Introduction

The Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP), as described in Australian Defence Force Procedures (ADFP) 5.0.1, is a framework used by military planners to plan and conduct military operations and campaigns and to solve complex problems.^[1] It is crucial that military planners and commanders have access to a theory or framework that is effective and suitable for their needs. Regular reviews of these frameworks are necessary for the Australian Defence Forceto maintain its intellectual advantage and operate efficiently in modern environments. Failure to do so can put the ADF at a disadvantage. The ADF is currently reviewing its military planning doctrine with the soon-to-be-released ADF-I-5 Military Planning Process (MPP) doctrine that will replace JMAP and the Australian Army’s Staff Military Appreciation Process (SMAP) and Individual Military Appreciation Process (IMAP), which are usually used at the lower operational and tactical levels.^[2] This paper contends that a key area of both the JMAP and SMAP (and the derivative IMAP), which should be seriously reviewed before inclusion in the MPP, is the concept of the Centre of Gravity (COG) and its analysis. ADF doctrine defines the COG as: ‘[t]he primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve an objective or the desired end state.’^[3]

This paper will describe how the concept is currently used before comparing it to allied definitions and uses. Adopting a universal approach to identifying and addressing COGs may be unsuitable for modern military operations. This is due to the diverse nature of threats faced by the ADF, the complex adaptive nature of the environment the contemporary ADF operates in, and the COG’s lack of usefulness in achieving meaningful planning outputs in all operations across the spectrum of conflict. It also has limited usefulness at the lower or simpler operational levels and the tactical level of command due to the complexity of the process and the contentious and subjective nature of defining and agreeing on a COG, which may impede the speed of planning required at these levels of command.^[4] In the latest version of the JMAP, published in 2019, the following amendment was made: ‘COG analysis has been de-emphasised to better enable the planning process to be applied during unopposed as well as opposed campaigns and operations.’^[5] This de-emphasis highlights the waning usefulness of the COG concept in modern military planning for some military operations. It is unknown if the COG concept will be kept or modified in the upcoming MPP doctrine, so this paper aims to advise on the update to the ADF’s new military planning doctrine and process.

This paper investigates to what extent Centre-of-Gravity analysis should be included in the ADF’s new Military Planning Process, and if it should be included, at what levels of command planning should it be applied? It will look at this by comparing how our key allies and partners use COG in their planning doctrine and processes to ensure the ADF is aligned with them as an integrated force that can operate with our key allies and partners as directed in the Defence Strategic Review (DSR).^[6]

The concept of the COG is derived from Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal text, On War, where he uses the term over 50 times.^[7] Clausewitz used it as a metaphor based on the understanding of physics of his day.^[8] The concept became popular in Western military thinking in the early 1980s, especially after the defeat of the US in Vietnam. However, modern Western military theorists and practitioners have vastly different interpretations of what a COG is or how it should be analysed.^[9] The latest thoughts on its use are based on a 2004 study which has informed current ADF doctrine.^[10] This paper will compare the doctrinal definitions of a COG and the processes for analysing them between the ADF, the UK (including NATO) and the US (focusing on their Joint Planning, rather than Service-specific, doctrine).

The ADF’s use of COG

The COG process, or analysis, as described in the ADF military planning doctrine, the JMAP, states all actors have a COG and that it may be different at the different levels of command or military planning, namely the strategic, operational and tactical levels.^[11] The reason for doing a COG analysis is stated in the higher military planning doctrine, ADF – Philosophical – 5 Planning (ADF-P-5), which states that it ‘provides an understanding of an adversary’s (or other’s) strengths, weaknesses, critical relationships and targetable assets’.’^[12] The JMAP describes how to do this by breaking the friendly and adversary COGs into three subsets: Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities.^[13] The most significant part of this analysis taken forward into the planning process are the Critical Vulnerabilities, which are ‘inherently targetable’ for desired effects.^[14]

The doctrine also states that ‘true COG will be difficult to determine, particularly in complex environments. Misidentifying COG poses the very real danger of skewing planning and so raising operational risk during execution.’^[15] This highlights that defining and analysing the COG is subjective and contentious even within the current doctrine. Many experts and theorists agree, describing it as ‘controversial’, ‘not suitable’, ‘polluted’, or that military planners should ‘stop looking for the centre of gravity’.^[16] With this in mind, and as a comparison, this paper will consider to what extent the COG is utilised in allied and partner doctrine and at what command levels it is generally attributed. This comparison can then better inform the update of ADF planning doctrine in the MPP.

At the tactical level, the ADF continues to use COG analysis in the Military Appreciation Process, this time under the SMAP and IMAP in Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 5-1-4.^[17] Here, COG is used with a different, older definition: “characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.’^[18] However, like the JMAP, the key outcome of the COG analysis is to derive or determine Critical Vulnerabilities for targeting and tying into decisive events.^[19] JMAP, SMAP, and ADF-P-5 doctrines all state that the COG analysis should be conducted at all levels of command, including the tactical level.^[20] The doctrine states that the COG must be derived and analysed for each enemy course of action and the friendly force.^[21] This is an extremely time-consuming process, often with staff unable to agree on a single COG, let alone a multitude.^[22] Timely military planning and decision making are critical at all levels of command, but especially at the tactical level with its much shorter planning time frames.

