Deterrence and the case for Australian Industry Policy

Can industry policy become a tool of national deterrence? Major Andrew Buckley argues that reshaping Australia’s economy could strengthen resilience—and dissuade coercion before it begins.

26/11/2025

<30 min

Introduction

Industry policy is experiencing a renaissance among countries seeking to enhance their economic security. Originating as policies that promoted domestic manufacturing industries, today industry (or industrial) policy refers to targeted assistance to the private sector to address specific challenges, where market forces alone are insufficient to reshape economic activity in response.^[1] Whether or not governments should intervene in otherwise free markets has been a controversial subject in economics, but this dichotomy is increasingly giving way to consideration of how best to intervene.^[2] Numerous challenges, including ‘the green transition,’ and supply chain assurance are behind a renewed interest in these policies.^[3] Prominent among these challenges, is the intersection of economic security and US-China competition. For many states, globalisation and the emergence of a multipolar world are creating connected economic and national security concerns.^[4] These geopolitical challenges are displacing ideological opposition to industry policy and countries are beginning to employ it explicitly for their own security.^[5]

Australia’s strategic environment is marked by a similar concern for the impact of great power competition on its interconnected economy. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (the DSR) describes significant challenges for Australia and its near region, including economic coercion. The DSR affirms Australia’s interest in protecting the “global rules-based order upon which international trade depends.”^[6] Geoeconomic competition and the desire to sustain an open global economy had already featured in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.^[7] However, with the DSR came the idea that the strategic circumstances “demand that we deploy all elements of our national power in statecraft.”^[8] This is emblematic of a transition to the new conceptual approach of National Defence which demands a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to deter coercion by denial.^[9] While the strategic end is made clear, the means to achieve it are not; exactly what ‘all elements of national power in statecraft’ might include, is not stated.

Restructuring economic activity seems an intuitive way of denying economic coercion, and the Australian Government has affirmed support for the employment of industry policies in a transparent, good-faith manner for legitimate objectives.^[10] Despite this, industry policy is not explicitly called out as a component of Australia’s deterrence strategy. This raises the question – if economic tools can have a deterrent effect, how might the Australian Government employ industry policy to support its strategy of deterrence by denial? The DSR, and the National Defence Strategy (the NDS) that followed, propose measures that suggest the use of industry policy might be needed, but they stop short of saying such policies are candidate tools of economic statecraft. They are instead outlined as part of a strategy to enhance resilience, and resilience is claimed to be a means for deterrence. If resilience can indeed have a deterrent effect, then government shaping of economic activity that seeks to improve resilience should, by extension, support deterrence.

This paper argues that the Australian Government should employ industry policy as part of an explicit, whole-of-nation approach to deterrence by denial. It first explores the emergence of economic tools of deterrence, and the current state of Australian industry policy. This review highlights the conception of deterrence through resilience that is shared by National Defence and the nascent Future Made in Australia industry policy. This paper argues that resilience has the potential to deter, and that Australia should embrace a whole-of-nation approach to enhance resilience. This paper then argues that it makes sense for Australia to employ industry policy as part of this whole-of-nation approach. It makes the case for industry policy to be employed in a way that enhances resilience while minimising risks to Australia’s competitiveness in trade. Finally, this paper argues that for Australian industry policy to be an effective deterrent, it must be employed as part of a coherent strategy and the intent must be clearly communicated. This work does not challenge the ‘global rules-based order’ rhetoric or the need for a deterrence strategy. It accepts National Defence as a premise, and instead seeks to explore the potential for economic restructure to support the strategy.

Literature Review: Economics in Deterrence, and Australian Industry Policy

The evolution of deterrence strategies has resulted in a growing focus on denial, and the role of non-military tools of statecraft. Contemporary work to update deterrence theory has been carried out by Michael J. Mazarr, a senior political specialist at the RAND corporation, who refers to deterrence as the challenge of “discouraging states from taking unwanted actions, especially military aggression.”^[11] This work is motivated by the re-emergence of deterrence as a central component of many countries’ defence policies. The theory’s prominence during the Cold War relied upon assured destruction to dissuade conflict by threat of punishment.^[12] Since then, changes in deterrence strategies have resulted in the emergence of deterrence by denial.

Reviewing the vast literature, Mazarr and colleagues distinguish between practicing deterrence by threatening severe punishments for engaging in aggression (deterrence by punishment), and by denying an aggressor the means to attack through credible defensive measures (deterrence by denial).^[13] This language illustrates the common military-centric conception of the strategy. Nevertheless, Mazarr argues that changes in the international security environment have changed the context for deterrence.^[14] While narrow conceptions of deterrence using only military tools of statecraft remain common, there are compelling geopolitical reasons to take a broader view of deterrence that involves all tools of statecraft.^[15]

Despite this, the role of economics in a whole-of-government strategy of deterrence by denial is not prominent in the literature. In ‘Understanding Deterrence,’ Mazarr only refers to economics when highlighting the ability to deter by threat of sanction (a punishment).^[16] In a RUSI article, Wirtz and Larsen critique the US’ Integrated Deterrence concept, citing a commentator’s view that the DoD should not be the lead on economic sanctions.^[17] Even the limited coverage of ‘economic deterrence’ by denial has tethered the concept to the military, with one paper arguing that its aim is to threaten to reduce the likelihood of military success.^[18] These conceptions are not inherently problematic, but are limiting if economic means are intended to deny hybrid threats and non-military aggressions like economic coercion or other conflict short of war. Observing a broader view of deterrence, Mazarr has referred to denial strategies as seeking “to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives.”^[19] He also contrasts immediate deterrence which represents crisis-like, urgent efforts to prevent an attack, with general deterrence, which is “the ongoing, persistent effort to prevent unwanted actions over the long term and in noncrisis situations.”^[20] This expanded understanding of how a deterrent effect can be achieved, potentially without the threat of punishment or military action, creates the space for economic tools to be used in a deterrence strategy. Economic tools would best support deterrence by denial if used as general deterrents whose goals is to prevent a crisis.

