Western governments and militaries have the capabilities, frameworks and processes necessary to counter political warfare – but they must be applied with a unified whole-of-government approach.

Introduction

Whether it realises it or not, the West is already at war, and it is losing. The growth in prevalence of grey zone tactics—including political warfare—has increasingly blurred the lines between war and peace, challenging the traditional frameworks employed by the West to govern its application of hard power. Smart adversaries like China and Russia have learned to exploit the grey zone, achieving their strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of ‘war’, and thus avoiding the significant cost of conventional war with the West. The same openness and freedom that defines Western liberal democratic states ironically leaves them especially vulnerable to the range of subversive techniques that comprise political warfare, while authoritarian states are enabled and empowered by the emergence of cyberspace as the fifth domain of war.^[1] Political warfare is persistent, pervasive, and often difficult to attribute. It is therefore inherently complex, and demands creativity, agility, and the application of a whole-of-government (WoG) approach.

This essay will argue that existing theoretical and procedural frameworks for planning and conducting military campaigns do effectively enable Western militaries to adapt to the demands of contemporary political warfare, provided they are applied flexibly and creatively within a coordinated multi-agency WoG approach. First, this essay will describe the broad range of actions from various state and non-state actors that constitute political warfare, including coercion, political interference, information warfare, cyber-attacks, and other elements of great power competition (GPC) designed to achieve an actor’s strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of conventional war. Second, this essay will describe the Western concept of operational art, as implemented in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) through the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP). In doing so, this essay will highlight that Western planning frameworks are flexible and robust planning constructs that assist military planners in the development of creative, viable, and implementable Courses of Action (COA). Finally, this essay will outline some of the challenges associated with planning and conducting operations in the context of political warfare, highlighting the need for unity between the military and other government departments (OGDs), while describing one possible model for the application of operational art to political warfare combining all instruments of national power.

Political warfare

All war is fundamentally political. As Clausewitz famously noted, ‘[w]ar is the continuation of politics by other means’.^[2] States inherently seek to achieve their ‘ends’—typically increased national power—by whichever ‘ways’ make best use of their available ‘means’.^[3] In today’s parlance, political warfare (POLWAR) is a broad term that encompasses a range of actions undertaken by an actor in pursuit of strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of war, and thus avoiding a conventional, kinetic response.^[4]  Grey zone activities, subversion, coercion, information warfare, election interference, and propaganda campaigns, among others, all fall into this broad category.^[5] Despite the proliferation of new terminology, the application of these sub-threshold methods—either as a precursor to, to supplement, or in lieu of conventional methods of warfare—is far from new.^[6] As far back as 500 BC, Sun Tzu noted that ‘[u]ltimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting’.^[7]

The application of political warfare has a rich history, which should be a source of considerable knowledge and expertise within Western militaries. The First and Second World Wars saw both sides effectively employ psychological tactics to support their conventional operations, including, for example, the use of leaflets, radio broadcasts, and propaganda.^[8] The term ‘political warfare’ was included in a 1948 US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report written by George F. Kennan, who outlined various forms of overt and covert political warfare being undertaken by the British, Russians, and Americans.^[9] The Cold War saw the extensive use of non-kinetic means to promote political interests and pursue national power.^[10] In 1950, the CIA created the Congress of Cultural Freedom, which was used to support the development and distribution of books, music, art, television and films aimed at both Soviet and domestic American audiences, promoting the benefits of democracy.^[11] More covert actions included the use of deep cover operatives and the provision of support for anti-communist movements.^[12] In recent decades, the development of the internet and the emergence of cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare, coupled with the growth of conventional military power, has further enabled and promoted the use of POLWAR techniques.^[13] These developments, together with the growing economic interconnectedness of the world, have simultaneously increased the cost of kinetic conflict while decreasing the cost of non-kinetic conflict. While most state and non-state actors around the world are involved in POLWAR to some degree, it is the actions of a specific group of actors that are of predominant concern to the West—the ‘four plus one’—comprising China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and various global terrorist organisations.^[14] Within this group, it is the actions of the two most powerful authoritarian state actors, China and Russia that pose the greatest threat to the West.^[15]