The fact that ADF doctrine, unlike US or British doctrine, states that a COG analysis should be conducted at the tactical level, not just once, but multiple times per planning iteration, is a key flaw in the doctrine. This is even worse given that this does not just apply to brigade-level staff or battle group-level tactical planning but is also in the IMAP for individual planning, from the Combat Team down. This doctrinal direction to conduct a COG analysis at the tactical level is a key difference between ADF doctrine and British and US Joint doctrines. Given that the LWD 5-1-4 doctrine uses a different definition of COG and has not been substantively updated since 2015, it is certainly timely that the ADF is combining all military planning doctrine and processes into one doctrinal process. This will better allow the ADF to act and plan as an ‘Integrated Force’ as directed in the DSR, with all Services and organisations in the ADF using the same process and definition, which should also be more aligned with our key allies and partners to ensure better multinational operational planning.^[23]

Key partners’ use of COG

British (NATO) — The British doctrine for planning operations is also the NATO doctrine, Allied Joint Publication-5 (AJP-5). It defines a COG as, ‘the primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action, or will to fight. It is always an entity.’^[24] It discusses the differences between ‘moral-strength’ and ‘physical-strength’ COGs at the political-strategic level, stating that only physical-strength COGs exist at lower levels. This is a key difference to ADF doctrine and military planning processes, which do not make this distinction, meaning ADF planners may still consider ‘moral-strength’ (or non-physical as described in ADF doctrine) COGs at military-strategic, operational or even tactical levels, adding to the complexity of the analysis significantly for the ADF which will impact timely planning and decision making.^[25] The British process of breaking the COG into factors is very similar to the ADF model. However, Critical Capabilities are named Critical Abilities in British doctrine; Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities remain, with the focus being on deriving Critical Vulnerabilities to target and affect.

Another key difference is that AJP-5 states that if higher-level COGs are not already identified, they must be as commanders and staff must be aware ‘of higher-level COGs and their relationship to own-level COGs’.^[26] ADF doctrine states that COGs may differ at different levels, but staff should focus on their command level, only considering other level COGs if time permits.^[27] As most military planners will know, there is rarely enough time to conduct own-level planning, let alone higher-level. This fundamental difference is important as it shows a lack of deriving COGs and ensuring they are ‘nested’, like a mission, with higher command analysis and direction. This could seriously impede planning that is neatly ‘nested’ in a higher commander’s plan if ADF planners at lower levels focus on a wildly different COG with derived Critical Vulnerabilities to affect. This difference in doctrine highlights the problem with the subjectivity and contentiousness inherent in deciding on a COG, especially in the ADF doctrine and planning process.

A further key difference is that British doctrine only considers COGs and their analysis at the strategic and operational levels.^[28] For the ADF, COG is not only in the JMAP but also in the SMAP and IMAP, which are focused on the tactical level. As discussed previously, this inclusion can seriously slow down tactical-level planning in the ADF compared to the UK and NATO. However, a key similarity between ADF and British doctrine, mirrored in US Joint doctrine, is the ‘characteristics of a centre-of-gravity’ diagram.^[29] British doctrine states they took the figure from US Joint Operation Planning 5-0, but there is no mention in ADF doctrine where this figure came from. So, despite the differences between the British and ADF doctrines of not nesting COGs with higher command’s COG analysis, of deriving COGs down to the tactical level, and allowing non-physical or ‘moral-strength’ COGs as well as physical ones from the operational level down, at least the characteristics of a COG can be agreed upon. This similarity, however, is not as impactful as the differences, which will become particularly stark in multinational operations with British forces or other NATO countries. Following on from above, the similarities and differences between US Joint doctrine and ADF doctrine for deriving a COG and its analysis, as well as when it should be used, will be discussed.

US Joint – The US military has four different planning doctrines, one for each Service (including the Marine Corps). They do not agree on a definition of a COG or what to do with it due to the different warfighting functions and histories of the services.^[30] To try and counteract this, especially when working with other government agencies, in multinational operations, and to improve ‘jointness’ in the vast US military, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning (JP 5-0) was released.^[31] JP 5-0 defines the COG as: ‘the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve its objective and is what an opposing force can orient its actions against that will lead to enemy failure.’^[32] There are some key differences between this and the ADF and British definitions. Both the UK and ADF state the COG is ‘an entity’, with the British doctrine also defining it as a ‘source of power’, whereas the US Joint doctrine describes it only as a ‘source of power’. This may lead planners in the UK and ADF to focus on physical things or entities as a COG, whereas US Joint planners may be more inclined to look at non-physical ‘sources of power’. Understanding this key difference is important when the ADF aspires to work more directly with the US as an integrated force.^[33] US Joint doctrine perhaps makes it clearer that the purpose of defining the COG is so it can be affected to cause failure. This applies to both an adversary COG—what needs to be affected by your forces—or your own COG, which needs to be protected to avoid failure.