While deterrence is a re-emerging strategy for some countries, it is a new approach to Australia’s defence posture. In a 2023 paper and related article on archipelagic deterrence, Australian National University senior lecturer, Dr Andrew Carr, explains that Australia has only recently settled on deterrence by denial as a strategy.^[21] As a result, there remain questions about the approach, and the role of economic levers. In his paper, Dr Carr explains two apparent issues with this new approach as outlined in the DSR, through the lens of what is often termed the ‘three-Cs’ of deterrence – credibility, capability, and communication.^[22] Excepting what he calls an inherently credible strategy, he first argues that while the DSR recognises that deterrence exists in an adversary’s state of mind, it does not say who is being deterred.^[23] This is particularly important given Mazarr’s conclusion that the perceptions of the potential aggressor are the dominant variable in deterrence’s success or failure.^[24] Second, he argues that despite the strategy resting on capability, “Australia’s capabilities appear tenuous.”^[25] While his assessment was of the Australian Defence Force, it is a sound warning for the other candidate elements of national power in statecraft. Given Australia’s recent adoption of a deterrence by denial strategy, coupled with the limited coverage of economic means of denial in the literature, it is perhaps no surprise that economic tools of statecraft, like industry policy, are capabilities in waiting.

Industry policy has not been a prominent tool of Australian economic statecraft, and there have been no notable calls for it to be employed broadly for deterrence. The Lowy Institute Poll 2024 highlights that Australian governments since the 1980s have largely adhered to a free market approach to shaping the economy, and that this enjoys strong support in Australia.^[26] The strong support for free trade in Australia correlates with the long-held view that industry policy involves governments inefficiently ‘picking winners’ and promoting uncompetitive industries.^[27] Nevertheless, interest in industry policy is growing along with the realisation that a level of government intervention is necessary to aid imperfect market forces, and as arguments against intervention are challenged by modern approaches.^[28] In addition, industry policy has become a candidate tool for supporting societal goals.^[29] A recent study defines industry policy as “those government policies that explicitly target the transformation of the structure of economic activity in pursuit of some public goal.”^[30] However, deterrence is rarely one of these public goals, which further contributes to the disconnect between the two ideas in the literature. Recent efforts by the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D) to address the whole-of-nation, all tools of statecraft deterrence challenge do not advocate for industry policy as an option.^[31] In the few places that industry policy is discussed alongside deterrence, the former is typically linked to the defence industrial base. In keeping with the theme of military-centric deterrence, Head of Shoal Group Graeme Dunk’s argument for industry policy focuses on assuring a military deterrent capability. ^[32] The role of government-directed economic shaping therefore remains an under-explored means for effecting general deterrence by denial.

A significant change in Australia’s economic security landscape occurred in April 2024 when the Prime Minister announced the Future Made in Australia industry policy. While the Prime Minister’s website says it is “about seizing the opportunities of the move to renewable energy while becoming a country that makes things again,”^[33] the policy has a clear economic security intent.^[34] To enact the support it considers necessary to address structural and strategic challenges to the Australian economy, the government has developed a National Interest Framework (NIF) that classifies priority industries under two streams: the Net Zero Transformation Stream; and the Economic Resilience and Security Stream.^[35] Here, the potential for linking Australian industry policy and the deterrence strategy of National Defence emerges. Resilience is both a key element of this industry policy and the DSR’s stated “central component of deterrence.”^[36] For this implicit linking of industry policy and deterrence to be cogent, industry policy must enhance resilience, and resilience must create a deterrent effect.

Deterrence through Resilience and a Whole-of-Nation Approach

AUKUS meeting photo with Athony ALbanese, Joe Bidden and Rishi Sunnick

Resilience has become the defining means of deterrence for Australia. Linking the two ‘contrasting cornerstones of security’ of deterrence and resilience has largely emerged in 21^st century security policies.^[37] Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper spoke at length of Australia’s success being contingent on strength and resilience, community cohesion, and a competitive economy, however it was with the 2023 DSR that the link between resilience and deterrence was made clear. ^[38] The review calls resilience a central component of deterrence, arguing that a demonstrated ability to endure disruption lessens Australia’s susceptibility to coercion, and signals Australia’s resolve to an adversary.^[39] The 2024 NDS reinforces the centrality of resilience, highlighting how national, industry, and supply chain resilience and integrated statecraft are critical to National Defence.^[40] In placing resilience at the heart of its deterrence posture, Australia has followed the lead of NATO countries like the US and UK.^[41] NATO argues that ‘national and collective resilience’ are an essential basis for ‘credible deterrence.’^[42] The organisation goes on to say that an ‘all hazards’ and ‘whole of society’ approach to resilience is an integral part of its deterrence posture. NATO states that societal resilience is an important aspect of deterrence by denial, and argues that resilience can persuade an adversary not to attack by convincing it that an attack will not achieve its intended objectives.^[43] Linking the two, the logic follows that if a country demonstrates an ability to endure disruption (resilience), an aggressor loses confidence in their chance of success and ultimately does not engage in aggression (deterrence). This seems a sound theoretical basis for a defence strategy, but Australia’s embrace of a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to deterrence through resilience is likely to be a considerable undertaking. Such an approach therefore demands some assurance that resilience does in fact have a deterrent effect.

