'Why We Write' Series - WHY I WRITE

#Why I Write

WGCDR Chris McInnes

I find writing difficult and, frequently, not enjoyable. For me, answering the title question typically involves much wailing and gnashing of teeth as I ponder why I keep doing this to myself. But then I will see a new, stronger argument emerge from what I have put down on page or a nice turn of phrase will allow a small glimmer of ‘you can genuinely write’ light into the ‘you’re an impostor, what do you think you’re doing’ darkness.

In many ways, my relationship with writing is much like the relationship I have with golf. Mostly its bloody awful, but the occasional good bits are more than enough to keep me coming back for more.

So why do it? I’m a firm believer in James Boswell’s adage that “good writing is disciplined talking.” I can talk; and I love the back and forth that comes from live presentation. Audience engagement shapes and clarifies ideas and the way they are presented. For me, it is entirely possible to start a presentation knowing roughly half of what I want to say; the rest will emerge as we – the audience and I – progress along our shared journey.

But you cannot do that in writing. When you publish writing, there is no ‘oh yes, but…’ option. The argument must stand alone. That reality forces me to grapple with arguments far more deeply than simply talking about them.

So what arguments matter to me and what motivates me to engage? I am an airman, a history nerd, and a science and technology enthusiast so I am stimulated by the intersection and interplay of those three areas. I will explore the role of each in turn.

I am an airman, by which I mean an airminded member of the profession of arms. I think the advent of aircraft and air power has fundamentally reshaped the character of military operations by creating vertical manoeuvre space. But its impact has been very poorly understood and articulated, either through over-reaching to declare other forms of power irrelevant or timidly assigning air power to supporting others.

Instead, I think exploiting the potential of vertical manoeuvre generates a different way — an airminded way — of conducting military operations that has a distinct place in the tool box. William Slim, an Army officer who was an airman, devised a brilliantly airminded campaign to eject the Japanese from Burma. The Anglo-American defeat of Germany and the American destruction of Japan in the Second World War were airminded campaigns writ large.

These are not claims that air power alone defeated the Japanese in Burma or won the war completely; it did not. But neither did any other form of power. Instead it was the cumulative effects of every form of power. In the case of the Anglo-American campaigns, this included taking the roofs off the Third Reich and Japanese Empire to create new opportunities to apply pressure and amplify the pressure coming from other sources. If you’re looking for a great discussion on the impact of air power — and the difficulties encountered in articulating that impact — I recommend British Air Marshal Ed Stringer’s Trenchard Memorial Lecture from 2018.

I write because I am an airman but I am not an aviator. The only position I am qualified to fill on an aircraft is ‘pax’ or ‘self-loading ballast.’ For some, this automatically excludes me from holding useful views on air power. I don’t mind if people question the utility of my views — they should — but I take issue with the automaticity of the exclusion as it also excludes a huge range of clever people.

Importantly, the automatic exclusion comes from aviators and non-aviators alike. Too often I have heard and seen smart, experienced people in sky camouflage shrug their shoulders and declare they have nothing to contribute about air power because they’re not aircrew. There are plenty of non-aviators who know quite a lot about the application of air power, and there are plenty of aviators who, frankly, don’t add much to the discussion beyond technicalities.

I write because I think too many fail to grasp, or are uninterested in the notion that air power and aviation are related but distinct concepts. The former is enabled by the latter but is vastly larger, more complex and chaotic. The value proposition of air forces is air power, not aviation. I write to try and fill gaps in our understanding of what air power brings to the table and, perhaps more importantly, to (hopefully) demonstrate that non-aviators can and should engage in air power ideas.

I am a history nerd and a career intelligence officer. I have spent a huge amount of time processing information and trying to distil insights into digestible forms. This has made me exceptionally familiar with the sensation of being wrong and has left me very, very humble about my own — and broader humanity’s — ability to accurately forecast the future or to even understand the complexity of the present.

However, this experience has demonstrated to me that sufficient insight can be found to enable good outcomes even when the situation is complex and the forecasts are wrong. The value frequently comes down to being able to provide good enough frames of reference for people to get a grip on external factors and get moving in pursuit of their own objectives. A good story that helps people make sense of complexity, without necessarily predicting anything, is enormously valuable. I write to tell stories that help me make sense of the world, and hopefully help others to do the same.

Finally, I am a science and technology enthusiast. I’m solidly in JFK’s optimistic camp that “man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable and we believe they can do it again” and am stimulated by the new possibilities that new knowledge creates. The airminded approach to operations is one such example.

I write because I like to explore these possibilities. Lest someone accuse me of peddling a new “vampire fallacy” that war will be easy and hygienic due to a new wonder weapon, I often focus on the limitations of technology and to highlight the fundamental role that ideas, organisation, and people play in turning potential into reality. But I still like to explore new opportunities because among the few things I find less convincing than a vampire fallacy are claims that the only way to solve a problem is the way we’ve always done it.

So that is why I write. What are the principal challenges to my writing? As a father, husband, full-time employee, and gifted procrastinator I have plenty! But I will focus on two that might not appear in other contributions to this series.

Firstly, the professional development puritans bug me no end because I think they wind up discouraging people from contributing to the discussion. Who do I mean? I mean the people that write as though membership of the profession of arms involves dedicating yourself solely and absolutely to the study and refinement of that profession. Those that assert you should spend every spare minute reading Clausewitz or Thucydides or Boyd, publish at least 30 articles per year while also writing a book every second. If you’re not doing this then you’re letting yourself down, you’re letting your soldiers, sailors, and airmen down and — most importantly — you’re undermining the security of your country.

If you can do that, and there are some that seem to pull it off, I sincerely doff my hat to you. But there are many ways to contribute to the profession of arms and, perhaps more importantly, contribute to the societies that our profession seeks to defend. How does one weigh coaching a junior soccer team versus writing the definitive paper (another one) on Clausewitz’s trinity? To be honest, I think the coach might be doing more good in this case.

Secondly, the professional development canon is pretty stale. I enjoyed my year at staff college but there was a disturbing sameness to the perspectives on offer. We had three American generals come and speak as guest presenters who were impressive and impeccably credentialed but, from my cheap seat, were all the same. We all studied the same material and studied it in the same way, slogging through lots of reading about humans making decisions and then writing about those decisions.

I’m all for slogging through lots of reading but I am concerned that the professional development discussion within the profession of arms is becoming too insular. I understand there are aspects of the profession of arms that are unique, but I think we sometimes overemphasise the unique aspects to our detriment. Thinking our field of expertise as uniquely different and demanding is classic hedgehog behaviour that has been demonstrated, through the work of Phillip Tetlock and others, to reduce decision-making and forecasting effectiveness.

I flag these two issues as challenges to professional writing because I think they discourage contributors and new approaches. As a profession, I think we need to be more open and accessible to new ideas, and actively encourage members of the profession to contribute in different ways and seek different educational experiences.

To wrap up, writing is not easy for me but it helps me think through issues and I genuinely enjoy the moments of discovery that come from this process. I write for a variety of reasons but what motivates me most is encouraging others to write. That is why I help run The Central Blue and that is why I’m happy to share my thoughts for this series.

Chris McInnes is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force and co-editor of The Central Blue. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government.

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.