JP 5-0 also clearly states that COGs will exist at different levels, but only states these as the strategic level with both physical and non-physical COGs possible and the operational level with physical COGs more likely.^[34] A key difference with ADF doctrine, and alignment with British doctrine, is that COGs should only be derived and analysed at the strategic and operational levels, not at the tactical level. Both British and US Joint doctrines make it clear that the COG determination and analysis are part of operational design, which should only happen at the higher command levels (higher operational or campaign and the military strategic), not at the tactical level. Again, this asks the question as to why ADF doctrine and planning processes, which are usually and otherwise so aligned with US and British doctrines, differ. As with British doctrine, ADF doctrine aligns with US Joint doctrine on conducting the COG analysis and deriving Critical Capabilities (or Critical Abilities in AJP-5), Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities, as well as the characteristics of a COG.^[35] As with British and ADF doctrines, the key element of the COG analysis is the derived Critical Vulnerabilities, which should be targeted. Also, all three countries’ doctrines state that deriving and analysing a COG is a continuous assessment throughout the planning process.^[36] This is where the substantive similarities end.

Unlike British and NATO doctrine, the US Joint doctrine makes no specific mention of ‘nesting’ a CoG within a higher commander’s derived one. This seems similar to the ADF doctrine but is likely from a slightly different perspective. JP-5 is primarily aimed at joint operational planning teams, whereas ADF doctrine is for planning teams at all levels of command, which may account for this omission from the US Joint doctrine. A key point drawn out of JP-5, missing in both British and ADF planning doctrine, is: ‘[w]ithout a well-defined threat, there will often be no enemy or adversary COG.’^[37] Given the complex, multidimensional nature of modern military operations that span the full spectrum of conflict, this is a key point missed from ADF doctrine that should be included in the MPP. Both British and ADF doctrines state how difficult the COG can be to determine and analyse, but neither considers that there may not be one for all military operations. So, should COG—which is so contentious and subjective, with no solid definition even within the US military, let alone amongst allies and partners—even be included in the ADF’s new Military Planning Process?

The problems over the subjectivity and contentiousness of the COG concept and its analysis abound in modern literature.^[38] This is especially pertinent when considering the increased complexity of modern military operations that span the full spectrum of conflict, including the newer and emerging space and information (including cyber) domains. Despite this, and the latest version of ADF doctrine downplaying the importance of COG slightly to encompass the full range of military operations, it should remain part of the upcoming MPP doctrine.^[39] One reason for this is its continued use with our allies and partners at the operational and strategic levels. However, several key recommendations come from this paper on using the COG concept and its analysis, which should be considered for the new ADF-I-5 MPP doctrine.

Recommendations

1. As ADF-I-5 MPP will replace all ADF Military Appreciation Process doctrines, from the tactical up to the military-strategic levels, the use of COG at the tactical level should be expressly downplayed or omitted entirely. Our key allies and partners do not use the concept at this level, nor should the ADF, especially given the time-consuming and contentious nature of conducting multiple COG analyses (at least two adversary and one friendly force COG and analysis).
2. In line with JP 5-0, the MPP should be explicit that there may not always be an enemy or adversary COG for all military operations. This will allow planning teams to skip this part of the process more readily without wasting time arguing over the merits of multiple COG analyses because the doctrine states it should be done.
3. ADF-I-5 MPP should be more closely aligned to our allies’ doctrine over the definition of a COG and be more explicit at what command levels non-physical and physical COGs are likely. In particular, AJP-5 is specific over ‘moral-strength’ (non-physical) COGs that usually only exist at the military strategic level.^[40] It describes how to derive these and physical strategic COGs and apply them to a nested ‘physical-strength’ COG at the operational level.^[41]

Conclusion

This paper has critically examined the concept of the COG within the context of the ADF military planning doctrine and processes (JMAP, SMAP and IMAP), focusing on how it compares to the approaches of key allies and partners, the UK and the US. The analysis has revealed significant disparities in the definition, application, and utility of the COG concept within these different frameworks. The ADF's use of the COG, as outlined in the JMAP and other related doctrines, is complex and contentious. The COG analysis process is meant to provide insights into adversaries' strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities, aiming to identify targetable assets. However, this process is mired in subjectivity and often results in disagreements among military planners, making it less suitable for some modern military operations.

Furthermore, the ADF's inclusion of COG analysis at the tactical level adds an additional layer of complexity, with implications for timely decision making and planning efficiency. Comparisons with the British (NATO) and US Joint military planning doctrines have highlighted significant differences in the understanding and application of the COG concept. There are also some key similarities, such as the characteristics of a COG and the fact that it is an iterative process. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the COG concept, as currently applied, is a problematic element in the ADF's military planning doctrine. The forthcoming ADF-I-5 MPP doctrine presents an opportunity to reevaluate and potentially modify the role and use of the COG and its analysis in ADF planning. This review should consider the best practices of key allies and partners and seek to align the ADF with them to facilitate smoother cooperation in joint and multinational operations.