How do you change a Complex Adaptive System?

Introduction

For an organisation that has committed so much of its time and money^[1] to changing the way it does business and how it behaves, it is somewhat surprising that until relatively recently there was no ADF definition of ‘culture’. Perhaps the ADF relied on the Dennis Denuto character’s definition from the 1997 movie The Castle—‘In summing up. It’s the constitution. It’s Mabo. It’s justice, it’s law. It’s the vibe and, no that’s it, it’s the vibe. I rest my case^[2].’ Edgar Schein provided the simplest definition of culture as ‘the way things are done around here’ or ‘the vibe’ ^[3]. With the publication of ADF-P-0 Culture in the Profession of Arms the ADF finally has a definition of culture as, ‘a set of beliefs, values, and attitudes shared by members of an organisation or group that influence their behaviours and practices.’ But what does it mean by an organisation or group of members of the ADF? At one level it could be the Department of Defence, at another the ADF, or the Army, Navy or Air Force, or a unit within one of the Services or a sub-unit, or a section. So, in this respect the ADF consists of a multitude of smaller organisations—a system of systems—and each can have their own unique culture, and these cultures may vary considerably from the cultural ‘norms’ of Defence as a whole. In this sense the ADF is a Complex Adaptive System (CAS), and understanding how such a system changes over time is the focus of this paper.

This paper will explain what is meant by the term ‘CAS’ and how such a system behaves in various contexts. The paper will then look more deeply at why the ADF could be considered a CAS and what value there might be in thinking about the ADF via this lens, eg, the ‘value proposition’. For example, by considering the Agents, Levels, and Environments that make up the ADF CAS, we might have a clearer basis for understanding cultural differences across the ADF. Via this lens it might be easier to understand why formal cultural change programs in the ADF have experienced questionable levels of success^[4]. CAS thinking can allow us to understand cultural change in the ADF, and the purpose of this paper is to highlight how this understanding can encourage relevant cultural change to take place. The paper will not offer suggestions on what aspects of culture need to be changed.

What is a Complex Adaptive System?

Any complex system has many parts, like a living organism. In a cultural context, complexity is embedded even at the most basic level, as agents, or, at the lowest level, individual people within the ADF can each have a unique idea of what the organisation’s culture is. Teams of agents at one level of the organisation become a single agent at the next level and so on up the entire organisational structure. So an individual soldier is an agent of a Section, a Section is an agent of a Platoon, and so on. Due to ongoing interactions between agents at all levels, CAS’s are dynamic, that is, they are in a constant state of movement.

David Snowden defined a complex system as having the following characteristics^[5]:

It involves large numbers of interacting elements [agents].
The interactions are nonlinear, and minor changes can produce disproportionately major consequences.
The system is dynamic, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and solutions can’t be imposed; rather, they arise from the circumstances. This is frequently referred to as emergence.
The system has a history, and the past is integrated with the present; the elements [agents] evolve with one another and with the environment; and evolution is irreversible.
Though a complex system may, in retrospect, appear to be ordered and predictable, hindsight does not lead to foresight because the external conditions and systems constantly change.
Unlike in ordered systems (where the system constrains the agents), or chaotic systems (where there are no constraints), in a complex system the agents and the system constrain one another, especially over time. This means we cannot forecast or predict what will happen.
Complex systems have multiple identities and can fluidly switch between them without conscious thought. (For example, a person can be a respected member of the community as well as a terrorist.)
They make decisions based on past patterns of success and failure, rather than on logical, definable rules.
They can, in certain circumstances, purposefully change the systems in which they operate to equilibrium states in order to create predictable outcomes.^[6]

Why the ADF can be described as a Complex Adaptive System

Reflecting on Snowdon’s points, the ADF can be seen to involve a large number of interacting elements—whether they be units, individuals, or Services. The interaction of these elements are nonlinear, and what may appear as a minor issue or event can produce disproportionately major consequences. For example, the ADFA Skype incident^[7] was nonlinear, that is, there were no events (detected) that were leading up to this one event. Furthermore, the event was small in terms of the number of agents involved in the original act, and isolated, but by becoming public knowledge it produced disproportionately major consequences for the ADF.

