You’re Only as Strong as Your Weakest Link

China’s emergence as a great power and its intensifying competition with the West have challenged the prevailing security paradigm in the Indo-Pacific, that of the Unites States as the sole hegemon patrolling the shipping lanes and securing a Western view of the rules-based order established after WW II. Looming within this contest lies Taiwan and the issue of its sovereignty. Beijing has unequivocally stated its intent to incorporate Taiwan under its One-China policy, and in fact Taiwan also pursues unification from the opposite position.^[1] To that end, Beijing employs deft diplomatic manoeuvres to prevent other nations from recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign entity. Even the United States, a staunch advocate for a free and democratic Taiwan, does not dispute this policy and recognises Beijing as the capital. Prior to 1972 the U.S. embassy to China was only in Taipei, but in order to purse the 1972 ground breaking effort ‘Opening to China’ led by Henry Kissinger under the Nixon administration, it was a precondition that the US move the embassy and recognize the One-China Policy.^[2] Therefore, one could surmise that the most important objective in Chinese grand strategy, which has persisted over fifty years to the present day, is the reunification of Taiwan.

However, there was one precondition specified by the US in return, that the reunification must be pursued through peaceful means.^[3] In light of the growing costs amid China’s diplomatic successes and burgeoning military might,^[4] there are few indicators that China is still committed to pursuing peaceful reunification. However, a strong military does not preclude a peaceful end, as Sun Tzu in The Art of War writes again and again throughout the text. In his description of the 9-types of terrain, where his explanation surpasses the basic description of terrain to include the human context including the relationship of its leaders and allies:

“[A leader] must use local knowledge to take best advantage of the natural features…A worthy General, when he attacks a powerful state, does not allow the enemy to concentrate his forces. He looms over them and prevents their allies from joining them…He keeps his own counsel, looming threateningly over the enemy. Thus he is able to capture their cities and conquer their kingdoms.”^[5]

Sun Tzu’s discussion of strategy is wholly consistent with modern China’s actions within the South China Sea, when viewed through the lens of the inevitable incorporation of Taiwan. Such insight allows us to understand a key facet of China’s grand strategy: isolate Taiwan by militarizing the South China Sea (SCS) to dominate shipping lanes and the Taiwan Strait, thereby undermining U.S. influence in the region.^[6] Central to this strategy is the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally strategically located just 100 nautical miles south of Taiwan via the Luzon Strait, and which simultaneously maintains China as its largest trading partner. The Philippine Islands’ proximity and historical significance—having proven decisive terrain in World War II—make them a critical vulnerability in the U.S. alliance network, a “weakest link” China exploits to advance its aims.

This case study examines Chinese actions in the Philippines through a realist lens, emphasizing how China targets the Philippine Islands due to its geographical proximity and rich natural resources, to undermine U.S. influence and deny access to the region, thereby securing its broader objective of isolating and reclaiming Taiwan. Realism, which views international relations as a relentless power struggle in an anarchic system, frames Taiwan as the prize and the Philippines as a fragile ally, which China exploits to undermine U.S. dominance.^[7] It does not recount the entirety of the Taiwan conflict, but rather uses competition in the Philippines as a lens to illustrate a broader lesson for strategists: the fragility of alliances in great power competition.

Theoretical Framework: Realism and Instruments of Power

China’s interests in the Philippine Islands are twofold, the first to prevent the U.S. from utilizing the Philippine terrain in the event of a conflict over the reunification of Taiwan, and the second is controlling and claiming the resources of the SCS. While China’s overt military actions, such as fortifying the Spratly Islands and constructing artificial outposts, signal its regional ambitions with tangible force, its other instruments of power – economic coercion and information warfare – are subtle and equally potent.^[8] Beijing’s multifaceted approach seeks not only to claim the SCS resources, such as fisheries and gas reserves, but in so doing erode American influence in Manila and deny U.S. access to key strategic terrain. China’s use of these instruments viewed through a Realist lens illustrates the point: while this facet of Chinese strategy in the Philippines may fulfill many secondary objectives, it clearly denies U.S. access to the region and systematically isolates Taiwan, all necessary steps for its eventual reclamation.

