Introduction

The Australian Defence Force faces complex challenges in an increasingly contested strategic environment. Adversaries are acquiring advanced capabilities that reduce response times and necessitate more agile planning. As the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (referred to throughout this paper as the DSR) outlines, traditional regional stabilities and warning time assumptions no longer apply.

This warning statement is topical, as the attack on Israel by Hamas on 07 October 2023 was swift and deadly. Threat warnings that must have existed remained undetected or uncommunicated despite the region's history of violence and Israel's specific preparedness for this threat. Militants and missiles saturated and overwhelmed Israel's defences. Saturating tactics and innovation mean threats can arise suddenly, outpacing lumbering defences and overwhelming outdated capabilities. New technologies like autonomous systems and Artificial Intelligence expand possibilities for surprise attacks across all domains.

If strategic warning times can no longer be assumed, the ADF must transform its operational planning framework to meet these rising technological and asymmetric challenges. The ADF requires greater integration, adaptability, and responsiveness, shifting planning from incident response to pre-emption and continuously evaluating our assumptions and risks. Capability development must accelerate to match the speed of technological change. And information sharing must improve across the government and the ADF to enable faster sensing and response. ^[1],^[2]

The ADF operational planning system needs more agility to address grey zone confrontation and technical innovations like hypersonic missiles. Focusing on threat identification, risk reassessments, inter-Service/cross-domain coordination and communication. This essay examines issues with the current framework and provides recommendations aligned with imperatives from the DSR. Transforming mindsets and culture will be as crucial as procedural reforms in making the ADF more anticipatory and responsive. The ADF can better prepare for innovative technologies and grey zone tactics by focusing joint operational planning on pre-mitigation, anticipating potential threats and being ready to respond instantly.

Achieving meaningful integration and Jointness is also critical. In this essay's context, ‘Jointness refers to integrated, interoperable military capabilities across all five domains (land, air, sea, space, and cyber). The source of this term is from the DSR excerpt, specifically:

The DSR identifies that progress on joint integration remains uneven, with capability development largely service-focused. Stronger enterprise accountability is required to deliver joint outputs. Communication gaps from government guidance through to capability delivery need closing. Transforming mindsets and cultures is also vital for this plan to succeed. Workforce skills must be developed for integrated joint operations, and change fatigue from constant reform requires addressing. ^[4],^[5]

However, the direction for the ADF to act already exists, and it is for the Australian Government and Defence to act upon it. Our direction is already provided through numerous strategic white papers, force updates, and the DSR. These papers provide the ADF with our contemporary joint planning directions. This essay will therefore examine reforming the operational framework, providing recommendations aligned to imperatives from the 2023 DSR, 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP) and Defence Strategic Update (DSU). The key focus areas for this essay include threat-based planning, accelerated capability development, integration and Jointness, communication and cultural change.

Australia's joint operations framework requires root and branch restructuring for the more complex strategic environment, emphasising pre-emption, capability development acceleration, and joint operation plans aligning with the ADF strategic guidance.

Caveats

The 2016 Defence White Paper will hold less weight within this discussion, as the context of strategic guidance has shifted significantly in 2023. The DSR identifies a reduced strategic warning time and calls for increases in defence spending and capabilities, transforming the ADF into an ‘Integrated Force’ and moving to a biennial National Defence Strategy. The 2020 and 2023 reviews also outline more substantial force structure and capability adjustments compared to the 2016 White Paper's more modest spending goals and the less competitive strategic environment of the time. ^[6]

Given the significant policy shifts proposed in 2020 and 2023, our contemporary direction remains in this era. The 2016 White Paper's alignment appears insufficient, and more recent reviews provide a more contemporary direction on force structure requirements and capability assessments for analysis.

