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War College Papers 2023

Introduction

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is in a state of transformation to quickly adapt to increasing uncertainty because of the contemporary strategic environment. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) has called for a national defence and whole-of-government approach to strategy and planning.[1] How does the ADF integrate with other agencies to achieve preparedness, deterrence by denial, and national security coordination? The planning process and its ability to incorporate other agencies outside the military will be necessary. The ADF currently utilises the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) for military planning. However, this model is rarely practised outside the ADF and is potentially unsuitable for facilitating a national planning output.

This paper will argue that a re-evaluation of the JMAP is required to accommodate the integration of other agencies and form a national approach to joint operational and campaign planning. This paper will commence by explaining the contemporary military planning environment to provide the foundation for the argument. The second part of this paper will analyse the JMAP to provide an understanding of the utility of the process. The third section of this paper will compare the JMAP to the United States Joint Planning Process (JPP) to explore applicability to Australia’s Department of Defence and other agencies.

Context

Firstly, the JMAP is a planning process that the ADF has adopted for joint campaign and operational planning.[2] The ADF describes the JMAP as a process that 'promotes critical thinking' and consists of five steps: Scoping and Framing; Mission Analysis; Course of Action (COA) Development; COA Analysis; and Decision and Concept of Operations Development.[3] The basis for the process has been updated as recently as 2019 and strives to incorporate the concepts of operational art, operational design and the arrangement of operations.[4] The ADF defines operational art as, 'The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and operations'.[5] In other words, the process tries to link the art and science of military planning using an analytical linear system. This brief explanation of the JMAP will provide context to the argument and be built on in subsequent sections of this paper.

Additionally, the ADF has released three documents informing the approach to military planning and the JMAP: ADF-P-3 Campaigning and Operations; ADF-P-5 Planning; and Integrated Campaigning: The ADF's Capstone Concept.[6] The scope of this paper will not allow for a comprehensive analysis of these documents. However, it is essential to understand that overlapping principles apply to this paper and the process of the JMAP. The process of the JMAP exists in ADF-P 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process.[7]

Secondly, the US uses a similar process to the JMAP called the Joint Planning Process (JPP). Fundamentally, the JPP consists of seven steps centred on four planning functions: strategic guidance, concept development, plan development and assessment.[8] The scope of this paper will not allow a detailed explanation of this process, but further information is afforded through the US Department of Defense Joint Publication 5-0 – Joint Planning.[9] The JPP will be expanded on later in this paper to inform the applicability of the JMAP to Defence and other organisations.

For this paper, other agencies include all organisations outside the ADF, including entities as part of Defence, the Australian Government, coalition nations, non-governmental organisations, and potentially, private and international organisations. It is essential to clearly outline the meaning of the term ‘other agencies’ to form this argument and explore the applicability of the JMAP to Defence and the broader national community.

Additionally, the contemporary operating environment has changed in recent history. A significant shift in global order and great power competition has required Australia, a regional middle power, to adopt a more sophisticated approach to operational planning.[10] There is also literature that identifies the prevalence of grey zone actions, which includes using multi-domain actions to achieve strategic objectives while remaining below the threshold of traditional military actions.[11] Increasing grey zone actions and strategic competition requires a multi-domain approach incorporating all national power aspects.[12] It suggests that operational art concerns more than the ADF, and Australia's understanding must align with the contemporary environment.[13] These arguments support the 2023 DSR, which states, 'Australia's region, the Indo-Pacific, faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives'.[14] The DSR evidences a complex and dynamic environment requiring multiple agencies' input to succeed. The current strategic environment is an essential component of future planning and will inform the analysis of the JMAP in subsequent components of this paper.

The Advantages of the JMAP

The JMAP has several advantages that lend it to planning military operations. The JMAP has components that emphasise creative and critical thinking while linking operational design and the arrangement of operations. Jackson argues that the most significant update to the JMAP was the inclusion of step one—Scoping and Framing.[15] The ADF-P 5.01 states, 'The Joint Military Appreciation Process encapsulates operational design and arrangement of operations, which together constitute the contemporary practice of operational art’.[16] Translating design to the arrangement of operations is an integral part of the success of the process. The first two steps allow the planning team to be creative and incorporate operational design for the commander, while the subsequent steps incorporate the arrangement of operations.[17] The addition of Scoping and Framing allows a normally reductionist and linear process to be open and imaginative. This component of the JMAP presents an opportunity for interagency inclusion by allowing abstract thinking through diversity. If agencies outside of the ADF had clear input in this stage of the JMAP, it could unlock valuable planning potential. Unfortunately, there are limited stages for input from external agencies written into the doctrine, which is why the JMAP needs to be revised.