Realism provides the analytical framework to understand China’s strategy, rooted in the premise that international politics is a zero-sum contest for power in an anarchic system where survival hinges on relative strength.^[9] John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism sharpens this perspective, arguing that great powers pursue hegemony by maximizing relative power, often exploiting weaker states, or vulnerabilities in rivals’ alliances to secure their dominance.^[10] While alliances extend a state’s influence, they also expose inherent weak links. This logic suggests that an ally like the Philippines becomes a prime target for disruption due to strategic proximity and economic fragility. China’s realist approach leverages economic dominance and information campaigns, as evidenced by $40 billion in bilateral trade estimates in 2023 and systematic information messaging campaigns, both underpinned by militarizing the SCS, to control maritime access and transform Manila’s strategic position into a liability. ^[11]^,^[12] This reflects a broader pattern where great powers systematically leverage fragile allies despite intended neutrality, a dynamic underscored by historical parallels such as Soviet pressure in Europe during the Cold War.^[13] China’s actions reveal a calculated, realist approach to erode the U.S.-led security architecture by leveraging Manila’s vulnerabilities to tilt the Indo-Pacific balance in its favour.

Case Study Analysis:

Economic Coercion as a Realist Tool

Economic power emerges as an important realist tool, transforming trade into a mechanism for both exploitation and strategic control. Joseph Nye distinguishes economic influence as soft power when it persuades through attraction,^[14] but a realist lens sees it as hard power when it coerces or extracts compliance through dependency. China leverages the Philippines’ economic reliance, evidenced by Philippine statistics reporting trade imports topping $23 billion by 2023, to secure access to fish stocks and potential gas reserves while pressuring Manila to limit U.S. military presence.^[15] As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines and other SCS nations have sought to limit Beijing’s ambitious claims in areas such as the Scarborough Shoals, to little effect as China’s presence has now been continuous since 2015.^[16] This dependency is not accidental but a deliberate outcome of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which entangles economies in debt and trade networks, amplifying the cost of defiance.^[17]

Economic coercion also undermines U.S. credibility with calculated ruthlessness. China’s trade leverage, exemplified when Beijing threatened to cut imports of Philippine bananas (15% of exports), deters Manila from expanding more basing locations under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which could enhance U.S. access to the Luzon Strait.^[18]^,^[19] During Rodrigo Duterte’s tenure (2016-2022), this pressure prompted a pivot toward Beijing, stalling EDCA and limiting U.S. troop rotations numbers, hampering the efficacy of combined training exercises and reducing alliance capability.^[20] The Belt and Road Initiative amplifies this leverage, entangling Manila in debt, e.g. the P4.37 billion Chico River Pump Irrigation Project, which makes defiance costly.^[21]

China’s militarization of the SCS, exemplified by outposts like Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, encroaches on the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), jeopardizing marine resources critical to over 385,000 registered Filipino fishermen^[22] who rely on these waters for their livelihoods.^[23] Since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, China’s control has barred Filipino fishing in the area, with local reports indicating a 70% income drop for Zambales fishermen^[24] amounting to millions in lost revenue due to restricted access and rampant overfishing by Chinese fleets. This ecological coercion is compounded by coral reef destruction from giant clam harvesting, further undermining Filipino fishing communities. Energy resources face parallel threats; in March 2021, Chinese vessels harassed Philippine survey ships near Reed Bank, effectively stalling exploration where there is an estimated 3 billion cubic feet of gas capable of bolstering Manila’s energy supply, further tightening China’s grip on the region.^[25] Realism explains how China uses its economic leverage, underpinned by SCS militarization, to exploit resource reliance and expose the tension between economic security and military commitments, thereby weakening strategic alignment and undermining U.S. alliance cohesion.^[26] The Philippines’ wavering commitment underscores how China’s economic power can hollow out alliances from within.