The operating environment of the ADF at all levels is dynamic (eg, continually changing) and, at every level, is responsive to changes in its external environment^[8]. According to CAS theory, the performance of a system is not the sum of the independent performances of its parts but is the product of their interactions.^[9] What can be achieved by a deployed Task Force, made up of many integrated units, is not just the effectiveness of units working independently, it is what happens when all those units work collectively. Via the sharing of relevant intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and Post Action Reports, new ideas emerge and are quickly considered, tested and incorporated into the collective working structure. In other words, the system becomes a hive brain where all areas benefit from the discoveries and ideas of every member.

Moreover, organisations also make use of corporate and historical knowledge to keep informing a likely future. This process of synthesis is not limited to one’s own military but also includes our understanding of the histories and experiences of other militaries. Recognising the importance of this huge historical record is why military history remains a central component of modern military training. The experience of the Spartans in the Persian Wars of 499-449 BC may seem esoteric to 21^st century warriors; however, the evolution of an extremely determined military force that ultimately defeated a far stronger adversary in the Persians continues to inform how modern militaries plan and shape task forces to this day. These traditions and shared histories also shape individual elements and how they interact with their external environment, creating incremental changes to the ongoing history of that element.

So, while the ADF and its elements may appear ordered and predictable, particularly in terms of the organisational structures inherent in the system, when a major event in the external environment necessitates change the organisation is equipped to respond adaptively. While it is true ‘the next war is never the same as the last war’, it is equally true there is no value in reinventing the wheel^[10]. Dynamic organisations benefit as much from the learnings of the past as they do the discoveries of the present. Consequently, it is possible to see the difference between well-informed and ill-informed change: the former builds on internalised knowledge and integrated thinking whereas the latter tends to be instituted by those who have no understanding of why systems have evolved to where they are. As the external environment continues to change it requires the ADF system to make changes to adapt to these changing conditions, but this must occur in an informed way, not because of expediency.

Agents, Levels and Environments

One of the challenges in thinking about complex systems is understanding the different levels that exist within them. This is a system-of-systems thinking challenge. Most systems are made up of numerous sub-systems and, in turn, each sub-system can be made up of many sub-sub-systems, creating a systems (or organisational) hierarchy. These are easy to see in the Services of the ADF: at the highest level the Army is a system comprising 1^st Division, Forces Command, Aviation Command and Special Operations Command. Forces Command as a system has the following sub-systems 1^st Brigade, 3^rd Brigade, 6^th Combat Support Brigade, Royal Military College of Australia, and 2^nd Division. The system of 2^nd Division has 7 further sub-systems, and on it continues until we are looking at the individual section level perhaps consisting of as few as 9–16 soldiers. Navy and RAAF can also be viewed in a similar fashion through their commands and Force Element Groups.

So the Section level is the Army’s smallest organisational structure, and the 9 to 16 soldiers that interact in that section (and in the language of a CAS) are termed ‘agents’. Their individual and joint behaviour create the environment (or culture) of that section. Those who have served in the ADF for some time will acknowledge that cultures, work climate or ‘the vibe’ can differ between sections for many reasons^[11].

Taking this up a level, an infantry platoon consists of three sections, so, at the Platoon level each subordinate section is considered an agent. The three sections, individually and in relationship with each other, create the culture of the Platoon. At the next level up, the Platoon becomes an agent that makes up the Company, and the culture of the Company consists of the individual and collective behaviour of the Platoons. Depending on what level of an organisation one is observing then, constituent agents can be the individual soldier (at Section level) or a Brigade (at Forces Command level).

In CAS terms, agents—whether individual soldiers or groups in the organisation—will typically interact with their unique external environment, as opposed to the whole system. So while the ‘adaptive’ part of a CAS is about the system adapting to changes in its external environment so as to ensure its ongoing success and survival, the external environment of a section in an infantry Brigade is its operational environment (eg, on exercise or operations, so either a field training area or tactical area of operations). That external environment can be physically harsh and demanding and filled with risks to life. The agents (soldiers) in that section will do what is required (individually and with others in their section) in that environment to experience success (achieve the mission) and to survive. Individual and collective behaviours that increase the chances of success will be identified and amplified^[12], whereas individual and collective behaviours that detract from success will be dampened or extinguished.