Consequently, the JMAP's deliberate and linear nature can be applied to break down complicated and complex problems. The ADF-P 5.01 states, 'Scoping and Framing may involve the need to deconstruct a complex, ill-structured and/or ill-defined situation into a structured and understandable problem set’.[18] As previously mentioned, this component allows planners to simplify and understand the problem(the art), before applying the arrangement of operations (the science) to produce operational art.[19] This construct means planners can find a starting point and compartmentalise information to be combined later while having routine engagements with a commander. These process attributes can be beneficial to solving complex problems if planners have the time and are informed correctly. The structured approach means that the process can also be taught easily to interagency personnel, which would assist in amending the process to a whole-of-government level. The JMAP is effective when there is sufficient time and information available. However, this sits in paradox to the subsequent parts of this paper, which see the JMAP's linear and deliberate structure as a potential disadvantage when it comes to intuitive and dynamic thinking.

The Disadvantages of the JMAP

Conversely, there are several disadvantages to applying the JMAP, some of which contradict the previous advantages in certain circumstances. The JMAP must be taught and practised to be an effective tool; only the ADF adopts this approach, making interagency planning difficult. Planning becomes essential in interagency operations, for example, the conduct of the Afghanistan Non-combatant Casualty Operations in Kabul 2021, where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade needed to operate closely with the ADF.[20] This operation was short; teaching and learning the JMAP in a dynamic environment is not functional. The ADF is the only organisation within Australia that teaches and practises the JMAP regularly, with the caveat that it only teaches this on bespoke courses and in specific postings. Hence, bringing people into the planning process or having another organisation lead is difficult, confirming that the JMAP needs to be revised.

In elaboration, interagency cooperation is likely to increase based on the complexity of the strategic environment. The DSR also comments on the importance of national whole-of-government planning, stating, 'Critical to this whole-of-government National Defence approach is to have a national strategy and unity of effort to Australian statecraft.'[21] McKenna also states that '… recent development in ADF operations has been greater involvement of civilians, both from Defence's integrated workforce and from other government and non-government agencies, as well as from industry.'[22] Jackson also argues that stakeholders agree that there will be an increase in interagency cooperation and that the JMAP needs to adopt a better approach to interagency integration, particularly communication of the process, to incorporate input and learning from multiple organisations.[23] There will be a need to incorporate a standard planning function that focuses on a national approach, even where military operations are not the primacy. The JMAP is limiting the integration of a whole-of-government approach. The lack of training and integration of the JMAP, as well as its bias as a tool for military planning, is an inhibitor of this ambition. The JMAP should be revised to accommodate organisational planning outside the ADF.

Furthermore, the JMAP centres on military solutions that are ineffective for planning around irregular and non-military problems. Crabb argues that components of ADF operational planning are limited in their application to complex and non-military problems, using an example that a Centre-of-Gravity (COG) construct will not exist in situations where there is no clear adversary. He states, 'COG process has limited usefulness when it comes to facing and accounting for multiple adversaries, neutral parties, and unknown actors in a disordered and chaotic operational environment.'[24] This statement is particularly relevant when considering the current strategic circumstances explained earlier in this paper. There have been limited operational problems that will have traditional adversaries that the COG can cleanly apply.[25] Jackson reports findings during stakeholder engagement, arguing that the COG construct needs expansion due to recent historical planning and that previous iterations '… required ad hoc adaptation by practitioners …'.[26] It is reasonable to say that the ADF will only be a small portion of a national response to problem solving. Therefore, the JMAP is a limited tool for applying national power operationally in a whole-of-government setting. It is not a suitable means to tackle contemporary problems across the full spectrum of national power and needs revision.

Furthermore, whilst a linear process was described as an advantage earlier, it also has disadvantages. The linear fashion of the JMAP does not have the flexibility for the dynamic strategic environment that Australia and the ADF could meet in the future. The JMAP has steps that must be completed before information can be fed into subsequent steps. For example, decisive points and the lines of operation diagram are outputs of step two—Mission Analysis. The process requires these outputs before commencing step three, COA Development.[27] These components demonstrate a linear constraint to the process. Although the doctrine describes flexibility in revising previous steps, it does not allow the flexibility to miss or truncate the process. In dynamic environments, the JMAP lacks flexibility and adaptability; often, an increase in speed means a reduction in the effectiveness of the process. Friction will increase as multiple organisations are incorporated into joint planning, stressing the importance of a simple and consistent methodology to allow flexibility and shared understanding. The JMAP is linear and deliberate, not dynamic, which is not conducive to future planning interactions or a whole-of-government approach.