Information Power as a Realist Tool

Information power complements this economic strategy, manipulating perceptions to justify resource claims and erode U.S. credibility with surgical precision. Nye frames it as narrative control, a soft power tool to shape opinions.^[27] However, Mearsheimer aligns it with power politics, where disinformation disrupts alliances and legitimizes territorial ambitions.^[28] China’s state media casts doubt on the legitimacy of U.S. Navy operations in the SCS, claiming that the PRC has a right to patrol its waters while undermining Washington’s narrative of ensuring freedom of navigation.^[29] This psychological campaign, intensified by the Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan, supports resource exploitation by framing China’s actions as inevitable while eroding U.S. influence. The sophistication of this effort lies in its exploitation of digital platforms—Chinese bots amplify anti-American narratives,^[30] sowing discord in Manila and weakening its resolve to host U.S. forces.^[31] Realism views this as an assault on alliance cohesion, targeting weak links and leveraging information to destabilize U.S. credibility without firing a shot, a tactic echoing Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine.^[32]

China’s militarization of the SCS enhances its use of information power. State media like Global Times and China Daily assert China’s “historical rights” ^[33] to SCS fisheries and gas, framing Philippine resistance as futile while warning of U.S. abandonment—“America won’t risk war over Taiwan”.^[34] Chinese military operations in the region amplify this narrative; patrols from Subi Reef, 150 miles from Manila, and radar on Fiery Cross Reef make China’s dominance tangible,^[35] legitimizing resource exploitation and pressuring Manila to yield terrain.^[36] Realism casts this as psychological warfare, exploiting Manila’s proximity to Taiwan to sow doubt among allies about American resolve.^[37] The campaign’s depth lies in shaping perceptions without confrontation, a hallmark of modern great power competition, while fracturing Manila’s alliance ties. By fracturing Manila’s alliance ties, it sets the stage for terrain denial, where narrative dominance translates into physical exclusion, leveraging the Philippines’ geography to restrict U.S. access to strategic terrain and turn an ally into a liability.

South China Sea Militarization and Terrain Denial

Terrain denial emerges as a further, more insidious aim. By influencing the Philippines through economic and information power, China ultimately restricts U.S. military operations and naval manoeuvrability near Taiwan. Its use of economic threats to ensure Philippine compliance turns Manila’s strategic geography against its ally. For example, Manila’s refusal to allow U.S. surveillance flights from Clark Air Base in 2023, fearing trade reprisals, essentially allows China to control the Luzon Strait, which ultimately limits U.S. staging options.^[38] Realism explains how this isolates Taiwan, not just physically but psychologically, by targeting weak links among regional allies and signalling that the reach of the U.S. is contingent and fragile.^[39]

Further SCS militarization such as in Mischief Rief and Scarborough shoals also serves as the physical backbone of China’s resource control and terrain denial strategy. David Shambaugh notes that outposts like Mischief Reef and Subi Reef secure shipping lanes and project dominance, ensuring China’s resource extraction while restricting U.S. naval access.^[40] These bases, equipped with runways and radar, also amplify information campaigns, making China’s presence a tangible threat through patrols and surveillance. Realism interprets this as the strategic use of the Philippine Islands’ position along the first island chain, as a lever to deny U.S. access to critical maritime chokepoints, enhancing China’s non-military leverage.^[41] Militarization creates a psychological barrier, signalling deep commitment to oppose the U.S and its allies, militarily if necessary, and is therefore a form of coercive signalling to other nations.^[42] These instruments collectively illustrate how China targets a weak ally, using its military presence with economic and informational pressure, to dominate the region and achieve strategic ends; the ultimate isolation and incorporation of Taiwan.

Lessons for the Strategist

Realism explains how China exploits the Philippine Islands’ proximity through economic coercion, targeting its resources while systematically undermining U.S. credibility and denying terrain access. Resource exploitation is an end in its own right, but it also becomes a means to justify increased Chinese military presence to protect their interests, and ultimately serves to control shipping lanes and prevent U.S. access. These ends are a logical step towards the isolation of Taiwan because they deny the U.S. freedom of navigation in the straits and land bases in the Philippines, which could be used to project power forward in a Taiwan crisis. Evidence underscores the gravity of this exploitation. Economically, China’s trade dominance extracts resources while deterring EDCA expansion, limiting U.S. basing near Taiwan and exposing the cost of economic entanglement.^[43] Informationally, China’s information campaigns and militarized presence erode U.S. credibility, denying the use of bases like Subic Bay and amplifying doubts about American reliability.^[44] All of these efforts contribute isolating Taiwan and hobbling U.S. options, a realist strategy of turning a U.S. asset into a liability with chilling efficiency.^[45] Manila’s reluctance to allow U.S. flights in 2023 highlights how deeply China’s tactics affect the Philippines, exploiting proximity to unravel alliance cohesion and shift the regional balance. The cumulative effect is a weakened U.S. posture, unable to fully leverage its Philippine foothold against China.