Russia is actively engaged in a POLWAR campaign against the West, intended to weaken and undermine Western dominance and power.^[16] The Kremlin employs sophisticated, coordinated information operations (IO) to weaken its adversaries and manipulate public perceptions in its favour.^[17] State-run media outlets, including RT and Sputnik, as well as coordinated social media operations, are used to spread Russian propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation.^[18] Hack-and-leak operations (HLO) are used to obtain and release sensitive classified documents to embarrass or discredit public officials, weakening social and political cohesion.^[19] Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, and the 2017 German and French presidential elections, were clear cases of cyber-enabled POLWAR.^[20] Russia is also believed to have used social media to influence the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum, thus achieving its strategic objective of weakening the European Union.^[21] Russian military leadership has stated that ‘[t]he role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness’.^[22]

China’s POLWAR strategy is encapsulated by ‘The Three Warfares’ doctrine, comprising public opinion/media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.^[23] Like Russia, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs a sophisticated propaganda machine to weaponise the public opinion of Western countries, weakening them by seeding new—or emphasising existing—social divisions.^[24] More overtly, the CCP’s psychological warfare elements exert pressure on other countries through diplomatic pressure or overt demonstrations of military force, such as PLA Air Force incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), or transiting of the Taiwan Strait by the PLA Navy.^[25] China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a systematic and organised effort to increase its influence abroad through economic coercion.^[26] The BRI uses economic inducements, penalties, intimidation, and debt traps to gain control and influence over foreign governments.^[27] China and Russia are evidently comfortable using grey zone POLWAR mechanisms to achieve their strategic aims, whereas the West’s narrower focus on the distinction between war and peace, and its principled adherence to the rules-based order it seeks to defend, puts it at a disadvantage.^[28] For the West to succeed in 21st century POLWAR, it must be willing to adapt its ‘way of war’, including its theories and frameworks for the planning and conduct of military campaigns, to the ever-changing character of war.

Operational art and the Western way of war

The Western way of war is perhaps best characterised by its focus on technological overmatch—especially using stand-off engagement—and the pursuit of decisive victory through the application of hard power.^[29] To complement its focus on technology and firepower—and to ensure its military capabilities are harnessed effectively—Western militaries employ theories and frameworks for the planning and conduct of military campaigns evolved over generations of hard-won experience. The core idea of this Western theory is ‘operational art’, described as the ‘skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations’.^[30] It is, in other words, the thoughtful and creative linkage between ends, ways, means, and risk.^[31] This ‘operational art’ is applied in practice through planning processes, such as the ADF’s JMAP, comprising operational design and arrangement of operations.^[32] While encouraging imagination and creativity, the process follows a logical path, allowing military planning teams to solve complex problems in a robust, consistent manner.

Western military planning processes, including the JMAP and supporting Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), provide a structured process to break down and solve complex problems. The first task is Scoping and Framing, wherein the Joint Planning Group (JPG) aims to establish the actual problem to be solved.^[33] Strategic direction and guidance are used to generate a narrative summary of the problem, and the desired operational end state.^[34] A Mission Analysis is then conducted, wherein the JPG aims to determine the resources available for the campaign, conduct a Centre of Gravity Analysis (COGA), determine the mission, objectives, limitations, decisive points (DP), and lines of operation (LOO).^[35] Within the COGA, identification of friendly and adversary critical capabilities (CC), critical requirements (CR), and critical vulnerabilities (CV) inform the JPG regarding enemy critical factors that should be targeted, and those friendly critical factors that should be protected.^[36] DPs are those milestones in an operation that are regarded as providing the commander an advantage over the adversary, contributing to the overall success of the operation.^[37] Inherent in the determination of DPs is the JMAP principle that outcomes and end states are achieved by generating an effect, which can be either physical, physiological, psychological, or functional.^[38] Once a series of DPs have been devised, they are linked together along one or more LOO—paths from the current state, through DPs and operational objectives, to the desired end state.^[39] In circumstances where the time and space relationship between objectives and end states is less clear, or in operations where military action is undertaken in support of OGDs, lines of effort (LOE) may be a more suitable alternative construct.^[40] These steps—Scoping and Framing and Mission Analysis—constitute the Operational Design phase, which is followed by the Arrangement of Operations phase.