The deterrent effect of resilience is validated by the relative success of the strategy among NATO’s Baltic Sea states. During the Cold War, Sweden’s proximity to NATO and the USSR, and their desire to maintain neutrality, motivated a whole-of-society approach to resilience. By requiring a whole-of-society contribution to ‘Total Defense,’ Sweden augmented their military with a resilient population and demonstrated a model approach to deterring threats.^[44] For many years since, Sweden’s resilience has contributed to the view that it is an unlikely candidate for Russian aggression, relative to other states in the region.^[45] In light of changing circumstances, Sweden has revived its whole-of-society, collective resilience concept, and influenced several of its Baltic and Nordic neighbours in the process.^[46] ‘Total’ or ‘Comprehensive Defense’ is a feature of the 2015 Swedish National Defence Bill, and the equivalent strategies and concepts of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland.^[47] The concept refers to the integrated use of military and non-military efforts in a whole-of-nation approach to deter aggression. Total Defense is underpinned by resilience, and in the Baltic, societal resilience is having a successful deterrent effect. A study of approaches within the region makes the case that enhancing Baltic resilience is likely to continue to impact Moscow’s risk calculus when considering a military occupation.^[48] Resilience-enhancing efforts are not only necessary for deterring occupation or other military aggression, but to make the Baltic states more robust in the face of grey zone conflict.^[49] This ability of resilience to support deterrence of a multitude of threats is a strong case for a whole-of-nation approach to enhancing resilience, and one that is having influence beyond NATO in places like Taiwan.

To help understand resilience’s deterrent effect and identify any limitations, Australia would do well to monitor Taiwan’s adoption of a NATO-like approach. There are parallels between Taiwan’s context and that of the Baltic states; both border a major power that questions the legitimacy of their statehood. There are also parallels between Australia’s context and Taiwan’s; both have been the target of Beijing’s coercive tactics. While the object of the DSR’s deterrence posture is implicit, both Australia and Taiwan are seeking to deter aggression of some form, from the same source. Taiwan’s ‘porcupine strategy’ builds on Sweden’s Cold War ‘Total Defense,’ and constitutes a whole-of-society approach to deterrence.^[50] In line with this strategy, Taiwan has established organisations to enhance national resilience to natural disasters and Chinese military threats, and the government has worked closely with the private sector to help mitigate trade risks to industries dependent on China.^[51] It is this latter step that is of particular interest for three reasons. First, it relates to the threat of Chinese economic coercion experienced by Taiwan and Australia alike. Second, like Taiwan, Australia must pursue a denial strategy to deter this threat as it has limited options for punishment.^[52] Third, deterring this threat requires a government to wield economic policy as a tool of statecraft; market forces alone cannot solve the problem if those forces are the very thing being manipulated to gain leverage. Taiwanese trade policy intervention seeks to enhance the country’s economic resilience. By finding alternate export partners, Taiwan can better endure attempts at economic coercion. To enhance economic resilience, the national interest, and those of the private sector must align in an approach that extends beyond ‘whole-of-government.’ This is a candidate case study in whole-of-nation deterrence for Australia. By being a step ahead of Australia, Taiwan offers a contemporary, region-specific observation of NATO’s societal resilience strategy in action.

Why Industry Policy Makes Sense for Australia

Given the context of the Australia-China economic relationship, it is also necessary to consider whether a trade policy approach to resilience like Taiwan’s is sufficient for Australia’s denial strategy. Australia’s economy is vulnerable to trade tensions with China due to a relative lack of export profile diversity and given China’s status as its largest trading partner.^[53] Australia’s dependence on China as an export market heightens its risk of economic coercion by Beijing, and many have argued for trade portfolio diversification as a mitigation.^[54] Conceivably, Beijing’s attempt to influence Australia’s behaviour by pursuing an alternate source of coal or iron ore, or through an import ban or tariff, could be denied if Australia could export said coal or iron ore to another market. Responding to economic coercion by diversifying exports is therefore an intuitive approach and one that could work for industries that enjoy alternate markets.^[55] Despite the decline in the Australia-China relationship, China remains Australia’s largest trading partner and assessments of Australia’s geoeconomic environment offer no time horizon beyond which attempts at coercion are expected to cease. ^[56] To the contrary, National Defence is motivated by a strategic environment becoming increasingly contested. For the foreseeable future then, Australia should take steps to deter economic coercion. At a macro-level, attempts to harm Australia through economic coercion have been largely unsuccessful due to diversification and increased Chinese demand for iron ore. However, Beijing’s inability to influence Australia’s behaviour in its favour thus far is insufficient to assure the success of Australian export diversification as a deterrent. There is no guarantee trade solutions would succeed again in the face of any future attempts at coercion which could become more severe and have a greater impact.^[57] Successful diversification requires alternate export partners, and these are finite; Australia cannot feasibly trade with everyone, and in the case of some primary commodities, there simply are no suitable alternate markets.^[58] However, the most compelling objection to a reliance on trade portfolio diversification as a deterrent has to be its failure to treat the underlying issue of asymmetric economic dependence. This issue creates the conditions where economic coercion can be considered a viable means to influence or gain leverage. To enhance economic resilience, Australia must do more than diversify existing exports. Australia must instead begin restructuring economic activity to change the nature of the Australia-China relationship. This calls for the use of industry policy for deterrence beyond the bolstering of military capability.