Preparedness

Interoperability between Services has been a persistent challenge in capability development and employment, undermining the ADF's ability to conduct high-end joint operations. Numerous Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) reports have demonstrated this over the last two decades. Consider the following: Attack Class submarines (cancelled); Eurocopter Tiger helicopters (withdrawn); Sky Guardian attack drones (cancelled); the Army's Battle Management System part of Army's LAND200 (cancelled); Spartan battlefield airlift aircraft (underperforming) and MRH90 helicopter program (underperforming); and any of the performance issues around the LHD, LCM1E and AOR naval vessels. The speed of capability development must increase to keep pace with adversaries for innovative technologies. Traditional mindsets valuing efficiency over operational effectiveness must shift to one of delivering capability.

Risk management biases efforts towards the pre-mitigation of risk, focusing on technical risk at the cost of capability timelines or limiting the delivered capability. The ANAO reports on land, maritime and air capabilities collectively point to flawed acquisition programs, where program risk may have been successfully argued on paper but not delivered by scheduled IOC. When translated into in-Service risk, the responsibility for the project shortfalls is placed on ADF people to provide capability mitigations for the extended timelines. Common themes of project shortfalls point to immature designs, material shortfalls, poorly conducted systems integration, and ineffective test and evaluation programs. In a modern war with rapidly changing technologies, a slow response to new capabilities will only allow a late and less effective response. The frequent business reviews conducted by Defence through the 2000s attempted to address business and procurement problems, but as Fred Bennett, Chief of Capital Procurement in the Defence Department in the 1980s, stated:

The diverse range of problems identified by ANAO reviews from the 1990s to 2023 point toward diverse circumstantial problems of Capability Development and acquisition, with lessons learned usually not translating to curing problems in subsequent projects.

Drawing from strategic guidance for capability development and improving procurement is vital to the preparedness of the ADF to fight in the future battlespace, as well as assessing our capability and force structure gaps against emerging threats in place of individualistic capability development programs. This could involve evaluating whether the ADF has the right mix of forces and equipment to meet strategic objectives. Areas also mentioned in strategic guidance include enhancing our inter-Service (or domain) communications, aligning our joint training and force generation cycles, and developing adaptable capabilities. These involve analysing operational readiness through identifying capability gaps, training, equipment, and force preparedness, and broadening risk management practices beyond regulatory compliance to inform force structure and capability decisions, integrating top-down and bottom-up planning.

The most critical aspect is the joint ability to track and confirm the implementation of changes across inter-Service domains, forcing responsibility for preparedness and individual accountability for decision-making.

Aligning ADF capabilities and force structure with strategic priorities

The proliferation of advanced technologies and military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region presents capability gap implications for the ADF that must be addressed. Powers within our region are acquiring next-gen platforms, including fifth-generation fighters, advanced submarines, long-range precision strike systems, and sophisticated C4ISR networks. This rapid modernisation will challenge Australia's ability to achieve land, air, maritime, or C4ISR superiority in conflict.

Evaluating capability gaps requires analysis of emerging threats against current force structure designs as they were outlined in the 2020 DSU, including:

The ADF must evaluate if it has the right mix of forces and equipment to meet strategic objectives identified by the 2023 DSR and signalled in the 2020 DSU. The DSR provides a detailed capability gap analysis for the ADF in weighing emerging threats against current and planned ADF capabilities. The reviews' assessments include countering anti-access threats, enabling multi-domain integration, seizing the information edge, and evaluating force structure alignment with strategic priorities. The analysis of these reviews informs the Integrated Investment Program (IIP) to mitigate the ADF capability gaps, reevaluating force structure and design to align with the Australian Government's strategic objectives.

Improving agility, integration, and interoperability

The ADF requires greater integration and interoperability between services to operate as a truly joint force. The FSP pointed specifically to the Joint Capabilities Group to prioritise key joint capabilities and upgrade joint command, control, and communication systems—but identified that more effort is required to align doctrine, training, and procedures across services to engender a culture of Jointness. ^[17],^[18]

Developing adaptable and agile capabilities is critical for responding to rapid changes in the strategic environment. For example, investments in autonomous systems will provide flexible capability options, or adapting existing platforms through open architecture upgrades could create multifunctional, evolving capabilities.

Aligning force generation across Services is intended to deliver a prepared joint force. Still, this joint capability can only be proven through joint training exercises conducted often via domestic and international exercises. Emphasising shared joint professional education and postings across Services, domains and internationally will further engender true joint capability. With deeper Jointness, the ADF can become a truly integrated fighting force.

