Australia’s recent normalisation of its foreign policy approach to that of a ‘regional power’ has been necessitated by significant changes to the strategic dynamic in the Indo-Pacific. From the perspective of the Australian Department of Defence, this shift in strategic direction was laid down in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, which stated, ‘The Government has decided that defence planning will focus on Australia’s immediate region: ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific.’^[1] The ADF’s capstone concept, Integrated Campaigning, released in 2021, articulated Defence’s response to the change in national policy. It recognised that achieving Australia’s regional ambitions required a move away from ad hoc crisis arrangements to continuous whole-of-government campaigning to maximise national power.^[2]

This paper argues that Integrated Campaigning will continue to be both relevant and necessary for Defence to behave as required by the strategic circumstances and expected by the Australian Government. However, the absence of a coherent national security policy continues to allow for ‘strategic wandering’ and the ADF command and control structures are not optimised for ‘campaigning’. By examining the strategic demands placed on Defence by relatively recent but uncodified changes in Australia’s strategic policy, this paper highlights the challenges—and recommends changes—to enhance Australia's and Defence’s capacity to maximise power and avoid ‘strategic wandering’ in the evolving strategic landscape.

This paper will begin by providing a short overview of the normalisation of Australia’s foreign policy approach from a ‘global middle power’ to a ‘regional power’ with a tight focus on the Indo-Pacific. The second section will demonstrate that Australia’s government continues to outsource security strategy-making to Defence and that there has been a growing realisation of the need for a declared national security policy over the last two decades. It argues that without such a policy, all arms of government are hampered in achieving whole-of-government and international integration.Finally, this paper examines the requirements ADFdoctrine places on the conduct of operations. It argues that due to the ‘external approach’ to joint operations embedded in the Joint Task Force (JTF) command and control model, the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) does not have the required unity or clarity of command to meet the requirements of Integrated Campaigning. As such, it recommends the integration of the Environmental Commands of the three Services under CJOPS as part of a Unified Combatant Component Command (UCCMD). The paper concludes by summarising the recommendations and highlighting the potential obstacles to their implementation.

The Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and Integrated Campaigning represent the latest iteration of a slow shift in Australia’s foreign policy and security approach. Professor Andrew Carr has termed this a normalisation of Australia’s foreign policy. Since federation, Australia has sought to leverage a partnership with a great power ally to project an outsized amount of power within the global political economy.^[3] This has resulted in a ‘time-honoured Australian warfighting tradition of sending forces—particularly troops—overseas to defend values and uphold interests’.^[4] This approach, often termed ‘strategic wandering’, has usually conflicted with the stated national security strategy. ^[5] Australia has been able to afford this wandering due to the relative stability of our region.

It is now almost trite to say that the strategic circumstances the Indo-Pacific faces are the most challenging Australia has encountered since the end of WWII. The return of great power competition to the region, state-on-state conflict, pandemics, a cost-of-living crisis, a housing crisis, supply chain vulnerability, and the ever-present shadow of climate change do not even begin to exhaust the challenges Australian policymakers face. The World Economic Forum 2023 Global Risks Report indicates that things are likely to get worse before they get better:

Australia can no longer afford ‘strategic wandering’ in an increasingly complex and uncertain regional environment. The Australian Government has demonstrated it understands this by accepting the DSR recommendation that the ADF move from a balanced to a focused, integrated force.^[7] The balanced force reflected Australia’s tendency for strategic wandering. Whilst it was ‘primarily designed for the Defence of Australia, the broader purpose of the ADF was for it to be structured to respond to a range of contingencies’.^[8] By contrast, the focused, integrated force must be optimised to achieve deterrence-by-denial in Australia’s northern approaches and the immediate region encompassing the northeastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific.^[9] Bringing this level of focus limits the ability of the government to engage in ‘strategic wandering’, at least in the exercise of military power. Outside of public ministerial and official level statements, the DSR remains the only Australian Government policy document that articulates this significant change in the national strategic direction. The lack of a declared policy allows flexibility for the government to engage in ‘strategic wandering’ in spite of changes to the ADF.