Australia needs to employ industry policy to enhance its economic resilience and deter threats by denial. To successfully deter, Australia must seek to alter Beijing’s thinking on the likely success of its attempts at coercion by reducing the perceived benefits of engaging in such behaviour.^[59] Australia’s use of economic tools should be in support of general deterrence – reducing the need to use immediate tools by creating a deterrence effect so well established that Beijing habitually hesitates to engage in coercive behaviour.^[60] Australia must therefore take a longer-term view toward a restructure of economic activity, productivity-raising measures, and a better linking of economic and national security objectives.^[61] Industry policy is uniquely and ideally placed to service this need. There are several instances of industry policy being employed for resilience and security. In the case of resilience, the industry policy discussion often focuses on ‘climate resilience’ or ‘supply chain resilience.’ The latter gives rise to one of the most famous examples of modern industry policy being employed by a major power – the US’ adoption of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act (CHIPS and Science Act).^[62]

Through this industry policy, the US aims to establish itself as a leader in emerging technologies and semiconductor development, and to enhance the resilience of its semiconductor supply chain by reducing its dependence on China.^[63] The Act’s factsheet makes the security motivations behind the policy clear: the US is reshaping economic activity to “create jobs, strengthen supply chains, and counter China.”^[64] By reducing dependence, the US is moving toward a greater level of strategic autonomy and perhaps indispensability, both of which have enabled Japan and Taiwan to deter coercion in the past.^[65] While a prescription for an Australian approach to deterrence through industry policy would require its own detailed study, the Future Made in Australia policy gives an (admittedly less direct) indication of how Australia is beginning to pursue greater autonomy in its own way. Although the Net Zero Transformation Stream might not seem like a deterrent on the surface, what it does is begin the process of decoupling Australia’s economic prosperity away from a China-heavy minerals and energy trade portfolio. Over time, this shift will likely reduce coercion options; as fossil fuels are traded less, the benefit to be gained from threatening to source coal from an alternate supplier decreases. Australia is taking its first steps along a path to denying an avenue for coercion, through long-term, general deterrence by denial.

Industry policy makes sense for Australia despite being relatively controversial among economic tools of statecraft. Despite renewed interest in industry policy and its potential deterrence effect, and the release of Future Made in Australia, its use is not a foregone conclusion; there remains a healthy level of scepticism after its decades “relegated to the political wilderness.”^[66] Historical aversion to industry policy is in part due to the central argument of government intervention in markets. For some, the idea that market failures are the fault of governments getting in the way of perfectly good market forces is ideological.^[67] For many others, the concerns about government intervention are more rational; there are numerous examples of industry policy gone wrong. Altenburg’s 2011 survey of industrial policy in developing countries summarises the clear failures of centrally planned economy experiments, the unsustainable debts resulting from import-substitution industrialisation strategies of the 1960s-70s, and a multitude of subsidised projects that failed.^[68] Fortunately, the existence of these examples can help shape more sound policy approaches; Altenburg’s survey, among others, offer a lot of general considerations for modern industry policy. As a result, modern industry policy can be developed to avoid succumbing to protectionism and a loss of focus on macro-objectives. Key to this, is having a clear national project (in this case, economic resilience) to steer and constrain government so that the industry policy means support the national strategic ends. There are also three apparent challenges specific to Australia’s use of industry policy for resilience that should be managed.

First, the long-term, general deterrent approach requires careful, integrated planning to avoid a risk of premature decoupling. A parliamentary briefing book conveys that “analysts warn a significant reduction in trade with China could result in a reduction in living standards for Australians.”^[69] The rate of change must be managed so that industry policies do not make Australians worse off. Second, the government should avoid employing economic tools in a manner that does not accord with the ‘rules-based order.’ Doing so could undermine Australia’s reputation and the credibility of its deterrence posture. Finally, government intervention must not unacceptably impact Australia’s competitiveness in trade. Fundamentally, industry policy should build on current and intended future comparative advantages. Fortunately, Future Made in Australia seems to recognise this need. To be a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to resilience, and therefore successfully deter, industry policy needs private sector buy-in, and the support of the population. This support is contingent on these risks being appropriately managed.

Where to From Here?

The release of Future Made in Australia signals the start of an approach that could see Australia employ industry policy as an element of national power in statecraft, to support deterrence. The role industry policy can play in deterring through resilience is understood, as are the associated policy-specific risks. Future Made in Australia may need to adapt to strategic circumstances, and the need for alternate industry policies may also arise in future. From here, it is necessary to consider how best to employ these policies in a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach to resilience and how to best ensure this resilience will have the desired effect. The former calls for coherence of strategy and coordinated management. The latter calls for clarity of communication.

Employing industry policy in support of national security objectives is likely to be a considerable undertaking. Adding a national security objectives ‘layer’ will exacerbate the challenge of managing policy which has already been criticised for a lack of cohesion and central coordination.^[70] Future Made in Australia has also received early criticism for a supposed lack of clarity in its guidelines, and questions have emerged about how it will be managed. ^[71] In considering what a whole-of-nation approach to international policy could look like, an AP4D options paper argues that “a new depth of coordination and coherence must be injected into Australia’s international and security policy.”^[72] In the Swedish and Taiwanese examples, whole-of-nation resilience enhancing efforts were centrally managed. Coordination requires national strategic direction to be implemented through the relevant industry policy objectives, inter-departmental and inter-agency solution-development, and longer-term monitoring and evaluation.^[73] Coherence requires that the approach supports the strategic ends. Both coherence and coordination may be best achieved with the support of a specialist organisation, established specifically to bridge the various government departments, and the government and private sector.^[74]