However, the external environment for an infantry section is not the exact same external environment for a Platoon, Company or Brigade. When considering the tactical environment of the individual section, each of these levels will be focused on a bigger piece of the puzzle while at the same time monitoring lower-level operational performance. Their coordinating role with other agents, such as other Platoons, Companies or Brigades, and meeting operational goals will see each level operating individually and collectively and promoting behaviour oriented for success and suppressing behaviour and activity that threatens the mission. The same applies at the Army level, where the individual and collective behaviour of 1^st Brigade, 3^rd Brigade, 6^th Combat Support Brigade, Royal Military College of Australia, and 2^nd Division will determine Army’s success in its external operating environment. This is a far cry from the external operating environment of the individual infantry section, but the levels are not disconnected entirely. How many times do we hear higher levels of an organisation being criticised by those at a lower level because they don’t understand our specific situation? Herein lies the value of understanding the way a CAS operates.

Understanding agents, levels, and environments are important as environmental changes impact on an organisation and members, or agents, within that organisation interpret the new information and create schemas (methods) that allow the organisation to adapt to this changing environment and to ensure its ongoing survival. This requires an understanding that our external environment is constantly changing, and therefore how the ADF structures itself and how it behaves determines its likelihood of survival.

Cultural Change Programs in the ADF

So, if we accept that the ADF can be characterised as a CAS that has different agents, levels and environments, how successful have ADF cultural change programs been?

The ADF is often viewed by those at the most senior level of having one culture (which can be changed as required). Whereas there are some similarities between the three Services, there remains—rightly, I would argue—three separate Service cultures^[13] and many sub-cultures within each Service. The assumptions that underpin cultural change efforts in the Department of Defence, such as the Pathway to Change program, include the assumption that cultural change can be ‘driven’ from the top leadership down. Also, that it is possible to ‘build’ a reformed Defence culture through a process of ‘cultural renewal’.^[14] While pressure to reform an organisation can come from the response to negative events affecting an organisation, cultural change really only occurs when people inside the ‘system’ believe the change is necessary to both improve their effectiveness and ensure their survival. Indeed, thinking about the CAS as an organism is very helpful to understanding this process, because an organism only adapts when there is an existential threat, and that is true of a CAS.

Rhetoric regarding top-down-driven cultural change is not unique to the Department of Defence and the ADF. An article in the Australian Institute of Company Directors magazine states: ‘Good organisational governance sets expectations for both formal and informal behaviours that shape culture. These expectations serve to create a link between the organisation’s purpose (why it exists) and its strategic goals by expressing the behaviours it expects from its people.^[15]’ The question remains though, are these programs successful in changing the culture of business organisations?

Pathway to Change nominally ended on 31 December 2022^[16] declaring, ‘Defence made progress towards achieving its cultural reform priorities’, and going on to list five ‘significant achievements’. It would be fair to say, however, that since December 2022 not all of Defence’s cultural issues have been solved. Indeed, events such as the Afghan inquiry, the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, and the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce would question the effectiveness of the cultural change program. It is questionable then whether change programs have been successful in changing the culture in the ADF. Indeed, there is a paucity of publicly available hard data or metrics to indicate cultural change in the ADF.

While there are many overlaps, the operating/external environment of one part of the organisation is not the same as the operating/external environment of another part. For example, the external operating environment of ADF HQ in Canberra is very much one of the political/bureaucratic environment that exists in Canberra. How successfully the HQ adapts to changes in its external operating environment will ensure its ongoing relevance in that environment. Nevertheless, the ADF HQ will attempt to change the entire ADF culture (however defined) in order to meet ministerial (and public) expectations. Because operating environments at different organisational levels differ, other ADF units that have their own (sometimes unique) operating environments may have difficulty in reconciling an HQ ADF directive for change with what their own environments are indicating. Indeed, the changes that HQ ADF may be requiring of the unit may be contrary to what that unit’s environment is indicating. Requests or changes implemented top-down may be largely irrelevant or, at worse, contrary to experiencing success at other levels within the organisation, if CAS theory is to be believed. Indeed, Brodnick and Krafft^[17] noted that in organisational change efforts:

Cause and effect are not necessarily closely related in time and space.
Massive interventions may have insignificant results, and small interventions may have massive results.
Similar actions taken by different institutions will never lead to the same result [one size does not fit all].
Functionally accurate forecasting is impossible in the broad scale and for the long term.

How then, should the ADF approach Cultural Change?

If top-down cultural change programs have limited impact on cultural change across a large organisation, how should cultural change be approached?

Organisational culture does change slowly over time based on the requirements of the continually changing external operating environment. If there are drastic (rather than incremental) changes in the external environment, then the organisation may need to implement drastic changes (eg IED defensive tactics in Afghanistan).