Two years before the release of the DSR, the ADF released its capstone doctrinal concept, Integrated Campaigning. The Chief of the Defence Force recently characterised the concept as, ‘The ADF’s approach to this increasing ambiguity’, which ‘involves military power being brought together with other elements of national power … and, when directed by the government, also combined with the military and national power of allies and partners’.^[10] This echoes the public statements of the Foreign Minister, who told the National Press Club: ‘We need to harness all elements of our national power to advance our interests when the implications of unchecked strategic competition in our region are grave.’^[11] Whilst the DSR, Integrated Campaigning, and the Foreign Minister’s comments clearly articulate the need for a national approach, they in no way hold other parts of the federal—let alone state—government bureaucracies accountable to behave in the manner desired. Outsourcing security strategy-making to Defence is not new, and it looks set to continue in the post-DSR era. Dr Alan Ryan warned in testimony to a 2004 parliamentary inquiry into Australia’s Maritime Strategy‘that for too long, Australia has used ‘‘defence” as the alternative to developing a national security policy ...’^[12] The development of a biannual National Defence Strategy seems to continue this trend, and it remains wholly insufficient to ensure that the goals of Integrated Campaigning can be met.

The same inquiry found that there is a ‘need for a comprehensive national security strategy which would articulate all the elements that the Australian Government has at its disposal to address issues of national security … The National Security Strategy should indicate where our military strategy fits within this “grand strategy”.’^[13] This has been a consistent view within the national security community in Australia for at least the last 20 years.^[14] Various governments have addressed that view. In 2008, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd issued the First National Security Statement to the Parliament, stating: ‘For the first time, this country will have a coherent statement of the national security challenges facing Australia into the future, and of the comprehensive approach we propose to adopt in responding to those challenges.’^[15] Rudd had intended that this statement become a regular annual fixture in the Australian political landscape, similar to Budget Night. However, the next ‘annual’ statement was Australia’s first National Security Strategy, published in January 2013 by the Gillard government.^[16] Five months after the National Security Strategy was released, a resurgent Kevin Rudd ousted Prime Minister Gillard. In September 2013, the Labor Party lost the federal election, and Tony Abbott became the Prime Minister. As such, Australians are still waiting for their next ‘annual’ update, and national security strategy-making is still being outsourced to Defence.

Integrated Campaigning asserts that ‘military power alone is inadequate for conflict. And national power, devoid of military power, is inadequate for competition’.^[17] It asks that the ADF integrate with other arms of government, industry, academia, allies and partners.^[18] The lack of a policy document that requires, incentivises, or informs potential integration partners of Australia’s goals, priorities, or expected behaviours continues to allow for ‘strategic wandering’. The lack of clear guidance hampers the ability of Defence or any other government department to integrate outside of their own department.^[19] However, Defence can only control how it behaves and bears no responsibility for the behaviour of others. In that way, Integrated Campaigning stands as a useful capstone concept to drive the organisation's mindset and behaviours to become an exemplar of the whole-of-government integration called for by successive Australian governments and the national security community since the early 2000s.

To become of an exemplar, the organisation must structure itself appropriately. Integrated Campaigning states that ‘all ADF activities and actions are part of broader, continuous Defence and national campaigns and need to be planned and executed as such’.^[20] Current ADF Command and Control doctrine assigns CJOPS ‘theatre command’^[21] over assigned forces. As theatre commander, CJOPS ‘designs a campaign or operational plan, commands assigned forces and directs the major operations of a campaign’.^[22] When forces are not assigned to CJOPS, they are under operational command^[23] of their respective Service Chiefs who, ‘as capability managers … raise, train and sustain their Service to deliver Service capabilities, including combat-ready forces.’^[24] The ADF Campaigns and Operations doctrine states that ‘the building blocks of campaigns are operations’.^[25] However, operations and joint exercises for which forces are force assigned to CJOPS^[26] are the minority of ADF activities. Due to the inflexibility of the Command and Control doctrine, CJOPS, as the theatre commander, does not control the majority of the ADF activities that Integrated Campaigning dictates must be planned and executed as part of a continuous campaign.