Regardless of how the strategy is managed, or by whom, communication must be front of mind when employing industry policy for deterrence. In ‘Understanding Deterrence,’ Mazarr cautions against focusing on the perspective of the country engaged in deterrence and argues that a successful strategy must focus on the perceptions of the aggressor.^[75] Much of this paper has focused on the ‘capability’ part of the deterrence equation. It has shown that industry policy can support resilience, and that resilience can deter. But deterrence focused on capability without due consideration of communication risks failure; deterrence occurs in the mind of the aggressor. Sweden’s successful deterrence of the USSR was enabled by its clear communication; Sweden outwardly communicated its deterrent posture, and actively sought to convince the Soviet Union that invading would be unlikely to succeed.^[76] If Australia is serious about deterrence, it must communicate its intent. Dr Carr’s criticism of the 2023 DSR still holds; if Australia is deterring Beijing it should say so. If Australia is going to use industry policy for resilience, and is building resilience to deter Beijing, it should say so. While the White House Factsheet on the CHIPS and Science Act is abundantly clear that countering China is among its objectives, Future Made in Australia is held up as being about the green transition and “making more things here.” The Lowy Institute Poll 2024 says the policy “seeks to…achieve economic, national security, and decarbonisation objectives,”^[77] without expounding those national security objectives. The link between Australia’s embrace of industry policy and its strategy of deterrence is implicit at best. Australia needs to be clear what deterring with all elements of national power in statecraft means, lest it risk failure.

Conclusion

Explicit calls for Australia to pursue economic structural reform to support its denial strategy are limited. Comprehensive and integrated approaches to deterrence recognise the role of economic tools, although the focus is generally on promoting open and transparent trade, portfolio diversification, and the threat of sanctions. Australia’s middle power status and the intersection of its strategic environment, its chosen strategy of deterrence by denial, and its long-term precarious economic position demands more. The re-emergence of industry policy as a means of enhancing economic resilience presents an opportunity for Australia to develop the capability to deter threats from Beijing.

In a piecemeal fashion, Australia has begun to communicate its willingness to capitalise on this opportunity. With National Defence, Australia has embraced deterrence by denial as a strategy, and linked deterrence to resilience. National Defence calls for all elements of national power in statecraft but leaves the extent to which it will employ economic reforms and the object of its deterrence strategy unstated. The nascent Future Made in Australia industry policy seeks to build resilience, but the National Interest Framework does not mention deterrence and stops short of linking the policy to Defence artefacts. The elements are all there; what is needed now is a coherent, whole-of-nation approach, clearly communicated.

This paper has made the case for Australian industry policy to support deterrence. It has argued that industry policy can deter, and that Australia should employ it accordingly. Whether or not industry policy will have the deterrent effect Australia seeks will depend on how successfully it can be employed, and how it is perceived. Industry policy implementation would depart from the free-market approach and preference industries based on national security objectives. For Australia to successfully employ the tool, the interests of government and the private sector must be bridged; the opportunity cost must be understood, and the rationale must be compelling. Coherent and coordinated strategic industry policy management will be critical for this whole-of-nation approach. That leaves the last variable in the equation – communication. Beijing’s perception will determine the success of Australia’s deterrence. Australia must consistently communicate that coercive acts are so unlikely to succeed in their aims that the costs cannot be justified. Influencing Beijing’s risk calculation requires clear communication of Australia’s industry policy intent.

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Joint Statement. ‘Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices’, 9 June 2023.https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/joint-declaration-against-trade-related-economic-coercion-and-non-market-policies-and-practices.

Juhász, Réka, Nathan Lane, and Dani Rodrik. ‘The New Economics of Industrial Policy’. Annual Review of Economics, August 2023.https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081023-024638.

Kim, Dong Jung. ‘Economic Deterrence Through Economic Engagement’. Foreign Policy Analysis 15, no. 2 (1 April 2019): 176–86.https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/ory001.

Laurenceson, James, Thomas Pantle, and Michael Zhou. ‘PRC Economic Coercion: The Recent Australian Experience’, 14 September 2020.

Mazarr, Michael J. Understanding Deterrence. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018.https://doi.org/10.7249/PE295.

Mazarr, Michael J., Arthur Chan, Alyssa Demus, Bryan Frederick, Alireza Nader, Stephanie Pezard, Julia A. Thompson, and Elina Treyger. What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018.https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2451.

Muresianu, Alex. ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act: Comparing and Contrasting the New Industrial Policy’. States News Service, 8 March 2024. Gale Academic OneFile.

NATO. ‘Deterrence and Defence’. NATO. Accessed 18 September 2024.https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm.

———. ‘Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3’. NATO. Accessed 18 September 2024.https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.

Neelam, Ryan. ‘2024 Report: Economy and Trade - Lowy Institute Poll’. Lowy Institute Poll 2024. Accessed 29 July 2024.https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2024/economy-and-trade/#report.

OECD. ‘Industrial Policy’. OECD. Accessed 27 September 2024.https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/industrial-policy.html.

Peters, Robert, Justin Anderson, and Harrison Menke. ‘Deterrence in the 21^st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force’, 2018.

Phillips, Toby, and Esther Koh. ‘Setting Direction | A Purposeful Approach to Modern Industry Policy’, 4 April 2024.https://cpd.org.au/work/setting-direction-a-purposeful-approach-to-modern-industry-policy/.

Prior, Tim. ‘Resilience: The “Fifth Wave” in the Evolution of Deterrence’, 12 April 2019.https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html.

Ramizo Jr., Godofredo. ‘Industrial Policy: A Survey of Institutional Challenges’. Journal of Australian Political Economy 2016, no. 77 (1 December 2016): 136–51.

Robson, Alex. ‘Optimal Industry Policy - Speech’, 30 August 2023.https://www.pc.gov.au/media-speeches/speeches/optimal-industry-policy.