This principle extends beyond this case study, reinforcing the lessons on great power competition. Russia’s disinformation targeting NATO’s Baltic allies weakens cohesion, showing how great powers exploit vulnerabilities to destabilize rival blocs, a tactic honed in Ukraine and now mirrored in the Indo-Pacific. The Philippines’ plight highlights the risk in the U.S.-Philippine alliance, but how can weak links be fortified to prevent China’s strategy from unravelling the U.S.-led order? For strategists, this indicates the necessity to protect weak allies, e.g. diversifying Manila’s trade to reduce China’s leverage, or countering disinformation with U.S. information campaigns to preserve terrain access and alliance strength.

Conclusion

Realism frames China’s exploitation of the Philippines as a calculated assault on a fragile ally, using economic leverage, information campaigns, and militarized presence to erode U.S. influence and isolate Taiwan. The critical lesson for strategists emerges: great powers target weak links to dismantle rival alliances, turning partners into liabilities. China’s hybrid strategy of blending trade, disinformation, and South China Sea dominance exemplifies this, exploiting Manila’s proximity to shift regional power. Unlike mere resource grabs, this approach reveals a deeper intent: to hobble U.S. credibility and secure Beijing’s One-China vision. Historical parallels, like Soviet pressure on Cold War neutrals, reinforce this pattern. Strategists must recognize that alliance strength hinges on its most vulnerable members, a principal China masters with chilling precision. Analysing Beijing’s actions here unveils a broader truth, that proximity and fragility amplify a weak ally’s strategic cost, and offering insight into how great powers can reshape global orders through calculated disruption.

Use of AI Declaration:

Microsoft Copilot and Brave Search Engine utilizing LEO AI were both used to search for in-depth references on the escalating competition between China and the Philippines in the SCS, in researching journal articles analysing Russia grey-zone operations in the Ukraine War, and in evaluating the strength of the paper outline.

Bibliography

1. Air University (AU). “The People’s Liberation Army’s Command and Control Affects the Future of Out-of-Area Opera,” April 24, 2023.https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371571/the-peoples-liberation-armys-command-and-control-affects-the-future-of-out-of-a/

2. Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

3. Bateman, Sam “South China Sea Militarization and Regional Perceptions.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 76, no. 4 (2022): 401–19.

4. Bateman, Sam, and Ralf Emmers, eds. Security and International Politics in the South China Sea. 0 ed. Routledge, 2008.https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203885246.

5. China Daily HK. “US Navy the Real Threat to Freedom of Navigation.” Accessed March 15, 2025.https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/242907#US-navy-the-real-threat-to-freedom-of-navigation-2021-10-13.

6. “China’s Disinformation Campaign in the Philippines.” Accessed March 15, 2025.https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinas-disinformation-campaign-in-the-philippines/.

7. Clark, Colin. “China Tightens ‘counter-Stealth’ Military Radar Net around South China Sea, Says Report.” Breaking Defense, October 23, 2024.http://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/china-tightens-counter-stealth-military-radar-net-around-south-china-sea-says-report/.

8. Cook, Malcolm. “THE PHILIPPINES IN 2020: Continuity despite Crisis,” n.d.

9. CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. “South China Sea Economic Impacts: Philippines Case Study.” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023.

10. De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Exploring the Philippines’ Evolving Grand Strategy in the Face of China’s Maritime Expansion: From the Aquino Administration to the Marcos Administration.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 43, no. 1 (April 1, 2024): 94–119.https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034241234670

11. De Castro, Renato Cruz. “The Limits of Intergovernmentalism: The Philippines’ Changing Strategy in the South China Sea Dispute and Its Impact on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39, no. 3 (December 2020): 335–58.https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420935562.

