Indonesia and China: Geostrategic Implications for the ADF

As security tensions heighten in the Indo-Pacific, Australia is well placed to strengthen its relationship with Indonesia by stepping up military cooperation to jointly address China's growing influence in our region.

12/04/2022

> 30 min

Indonesia’s relationship with China is one of its most complicated and significant relationships. More enigmatic than its relationship with the United States, Indonesia’s relationship with China is of similar importance, not least by dint of its economic power and willingness to invest. Nevertheless, for reasons of history, geography and politics, Indonesia’s stance towards China is one of deep ambivalence.

Indonesia does not have any official territorial disputes with China. Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, its maritime territory in the South China Sea is not included in China’s nine-dash-line claim. The dominant driver in the framing of Indonesia’s foreign policy, since the beginning of the Suharto regime in 1965, has been the Indonesian military. It is wary of China but knows that, like its ASEAN neighbours, it is in no position, and likely never will be, to confront Chinese military aggression beyond its borders. Fortunately for Indonesia, short of a war in the region, such a scenario is unlikely. Should Beijing escalate matters across the Taiwan Strait, for example, Indonesia will be deeply uncomfortable and will have little capacity or desire to be involved directly in any response.

Tensions dating back to the middle of the Cold War continue to shape contemporary relations between these two very different Asian giants. Following its declaration of independence in 1945, Indonesia enjoyed positive relations with China. In 1965, relations were so strong that the left-leaning President Sukarno flamboyantly declared an ‘anti-imperialist axis’ that included Peking.^[1] Under Sukarno, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI – Partai Komunis Indonesia) was the largest communist party in the world outside of those in government in Russia and China. The PKI won 16% of the national vote (and twice as much in Java) in the 1955 parliamentary elections and was said to have 2 million members. It backed Sukarno’s authoritarian swerve to ‘guided democracy’ in 1959 and welcomed his ideological pivot to Nasakom: nationalism (nasionalisme), religion (agama) and communism (komunism).

Two years later, however, the new, US-aligned, military-backed, ‘New Order’ regime of General Suharto suspended diplomatic relations with China based on allegations that it had played a role in the mysterious 1965 ‘coup attempt’,^[2] which precipitated the slaughter of more than 500,000 alleged PKI members and sympathisers. Many of the victims were ethnic Chinese and large numbers of those targeted figured in lists provided by the CIA.^[3] While Indonesia-China relations were officially restored on 8 August 1990, the Suharto regime remained anxious about China, choosing to amplify the threat of Chinese communist subversion as reason for its sustained vigilance.^[4]

Under Suharto, Indonesia’s minority Chinese population—today objectively estimated to represent just 1.2% of Indonesian society but previously presented as being three or four times larger—was made a scapegoat. Communism was framed as an ever-constant threat and all discussion of the violent anti-PKI pogrom of 1965-66 was taboo. Chinese support for the PKI was a tiny element of a complex story, but members of Indonesia’s small but highly visible ethnic-Chinese population, most of whom spoke Indonesian or Javanese rather than Mandarin or other Chinese languages, were made to bear the brunt of this fear campaign. Suharto banned the teaching and printing of Chinese language material and the celebration of Chinese festivals and cultural events, such as the Lunar New Year, and encouraged Indonesian Chinese to adopt Indonesian names. At the same time, he built strong economic partnerships and alliances with elite ethnic-Chinese families, leading to the establishment of the majority of Indonesia’s modern corporations.

Under the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), the anti-Chinese restrictions of the Suharto regime were swept away, and the Javanese Islamic leader, democratic reformer, and long-time champion of minority rights, proudly spoke of his family in East Java benefiting from mixed Chinese ancestory. And following him both President Megawati Sukarnoputri and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continued support for a series of social and political reforms that recognised and supported Indonesians of Chinese heritage.

At the same time, the remarkable rise of China fostered respect and fuelled curiosity in China. If China failed to build the sort of soft power that Japan and South Korea enjoyed across Southeast Asia, its economic transformation nevertheless captured the imagination of many. This included many middle-class Indonesians, who encouraged their children to learn Mandarin Chinese and to look to China for opportunities in business and education.