CJOPS only attains operational command of forces when they are force assigned to him under a JTF established for a particular operation or exercise.^[27] Major General (retd) Andrew Hocking found that the application of this model in the Afghanistan campaign created ‘excessively complex ADF C2 arrangements in Afghanistan (which) impacted three of the eight key principles of command, namely: unity of command, clarity, and accountability’.^[28] Despite the change in strategic circumstances, the ADF has retained a C2 structure to support the ‘time-honoured Australian warfighting tradition of sending forces—particularly troops—overseas to defend values and uphold interests.’^[29]

The use of JTFs reflects a tradition within Defence of taking an ‘external approach’ to jointness and integration. Air Vice-Marshal Stephen Edgeley wrote that in this approach, ‘the Services treat joint as an adjunct or as a series of activities that occur outside of the Services. In this approach, the Services support joint by providing personnel and funding to joint organisations and activities that occur outside of their organisations.’^[30] The external approach to integration applied through JTFs demands resources the ADF simply does not have. In Edgeley’s view, to achieve an ‘integrated approach’ the ‘Services would have to do more than just provide resources. Joint would be an integral part of conducting internal activities.’^[31] Integrated Campaigning demands that the first task is for the ADF to become ‘integrated across the Services to harness the power of multi-domain effects’. The Command and Control doctrine pre-dates Integrated Campaigning and must be updated to build an ‘integrated approach’ to support the change in national strategy and the requirement for continuous campaigning.

The ADF’s own Joint Doctrine Note on the formation of JTF Headquarters states: ‘A JTF is a temporary tactical-level organisation for operations.’^[32] Despite this, the ADF maintains several permanent and standing JTFs. Their mere existence indicates that there is nothing temporary or tactical about the requirements placed on the ADF in today’s strategic environment. The DSR argues that ‘a theatre command and control framework that enables an enhanced Integrated Force’ will be critical to achieving deterrence by denial. ^[33] As previously indicated, the current JTF model reflects an ‘external approach’ anathema to Integrated Campaigning. It creates a split within the organisation between those who are preparing for an operation and those who are conducting operations. Fortunately, there is a description of a JTF that fits the requirements of the ‘integrated approach’.

However, temporarily implementing the component method of command at the tactical level does nothing to bring the ADF closer to an ‘integrated approach’to joint operations. It reinforces the ‘external approach’. To achieve integration, the component method must be elevated to the operational level. Effectively, CJOPS must become the Commander of the Joint Task Force – ADF to achieve the outcomes required by Integrated Campaigning. The Unified Combatant Command (UCCMD) model utilised by the United States seems the most appropriate for embedding the integrated approach into the ADF command and control structure and forcing the required cultural change through the organisation.

‘In the United States military, it is understood that a UCCMD is normally required to ensure unity of effort when either or both of the following apply:

1. A broad continuing mission exists, requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments^[34] and necessitating a single strategic direction.
2. Any combination of the following exists and significant forces of two or more Military Departments are involved:
   1. A large-scale operation requiring positive control of tactical execution by a large and complex force;
   2. A large geographic or functional area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations therein; and/or
   3. Necessity for common use of limited logistic means.’^[35]