12. De Castro, Renato Cruz. “The Philippines Hedging between the United States and China: Is the Biden Administration Tipping the Balance?” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 34, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 101–23.https://doi.org/10.22883/kjda.2022.34.1.006.

13. FULCRUM. “Philippine-China Standoff Over Second Thomas Shoal: There Are Three Others,” July 17, 2024.https://fulcrum.sg/philippine-china-standoff-over-second-thomas-shoal-there-are-three-others/.

14. Gacal, Franco M. “Territorial Disputes in Spratly: An Assessment of the Philippine Initiatives:” Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 1, 2013.https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA589239.

15. Green, M. J. By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.

16. Harold, S. W. The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021.

17. Heginbotham, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, et al. “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017.” RAND Corporation, September 14, 2015.https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html.

18. Heginbotham, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest Morgan, Jacob Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, et al. The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996--2017. RAND Corporation, 2015.https://doi.org/10.7249/RR392.

19. Hoffman, Frank G. “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges.” Prism 7, no. 4 (2018): 31–47.

20. Jr, Joseph S. Nye. The Future of Power. PublicAffairs, 2011.

21. Kaplan, Robert, 1952- author. “Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific / Robert D. Kaplan.,” January 1, 2014.https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id="70edb647-ae61-3bf7-8efc-0fd8f52157da."

22. Kissinger, Henry, ed. On China. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2012.

23. Kramer, Mark, Aryo Makko, and Peter Ruggenthaler. The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe. Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.

24. Kurlantzick, J. “China’s Digital Silk Road: Information Power in Southeast Asia.” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 126 (2020): 789–804.

25. Lardy, Nicholas R. The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China? Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2019.

26. Lorteau, Steve. “China’s South China Sea Claims as ‘Unprecedented’: Sceptical Remarks.” Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 55 (October 2018): 72–112.https://doi.org/10.1017/cyl.2018.6.

27. Matsuda, Takuya. “Japan’s Emerging Security Strategy.” Washington Quarterly 46, no. 1 (March 1, 2023): 85–102.https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2190218.

28. Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition). W. W. Norton & Company, Incorporated, 2014.http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/deakin/detail.action?docID="7170635."

29. Medcalf, R. Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020.

30. Men, Honghua. China’s Grand Strategy: A Framework Analysis. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4257-2.

31. Norris, William J. “China’s Post-Cold War Economic Statecraft: A Periodization.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 50, no. 3 (December 2021): 294–316.https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211058186.

32. Nye, J. S. The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.

33. “Oplas-Table2-050824.Jpg (JPEG Image, 1725 × 1347 Pixels) — Scaled (33%).” Accessed March 15, 2025.https://www.bworldonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Oplas-table2-050824.jpg.

34. Patton, Susannah, Jack Sato, and Hervé Lemahieu. “2024 Key Findings Report,” n.d.

35. Philippine Government Statistics. Accessed March 16, 2025.

https://library.psa.gov.ph/kohaimages/PSA/ebookreader/ viewebook.html? -bin/koha/opacdetail.pl?biblionumber="28213#book/2."

36. Quayle, Linda. “Southeast Asian Perspectives on Regional Alliance Dynamics: The Philippines and Thailand.” International Politics 57, no. 2 (April 2020): 225–41.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00193-9.

37. Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “Defending Without Provoking: The United States and the Philippines in the South China Sea,” February 12, 2025.https://quincyinst.org/research/defending-without-provoking-the-united-states-and-the-philippines-in-the-south-china-sea/.

38. Ramos, Mariejo. “Filipino Fishermen Caught in Debt Net in South China Sea Row | Context.” Accessed March 16, 2025.https://www.context.news/socioeconomic-inclusion/filipino-fishermen-caught-in-debt-net-in-south-china-sea-row.

39. Rolland, Nadège. “China’s Vision for a New World Order,” n.d.

40. Shambaugh, David. Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

41. Shambaugh, David. “Navigating between the Giants: ASEAN’s Agency.” In Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia, edited by David Shambaugh, 0. Oxford University Press, 2021.https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190914974.003.0006.

42. Storey, Iain. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea: Role of the Philippines.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 42, no. 2 (2020): 189–214.