Several decades on from the Suharto years, and diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China have ostensibly normalised. Since taking office in 2014, the incumbent president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), has placed considerable emphasis on developing Indonesia’s relationship with China. One of his first initiatives was to officially rehabilitate the use in Indonesian of the Hokkien words ‘Tiongkok’ (Middle Kingdom) and ‘Tionghoa’ for the nation and people of China, in an effort to overturn the stigma that some associated with the word ‘Cina’. Ever the pragmatist, Jokowi’s reason for doing so appears, in part, to be China’s preparedness to finance many of the infrastructure projects Indonesia needs if it is to improve domestic connectivity and join the top 10 global economies by 2025.^[5]

In its current form, however, the Jokowi administration’s China policy remains tactical and somewhat naïve, and appears to be driven more by opportunism and elite vested interests rather than clearly-articulated long-term national interests. In simple terms, the administration has sought to have its moon cake and eat it too. It has sought to minimise confrontation with China in the South China Sea so as not to affect Chinese investment in Indonesian infrastructure, from which many Indonesian elites derive personal benefit. At the same time, Indonesia’s military continues to cooperate principally with the West, only engaging China in military cooperation on a sporadic basis.

Policy of non-alignment

This muddling-through policy is underpinned by Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy doctrine of non-alignment or ‘bebas dan aktif’(free and active)—a doctrine inspired by the bipolarity of the Cold War period and Indonesia’s refusal to directly side with either the United States or Soviet Union, but rather to take a middle path and ‘row between two reefs’ (mendayung diantara dua karang). More contemporary scholarly and bureaucratic interpretations of the policy have (re)defined it as ‘pragmatic equidistance’,^[6] ‘jalan tengah’ (the middle way),^[7] and ‘dynamic equilibrium’.^[8] The significance of bebas dan aktif cannot be understated; indeed, it is a crucial part of Indonesia’s national identity, having been incorporated in Indonesian foreign policy from the birth of the Indonesian nation. The geo-political climate of East Asia and the western Pacific, however, arguably demands that Indonesia reinterpret bebas dan aktif in a way that reflects the exigencies of growing Chinese influence in that bloc.

Tactical, rather than strategic

Insofar as it is purely tactical, Indonesia’s current China policy comprises initiatives and incremental steps taken on a day-to-day basis, but it lacks a discernible over-arching strategy, that is, long-term goals and an achievable vision. Indonesia’s China policy appears devoid of any meaningful strategic consideration of what East Asia and the western Pacific might look like under Chinese hegemony or Pax Sinica (Chinese peace).^[9] Currently, it rests on the hope that Chinese hegemony will never be realised. And while Indonesia might be able to maintain the status quo in the short- to medium-term - and the notion of Pax Sinica might be hyperbolic, leading figures, including former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Australian defence expert Hugh White, argue that the current trajectory of Chinese economic and military growth suggests that Southeast Asia has perhaps just 20 to 30 more years until China dictates Southeast Asian regional order.^[10] Indonesia’s insouciance about this looming development brings to mind what Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote some 2,500 years ago, ‘Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat’.^[11]

Predictions of China’s rise to regional dominance are based on estimates that, by 2050, China’s GDP could be double that of the United States. As Hugh White asserts, history has shown that ‘ultimately, wealth is power’.^[12] The proposition that China could both undergo fundamental social and economic transformation itself and transform the economies of the rest of Asia —but that the strategic order in the region would remain the unaltered—appears more than a little naïve. Indeed, other than post-War Japan, there has never been a economically powerful country that was not militarily strong, nor a militarily powerful country that was not economically strong,.

China is only too conscious of this dynamic. Indeed, why else would it increase its foreign direct investment (FDI) into Indonesia by almost 600% between 2015 and 2020, and build goodwill by selling countless doses of Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccine to Indonesia to protect the Indonesian population, only to then continue to push the limits—both legally and literally—in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone EEZ? The simplest explanation is because it can. The sheer size of its economy means it can afford to make such an investment in Indonesia, and its military might means that it can command de facto control of the South China Sea, regardless of any ruling an international tribunal might issue.

