this leads to the phenomenon of emergence. Emergence is where the individual parts interact to give the system properties and behaviours that cannot be described by looking at the individual components alone.^[8] Emergence describes how ‘networks form, grow, dynamically interact, collapse, and reform again’.^[9] Complex adaptive systems are dynamic, and solutions cannot be predicted but arise from circumstances.

The ADF is required to compete within a complex adaptive system across the spectrum of competition and uses this spectrum to describe the complex relationship between nations.^[10] The spectrum of competition is based on a realist view of the world where competition between nations is constant, though it may vary from cooperation to conflict.^[11]  The complex interactions between nations mean that they may frequently shift their relative position on the spectrum or even occupy two separate positions simultaneously. In this way, the spectrum of competition represents a complex adaptive system, where nations are locked in a perpetual competition where they continually seek to gain an advantage within a complex, competitive environment.^[12] The spectrum of competition helps to frame planning and ensure the support of national interests.

The ADF utilises the MAP as a framework to support the execution of operational art across the spectrum of competition. The MAP directly supports the design, organisation, sequencing and direction functions of operational art by providing a scalable planning framework that can be used in single-domain, multi-domain, and multinational situations. The MAP supports achieving a unity of effort by synchronising kinetic and non-kinetic actions and lethal and non-lethal effects towards a unified outcome. However, like most planning processes, the MAP is inherently a linear, reductionist process. It takes large, complicated problems and systematically breaks them down into manageable components that can be distributed as orders to affect the arrangement of military action. Therefore, critics of the MAP have argued that, while it is effective when dealing with ordered (simple and complicated) systems, it is less effective at dealing with disordered (complex and chaotic) systems.

To effectively organise the application of military violence against complex adaptive systems, design thinking was incorporated into the MAP. Broadly, design thinking in military planning involves ‘creating what is needed but does not yet exist, so that the military organisation gains relevance and advantage in the future system that is emerging’.^[13] Design thinking can also be defined as ‘an action-orientated, human-centred and collaborative approach for accelerating innovation’.^[14] Since 2014, design thinking has been gradually incorporated into ADF doctrine as operational design.^[15] While operational design had been a topic of discussion and debate in Australia since the mid-2000s, it was not formally adopted into doctrine until the release of the second edition of Australian Defence Force Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 5.0—Joint Planning (2014). The key operational design elements included in ADF planning doctrine include methods for conducting environmental and problem framing during the scoping and framing step. In addition, guidance was added to highlight the importance of critical thinking and circularity during planning, including the requirement to conduct re-framing when the system adapts.^[16] Some have criticised the pragmatic incorporation of design thinking into the MAP as they believe it perpetuates existing approaches that do not require military personnel to challenge their fundamental beliefs.^[17] However, incorporating operational design into Australian planning doctrine has provided the ADF with the cognitive framework to deal more effectively with complex planning problems.^[18]

Weaknesses of the Military Appreciation Process

If misused, the MAP can lead to practitioners oversimplifying problems within a complex adaptive system. The MAP is a reductionist process involving breaking a problem down into its constituent components. However, reductionism loses its utility when dealing with complex adaptive systems because it fails to recognise the complex relationships between the components. This can lead to the planner focusing on the individual components within the system rather than the system as a whole. While simplification can provide an advantage in some situations, oversimplification can be dangerous when dealing with complex adaptive systems. For complex adaptive systems, ‘no proportionality exists between cause and effect, elements of ambiguity and surprise are defining characteristics of a context, and future-states cannot be reasonably explained by past knowledge’.^[19] The more complex the system is, the more unintended and unwanted consequences can result from decisions based on gross simplification.^[20] If the MAP is not conducted correctly, complex problems may be oversimplified into two or three predetermined branch plans. This can give the illusion that the planning process has a predictive quality and that humans can exert some control over complex adaptive systems by removing ambiguity from them.^[21]