43. Sunzi, and James Trapp. The Art of War Illustrated. London: Amber Books, 2018.

44. Sutter, Robert, and Chin-Hao Huang. “China-US Rivalry Very Much ‘In Play’: Outcome Uncertain.” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 25, no. 2 (September 1, 2023): 83–94.

45. “The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions.” Accessed March 15, 2025.https://viewer.ebscohost.com/EbscoViewerService/ebook?an="2030468&callbackUrl"=https%3a%2f%2fresearch.ebsco.com&db="nlebk&format"=EB&profId="eds&lpid"=&ppid="&lang"=en&location="https%3a%2f%2fresearch.ebsco.com%2fc%2fnp77rt%2fsearch%2fdetails%2fhf4tqws7f5%3fdb%3dnlebk&isPLink"=False&requestContext="&profileIdentifier"=np77rt&recordId="hf4tqws7f5."

46. Times, Global. “Why the US Will Abandon Island of Taiwan Eventually: Global Times Editorial - Global Times.” Accessed March 16, 2025.https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231877.shtml.

47. Tran, Bich T. “Presidential Turnover and Discontinuity in the Philippines’ China Policy.” Asian Perspective 43, no. 4 (2019): 621–46.https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0026.

48. U.S. Naval Institute. “Hybrid Warfare Helps Russia Level the Playing Field,” August 1, 2018.https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/august/hybrid-warfare-helps-russia-level-playing-field.

49. Waltz, K. N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

50. Wang, Yong. “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy.” The Pacific Review 29, no. 3 (May 26, 2016): 455–63.https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1154690.

51. “Why US South China Sea FON Operations Don’t Make Sense.” Accessed March 16, 2025.https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/why-us-south-china-sea-fon-operations-dont-make-sense/.

52. Wu, Chien-Huei, and Mao-Wei Lo. “The Threat of China’s Economic Coercion,” 14–49. Routledge, 2025.https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003371427-2.

53. Zhang, Feng. “China’s Long March at Sea: Explaining Beijing’s South China Sea Strategy, 2009–2016.” The Pacific Review 33, no. 5 (September 2, 2020): 757–87.https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1587497.

54. 宋婧祎. “China’s Territorial Claims in the South China Sea Backed by Reliable Historical Evidence.” Accessed March 16, 2025.https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202105/12/WS609b359ea31024ad0babd5d0.html.

Footnotes

¹ Henry Kissinger, ed., On China (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2012), 248.

² Kissinger, 249.

³ Kissinger, 248–50.

⁴ Robert D. Kaplan 1952- author., “Asia’s Cauldron : The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific / Robert D. Kaplan.,” January 1, 2014, 50,https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id="70edb647-ae61-3bf7-8efc-0fd8f52157da."

⁵ Sunzi and James Trapp, The Art of War Illustrated (London: Amber Books, 2018), 129.

⁶ Feng Zhang, “China’s Long March at Sea: Explaining Beijing’s South China Sea Strategy, 2009–2016,” The Pacific Review 33, no. 5 (September 2, 2020): 773,https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1587497.

⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition) (W. W. Norton & Company, Incorporated, 2014), 55,http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/deakin/detail.action?docID="7170635."

⁸ I. Storey, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea: Role of the Philippines,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 42, no. 2 (2020): 189.

⁹ K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 102–28.

¹⁰ Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition), 55–82.

¹¹ N. R. Lardy, The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China? (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2019), 103.

¹² David Shambaugh, “Navigating between the Giants: ASEAN’s Agency,” in Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast Asia, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford University Press, 2021), 95,https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190914974.003.0006.

¹³ Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko, and Peter Ruggenthaler, The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021), 92.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Future of Power (PublicAffairs, 2011), 84–86.

¹⁵ “Oplas-Table2-050824.Jpg (JPEG Image, 1725 × 1347 Pixels) — Scaled (33%),” accessed March 15, 2025,https://www.bworldonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Oplas-table2-050824.jpg.

¹⁶ Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Limits of Intergovernmentalism: The Philippines’ Changing Strategy in the South China Sea Dispute and Its Impact on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 39, no. 3 (December 2020): 337–40,https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420935562.