It appears, however, that one way China has perpetuated this de facto control over Indonesia’s interests has been by placating Indonesia’s political elite. One indication of this is a US$6 billion loan from China that happened to make its way into three Indonesian state-owned banks—BRI, BNI, and Mandiri—not long after the 2016 conflict associated with Chinese incursions into the EEZ of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands appeared to resolve itself. While not front-page news, it is public knowledge that that money arrived in those accounts shortly after the conflict subsided. There has been little interest, however, in investigating the circumstances behind these windfall deposits.

In turn, Indonesia’s flaccid response to these incursions can be chalked up to a number of factors. First, as the Indonesian saying ‘kamu tenggang rasa apapun’ (you can tolerate anything if you have to) suggests, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry, Kemlu (Kementerian Luar Negeri), takes great pains to avoid conflict and harsh words. This fits nicely with its desire to minimise confrontation with China at the moment.

Kemlu has, over time, sought to adopt a more principled position in its dealings with all countries, including China. This was, of course, punctuated by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling that China’s claims to the South China Sea are unfounded. China, however, remains unbothered by the PCA’s ruling, as is evidenced by its continuing de facto control of the South China Sea. But Indonesia’s insistence that it is not a claimant in its North Natuna Sea because its EEZ is protected under UNCLOS^[13] arguably does not serve Indonesian interests nearly as much as Indonesia might think. It has, of course, done little to prevent Chinese incursions.

That said, it is aimed at providing a diplomatic path to de-escalate matters, as Jokowi knows that military conflict with China could have dire consequences for Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population. Indeed, the memories of May 1998 and the anti-Chinese ‘riots’, which were orchestrated by elements of the military elite and preceded President Suharto’s political demise, still haunt many Indonesians today, as does the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists in 1965, many of whom were killed because of their ethnicity alone.

Furthermore, Indonesia’s navy is a minnow compared to China’s: Indonesian military spending remains at a mere 0.8% of its GDP, and the majority of that meagre sum—approximately 70%—continues to be spent on the army, in accordance with Indonesia’s archaic ‘defence in depth’ doctrine. The ‘defence in depth’ doctrine places far greater emphasis on the army than Indonesia’s naval and air forces, the rationale being that the only way Indonesia might resist and defeat a superior foreign attacker would be by maintaining the semangat (spirit) of the people, who would take it upon themselves to also defend their country. Why the world’s largest archipelagic nation continues to invest what little it allocates to its military in its land forces, rather than naval forces and especially the capacity to monitor and protect littoral waters, beggars belief, but much like bebas dan aktif, it has withstood the test of time.

Elite opportunism

It is little wonder that speculation abounds regarding key figures within Jokowi’s cabinet deriving financial benefit from the Indonesia-China relationship. Given the historical sensitivities surrounding Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population, China also knows that the easiest way to win influence over Indonesia is not to try to win the hearts and minds of the Indonesian people as a whole, but rather to focus its energy on courting Indonesia’s elite class of ex-military generals/politicians. Indeed, the latter is perfectly content for the companies in which they hold significant stakes to accept Chinese money. The prevailing business culture in Indonesia also aligns well with how China does business, namely in an often untransparent, unregulated manner. This is, of course, distinct from Japan, which has been a longstanding ally of Indonesia’s, but typically conducts business above-board and with transparency.

Japan’s fastidiousness has, on occasion, slowed projects down and somewhat frustrated Jokowi’s sought-after legacy as the infrastructure president, which is contingent on getting as many projects up and running as possible before his second term concludes.^[14] The rushed granting of projects to China, however, can lead to precarious outcomes. A case in point is the fraught Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail (HSR) development, a project Jokowi controversially entrusted to China in 2015, which is now some US$3 billion over budget and not due for completion until late 2022/early 2023—works were initially scheduled to commence in 2016 and be complete by 2019. Such is the comical state of this HSR that renowned senior economist Faisal Basri remarked that not even till the end of time (kiamat) would it see a return on investment.^[15] For the purpose of the current government, he is not far wrong. Projections by the HSR coordinating body suggest that it will be at least 40 years before a return on investment is seen.^[16] The HSR will also depart not from the centre of Jakarta, but from Halim, in Jakarta’s east, servicing several new property developments owned by tycoons, including Mochtar Riady, along the way. It will then reach its final destination not in Bandung, but at a Summarecon Agung Group property development, some 45 minutes outside the Bandung city centre. These are all red flags and suggestive of the vested interests of certain elites having informed planning decisions.

