Introduction

A foundational concept of military planning is what Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine describes as the ‘arrangement of military actions’. ADF Philosophical Doctrine: Planning defines this arrangement as the ‘contemporary application of the operational art in organising, sequencing and resourcing the operational approach to a situation’.^[1] This operational framework assists military forces in planning, executing, and enhancing military operations and comprises eight elements.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the ADF’s operational framework and how it applies to the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). Australia is New Zealand’s most important defence partner, and accordingly the NZDF derives much of its doctrine from ADF sources. Resultantly, the understanding of how operations are arranged is broadly consistent between the two forces. However, there are three elements where differences exist, and these constitute the focus of this article. It will first consider the concept of culminating point. In particular it will question its applicability in non-adversarial contexts, such as disaster relief. This is an aspect of military operations beyond that envisaged in its Clausewitzian origins. Next, this article will consider operational reach. This section will consider what this concept means for a small military with limited capabilities, as well as in a changing world that includes non-physical domains. Lastly, this article will analyse assessment and how it can be best used to measure operational effectiveness to aid forces to adapt and enhance their plans.

Culminating point

The first element of the ADF’s operational framework to be considered here is ‘culminating point’. This concept’s genesis is found within Clausewitz’s seminal On War. In this work, Clausewitz described the requirement for a force to transition from the offence to the defence once the point of culmination had been reached.^[2] However, the way in which the ADF defines culmination is broader than Clausewitz’s conception. Rather, the ADF’s doctrine defines culmination as ‘the point in time and location/space where a force will no longer be stronger than the adversary and risks losing the initiative’.^[3] This closely parallels the understanding of Australia’s closest allies. In 1986, the US formally incorporated ‘culminating point’ into its doctrine, through the release of FM 100-5 Operations.^[4] The 1993 edition of the Field Manual further expanded the concept’s definition to consider culmination in the defence: ‘the point where the defender no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully’.^[5] Today, US Army doctrine acknowledges that culmination represents a ‘crucial shift in relative combat power’.^[6]

Whilst these conceptions have utility in the conventional, force-on-force warfare for which they were developed, what utility do they have when considering non-adversarial military operations other than war? The ADF’s conception of culminating point is rooted in an adversarial paradigm, where one force competes with another. This exclusively adversarial understanding is shared within the NZDF’s Joint Operations Planning doctrine.^[7] Included within the ADF definition is the ‘risk of losing the initiative’. The ‘initiative’ itself is a poorly defined term, and the Australian doctrine fails to add clarity by explaining culminating point using this nebulous and poorly defined concept. ‘The initiative’ is mentioned throughout ADF doctrine, however, it is not defined within ADF Philosophical Doctrine: Planning. Defined elsewhere in the ADF’s Joint Military Appreciation Process doctrine, ‘the initiative’ can be understood as ‘operational momentum or decision superiority’—a further excellent example of obfuscating a definition by introducing further complex and unexplained terms.^[8] ADF doctrine clearly views ‘the initiative’ as something to be seized and retained. As the ADF’s Australian Military Power publication has it, ‘decisive operations seek to seize the initiative and then to dominate in order to gain—and then retain—the initiative in order to defeat an adversary’s will and/or means to conduct operations’.^[9] The initiative and its retention is supposedly of the utmost importance: ‘the generation of tempo and maintaining the initiative … must not be sacrificed for the sake of synchronisation’.^[10] For a concept that is thus apparently more critical than synchronisation (itself a part of sequencing, one of the eight operational framework elements), it is both surprising and unhelpful that ‘the initiative’ is left to be implicitly understood. The ADF operational framework would benefit from defining this key term, which in turn would help better explain what is meant by culminating point.

Whilst the adversarial focus of culminating point is appropriate in most contexts in which both the ADF and NZDF operate, this is not universally so. New Zealand’s Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 follows the lead of Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review, acknowledging heightened competition in the Indo-Pacific and the country’s need to understand, partner and act within the region.^[11] Clearly, this assessment is adversary focused and thus the definition of culminating point is applicable. However, the New Zealand policy also places increased emphasis on non-traditional security threats, and the need to respond to climate change induced disasters. At their least complex, humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) operations, whether domestically or externally to New Zealand, do not involve an adversary. Resultantly, the adversarial nature of the ADF’s culminating point lacks relevance in such contexts.