Incorrect application of the MAP framework can lead to practitioners focusing on producing outputs rather than thinking critically. Critical thinking is essential to the planning process as it promotes creativity and helps challenge and question planning outcomes and assumptions. However, the MAP process requires a significant number of inputs and outputs that can take substantial resources to produce. This creates a risk that practitioners may become overly focused on the process and producing outputs for their commander in a resource-constrained environment. This may reduce the time and scope they have to dedicate to critical thinking and may lead to them accepting the mission as it is rather than analysing whether it is valid.^[22] The MAP process is not a dogma to be followed mindlessly; instead, it should be modified and adjusted to fit the context in which it is being used. Lack of critical thinking and over-adherence to process are common planning errors in ADF-P-5 Planning and are associated with practitioners rather than the MAP framework itself.^[23]

The emergence of complex adaptive systems has led many theorists to question the relevance of some MAP outputs. The six components of the MAP produce several outputs that aid in planning. One of these outputs is the Centre of Gravity (COG), defined as ‘the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve an objective or the desired end state’.^[24] The concept of the COG was taken from Clausewitz, who defined it as ‘the point against which all … energies should be directed’.^[25]  While COG assists the planning process and promotes unity of effort, the emergence of complex adaptive systems has led some theorists to question the concept's utility.^[26] Complex adaptive systems do not have a single COG but are instead made up of multiple interconnected components. If one component in the system is struck, then the system adapts and reforms.^[27] Another weakness of using the MAP to identify a COG is that it often leads to planners identifying the enemies’ military forces as the COG, especially at the tactical level. However, destroying the enemies’ military forces may not be the best approach to achieving the desired operational effects, particularly in a limited war.^[28]  In addition, the concept of the spectrum of competition and continual competition against complex adaptive systems brings into question the existence of MAP outputs such as operational end states and objectives. These concepts become transient and paradoxical when considered in the context of an infinite emergent process of continual systemic change and innovation.^[29] This highlights the importance for military planners to incorporate versatility and agility into their planning process.^[30]

While the MAP is effective for military planning in a conflict environment, it becomes less useful in a competitive environment. As the ADF must plan for military action across the full spectrum of competition, it must generate plans that account for conflict and competition. Retired British General Rupert Smith has asserted that traditional wars, decisive encounters between men and machines on a battlefield, no longer exist and have been replaced with a constant state of competition.^[31] In a conflict environment, there are known adversaries, and their strategic interests and intentions can more easily be discerned. However, understanding potential competitors' intentions and likely actions in a competitive environment is difficult. This is because what nations say and do in a competitive environment are often different. As a result, it is difficult for planners to apply the MAP framework as outputs such as the COG, lines of operation, and decisive points are not always clearly discernible.

Strengths of the Military Appreciation Process

The MAP is a flexible analytical tool that can be adapted to the level of complexity in the environment. The six components of the MAP process can be broadly grouped under two foundational concepts of operational design and military action. Operational design encompasses the MAP components of scoping and framing, mission analysis and course of action development. It involves using design thinking in problem-solving to develop alternative courses of action.^[32] The arrangement of military action encompasses the MAP components of course of action analysis and decision. It involves the practical elements of planning and is necessary to provide clear orders and direction. The resources that planners dedicate to each foundational concept can be adjusted to suit the context. At the tactical level of command, where the inputs may be limited, and the environment constrained, military planners place less emphasis on operational design and more on the arrangement of military action.^[33] Conversely, military planners may place more emphasis on operational design at the operational and strategic levels of command, where complex adaptive systems are more likely to be present.^[34] By emphasising the operational design components of the MAP, planners can reduce the tendency to produce overly ordered solutions to inherently complex dynamic problems.^[35]

The MAP mimics the model of human decision-making known as heuristics, which supports decision-making in complex environments. The human mind is limited in its cognition and uses reductionist tools called heuristics to break complex problems into smaller, more manageable components.^[36] Heuristics are problem-solving tools used by the human brain to process, evaluate, modify, and determine the best course of action based on limited information.^[37] Heuristics achieve this by assessing the situation and framing the problem to establish goals and objectives. Heuristics then use a person’s knowledge and experience to develop options to meet these goals and objectives. Finally, heuristics help a person decide to act. By modelling the process of human decision-making, the MAP provides a recognisable framework that helps planners assess the problem, environment, available resources and generate possible solutions. The link between heuristics and MAP helps integrate planning with partners in a coalition environment. This is because their planning tools, for example, the US joint planning process, broadly align with the same heuristic processes.^[38]