Indonesia’s military posture

With elite opportunism arguably undermining Indonesia’s geostrategic position vis-à-vis China, Indonesia’s military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) might take a larger role as a balancing force. As mentioned, the TNI has a long history of distrusting China and its communist ideology. Furthermore, many of its generals, including its new Commander-in-Chief, Andika Perkasa, have studied in the United States and have displayed a preference to cooperate with the United States, rather than China, as was evidenced in August last year when Indonesia and the United States conducted their largest ever joint military exercise, involving some 3,000 troops.^[17]

Indonesia’s Defence Ministry is also conspicuously lacking in China experts, primarily because its officers are keen to avoid the stigma associated with affiliations with communist China. It follows that Indonesia’s military top brass and Defence officials would be far more at ease with Indonesia approaching an arrangement (official or otherwise) with either the Quad (United States, India, Japan, Australia) or AUKUS. Indeed, were matters to escalate in the South China Sea, Indonesia’s best hope would lie with an intervention involving members of AUKUS. Kemlu might have issued a statement in which it ‘[took] note cautiously of the Australian government’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines’,^[18] but its response was much more ‘diam seribu bahasa’ (remaining silent in a thousand languages) than anything else; that is to say, it was an exercise in managing the optics, i.e., being seen to maintain bebas dan aktif,managing China’s expectations that Indonesia oppose AUKUS, while tacitly accepting (if not approving) that its neighbour to the south was a party to this new alliance that unofficially seeks to contain Chinese influence.

In military terms, Indonesia’s concerns regarding China’s claims to the South China Sea might make the notion of Indonesia-China military cooperation seem fanciful. The two countries have, however, engaged in piecemeal military exercises on occasion. On 22 March 2011, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence and China’s State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND) signed a memorandum of understanding.^[19] Then, between 2011 and 2014, parts of the two countries’ militaries engaged in certain military exchanges as part of what became known as ‘Sharp Knife’. Indonesia’s preparedness to engage China in military cooperation was, in part, informed by the decision of the US Congress to ban its military cooperating with Kopassus.^[20]

Sharp Knife 2011 saw Kopassus and the PLA conduct two weeks of joint exercises in Bandung, where they focused on anti-terrorism drills. Sharp Knife 2012 saw a repeat of those same exercises, but this time in Shandong Province. Sharp Knife Airborne 2013 was expanded to include Indonesian Air Force special forces and PLA Air Force. This was a week-long exercise involving approximately 200 personnel, while Sharp Knife Airborne 2014 then saw the same exercise repeated but in China.^[21] The Sharp Knife exchange was ultimately discontinued under Jokowi and his TNI commander, Gatot Nurmantyo, who was much more of a realist when it came to China and its repeated incursions in the South China Sea. Indeed, Gatot deemed China’s actions as contrary to Indonesia’s territorial integrity, rather than a mere misunderstanding about fishing rights.^[22]

In terms of defence industrial cooperation, in 2014, Indonesia took the step of equipping its three KCR-40 vessels with C-705 missiles imported from China.^[23] But whilst some TNI officers have welcomed China’s preparedness to share its military technology with Indonesia,^[24] the underlying distrust of communist China runs deep within TNI, as do suspicions that such preparedness to share brings with it China’s ulterior motive of collecting as much intelligence on Indonesia as possible.

Similarly, Jakarta’s acceptance of Beijing’s offer to aid in the salvage operation of the sunken KRI Nanggala-402 submarine, an aging submarine that suffered an uncontrolled dive on 21 April 2021, was conspicuous. Parts of the vessel—which was built in Germany in 1977 and acquired by Indonesia in 1981^[25]—remain in deep water on the sea floor, although three large pieces were successfully retrieved by the Chinese. The submarine, which had a history of problems, was scheduled for a total overhaul in 2020 but this was delayed due to Covid-19.^[26] Analysing the salvage operation ‘in the geostrategically sensitive Lombok Strait’, Derek Grossman, senior security and defence analyst at RAND Corporation, noted that ‘China very likely collected valuable oceanographic data during the failed salvage mission’, and Jakarta possibly accepted the offer ‘because China footed the entire bill’.^[27]

The salvage operation appeared to boost momentum, with Beijing announcing, a week later, that China and Indonesia were conducting joint naval exercises off the coast of Jakarta. China’s defence ministry said that the drills were part of the PLA Navy’s annual training program.^[28] As mentioned, however, the piecemeal nature of this cooperation reveals the lack of strategic thought underpinning it, at least from Indonesia’s side.