The Australian definition is, however, better than US definitions focused on attack and defence. This is because the Australian definition goes on to articulate that a culminating point may be reached due to ‘reduced combat power, attrition, logistics, dwindling national will or other factors’.^[12] These factors are wholly useful considerations in all types of military operations, from high-end combat to HADR operations. Even though the adversarial conception of culminating point is not universally applicable, these planning factors within the Australian explanation are relevant and should be considered by operational level planners. Notwithstanding this, there is scant academic scholarship on the utility of the concept of culminating point within HADR operations. Such a culminating point is theoretically possible; however, real world examples are difficult to find. From an NZDF perspective, whilst conducting overseas HADR operations are in the national interest, they are inherently discretionary and hence seldom conducted to the point of a force culminating. Conversely, any domestic HADR operation would be of far greater national significance. Even responses to significant domestic natural disasters, such as the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, did not see the culmination of the NZDF in its response. This is due to the non-discretionary nature of such operations, with the full resources of the force potentially available for the response. This makes culmination less likely. These domestic and foreign examples demonstrate that whilst providing useful planning considerations, culminating point may lack applicability for the full spectrum of operations undertaken by the NZDF. Whilst useful, the ADF doctrine would be enhanced through consideration of culminating point in non-adversarial contexts.

Operational Reach

Flowing on from culminating point, the second element of the ADF’s operational framework that will be discussed in this article is ‘operational reach’. According to ADF doctrine, operational reach is ‘the distance and duration across which a force element can successfully employ military capabilities’.^[13] The doctrine further states that this reach is fundamentally linked to a force’s culminating point. Factors such as weather, terrain, communities, and available resources can all constrain operational reach, whilst it can be extended through the forward positioning of capabilities and resources.^[14] This in many ways reflects the US Marine Corps’ statement that ‘logistics determines a force’s operational reach’.^[15] The ADF definition of operational reach is very similar to, and likely informed by, US joint doctrine. However, as a truly global power, US doctrine adds a heavy emphasis on the role that forward basing can play within operational reach. Joint Publication 5-0 states that forward basing underwrites a force’s ability to both shield its elements from adversary action, as well as influences combat power through greater ease of resupply and higher sortie rates in the air domain.^[16] This view of operational reach is useful for NZDF planners to understand when working as part of a coalition, particularly with larger partners such as the US. However, it is less relevant for New Zealand itself with its far more modest capabilities and limited capacity for forward basing and pre-positioning of stores.

Despite the concept’s utility, the NZDF does not incorporate operational reach within its joint operations planning doctrine as a standalone element of the operational framework. Within its capstone operational planning doctrine, the NZDF instead uses the concept of ‘operational geometry’. The NZDF holds that the geometry of the operational area should be analysed to ‘determine operational requirements related to geography’, particularly ‘the operational reach of joint forces, based on the range at which different force elements can prudently operate or sustain effective operations’.^[17] The term is identical to that found in NATO doctrine, focusing on geography and the effects of range for the effective employment of combat power.^[18] The concept of operational geometry is very Jominian in its focus, emphasising the physical domains and the role that greater distances play in the attenuation of military power. Whilst relevant, this concept lacks the broader considerations of operational reach.

Whilst US and Australian doctrine are similar in that they view operational reach in terms of the distance and duration included within the operational geometry concept, US doctrine adds depth to the Australian definition. For example, it states that operational reach can extend through the information environment, with the messages sent by the joint force’s actions reaching beyond the operational area to potentially have unintended audiences or consequences.^[19] For example, following this definition the maltreatment of prisoners by US forces at Abu Ghraib had significant operational reach beyond Afghanistan, affecting perceptions of the US as well as mobilising resistance in various other parts of the world. Whilst both Australian and US conceptions of operational reach focus on capabilities in the physical domains (land, sea, and air), the latter’s doctrine is broader in its description of the effects of military forces. This is a useful conceptual addition, which could hold utility for the NZDF in understanding and planning military operations.

A broader conception of operational reach is also of value when considering multidomain operations, which involve military actions beyond the physical warfighting domains. Whilst the NZDF’s existing concept of operational geometry can be applied in the traditional physical domains, it has little relevance in the cyber domain where distance and physical location play a limited and sometimes negligible role. Neither ADF nor US joint planning doctrine have made this connection yet or adapted their definitions to reflect this emerging domain. However, US Army doctrine has acknowledged that cyber fundamentally changes the nature of operational reach. According to the US Army’s 2021 cyber doctrine, ‘the nature of the cyberspace domain increases the operational reach of cyberspace and Electronic Warfare forces’.^[20] Applying this logic more broadly, cyber forces extend the operational reach of a force as a whole, allowing military effects to be applied beyond the operational reach that constrains that force in the physical domains. This is congruent with the US joint definition of operational reach that considers it as more than merely a planning factor relating to logistical sustainment. Whilst the current ADF definition of operational reach is adequate, it would thus benefit from being updated. A broader conception of operational reach, incorporating elements such as cyber and information operations, is a more useful model for the NZDF. Such a conception would aid in understanding the planning of contemporary military operations and the effects that even a small force can have.