Rogers, James. ‘Reinforcing Deterrence Through Societal Resilience: Countering Hybrid Threats in the Baltic Region’. In A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats, edited by Eugenio Cusumano and Marian Corbe, 259–80. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60798-6_12.

Santiago, Fernando, Nobuya Haraguchi, and Alejandro Lavopa. ‘Global Trends and World Order: Implications for New Industrial Policies in Developing Countries’. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 24, no. 1 (December 2024): 5.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-024-00419-4.

Shiojiri, Kotaro. ‘Fight Against Economic Coercion: Opportunities and Challenges for Japan’. Stimson Center (blog), 9 April 2024.https://www.stimson.org/2024/fight-against-economic-coercion-for-japan/.

The White House. ‘Fact Sheet: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China’. The White House, 9 August 2022.https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.

Townshend, Ashley, David Santoro, and Toby Warden. ‘Collective Deterrence and the Prospect of Major Conflict’, 12 September 2023.https://www.ussc.edu.au/collective-deterrence-and-the-prospect-of-major-conflict.

Warwick, Ken. ‘Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New Trends’. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers. Vol. 2. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, 5 April 2013.https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4869clw0xp-en.

Wesley, Michael. ‘Australia and the Rise of Geoeconomics’. Working/Technical Paper. Centre of Gravity Series Papers. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Australian National University, 2016.

Wickes, Ron, Mike Adams, and Nicolas Brown. ‘Institute for International Trade’, July 2021.https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/86052_wp04-economic-coercion-by-china-the-effects-on-australias-merchandise-exports.pdf.

Wilkinson, Edith. ‘Resilience and Deterrence: Exploring Correspondence Between the Concepts’. In Deterrence, edited by Anastasia Filippidou, 19–33. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_2.

Wilson, Jeffrey. ‘Adapting Australia to an Era of Geoeconomic Competition – Perth USAsia Centre’. Accessed 21 July 2024.https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-insights/publications/adapting-australia-to-an-era-of-geoeconomic-competition/.

Wirtz, James, and Jeffrey Larsen. ‘Who Does Deterrence?’ The RUSI Journal 168, no. 6 (19 September 2023): 14–20.https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2288133.

Zhou, Ian, and Tessa Satherley. ‘Global Trade Risks and Opportunities’. Text. Australia. Accessed 1 August 2024.https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook47p/GlobalTradeRisksAndOpportunities.

Footnotes

¹ OECD, ‘Industrial Policy’, OECD, accessed 27 September 2024,https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/industrial-policy.html; Réka Juhász, Nathan Lane, and Dani Rodrik, ‘The New Economics of Industrial Policy’, Annual Review of Economics, August 2023, 4,https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081023-024638.

² Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik, ‘The New Economics of Industrial Policy’, 2.

³ Alex Muresianu, ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act: Comparing and Contrasting the New Industrial Policy’, States News Service, 8 March 2024, Gale Academic OneFile; Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik, ‘The New Economics of Industrial Policy’, 2; Mark Dean and Shirley Jackson, ‘Industry Policy’, Journal of Australian Political Economy, no. 92 (2024): 148.

⁴ Fernando Santiago, Nobuya Haraguchi, and Alejandro Lavopa, ‘Global Trends and World Order: Implications for New Industrial Policies in Developing Countries’, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 24, no. 1 (December 2024): 4,https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-024-00419-4.

⁵ Santiago, Haraguchi, and Lavopa, 1–2; Alex Robson, ‘Optimal Industry Policy - Speech’, 30 August 2023,https://www.pc.gov.au/media-speeches/speeches/optimal-industry-policy.

⁶ Department of Defence, ‘National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023’, Website, 5, accessed 18 February 2024,https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.

⁷ Australian Government, ‘Foreign Policy White Paper’, Text, Foreign Policy White Paper (Foreign Policy White Paper, 2017), 44,https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf.

⁸ Department of Defence, ‘National Defence’, 6.

⁹ Department of Defence, 18, 32.

¹⁰ Joint Statement, ‘Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices’, 9 June 2023,https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/joint-declaration-against-trade-related-economic-coercion-and-non-market-policies-and-practices.

¹¹ Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 1,https://doi.org/10.7249/PE295.

¹² Robert Peters, Justin Anderson, and Harrison Menke, ‘Deterrence in the 21^st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force’, 2018, 16; Tim Prior, ‘Resilience: The “Fifth Wave” in the Evolution of Deterrence’, 12 April 2019,https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html.

¹³ Michael J. Mazarr et al., What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 2,https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2451.

¹⁴ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 1.

¹⁵ Mazarr et al., What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression, 3–4.

¹⁶ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 2, 4.

¹⁷ James Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen, ‘Who Does Deterrence?’, The RUSI Journal 168, no. 6 (19 September 2023): 17,https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2288133.

¹⁸ Dong Jung Kim, ‘Economic Deterrence Through Economic Engagement’, Foreign Policy Analysis 15, no. 2 (1 April 2019): 178,https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/ory001.

¹⁹ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 2.

²⁰ Mazarr, 4.

²¹ Andrew Carr, ‘Australia’s New Defence Era: Archipelagic Deterrence’, The Strategist, 28 August 2023,https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-new-defence-era-archipelagic-deterrence/; Andrew Carr, ‘Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence’, Survival 65, no. 4 (4 July 2023): 84,https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239058.

²² Peters, Anderson, and Menke, ‘Deterrence in the 21^st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force’, 17; Matthew P. Anderson, ‘NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 4 (2016): 5–30,https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.15.4.01.

²³ Carr, ‘Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence’, 94.

²⁴ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 7.

²⁵ Carr, ‘Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence’, 94.