According to a leaked document, Indonesia also has plans to spend up to US$124 billion on defence over the next five years,^[29] although there is speculation that the relevant draft regulation was deliberately leaked by the Palace in order to scuttle Prabowo’s lavish spending plans as defence minister. Nevertheless, Indonesia has announced plans to purchase Boeing’s F-15EX jet fighter from the United States or Dassault’s Rafale from France, rather than Sukhoi’s Su-35 from Russia. Indonesia had initially chosen the Russian jets at the Dubai Airshow in 2015, but never signed a formal agreement. In March 2020, the Trump administration compelled Jakarta to refuse to proceed with the purchase of the Su-35s, in accordance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a law passed by the United States Congress in 2017 aimed at stopping other countries from cooperating with Iran, North Korea, Russia, and later China, at the military level.^[30] The specifics of Australia-Indonesia defence industrial cooperation remain unclear as Australia does not make such information available to the public.^[31]

Future opportunities

With Jokowi ending speculation that he might either seek to extend his second term as president, or seek a third term—which would require a constitutional amendment^[32]—it will fall to Jokowi’s successor to determine the trajectory of Indonesia’s relationship with China beyond 2024. As China’s power continues to grow, Jokowi’s successor might therefore seek to resolve the current state of affairs in the South China Sea through diplomatic means, for which the East Asia Summit—a diplomatic forum and process comprising the ASEAN member states, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Russian Federation—might be the most appropriate platform. If this fails, Indonesia is unlikely to be able to maintain the status quo for more than the next couple of decades, after which time all bets are off. Unless, of course, it was to reinterpret bebas dan aktif and do what its military is already doing: forging closer military ties with the United States before China’s economic and military might grows even further.^[33]

As China’s star rises, and as American primacy in East Asia and the western Pacific potentially dwindles, Australia may well want Indonesia’s stocks to grow. By 2030, Indonesia is projected to be the seventh largest economy in the world, and by 2050, the world’s fourth largest economy. Indonesia has a young population with the median age being 29.7; a rising urban and middle-class population (more than 155 million); a low national debt (US$416.6 billion – Bank Indonesia, November 2020); abundant natural resources; recent regulatory reforms (primarily, its Job Creation Law); and increased macroeconomic stability and infrastructural development. Indonesia’s substandard administrative capacity and policy capacity, however, typically undermine its aspirations of becoming a greater power. If Indonesia does not realise these aspirations, it will most likely end up acquiescing to Chinese primacy, which is not in Australia’s national interest. Therefore, while the Jokowi administration continues to pursue its policy of non-alignment and reap the benefits of Chinese investment, Australia should accelerate its military cooperation with Indonesia; indeed, the pieces are already in place for this to happen. Indonesia and Australia already have the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IACEPA) in place, which, among other things, builds on existing economic and security arrangements. Furthermore, the recent inauguration of Andika Perkasa as TNI Commander-in-Chief is also likely to be beneficial for Australia. Doubts about his human rights record aside,^[34] Andika is a United States-educated general and will be more inclined to further increase military engagement and cooperation with the West, rather than China. In lieu of an Indonesian administration with a more strategic outlook, military cooperation is perhaps the best way for Australia and Indonesia to be on the same page when it comes to containing China’s growing influence in East Asia and the western Pacific.

Footnotes

¹ Natasha Hamilton-Hart and Dave McRae, ‘Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence’, United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, November 2015, 8.

² Greta Nabbs-Keller, ‘Growing Convergence, Greater Consequence: The Strategic Implications of Closer Indonesia-China Relations’ (2011) 7(3) Security Challenges 23, 25.