Enhancing operational readiness

The FSP outlines Defence initiatives to enhance readiness, but gaps remain in balancing training, material readiness and preparedness through training, exercises and Service-centric mission readiness assessments. Emphasis is needed on creating realistic joint training events integrating the ADF's advanced technologies to evaluate readiness. This is more important when evaluating novel capabilities or establishing systems confidence for critical functions, including developing trust in AI systems.^[19],^[20]

The DSR and ANO reports have identified in-Service material support and sustainment as challenges in all significant ADF acquisitions. The DSR extends its scope beyond the typical contractual obligations to include specific details about systems design. The DSR has advocated using novel modular/open system architectures to allow system upgrades amid rapid technological change, allowing multifunction systems to evolve and deliver enhanced capability over time and pivot towards the rapid evolution of capability technologies in this uncertain strategic environment. This approach will determine a need for Minimum Viable Capabilities (MVC) providing breathing space for capability development and technological evolution. ^[21],^[22]

Enhancing operational readiness requires a long-term commitment to joint training, versatile materiel, and comprehensive inter-Service preparedness assessments. This will validate the ADF's ability to integrate capabilities in a joint operations landscape for high-end warfare.

Strengthening risk management frameworks

The DSR highlighted gaps in translating high-level strategy into force structure decisions, with issues aligning preparedness planning and dependencies on enabling capabilities. It has recommended enhanced risk-based planning to address these gaps, of which the identification of MVC for capability acceptance plays a part. ^[23]

The FSP acknowledges the need to leverage the Defence Enterprise Risk Management Framework more in force generation but lacks detail on implementing this. Clear guidance is required to apply risk analysis to preparedness targets and balance preparedness and modernisation. The DSU advocates expanding risk practices beyond compliance to planning, preparedness and decision-making, formally integrating risk analysis into critical processes. ^[24],^[25]

While progress has occurred, the challenge remains in translating strategy into preparedness. The Enterprise Risk Framework offers a platform to assess strategic, operational, capability and resource risks systematically, but requires:

• More robust guidance and accountability for applying threat-based risk analysis in planning decisions on force structure, preparedness, and modernisation, including baseline acceptance and future development options.
• Expanding the focus from compliance to informing enterprise-wide decision-making.
• Enhanced risk reporting to senior leaders on impacts and trade-offs.
• Increased risk capability across the workforce through education and training.
• Improved data collection and impact assessments to quantify risks.
• Formal risk analysis of dependencies between enabling capabilities.
• Regular review and updating of risk registers to capture emerging threats.

While risk practices are improving, work remains to formally integrate risk analysis into force structure, preparedness and modernisation decision-making. This requires guidance, accountability, capability building and improvements across planning, data and processes. Defence can better align strategy, capability, and resources with mature risk-based planning.

Improving organisational communication and planning

The DSR and FSP highlighted gaps between government guidance, ADF headquarters, and the Services in translating strategy into capability requirements. It found that capability development remains largely stovepiped in the Services, indicating issues aligning strategic objectives with joint planning. Change is occurring but remains uneven. ^[26],^[27]

Achieving meaningful integration requires a long-term commitment to align organisational planning across the whole of the Defence enterprise. The review points to strengthening joint accountability in capability development architecture. The FSP also notes reinforcing joint responsibility for capability outcomes. This demands an increased focus on joint outputs when translating strategy into capabilities. Communication between Defence and national security agencies must be enhanced to clarify objectives. The review recommended improving senior leader communications skills to aid strategy articulation. Clear top-down guidance will enable coherent planning. Integrating top-down and bottom-up planning is also vital. While the FSP outlines joint force generation initiatives, the review found issues aligning training cycles between services to exercise joint operations routinely. More emphasis on exchanges for inter-Service engagement between Services and domains would further Jointness. ^[28],^[29],^[30]

Although initiatives are underway to improve, aligning organisational cross-Service communication and planning remains disjointed. A long-term, enterprise-wide commitment is required, strengthening accountability for joint capability outputs and enhancing communication channels from strategy to capability delivery. This will enable Defence to integrate strategic guidance into joint operational planning.