²⁶ Ryan Neelam, ‘2024 Report: Economy and Trade - Lowy Institute Poll’, Lowy Institute Poll 2024, sec. Free trade, accessed 29 July 2024,https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2024/economy-and-trade/#report.

²⁷ Becky Bathgate, ‘New Industrial Policy: A Future Made in Australia’, text, sec. The industrial policy pendulum, Australia, accessed 10 September 2024,https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/Budget/reviews/2024-25/NewIndustryPolicy; Dean and Jackson, ‘Industry Policy’, 148; Mark Dean et al., ‘Industrial Policy-Making after COVID-19: Manufacturing, Innovation and Sustainability’, The Economic and Labour Relations Review 32, no. 2 (June 2021): 298,https://doi.org/10.1177/10353046211014755.

²⁸ Tilman Altenburg, Industrial Policy in Developing Countries: Overview and Lessons from Seven Country Cases, Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut Für Entwicklungspolitik 4/2011 (Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2011), 1; Bathgate, ‘New Industrial Policy’, sec. Emergence of a ‘new industrial policy’; Toby Phillips and Esther Koh, ‘Setting Direction | A Purposeful Approach to Modern Industry Policy’, 4 April 2024, 3,https://cpd.org.au/work/setting-direction-a-purposeful-approach-to-modern-industry-policy/.

²⁹ Bathgate, ‘New Industrial Policy’, sec. Emergence of a ‘new industrial policy’; Phillips and Koh, ‘Setting Direction | A Purposeful Approach to Modern Industry Policy’, 3; Dean et al., ‘Industrial Policy-Making after COVID-19’, 288.

³⁰ Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik, ‘The New Economics of Industrial Policy’, 4.

³¹ Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue, ‘Take a Whole-of-Nation Approach to International Policy’, AsiaPacific4D, accessed 10 September 2024,https://asiapacific4d.com/idea/whole-of-nation/; Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue, ‘What Does It Look like for Australia to Use All Tools of Statecraft in Practice’, AsiaPacific4D, accessed 10 September 2024,https://asiapacific4d.com/idea/all-tools-of-statecraft/; Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue, ‘Navigate a New Era of Economic Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific’, AsiaPacific4D, accessed 10 September 2024,https://asiapacific4d.com/idea/navigate-a-new-era-of-economic-statecraft/.

³² Graeme Dunk, ‘There Is No Deterrence without a Manufacturing Base - Strategic Analysis Australia’, accessed 2 October 2024,https://strategicanalysis.org/there-is-no-deterrence-without-a-manufacturing-base/.

³³ Anthony Albanese, ‘Future Made in Australia’, accessed 10 September 2024,https://anthonyalbanese.com.au/our-work/future-made-in-australia.

³⁴ Anthony Albanese and Jim Chalmers, ‘Investing in a Future Made in Australia | Prime Minister of Australia’, 14 May 2024,https://www.pm.gov.au/media/investing-future-made-australia.

³⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Future Made in Australia’, accessed 10 September 2024,https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p2024-526942.

³⁶ Department of Defence, ‘National Defence’, 38.

³⁷ Edith Wilkinson, ‘Resilience and Deterrence: Exploring Correspondence Between the Concepts’, in Deterrence, ed. Anastasia Filippidou, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 19,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_2; Rubén Arcos, Irena Chiru, and Cristina Ivan, eds., Routledge Handbook of Disinformation and National Security (London New York: Routledge, 2024), 21.

³⁸ Australian Government, ‘Foreign Policy White Paper’, 11–13.

³⁹ Department of Defence, ‘National Defence’, 38.

⁴⁰ Department of Defence, ‘2024 National Defence Strategy’, Website (Defence, 17 April 2024), 18,https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program.

⁴¹ Prior, ‘Resilience: The “Fifth Wave” in the Evolution of Deterrence’.

⁴² NATO, ‘Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3’, NATO, accessed 18 September 2024,https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.

⁴³ NATO, ‘Deterrence and Defence’, NATO, accessed 18 September 2024,https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm.

⁴⁴ Jason Gambill and Christopher S Pinkerton, ‘Resilience and Resistance, A NATO Model For Taiwan’, 2021, 29,https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.20580.86403.

⁴⁵ James Rogers, ‘Reinforcing Deterrence Through Societal Resilience: Countering Hybrid Threats in the Baltic Region’, in A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats, ed. Eugenio Cusumano and Marian Corbe (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 268–69,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60798-6_12.

⁴⁶ Carl-Oskar Bohlin, Peter Rough, and Daniel Kochis, ‘How Civil Defense Boosts Deterrence: A View from Sweden | Hudson Institute’, 10 September 2024,https://www.hudson.org/events/how-civil-defense-boosts-deterrence-view-sweden.

⁴⁷ Stephen Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance (RAND Corporation, 2019), 2,https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2779.

⁴⁸ Flanagan et al., 26.

⁴⁹ Flanagan et al., 4.

⁵⁰ Elisabeth Braw, ‘Taiwan and the Art of Societal Resilience’, George W. Bush Presidential Center, 2023, sec. Get prickly,https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/broken-china/taiwan-and-the-art-of-societal-resilience/.

⁵¹ Braw, ‘Taiwan and the Art of Societal Resilience’; Calvin Chu, ‘Enhancing Taiwan’s National Resilience - Taipei Times’, 26 July 2024,https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/07/26/2003821318.

⁵² Ashley Townshend, David Santoro, and Toby Warden, ‘Collective Deterrence and the Prospect of Major Conflict’, 12 September 2023,https://www.ussc.edu.au/collective-deterrence-and-the-prospect-of-major-conflict.