Strong organisational cultures exist where agents/members interact closely. Strong cultures exist where there is a good ‘fit’ between the organisation and its external operating environment. Strong cultures exist where there is good intelligence of the organisation’s external operating environment and where incremental changes are made on a continuous basis to maintain this ‘fit’. Agents are sensitive to changes in the external operating environment and interpreting ‘weak signals’^[18] to identify need for change. Weak signals can be identified in the external operating environment through tried and true methods in the ADF (and particularly Army). Listening posts that forewarn enemy activity, reconnaissance patrols that collect information on enemy movement, and probing attacks are all methods to gain knowledge about the external environment. Leaders in these unpredictable environments need to focus on creating an environment from which good things can emerge, rather than trying to bring about predetermined results and possibly missing opportunities that arise unexpectedly.^[19] So, increasing levels of interaction and communication within the organisation should be encouraged so that good ideas can be generated and tested and monitored for success. This integration and communication is particularly important between those agents who interact most regularly with the organisation’s external environment.

Organisations that undertake regular planning that considers the external environment should be encouraged.^[20] Indeed, combat elements of all three Services continually monitor their external operating environment and adapt their tactics and plans in response.

Dooley^[21] provides some general guidelines to achieving cultural change in an organisation: (a) create a shared purpose; (b) cultivate inquiry, learning, experimentation, and divergent thinking; (c) enhance external and internal interconnections via communication and technology; (d) instil rapid feedback loops for self-reference and self-control; (e) cultivate diversity, specialisation, differentiation, and integration; (f) create shared values and principles of action; and (g) make explicit a few but essential structural and behavioural boundaries.

Conclusion

The ADF is continually changing, with some of these changes mandated from senior levels in response to what are seen as imperative issues. Top-down cultural change programs are, however, problematic in large organisations. While the ADF had no official definition of culture until recently, cultural attributes within the organisation, and in particular within the Services, are very strong and enduring due to their particular combat environments.

One way to observe cultural change in organisations is through the lens of Complex Adaptive Systems, particularly relevant for the ADF, which is made up of many sub-systems and has a history of successful adaptation to the environments it has found itself in. Agents, levels and the importance of the operating environment are fundamental to understanding an organisation through a CAS lens, as is the acknowledgement that different levels in the organisation experience different external environments.

It is difficult to assess whether top-down cultural change programs have been successful in the ADF due to a lack of objective data; however, some of the ‘rules’ of CAS would suggest that organisation-wide cultural change programs are problematic. However, applying and encouraging some of the attributes of CAS to cultural change at all levels within the ADF should see relevant change at all levels within the ADF organisation. Encouraging agent interaction and communication, enmeshing with the external environment, planning, and experimentation, are all ways that successful adaptation to a dynamic environment can be achieved.

Bibliography

ADF-P-0 Culture in the Profession of Arms Edition 1. 2024. Commonwealth of Australia.

Australian National Audit Office, 2021. Defence’s Implementation of Cultural Reform, at https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/defence-implementation-cultural-reform#footnote-084-backlink, accessed 19 Feb 2025.

Brodnick, R.J. & Krafft, L.J. 1997. Chaos and complexity theory: Implications for research and planning in higher education. Paper presented at the 37^th Annual Forum of the Association for Institutional Research.

Brown, C.S. How to Survive a Posting to a joint Unit: The Three Services’ Cultural Approaches to Leadership and Discipline, at https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/how-survive-posting-joint-unit-three-services-cultural-approaches-leadership-and-discipline, accessed 26 Nov 2024

Dooley, Kevin J. 1997. A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change, Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 1. 1997

Gerstman, J., Barry, C., 2004. Applying a Complex Adaptive System and Weak Signals to Economics Teaching. International Journal of Learning Vol 11.

Gharajedaghi, J., Ackoff, R. L., 2001. Mechanisms, Organisms and Social Systems.

Information DEFGRAM No 276/2012. Senior Leadership addresses ‘Pathway to Change’. 04 May 2012.

MacCormick, J.S. (2019) Governing Organisational Culture. The Australian Institute of Company Directors.

Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture 2017-22, at http://drnet/People/Culture/Pages/Pathway-to-Change.aspx accessed 26 Nov 2024.