Having completed the Mission Analysis step, the JPG proceeds with the development of a series of detailed COAs, combining previously designed LOOs with updated input from the commander and intelligence personnel. Each possible COA is tested to ensure it is feasible, acceptable, suitable, sustainable and distinguishable (FASS-D).^[41] COA analysis is then undertaken using a war-gaming process to identify deficiencies in any of the proposed COAs, as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses of each COA.^[42] The final step of the JMAP is the Decision and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development stage, in which the commander selects their preferred COA and sufficient detail is passed on to subordinate planners to enable more detailed planning to be undertaken prior to the commencement of operations.^[43] Following the commencement of operations, measures of performance (MOP) are used to assess friendly actions to determine if they have been accomplished correctly, while measures of effectiveness (MOE) are used to gauge changes in system behaviour, capability, or the operational environment to determine whether those actions are having the desired and expected effect. ^[44] These feedback loops help to identify whether changes to the campaign plan are required to achieve the desired end state.^[45]

The JMAP involves systematic analysis of the environment, desired end states, options, and risk, while feedback loops and measures of effectiveness and performance ensure the system performs effectively in a dynamic environment. Like any system, JMAP must be employed correctly to be effective. Assumptions of linear causality may result in failure to achieve the desired end states, as well as a failure to predict damaging or dangerous second- and third-order effects.^[46] Rigid, dogmatic, linear application of the process may result in slow decision making, and may limit the emergence of novel approaches.^[47] The doctrine itself acknowledges these limitations, stating that ‘[a]lthough [JMAP] is robust and adaptable, it is nevertheless subject to some inherent limitations that stem from its linear nature and formulaic structure. It will not foster critical thinking by itself’.^[48] The doctrine also acknowledges that the world is ‘inherently non-linear, fluid, and complex’, while also emphasising the need for planning staff to ‘exercise circularity within the planning process, rather than follow it in a linear, dogmatic fashion’.^[49] The Western concept of operational art, encapsulated within the JMAP process, therefore appears to be sufficiently agnostic of the situation and capabilities in question for application to any type of warfare. There are, however, some challenges in relation to its application to POLWAR that have resulted in limited Western success in this realm over recent decades.

Planning for POLWAR

POLWAR requires the coordination and employment of all forms of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). Failure to mandate a unified approach has traditionally been the first stumbling block for Western governments.^[50] In the USA, the Department of Defence (DoD) nominally coordinates grey zone strategies, including those related to POLWAR, but its lack of authority over OGDs, and its traditional focus on conventional warfare, limit its effectiveness.^[51] Various cultural, structural, and resource-related factors have historically resulted in poor integration of the various instruments of national power, leading to a stovepiped approach.^[52] In Australia, multi-agency coordination is accomplished through Interdepartmental Committees (IDCs) chaired by the department which has principal responsibility for the issue.^[53] Noting that relevant OGDs—including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)—are evidently not as well equipped or experienced to plan and lead multi-agency campaigns as Defence, one could make the case for Defence to take the lead. This would require a shift in attitudes by Defence, however, who have traditionally prioritised conventional campaigns over what they refer to as ‘military operations other than war’.^[54] Irrespective of the lead agency, the most mature theoretical and procedural planning framework available is the one employed by the military—operational art and the JMAP. It would require, however, creative and flexible application to maximise its effectiveness in the POLWAR space.

Creative and flexible application of the JMAP to the problem of POLWAR would enable militaries—in unity with OGDs—to effectively adapt to the changing character of war. A creative Scoping and Framing activity, and the development of a problem narrative, would identify that the escalating state of heightened competition—including unattributed or deniable actions—is, in fact, a state of political war, and thus, a problem that requires a solution.^[55] The identification of a desired ‘end state’ remains as important in POLWAR as in conventional warfare. This could range from the reduction in or cessation of POLWAR activities by the adversary, to the replacement of authoritarian regimes by liberal democratic alternatives.^[56] Identification of likely Force Element’s (FEs) would undoubtedly include elements of national power resident within OGDs, again highlighting the need for effective interagency command and control. The COGA, informed by the JIPOE, would likely identify that the enemy’s ability to conduct IO would constitute a CC, while domestic popular support may be a CR.^[57] Observed gaps between the adversary’s strategic narrative and actual activities, which could be exploited to undermine government legitimacy, may represent a CV.^[58] As in conventional campaigns, identified critical factors are used to identify DPs, although decisive effects may take longer to achieve in POLWAR.^[59] It is here that the identification of limitations—comprising constraints and restrictions— is critical. One of the disadvantages facing the West in a POLWAR environment is its relatively low appetite, compared to its adversaries, to cross various legal, moral, and ethical boundaries in developing its response options.^[60] The manipulation of media and spreading of disinformation, for example, represent a breach of the global rules-based order the West seeks to defend. In applying limitations on the use of such tactics, it maintains its moral and legal authority, but eliminates a powerful weapon from its arsenal. Given the multi-agency, WoG approach demanded by POLWAR, the application of LOE in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional LOOs, would enhance the commander’s ability to employ non-military activities within the operation, while emphasising that military capabilities are applied in support of other instruments of national power.^[61]