⁵³ Ian Zhou and Tessa Satherley, ‘Global Trade Risks and Opportunities’, text, Australia, accessed 1 August 2024,https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook47p/GlobalTradeRisksAndOpportunities.

⁵⁴ Zhou and Satherley, sec. Trade tensions with China; Jeffrey Wilson, ‘Adapting Australia to an Era of Geoeconomic Competition – Perth USAsia Centre’, 10, accessed 21 July 2024,https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-insights/publications/adapting-australia-to-an-era-of-geoeconomic-competition/.

⁵⁵ Mike Adams, Ron Wickes, and Nicolas Brown, ‘Australia’s Response to Chinese Economic Coercion: Towards a Comprehensive Strategic Approach to Export Diversification’, Policy Brief (Institute for International Trade, The University of Adelaide), 2, accessed 19 July 2024,https://iit.adelaide.edu.au/news/list/2022/07/06/australias-response-to-chinese-economic-coercion-towards-a-comprehensive.

⁵⁶ Ron Wickes, Mike Adams, and Nicolas Brown, ‘Institute for International Trade’, July 2021, 3,https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/86052_wp04-economic-coercion-by-china-the-effects-on-australias-merchandise-exports.pdf.

⁵⁷ James Laurenceson, Thomas Pantle, and Michael Zhou, ‘PRC Economic Coercion: The Recent Australian Experience’, 14 September 2020, 6.

⁵⁸ Adams, Wickes, and Brown, ‘Australia’s Response to Chinese Economic Coercion: Towards a Comprehensive Strategic Approach to Export Diversification’, 3.

⁵⁹ Fergus Hunter et al., ‘Countering China’s Coercive Diplomacy’, sec. What’s the solution?, accessed 21 July 2024,http://www.aspi.org.au/report/countering-chinas-coercive-diplomacy.

⁶⁰ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 4.

⁶¹ Adams, Wickes, and Brown, ‘Australia’s Response to Chinese Economic Coercion: Towards a Comprehensive Strategic Approach to Export Diversification’, 1; Michael Wesley, ‘Australia and the Rise of Geoeconomics’, Working/Technical Paper, Centre of Gravity Series Papers (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Australian National University, 2016), 18.

⁶² The White House, ‘Fact Sheet: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China’, The White House, 9 August 2022,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.

⁶³ Santiago, Haraguchi, and Lavopa, ‘Global Trends and World Order’, 8.

⁶⁴ The White House, ‘Fact Sheet’.

⁶⁵ Kotaro Shiojiri, ‘Fight Against Economic Coercion: Opportunities and Challenges for Japan’, Stimson Center (blog), 9 April 2024, sec. Japan’s Response to Economic Coercion: Opportunities and Challenges,https://www.stimson.org/2024/fight-against-economic-coercion-for-japan/; Gambill and Pinkerton, ‘Resilience and Resistance, A NATO Model For Taiwan’, 42.

⁶⁶ Dean and Jackson, ‘Industry Policy’, 148.

⁶⁷ Dean and Jackson, 148.

⁶⁸ Altenburg, Industrial Policy in Developing Countries, 1.

⁶⁹ Zhou and Satherley, ‘Global Trade Risks and Opportunities’, sec. Trade tensions with China.

⁷⁰ Robson, ‘Optimal Industry Policy - Speech’; Phillips and Koh, ‘Setting Direction | A Purposeful Approach to Modern Industry Policy’, 8.

⁷¹ Jacob Greber, ‘Government’s Future Made in Australia Plan Criticised for “vague and Difficult to Interpret” Guidelines’, ABC News, 29 July 2024,https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-29/future-made-in-australia-questioned-by-stakeholders/104155044.

⁷² Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue, ‘Take a Whole-of-Nation Approach to International Policy’, 11.

⁷³ Ken Warwick, ‘Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New Trends’, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, vol. 2, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, 5 April 2013, 4,https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4869clw0xp-en.

⁷⁴ Godofredo Ramizo Jr., ‘Industrial Policy: A Survey of Institutional Challenges’, Journal of Australian Political Economy 2016, no. 77 (1 December 2016): 138.

⁷⁵ Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, 1.

⁷⁶ Gambill and Pinkerton, ‘Resilience and Resistance, A NATO Model For Taiwan’, 30; Braw, ‘Taiwan and the Art of Societal Resilience’, sec. Get prickly.

⁷⁷ Neelam, ‘2024 Report’, sec. Free trade.

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(Buckley, 2025)

Buckley, A. 2025. 'Deterrence and the case for Australian Industry Policy'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/deterrence-and-case-australian-industry-policy (Accessed: 26 November 2025).

(Buckley, 2025)

Andrew Buckley, "Deterrence and the case for Australian Industry Policy", The Forge, Published: November 26, 2025, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/deterrence-and-case-australian-industry-policy. (accessed November 26, 2025).

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

Operational Planning Military Science defence-nsps-level2

Campaign Planning Operational Art defence-nsps-level3

Theatre Operations Strategic Art defence-nsps-level4

Coalition Operations Political Acumen defence-nsps-level5

Social Mastery

Lead Integrated Systems social-influence-level5

Moral Leadership social-ethics-level3

Lead organisation through ethical concerns social-ethics-level4

Stewarding the Profession social-ethics-level5

Character Role Model social-character-level3

Generate Climates of Trust social-character-level4

Character Exemplar social-character-level5

Biography

Andrew Buckley

Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Major

Major Andrew Buckley is a full-time Army Officer in the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, and is a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff Course (Military Art) class of 2024. His background is in combat service support roles in the Army Aviation and Defence Uncrewed Aerial Systems capabilities.