¹⁷ Honghua Men, China’s Grand Strategy: A Framework Analysis (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020), 153, 208,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-4257-2.

¹⁸ Lardy, The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China?, 125.

¹⁹ Linda Quayle, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on Regional Alliance Dynamics: The Philippines and Thailand,” International Politics 57, no. 2 (April 2020): 234–37,https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-019-00193-9.

²⁰ Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Philippines Hedging between the United States and China: Is the Biden Administration Tipping the Balance?,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 34, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 101–23,https://doi.org/10.22883/kjda.2022.34.1.006.

²¹ Shambaugh, “Navigating between the Giants,” 250.

²² CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “South China Sea Economic Impacts: Philippines Case Study” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023).

²³ Storey, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea: Role of the Philippines,” 214.

²⁴ Mariejo Ramos, “Filipino Fishermen Caught in Debt Net in South China Sea Row | Context,” accessed March 16, 2025,https://www.context.news/socioeconomic-inclusion/filipino-fishermen-caught-in-debt-net-in-south-china-sea-row.

²⁵ “Philippine-China Standoff Over Second Thomas Shoal: There Are Three Others,” FULCRUM, July 17, 2024,https://fulcrum.sg/philippine-china-standoff-over-second-thomas-shoal-there-are-three-others/.

²⁶ Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 165.

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Future of Power (PublicAffairs, 2011), 84–86

²⁸ Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition), 72.

²⁹ “US Navy the Real Threat to Freedom of Navigation,” chinadailyhk, accessed March 15, 2025,https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/242907#US-navy-the-real-threat-to-freedom-of-navigation-2021-10-13.

³⁰ J. Kurlantzick, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Information Power in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 126 (2020): 795.

³¹ “PRC Influence Operations in the Philippines: Can Beijing Flip the South China Sea Script?,” accessed March 15, 2025,https://jamestown.org/program/prc-influence-operations-in-the-philippines-can-beijing-flip-the-south-china-sea-script/.

³² “Hybrid Warfare Helps Russia Level the Playing Field,” U.S. Naval Institute, August 1, 2018,https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/august/hybrid-warfare-helps-russia-level-playing-field.

³³ 宋婧祎, “China’s Territorial Claims in the South China Sea Backed by Reliable Historical Evidence,” accessed March 16, 2025,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202105/12/WS609b359ea31024ad0babd5d0.html.

³⁴ Global Times, “Why the US Will Abandon Island of Taiwan Eventually: Global Times Editorial - Global Times,” accessed March 16, 2025,https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231877.shtml.

³⁵ Colin Clark, “China Tightens ‘counter-Stealth’ Military Radar Net around South China Sea, Says Report,” Breaking Defense, October 23, 2024,http://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/china-tightens-counter-stealth-military-radar-net-around-south-china-sea-says-report/.

³⁶ “The People’s Liberation Army’s Command and Control Affects the Future of Out-of-Area Opera,” Air University (AU), April 24, 2023,https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371571/the-peoples-liberation-armys-command-and-control-affects-the-future-of-out-of-a.

³⁷ Kaplan, “Asia’s Cauldron,” 72.

³⁸ Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996--2017 (RAND Corporation, 2015), 215,https://doi.org/10.7249/RR392.

³⁹ Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition), 361.

⁴⁰ Shambaugh, “Navigating between the Giants,” 95–130.

⁴¹ “The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions,” 172–73, accessed March 15, 2025,https://viewer.ebscohost.com/EbscoViewerService/ebook?an="2030468&callbackUrl"=https%3a%2f%2fresearch.ebsco.com&db="nlebk&format"=EB&profId="eds&lpid"=&ppid="&lang"=en&location="https%3a%2f%2fresearch.ebsco.com%2fc%2fnp77rt%2fsearch%2fdetails%2fhf4tqws7f5%3fdb%3dnlebk&isPLink"=False&requestContext="&profileIdentifier"=np77rt&recordId="hf4tqws7f5."

⁴² “Schelling-Manipulation Risk -1966,” n.d., chap. 3.

⁴³ De Castro, “The Philippines Hedging between the United States and China.”

⁴⁴ Kurlantzick, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Information Power in Southeast Asia.”

⁴⁵ Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition), 361.

Cite Article

Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.