Consequently, because of the linear nature of the JMAP, COA development is often delayed unnecessarily. It is not until step three—COA Development—that there is any concurrent progress into detailing COAs.[28] This delay and linear nature means it can limit concurrent activity and delay subordinate planning in a time-sensitive situation. These limitations could result in the loss of creative ideas and concurrent progress.[29] The JMAP needs to be more intuitive to allow for concurrent activity and more flexibility, particularly with the increase in uncertainty with the use of grey zone actions and other statecraft. The inability to develop COA concurrently means that the JMAP is not as suitable for real-time dynamic situations, and likely not for other government agencies to integrate with or plan concurrently. The JMAP must be revised to accommodate dynamic planning when the situation calls for this type of problem solving.

Finally, the linear structure of the JMAP promotes group thinking and cognitive bias. Dobson-Keeffe argues that 'military training exacerbates this problem and encourages members to think in a similar manner'. He argues that the JMAP does not account for the inherent bias associated with planning.[30] There is merit in this theory that applies to all individual and group processes. However, due to the linear format and collective training of the JMAP under the military umbrella, it could suggest that the process is more susceptible to bias than another process which concentrates exclusively on design theory, for example. Individual and group bias could be mitigated by including interagency support and greater diversity in the JMAP; this could be achieved by including other agency planners. The next section of this paper examines the JPP.

Comparison with the JPP

The US JPP has a bias towards inter-organisational and multinational planning that benefits a national approach to planning. The JPP contains substantial information and guidance, including detailed information in chapter one, and considers interagency and multinational planning throughout the document.[31] This theme contrasts with ADF-P 5.0.1, which mentions interagency input throughout the JMAP but does not provide dedicated sections or a consistent focus on integration. An example of integration in the JPP is the subtle but essential nuance of specific reports from the J9 (civil-military operations) in the suggested briefing formats.[32] These differentials promote specific interagency and whole-of-government inputs into the brief. There is an inherent bias to plan on a broader scope and incorporate a national approach when considering the US JPP. Perhaps this stems from overarching policies such as the National Security Strategy, of which Australia does not have an equivalent. [33]Australia should amend the JMAP to incorporate the national approach to reinforce the importance of government input as part of operational planning. These recommendations could potentially improve the integration of planners, particularly in the contemporary strategic environment.

The US JPP is similar to the JMAP and would allow for easier interoperability for multinational military operations. The JMAP consists of five steps, while the JPP consists of seven steps, but they follow the same principles and even use the same diagrams in some cases.[34] Both documents take the same approach of using operational design and the arrangement of operations. Unsurprisingly, the planning doctrine is similar and means that we can integrate more easily for combined and multinational operations in the future. Historically, we have seen friction in different planning structures and approaches, including friction during the planning of Operation Postern between key Australian and US planners as part of the South West Pacific Area in the Second World War.[35] Jackson argues that stakeholder analysis has confirmed the '… need for increased doctrinal interoperability with the US military, due to the frequency of combined military activities …'.[36] The advantages of interoperability between the US and Australia should be replicated across a national approach internal to the Australian arms of national power.

Finally, both the JPP and the JMAP are academic and analytical; however, in some instances, the JPP provides more intuitive and practical information than the JMAP. For example, the JPP explains the Centre-of-Gravity construct over six pages, while ADF-P 5.01 explains this concept over 13 pages.[37] Both represent the same academic approach, but the JPP does this more concisely. There can be two thoughts to this observation: on one hand, the JMAP provides more detail to explain how the COG can be applied; on the other hand, extra detail can be convoluted. The JPP takes a more general approach, allowing more flexibility and better comprehension across organisations. It would be reasonable to argue that a more practical approach would be applicable to enhance the usability of the JMAP as a national planning process in Australia. The nation needs a simple and easy-to-use process that all agencies can adopt; therefore, simplicity and comprehension will be essential.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has argued that a re-evaluation of the JMAP is required to accommodate the integration of other agencies and form a national approach to joint operational and campaign planning. The first part of this paper explains the contemporary environment, stating that an increase in strategic competition and contemporary statecraft calls for a national approach to defence and, thus, a national approach to planning.

The second part of this paper analyses the JMAP. The advantages of the JMAP stem from its linear and reductionist approach, where it can be used to break down and plan complicated and complex problems if presented with the required time. Recent interactions allow planners to combine creativity and design if they are cognisant of bias. However, the JMAP also has several disadvantages. Namely, it is taught and practised by the ADF in isolation, it promotes military and group thinking, and its linear nature is unsuitable for Australia's emerging strategic environment.