Implementing recommendations from reviews

Strategic reviews have generated recommendations to enhance ADF capabilities and operations. Changing organisational culture is slow, and progress in implementing reforms will likely remain slow in most instances. The DSR has determined that previous reviews do not automatically translate into meaningful change, with key recommendations falling by the wayside. This is not a new behaviour, as Defence business reviews have often found that cultural behaviours affect the implementation of change, and these behaviours extend across the Defence organisation. Kinnaird stated in 2003:

To realise the benefits of the recommendations, joint control of operations linked to capability development is required. The DSR has called for a systemic approach to Jointness, but joint capabilities remain stovepiped along service lines. Developing a work base of people skilled in integrated joint operations is needed to shift culture from traditional Service-based and stovepiped mindsets. ^[32],^[33],^[34]

Recommendations

This essay has discussed the manner in which Defence's strategic guidance points to improving operational planning. The strategic environment is changing rapidly, and warning times have been reduced. Defence must become agile and ready to meet the threats of our immediate future. Defence must:

1. Adopt Threat-Based Planning into CapDev Doctrine: Planning frameworks must become threat-based, continuously evaluating risks and measuring Australian capabilities against adversaries. This requires qualitative decisions on required effects, not quantitative inputs, to drive planning.
2. Accelerate Capability Development Processes within the ADF: Open system architectures will enable regular capability upgrades to counter rapid adversary modernisation. Traditional acquisition processes must be reformed to deliver new technologies rapidly.
3. Enhance Integration and Jointness: Stronger cross-enterprise control and accountability are required for delivering integrated joint outputs. Priority must be placed on aligning doctrine, training, education, procedures and force generation cycles across Services.
4. Strengthen Communication: Communication across Defence Services, domains and government agencies must be enhanced to clarify cross-domain and strategic objectives. Articulating strategy well translates guidance into joint capabilities.
5. Implement Recommendations with Accountability: Previous reviews often do not translate into meaningful change. Tracking implementation and benefits realisation is critical for reform. Sustained commitment through accountabilities is required to drive change.
6. Shifting Mindsets and Culture: Workforce skills must be developed for integrated operations to engender deeper Jointness. Achieving meaningful reform requires long-term commitment and systematic tracking of recommendations, not just investments in new capabilities.

Long-term cultural change is needed on Jointness. Furthermore, enterprise planning processes must better align strategy, capability, resources and risk. Reform implementation remains a work in progress across the ADF, and consistently tracking and resourcing recommendations from reviews in an integrated method across the enterprise will be critical to driving change.

Summary

The ADF joint operational framework requires reform to become more agile and responsive amid a complex strategic environment. The DSR found that planning remains focused on a traditional conventional warfare scenario and abundant warning time despite evolving threats requiring rapid adaptation.

Fundamentally, the Joint Operational Planning system must shift from post-mitigation responses to pre-mitigation, as the DSR advocates. This requires continuous reassessment of operational assumptions, earlier identification of emerging threats, and measuring force effects against adversaries. Accelerated capability development is crucial to keep pace with rapid technological change witnessed throughout the region. The FSP outlines investments across domains, but delivering capabilities rapidly enough to counter threats requires transforming traditional acquisition.

The DSR highlighted issues translating strategy into capability requirements. This underscores the need for tighter integration of top-down guidance with bottom-up planning. Furthermore, capability development must take an enterprise-wide perspective, overcoming service traditions and stovepipes. Tracking the implementation of recommendations with identified accountabilities is also critical for reform.

Ultimately, transforming mindsets and culture is as essential as procedural reforms. The DSU emphasises building workforce skills in integrated joint operations to enable deeper Jointness but warns of the effects of change fatigue on our workforce.

In summary, reform is crucial for the ADF to become more agile and responsive in a rapidly evolving strategic landscape. This requires a sustained commitment to transform systems, processes and workforce capabilities.