The requirements placed on the ADF by Integrated Campaigning, the recommendations of the DSR, and the narrowing of the strategic focus meet the criteria for forming a UCCMD. Creating a UCCMD to drive an ‘integrated approach’to joint operations in the ADF would be a relatively simple doctrinal change with significant cultural implications. The Command and Control doctrine states: ‘Environmental commanders are responsible to their respective Service Chiefs for raising, training and sustaining forces under their command.’^[36] To create a UCCMD, one needs only replace the words ‘Service Chiefs’ with ‘CJOPS’. This change would grant CJOPS operational command of the majority of the ADF forces and reinforce the role of the Service Chiefs as capability managers who retain technical control^[37] but have no command authority over the employment of their forces. Placing the Environmental Commanders under the permanent operational command of CJOPS would ensure that joint outcomes drive everything the Services do and embed an ‘integrated approach’to joint operations. Creating a UCCMD in this manner also allows CJOPS to choose the most appropriate method to exercise command and control in pursuit of whatever operational and campaign objectives might arise. CJOPS could decide to exercise command through Single Service Components, Functional Components (eg Special Operations Command), Subordinate Unified Commands,^[38] or JTFs. Organising the ADF as a UCCMD focussed on Australia’s immediate region as articulated within the DSR would give greater credence to Integrated Campaigning by empowering CJOPS with the command authority required to meet its intent and providing flexibility in the event of ‘strategic wandering’.

Without a national security policy, there is no mechanism to hold other government departments accountable for their behaviour or clearly articulate our intent to our allies and partners. This limits the extent to which Australia’s national power can be maximised. However, this is a situation that Defence and other government departments will have to continue to contend with. The only National Security Statement the country has ever had was delivered by a first-term prime minister, who at the time had the second highest approval rating (74%) that the Neilsen Poll has ever recorded.^[39] Its only National Security Strategy was released by a prime minister seeking to reinforce her national security credentials before an election. Governments before and since have sought to maintain the capacity for ‘strategic wandering’ by articulating Australia’s policy through speeches and announcements, and only setting concrete policy behind the closed doors of the National Security Committee (NSC) of Cabinet. Despite the protestations of ministers and the geographic focus brought by the DSR, the dilution of the political capital of the Australian parties of government means this situation looks set to continue. As it always has, it will pressure senior departmental leadership to contextualise the outputs of NSC conversations for their organisations and encourage collaboration with other departments through documents such as Integrated Campaigning.

For Defence to achieve even the first step towards achieving the goals of Integrated Campaigning, it must reform its approach to command and control of operations. The current system is optimised for strategic wandering and must now be optimised for strategic focus. The UCCMD model provides a template to empower CJOPS to achieve the orchestration effect outlined in Integrated Campaigning and ensure that all ADF activities are planned and conducted in accordance with continuous national and ADF campaigns. The implementation of the First Principles Review concept of One Defence has focussed on the Strategic Centre and did not significantly affect the operational and tactical levels of the organisation to any great extent. ^[40] Removing the environmental commands from the Services would be an enormous cultural shift for Defence. It would also bring a significant risk that the workforce apportioned to domain expertise will be further diluted by the further expansion of the joint force.^[41] Still, it would be consistent with the One Defence principles and the Integrated Campaigning mantra for procedural integration, ‘same by default, separate by necessity and similar by exception’.^[42] The establishment of CJOPS as the theatre commander of a UCCMD seems to be the next logical step in the One Defence journey and the only one that allows CJOPS the flexibility in the exercise of theatre command to ensure Defence can always be effective in achieving the government’s strategic intent.

Conclusion

This paper set out to show that Integrated Campaigning will remain relevant to Defence into the near future, but only to the extent that it can influence behaviour within the department. It has shown that the document is consistent with the behaviours expected by the government and articulated in the DSR. However, it has also demonstrated that its effectiveness will be limited whilst the political approach to security policy and ADF approach to commanding and controlling operations remain optimised for ‘strategic wandering’. Of these limiting factors, Defence can only control the internal workings of its organisation. As such, it is time to stop worrying about the lack of a cohesive national security policy and instead work to ensure Defence’s approach to operations is as effective and flexible as possible in executing its role within the available strategic guidance.