The third section of this paper compares the JMAP to the US JPP, highlighting the similarities and identifying interoperability. The JPP has a more practical approach and bias towards multinational and whole-of-government integration.

Furthermore, it is essential to discuss the limitations of this paper, mainly that the scope has not allowed for the complete analysis of the broader doctrine, and that the application of the JPP and the JMAP depends on the situation, circumstances and personnel involved in the process. There are times when the JMAP is an appropriate planning process; however, it will not always apply to every situation.

In summation, there needs to be a revision of the JMAP. A process to complement or replace the JMAP would enable a national approach to planning. The process should be easily comprehended, intuitive and readily taught to all agencies of national power. This process could be included in the national defence strategy, enhancing interoperability across all aspects of Australia's national power.

Bibliography

Australian Government. National Defence - Defence Strategic Review. Commonwealth of Australia, 2023. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review

Boon, Hoo Tiang, and Sarah Teo. ‘Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition’. Asia Policy 17, no. 4 (October 2022): 59–76.

Chapman, Bert. Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook. New York, United States: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dlsau-ebooks/detail.action?docID=497166

Chuan, Ho. ‘The Concept of Operational Art’, 2019, 1–13.

Crabb, Andrew L. ‘Toward Military Design: Six Ways the JP 5-0’s Operational Design Falls Short.’ JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, no. 105 (2022): 99–104.

Dean, Peter J. MacArthur’s Coalition: US and Australian Military Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945. University Press of Kansas, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvgd2dt

Department of Defence. ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process’. Plans Series Edition 2 AL3 (15 August 2019).

———. ‘Australian Defence Force – Philosophical Doctrine – 3 – Campaigns and Operations Edition 3’, 2023.

———. Australian Defence Force – Philosophical Doctrine – 5 – Planning, Edition 1, 2021.

———. ‘Australian Defence Force Capstone Concept Integrated Campaigning, Edition 1’, 2022.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. ‘Afghanistan Crisis and Response’. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed 24 October 2023. https://www.dfat.gov.au/crisis-hub/afghanistan-crisis-and-response

Dobson-Keeffe, Nigel, and Warren Coaker. ‘Thinking More Rationally: Cognitive Biases and the Joint Military Appreciation Process’. Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 197 (1 January 2015): 5–16.

Evans, Michael. ‘The Closing of the Australian Military Mind’. Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (2008): 105–31.

Jackson, Aaron. ‘A Tale of Two Designs: Developing the Australian Defence Force’s Latest Iteration of Its Joint Operations Planning Doctrine.’ Journal of Military & Strategic Studies 17, no. 4 (January 2017): 174–93.

———. ‘Center of Gravity Analysis “Down Under”: The Australian Defence Force’s New Approach’. Joint Force Quarterly 84, no. 1st Quarter 2017 (26 January 2017). https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1038829/center-of-gravity-analysis-down-under-the-australian-defence-forces-new-approach/

———. ‘Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art’. Security Challenges 13, no. 1 (2017): 59–80.

McKenna, Tim, and Tim McKay. ‘Australia’s Joint Approach’, September 2015. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1003115.pdf

Paparone, Chris. The Sociology of Military Science: Prospects for Post Institutional Military Design. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,sso&db=nlebk&AN=503203&site=eds-live&custid=s3330841

Scott, Trent. The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force. Study Paper (Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)) 319. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2011. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/sp319_the_lost_operational_art-trent_scott.pdf

Searight, Amy. ‘Countering China’s Influence Operations: Lessons from Australia’, 5 August 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-chinas-influence-operations-lessons-australia

Sherman, Ian. ‘Operational Art and the ADF Experience’, 2017. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1039930.pdf

Townshend, Ashley, Thomas Lonergan, and Toby Warden. ‘The U.S.-Australian Alliance Needs a Strategy to Deter China’s Gray-Zone Coercion’. War on the Rocks, 29 September 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-u-s-australian-alliance-needs-a-strategy-to-deter-chinas-gray-zone-coercion/

U.S. Department of Defense. ‘Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning’. U.S. Department of Defense, 1 December 2020.

Walker, David. ‘Refining the Military Appreciation Process for Adaptive Campaigning’. Australian Army Journal 8, no. 2 (1 June 2011): 85–100.

Footnotes

1 Australian Government, National Defence - Defence Strategic Review (Commonwealth of Australia, 2023), https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.