The MAP incorporates both divergent and convergent thinking, which aligns with the service design thinking methodology for managing complexity. Divergent thinking is a process that promotes creativity and innovation by exploring several possible solutions to a problem. Divergent thinking contributes to creative outcomes during planning by ‘enabling individuals to minimise and mitigate thought-constraining bias and more accurately interpret information’.^[39] Divergent thinking is most applicable to the MAP's scoping and framing, and mission analysis steps as it enables a more precise interpretation of information and reduces perception errors.^[40] The MAP also promotes convergent thinking during course of action development and decision and military action management steps. Convergent thinking involves establishing rules and logical reasoning to determine the solution to a problem.^[41] By promoting a process of convergent and divergent thinking, the MAP aligns with the service design methodology.^[42] The service design methodology includes problem definition (also called problem framing) and problem-solving. This methodology is advocated by the UK Design Council and involves exploring an issue more widely and deeply using divergent thinking before taking focused action using convergent thinking.^[43]

In the presence of complex adaptive systems, the MAP provides a common framework that can be used under a collective command model in combined and coalition environments. In his book, Team of Teams, former US General Stanley McChrystal distinguished between the ‘complicated’ military problems of the twentieth century and the ‘complex’ problems of the twenty-first century.^[44] The presence of complex adaptive systems and multi-domain operations has increased the scope and complexity of command. As a result, the modern command requires collaboration with allies, other government agencies, local authorities and non-government organisations.^[45] This has given rise to the concept of collective command, where ‘commanders have shared decision-making authorities, integrating subordinates, staff and partners into the process of leadership’.^[46] The MAP provides a common framework through which these multi-disciplinary teams can conduct their planning. By providing a common framework for military planning, the MAP ensures that everyone in the collective command team speaks the same language and works towards a common goal.

As simulation and wargaming techniques increase in sophistication, the mission analysis step within the MAP will enable greater testing and evaluation of courses of action within complex adaptive systems. For complex problems where cause and effect are not discernible, it is necessary to conduct multiple experiments to understand the nature of interdependencies within the system. This forms part of a broader process of learning and adaptation. With every action, there are multiple counteractions or adaptations.^[47] Therefore, commanders must iteratively probe and test their actions and responses when planning within a complex adaptive system. This can be achieved during the MAP process step of mission analysis. Mission analysis involves wargaming selected courses of action against proposed enemy courses of action. Current developments in AI and simulation will likely make wargaming against complex adaptive systems more effective. This will allow planners to develop, test, and adjust their plans iteratively.

Conclusion

The emergence of increasingly complex adaptive systems has challenged the linear reductionist nature of the MAP. However, the framework continues to have utility as it provides flexibility and standardisation for planning, which aligns with human heuristics and incorporates both divergent and convergent thinking. Technological advances have led to a more interconnected world, which has resulted in the ADF being required to compete against complex adaptive systems across the spectrum of competition. In response, the ADF incorporated elements of design thinking into MAP through operational design. While MAP does have several weaknesses, including its linear reductionist nature, and focus on products instead of critical thinking, these can be mitigated by effectively educating MAP practitioners. The MAP still provides a level of utility against complex adaptive systems. It provides a standardised, flexible framework that incorporates divergent and convergent thinking and is aligned with human heuristics.

There is no perfect tool for dealing with complex adaptive systems, however, some imperfect tools are still useful. The MAP is such a tool, and tools are only as effective as those that wield them. To effectively organise the application of military violence against complex adaptive systems, military planners must understand the MAP’s limitations to avoid a failure of imagination in their planning process. To achieve this, military planners must possess a level of talent refined by the dedicated study of war and warfare.^[48]

Disclaimer

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

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Footnotes

¹ Australian Government, Planning, 1 ed., ADF Philosophical Doctrine 5 Series Planning, (Commonwealth of Australia, 2021), 4.

² Government, Planning.

³ Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016), 19.

⁴ Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, 7.

⁵ David J Snowden and Mary E Boone, "A leader's framework for decision making," Harvard business review 85, no. 11 (2007): 4.

⁶ Snowden and Boone, "A leader's framework for decision making," 3.