³ Robert Cribb, ‘Behind the coup that backfired: the demise of Indonesia’s Communist Party’, The Conversation (online), 30 September 2015 <https://theconversation.com/behind-the-coup-that-backfired-the-demise-o…;.

⁴ Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (Routledge, 1990) 3-4.

⁵ Goals include: Indonesia’s average GDP per capita needs to increase by five, from US$3,000 (today) to US$15,000 per annum; GDP per se needs to increase to US$4.5 trillion (nearly five times the current GDP).

⁶ Evan Laksmana, ‘Pragmatic Equidistance: How Indonesia Manages its Great Power Relations’ in David Denoon (ed), China, the United States, and the Future of Southeast Asia (New York University Press, 2017).

⁷ Emirza Adi Syailendra, ‘Indonesia’s Jalan tengah in the new age of great power rivalries’, New Mandala (online), 24 November 2021 <https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-jalan-tengah-in-the-new-age-of-gr…;.

⁸ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s foreign relations: policy shaped by the ideal of “dynamic equilibrium"’, East Asia Forum (online), 4 February 2014 <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/04/indonesias-foreign-relations-p…;.

⁹ Lee Jong-Wha, ‘Can Pax Sinica replace Pax Americana?’, The Japan Times (online), 11 August 2021 <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/08/11/commentary/world-commen…;.

¹⁰ On the legitimate threat of Chinese hegemony in East Asia and the western Pacific, see: Henry Kissinger, ‘The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity’ (2012) 91(2) Foreign Affairs 44, 45.

¹¹ Some dispute the attribution of this quote to Sun Tzu.

¹² Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford University Press, 2012) 3.

¹³ Ismira Lutfia Tisnadibrata, ‘Indonesia Gives New Name to Sea Region North of Natuna Islands’, Benar News (online), 14 July 2017 <https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/North-Natuna-Sea-0714…;.

¹⁴ Eg, Ben Bland, ‘Dream state: Widodo struggles to build his vision for Indonesia’, Financial Times (online), 22 September 2020 <https://www.ft.com/content/322c7f9b-310a-4c4f-ae6e-598328f59028>

¹⁵ Muhammad Idris, ‘Kata Faisal Basri, Sampai Kiamat Pun Kereta Cepat Tak Akan Balik Modal’, Kompas (online), 15 October 2021 <https://money.kompas.com/read/2021/10/15/073446726/kata-faisal-basri-sa…;

¹⁶ Sebastian Strangio, ‘Indonesian Capital Plan Throws China-Backed Rail Link Into Disarray’ The Diplomat (online) < https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/indonesian-capital-plan-throws-china-ba…;

¹⁷ ‘Indonesia hails 'new era' for U.S. ties, hosts biggest joint military drills’, Reuters (online), 5 August 2021 <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-hails-new-era-us-t…;.

¹⁸ ‘Statement on Australia's Nuclear-powered Submarines Program’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia(online), 17 September 2021 <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2937/siaran_pers/statement-on-austra…;.

¹⁹ ‘Indonesia, China discuss C-705 missile technology transfer’, Antara News (online), 20 August 2013 <https://en.antaranews.com/news/90341/indonesia-china-discuss-c-705-miss…;.

²⁰ Frega Wenas Inkiriwang, “Garuda shield” vs “sharp knife”: operationalising Indonesia’s defence diplomacy’ (2021) 34(6) The Pacific Review 871, 883.

²¹ Natasha Hamilton-Hart and Dave McRae, ‘Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence’, United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, November 2015, 8.

²² Inkiriwang, above n 22, 885.

²³ ‘Indonesia to license produce Chinese C-705 missiles’, Defense Updates (online), 31 January 2013 <http://defenseupdates.blogspot.com/2013/01/indonesia-to-license-produce…;.

²⁴ Greta Nabbs-Keller, ‘Growing Convergence, Greater Consequence: The Strategic Implications of Closer Indonesia-China Relations’ (2011) 7(3) Security Challenges 23, 33, fn 30.

²⁵ Koya Jibiki, ‘Indonesia looks to triple submarine fleet after Chinese incursions’, Nikkei Asia (online), 30 May 2021 <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/I…;.