Schein, E.H. 1996. Organizational culture and leadership. 2^nd ed. Toronto, Ontario. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Snowden, D.J., and Boone, M. E. (2007) A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making, in Harvard Business Review, November, 2007.

Sitch, R., Cilauro, S., Gleisner, T., Kennedy, J. 1997. The Castle. Working Dog Productions.

The Australian Joint Professional Military Education Continuum 2.0. 2022. Commonwealth of Australia.

Wadham, Ben. 2012. ADFA Skype scandal: Smith’s reviews could help defence to change its culture, at https://theconversation.com/adfa-skype-scandal-smiths-reviews-could-help-defence-to-change-its-culture-5751 accessed 19 Feb 2025

Footnotes

¹ The Australian National Audit Office report into Defence’s Implementation of Cultural Reform indicated $11.19m was committed between 2012 and 2021. This, however, does not reflect the total cost of the program.

² Sitch, R., Cilauro, S., Gleisner, T., Kennedy, J. 1997. The Castle. Working Dog Productions.

³ Schein EH. Organizational culture and leadership. 2^nd ed. Toronto, ON: John Wiley & Sons Ltd; 1996.

⁴ A 2021 ANAO report found, ‘Defence is unable to provide assurance of the effectiveness of its implementation to date of its Pathway to Change – Evolving Defence Culture 2017-2022 cultural reform strategy.’

⁵ The David Snowden Cynefin Framework is referred to in a training and education environment in the Australian Joint Professional Military Education Continuum 2.0. p 46

⁶ Snowden, David J. and Boone, M.E. A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making. Harvard Business Review November 2007. Understanding Complexity side bar.

⁷ For an explanation see; https://theconversation.com/adfa-skype-scandal-smiths-reviews-could-help-defence-to-change-its-culture-5751 accessed 19 Feb 2025.

⁸ At the strategic level, one only needs to refer to the Defence Strategic Review to become aware of a changing threat environment. At a tactical level, consideration of technological threats now evident in the Ukraine-Russia conflict reveal a new threat reality.

⁹ Gharajedaghi, J. & Ackoff, R. L. 'Mechanisms, Organisms and Social Systems'.

¹⁰ Brodnick and Krafft’s second of eight postulates to assist understanding organisations is that ‘Institutions are attracted to identifiable configurations’, that is, they tend to configure in a way that offers the best fit with their external environment; so while some things change (adapt) not everything does all at once.

¹¹ Factors that affect section culture can include the personalities of the individuals, experience levels, skills, demeanour, reputation, etc.

¹² Sometimes called ‘emergent’ behaviours.

¹³ Brown, C.S. How to Survive a Posting to a joint Unit: The Three Services’ Cultural Approaches to Leadership and Discipline, at https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/how-survive-posting-joint-unit-three-services-cultural-approaches-leadership-and-discipline accessed 26 Nov 2024

¹⁴ Information DEFGRAM No 276/2012. Senior Leadership addresses ‘Pathway to Change’. of 04 May 2012.

¹⁵ MacCormick, J.S. (2019) ‘Governing organisational culture’, The Australian Institute of Company Directors.

¹⁶ Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture 2017-22, at http://drnet/People/Culture/Pages/Pathway-to-Change.aspx accessed 26 Nov 2024.

¹⁷ Brodnick, R.J. & Krafft, L.J. 1997. ‘Chaos and complexity theory: Implications for research and planning in higher education’, paper presented at the 37^th Annual Forum of the Association for Institutional Research.

¹⁸ Surprises [events that occur in the environment] that are not obvious and often not predicted are known as weak signals. Gerstman, J., Barry, C., 2004. Applying a Complex Adaptive System and Weak Signals to Economics Teaching. International Journal of Learning Vol 11. p 162

¹⁹ Snowden and Boone op cit.

²⁰ Many elements of Defence conduct regular planning which often includes a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) which assesses the internal strengths and weaknesses of the organisations and the opportunities and threats that exist in its external environment.

²¹ Dooley, K.J. A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change, pp 92-3

Cite Article

Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

Complex Problems defence-cognitive-level3

Social Mastery

Culture Alignment social-culture-level1

Biography

Callum Brown

GPCAPT

GPCAPT Brown is a now a Reserve officer who serves in the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College. Numerous postings throughout his career in the Permanent Air Force have necessitated the supervision and management of contracts. His interests are organisational culture, human behaviours, leadership, and ethics.