2 Department of Defence, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process’, Plans Series Edition 2 AL3 (15 August 2019): 1–2.

3 Department of Defence, 1–2.

4 Department of Defence, 1–4.

5 Department of Defence, 1–4.

6 Department of Defence, ‘Australian Defence Force – Philosophical Doctrine – 3 – Campaigns and Operations Edition 3’, 2023; Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force – Philosophical Doctrine – 5 – Planning, Edition 1, 2021; Department of Defence, ‘Australian Defence Force Capstone Concept Integrated Campaigning, Edition 1’, 2022.

7 Department of Defence, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process’.

8 U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 1 December 2020), chap. III.

9 U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning’.

10 Hoo Tiang Boon and Sarah Teo, ‘Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition’, Asia Policy 17, no. 4 (October 2022): 2; Andrew L. Crabb, ‘Toward Military Design: Six Ways the JP 5-0’s Operational Design Falls Short.’, JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, no. 105 (2022): 99.

11 Ashley Townshend, Thomas Lonergan, and Toby Warden, ‘The U.S.-Australian Alliance Needs a Strategy to Deter China’s Gray-Zone Coercion’, War on the Rocks, 29 September 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-u-s-australian-alliance-needs-a-strategy-to-deter-chinas-gray-zone-coercion/; Amy Searight, ‘Countering China’s Influence Operations: Lessons from Australia’, 5 August 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-chinas-influence-operations-lessons-australia

12 Ho Chuan, ‘The Concept of Operational Art’, 2019, 39.

13 Michael Evans, ‘The Closing of the Australian Military Mind’, Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (2008): 105–9; Trent Scott, The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force, Study Paper (Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)) 319 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2011), 16–29, https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/sp319_the_lost_operational_art-trent_scott.pdf; Ian Sherman, ‘Operational Art and the ADF Experience’, 2017, 1–3, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1039930.pdf

14 Australian Government, National Defence - Defence Strategic Review, 5.

15 Aaron Jackson, ‘A Tale of Two Designs: Developing the Australian Defence Force’s Latest Iteration of Its Joint Operations Planning Doctrine.’, Journal of Military & Strategic Studies 17, no. 4 (January 2017): 186.

16 Department of Defence, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process’, 1–1.

17 Department of Defence, 1-4-1–5.

18 Department of Defence, 2–1.

19 Department of Defence, 1–4, 1–5; Chris Paparone, The Sociology of Military Science: Prospects for Post Institutional Military Design (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 91, https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&;AuthType=ip,sso&db=nlebk&AN=503203&site=eds-live&custid=s3330841

20 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Afghanistan Crisis and Response’, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed 24 October 2023, https://www.dfat.gov.au/crisis-hub/afghanistan-crisis-and-response

21 Australian Government, National Defence - Defence Strategic Review, 33.

22 Tim McKenna and Tim McKay, ‘Australia’s Joint Approach’, September 2015, 9, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1003115.pdf

23 Aaron Jackson, ‘Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art’, Security Challenges 13, no. 1 (2017): 67.

24 Crabb, ‘Toward Military Design: Six Ways the JP 5-0’s Operational Design Falls Short.’, 102.

25 Aaron Jackson, ‘Center of Gravity Analysis “Down Under”: The Australian Defence Force’s New Approach’, Joint Force Quarterly 84, no. 1st Quarter 2017 (26 January 2017): 82–83, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1038829/center-of-gravity-analysis-down-under-the-australian-defence-forces-new-approach/

26 Jackson, ‘Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art’, 67.

27 Department of Defence, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process’, 3-33-3–44, 4–6.

28 Department of Defence, chap. 4.

29 David Walker, ‘Refining the Military Appreciation Process for Adaptive Campaigning’, Australian Army Journal 8, no. 2 (1 June 2011): 90.

30 Nigel Dobson-Keeffe and Warren Coaker, ‘Thinking More Rationally: Cognitive Biases and the Joint Military Appreciation Process’, Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 197 (1 January 2015): 13.

31 U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning’, I-24-I–30.

32 U.S. Department of Defense, III–43.

33 Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook (New York, United States: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009), 43–45, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/dlsau-ebooks/detail.action?docID=497166.

34 Department of Defence, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process’, 1–2, 3–9; U.S. Department of Defence, ‘Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning’, III–11, IV–23.

35 Peter J. Dean, MacArthur’s Coalition: US and Australian Military Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945 (University Press of Kansas, 2018), 300–304, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvgd2dt

36 Jackson, ‘Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art’, 67.

37 Department of Defence, ‘ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process’, 3-6-3–18.

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