⁷ Lt Col David Lyle, "Seeing the World as it is: Complex Adaptive Systems Approaches as Multi-Source, Multi-Input Integrators," in White Volume: National Security Challenges: Insights from Social, Neurobiological, and Complexity Sciences, ed. Mark Hardenberg (Washington DC: White Volume), 216.

⁸ Lyle, "Seeing the World as it is: Complex Adaptive Systems Approaches as Multi-Source, Multi-Input Integrators," 223.

⁹ Lyle, "Seeing the World as it is: Complex Adaptive Systems Approaches as Multi-Source, Multi-Input Integrators," 223.

¹⁰ Government, Planning, 2.

¹¹ Government, Planning, 2.

¹² Matthew Furtado, "A Survey of Creativity in Complex Military Systems," in Design Thinking Applications for the Australian Defence Force, ed. Aaron P. Jackson (Canberra: ADC Publications, 2019), 124.

¹³ Ben Zweibelson, "Fostering Deep Insight Through Substantive Play," in Design Thinking Applications for the Australian Defence Force, ed. Aaron P. Jackson (Canberra: ADC Publications, 2019), 2.

¹⁴ Brandon Pincombe et al., "Systemic Design of a Force for the Australian Army in 2050," in Design Thinking Applications for the Australian Defence Force, ed. Aaron P. Jackson (Canberra: ADC Publications, 2019), 27.

¹⁵ Aaron P. Jackson, "Introduction: What is Design Thinking and How is it of Use to The Australian Defence Force?," in Design Thinking Applications for the Australian Defence Force, ed. Aaron P. Jackson (ADC Publications: Australian Defence College, 2019), 11.

¹⁶ Jackson, "Introduction: What is Design Thinking and How is it of Use to The Australian Defence Force?," 14.

¹⁷ Alex Ryan, "A personal reflection on introducing design to the US Army," The Medium  (2016).

¹⁸ Jackson, "Introduction: What is Design Thinking and How is it of Use to The Australian Defence Force?," 15.

¹⁹ Cara Wrigley et al., "Air Force by Design: Applying Design for Transient Capability Advantages," in Design Thinking Applications for the Australian Defence Force, ed. Aaron P. Jackson (Canberra: ADC Publications, 2019), 54.

²⁰ Lyle, "Seeing the World as it is: Complex Adaptive Systems Approaches as Multi-Source, Multi-Input Integrators," 219.

²¹ Christopher R Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century (2011), 34.

²² Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, 2.

²³ Government, Planning, 70-71.

²⁴ Government, Planning, 126.

²⁵ Lawrence Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," War on the Rocks  (2014): 2.

²⁶ Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," 2.

²⁷ Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," 2.

²⁸ Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," 2.

²⁹ Wrigley et al., "Air Force by Design: Applying Design for Transient Capability Advantages," 54.

³⁰ David J Kilcullen, "Future Land Operating Concept," Complex Warfighting 7, no. 04 (2004): 19.

³¹ Rupert Smith, "The utility of force," The art of war in the modern world  (2006): 3.

³² Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, 58.

³³ Milan N Vego, "Systems Versus Classical Approach to Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ, no. 52 (2009): 41.

³⁴ Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen, "Chaos versus predictability: a critique of effects-based operations," Security Challenges 2, no. 1 (2006): 65.

³⁵ Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, 66.

³⁶ Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow (Macmillan, 2011), 98.

³⁷ Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow, 98.

³⁸ Government, Planning, 11.

³⁹ Furtado, "A Survey of Creativity in Complex Military Systems," 127.

⁴⁰ Furtado, "A Survey of Creativity in Complex Military Systems," 127.

⁴¹ Furtado, "A Survey of Creativity in Complex Military Systems," 128.

⁴² Richard Buchanan, "Wicked problems in design thinking," Design issues 8, no. 2 (1992): 11.

⁴³ "Framework for Innovation: Design Council's evolved Double Diamond," UK Design Council, 2019, accessed 15 Sep 2022, 2022 (Webpage).

⁴⁴ Gen Stanley McChrystal et al., Team of teams: New rules of engagement for a complex world (Penguin, 2015), 47.

⁴⁵ Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, 40.

⁴⁶ Anthony King, Command: The twenty-first-century general (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 18.

⁴⁷ Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, 60.

⁴⁸ Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, 2.