Assessment

Whilst most elements of the ADF’s operational framework, such as culmination point and operational reach, are considered upfront in the planning process, assessment is quite distinct in that it occurs once a plan is being executed. Unlike the other operational elements, the ADF’s Joint Operational Planning doctrine does not provide a concise definition of assessment. It does, however, state that successful military actions need their progress to be measured and that assessment should ‘occur continuously to support the review and evaluation of the plan’.^[21] Assessment is vital for military forces to understand whether their plans are having the effects they envisaged, as well as to guide how to modify these plans to better achieve their objectives.

Assessment is wholly applicable to the NZDF across the spectrum of operations, from non-adversarial disaster relief through to high-end warfighting. However, the NZDF’s equivalent Joint Operations Planning doctrine omits assessment as an element of its operational framework, instead focusing on ‘evaluation’. Although the two terms are colloquially synonymous, the NZDF’s conception of evaluation is wholly different from the ADF’s assessment. According to NZDF’s doctrine, evaluation involves ‘the conduct of assessments to identify lessons, gather and use knowledge, and take actions to enhance capability and preparedness’.^[22] Whilst this sounds somewhat similar, it is in fact focused on lessons learned: validated knowledge and experience derived from operations that may change how the NZDF operates.^[23] In this definition, evaluation is an action that occurs at the end of the operation to either change how similar tasks occur in the future, or to validate the approach taken. Assessment, however, is focused on iterative change during the operation itself, a key part of the planning and execution process, rather than a standalone activity at the conclusion of an operation.

Notwithstanding its absence from the NZDF’s Joint Operations Planning doctrine, assessment does feature elsewhere within the more recent NZDF’s Campaign and Operations doctrine. The ADF conception differs, however, by providing three types of measurements used in assessment, rather than the NZDF’s two. These are measures of performance (MOP), measures of effectiveness, and measures of impact (MOI). It is the latter MOI that is lacking from the comparable NZDF doctrine. MOI are used to determine if the actions undertaken by a military force led to the desired change in behaviour by an actor, such as an adversary or the civilian population. This is a crucial measure, compared with MOP. MOP seek to confirm whether the thing being measured has been done correctly, but risk being oversimplified into things that can be readily quantified. Common MOP used in recent conflicts include money spent, projects completed, programmes underway, adversaries killed or captured, and troops trained.^[24] Whilst such metrics may have some utility, at their worst they run the risk of measuring the wrong thing. A prime example of an MOP gone awry was the US fixation on body counts during the Vietnam War, where this measure was unsuccessfully used as a proxy for operational success.^[25]

Whilst MOP have some utility, MOI are a useful addition to the ADF doctrine that add rigour to the overall assessment process. They are useful in validating information operations, with ADF Joint Fires and Effects doctrine stating that they test ‘facts and understanding, including the relationships between actions that cause effects’.^[26] Crucially, MOI aid operational planners in understanding what may be occurring when tasks measured by MOP are being appropriately conducted, and yet conditions are not necessarily changing. This measure provides utility to the NZDF given its increasingly complex and challenging operating environment, which is both congested and contested by stakeholders.^[27] The application of the ADF’s more broadly defined concept of assessment would thus aid NZDF planners, increasing their understanding and ability to effectively modify operations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the ADF’s operational framework is highly applicable to the NZDF. Whilst similar to equivalent NZDF, US, and NATO planning and operational doctrine, there are notable differences. This article focused on three of the eight elements of the operational framework, analysing how they differ from comparable frameworks. The first element, culminating point, is broadly applicable to the NZDF. However, being defined within an adversarial paradigm, it lacks applicability when applied to non-adversarial contexts, such as disaster relief. The ADF conception is redeemed by explaining some of the factors that can lead to a force’s culmination, which provide practical considerations for operational planners. However, the ADF’s definition would be enhanced by articulating how the concept applies when the initiative and adversaries are not a concern.

The second element considered in this article, operational reach, is linked to the first and is similarly considered at the outset of operational planning. This concept applies to the NZDF and is more comprehensive, and thus more useful, than the NZDF’s own conception of operational geometry. Nevertheless, operational reach would also benefit from refinement, so as to articulate how the concept applies in non-physical domains such as cyber. Lastly, the third element of the operational framework considered was assessment. Unlike the first two, assessment is an iterative process that occurs after an operation has begun. As with operational reach, the ADF’s version of assessment is more complete than that used by the NZDF through the inclusion of MOI. Overall, these three elements demonstrate that the ADF’s operational framework is applicable to the NZDF and is generally equal to or better than its existing doctrine. It is, however, imperfect. Like all doctrine, it requires refinement and adaptation to ensure it keeps pace with the changing character of war and the full spectrum of military operations.