²⁶ Stanley Widianto and Kate Lamb, ‘Salvage of Indonesian submarine ends as questions over military hardware loom’, Reuters (online), 2 June 2021 <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-ends-salvage-effor…;.

²⁷ Derek Grossman, ‘Indonesia is quietly warming up to China’, Foreign Policy (online), 7 June 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/07/indonesia-china-jokowi-natuna-sea-…;.

²⁸ Laura Zhou, ‘China, Indonesia hold joint naval exercises near Jakarta’, ABS-CBN (online), 10 May 2021 <https://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/05/10/21/china-indonesia-hold-joint-n…;.

²⁹ Resty Woro Yuniar, ‘Indonesia to buy 8 Italian frigates and hike defence spending as China tensions rise’, South China Morning Post (online), 15 June 2021 <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3137387/indonesia-buy-8…;.

³⁰ Andrey Gubin, ‘Jakarta’s “heavy heart” over heavy fighters’, The Asia Times (online), 27 December 2021 <https://asiatimes.com/2021/12/jakartas-heavy-heart-over-heavy-fighters/…;.

³¹ Megan Price, ‘Australia is building a billion-dollar arms export industry. This is how weapons can fall in the wrong hands’, The Conversation (online), 26 May 2021 <https://theconversation.com/australia-is-building-a-billion-dollar-arms…;.

³² ‘Indonesia ends Jokowi third term speculation by unveiling 2024 presidential election date’, South China Morning Post (online), 25 January 2022 <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3164642/indonesia…;.

³³ At the time of writing Indonesia has indeed, momentarily at least, become a central figure in global diplomacy and must determine whether to disinvite Russia from the October 2022 G20 Summit in Bali. How it addresses this challenge will reveal important insights into its potential future actions.

³⁴ Konradus Epa, ‘Indonesian activists attack Widodo over new army chief pick’, UCA News (online), 23 November 2018 <https://www.ucanews.com/news/indonesian-activists-attack-widodo-over-ne…;.

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Akbarzadeh S. et al. 2022. 'Indonesia and China: Geostrategic Implications for the ADF'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/indonesia-and-china-geostrategic-implications-adf (Accessed: 13 December 2024).

(Akbarzadeh et al., 2022)

Shahram Akbarzadeh. et al. "Indonesia and China: Geostrategic Implications for the ADF", The Forge, Published: April 12, 2022, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/indonesia-and-china-geostrategic-implications-adf. (accessed December 13, 2024).

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Biography

Dr Daniel Peterson

Dr

Dr Daniel Peterson is a leading young scholar of Indonesian law and society, with extensive in-country experience. He graduated with his PhD Summa Cum Laude from the Australian Catholic University in 2019, has since completed a visiting Fellowship at the KITLV Leiden, and is an Associate of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society (CILIS) at the University of Melbourne Law School.

Biography

Dr Joshua Roose

Dr

Dr Joshua Roose is a Senior Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Melbourne. He gained his PhD in Political Science from the Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne in 2012. Dr Roose has extensive experience on research pertaining to Indonesian Politics, Religion and Law having spent two years as a Visiting Research Fellow at the East Asian Legal Studies Program at Harvard Law School. He is a member of the Editorial Board of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT).

Biography

Professor Greg Barton

Professor

Professor Greg Barton is a scholar of Indonesia Islam, Muslim society, terrorism and countering violent extremism, with more 30 years of experience researching Islam and social movements in Indonesia and broader Southeast Asia. Since 2016 Prof Barton has been leading the Home Affairs’ Southeast Asian Network of Civil Society Organisations (SEAN-CSO) working together against extremism.

Biography

Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh

Professor

Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh has two decades of research experience on Middle East politics and international relations. He is currently completing a major project on proxy wars, sponsored by Carnegie Corporation New York, which includes the development of an extensive database of flashpoints with multiple variables. He has published on foreign policy making and international relations. Since 2017 he has been running a leadership program for DFAT in Indonesia through which he has developed close links with collaborators in Indonesia.

Policy of non-alignment

Tactical, rather than strategic

Elite opportunism

Indonesia’s military posture

Future opportunities

Biography

Dr Daniel Peterson

Dr

Biography

Dr Joshua Roose

Dr

Biography

Professor Greg Barton

Professor

Biography

Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh

Professor

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