A proposed model for the application of operational art to irregular warfare, devised by Ucko and Marks, is of potential utility in the POLWAR context. Their model comprises five distinct LOEs—political, violence, non-violence, allies, and international—each of which is further broken down into nested subordinate campaigns.^[62] Nested within the non-violent LOE, for example, are campaigns of information warfare, lawfare, protest, subversion, and negotiations.^[63] Within the subordinate information warfare campaign, LOOs could include the use of fake news, internet activism, and social media, each targeting adversary COGs.^[64] Similarly, the ‘violent’ LOE could include campaigns of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, and war of position—some of which would likely be ruled out by Western governments when defining campaign limitations.^[65] Indeed, violent action would likely be ruled out entirely in POLWAR, or retained only as branch or sequel options to a commander in case of escalation. Instead, military contributions may comprise shaping, influencing, and defence diplomacy activities—such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and military exercises—within the ‘international’ or ‘allies’ LOEs.^[66] In conducting each campaign, actions would be continuously assessed against MOE to ensure they are having the desired effect, including influencing group beliefs and attitudes. The principal benefit of the model proposed by Ucko and Marks is that it facilitates the coordinated application of the full range of national power instruments.^[67] Their model demonstrates how the careful and deliberate application of operational art to the challenge of POLWAR could serve to provide the structure, coherence, and unity so sorely missing from the West’s current approach.

Conclusions

The nature of war in the 21st century is increasingly characterised by the rise of great power competition and the increasing prevalence of political warfare over conventional warfare to achieve a nation’s strategic objectives. The growth of the internet and the cyber domain have increased the scope and effectiveness of political warfare actions while simultaneously decreasing their cost. Furthermore, the increased interconnectedness and continued growth of military power has raised the cost of conventional military action, thus placing further emphasis on political warfare. While Western militaries have historically focused on technical and informational superiority to achieve victory over their adversaries, they have failed in recent decades to adapt to the shift from kinetic to non-kinetic tactics, while also failing to embrace the need for a unified, WoG approach to this new form of warfare. Western governments and militaries have the tools at their disposal, including the capabilities needed to produce the required effects, as well as the theoretical frameworks and processes necessary to plan and conduct coherent operations.

This essay has argued that the existing theoretical and procedural frameworks for planning and conducting military campaigns are sufficiently versatile to enable Western militaries to adapt to the demands of contemporary political warfare, provided they are applied with a degree of creativity and flexibility in a coordinated, WoG approach. First, the essay provided an overview of the history of political warfare and explored the contemporary application of political warfare against the West by its principal adversaries—China and Russia. Second, the essay provided an overview of the Western concept of operational art, including a summary of the JMAP, which is the manifestation of operational art in the ADF. Finally, the essay outlined the need for a WoG approach to contemporary political warfare. A brief description of the detailed application of operational art was also provided, highlighting the need for creative and flexible application of the process. Additionally, a possible model for the application of operational art, using five LOEs spanning all instruments of national power, was described. The West needs to recognise that the war has started and cannot be won by the military alone. The tools, skills, and experience are there—all that is missing is unity.

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Footnotes

¹ Antonios Nestoras, 'Political Warfare: Competition in the Cyber Era', European View 18, no. 2 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685819885318, 1.

² Carl von Clausewitz, On war, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

³ Arthur F. Lykke, Jr, 'Defining Military Strategy', Military Review 77, no. 1 (1997), 183.

⁴ Thomas Paterson and Lauren Hanley, 'Political Warfare in the Digital Age: Cyber Subversion, Information Operations and "Deep Fakes",' Australian Journal of International Affairs 74, no. 4 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1734772, 440.

⁵ Linda Robinson et al, The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare, Rand Corporation (2019), 1-2.

⁶ Robinson et al, The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare, 2.

⁷ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. John Minford, vol. 22 (Penguin, 2003), 12.

⁸ Philip M. Taylor, "'Munitions of the Mind'": A Brief History of Military Psychological Operations', Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 3, no. 3 (2007), https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.pb.6000064, 199.

⁹ George Kennan, 'The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare', State Department Policy Planning Staff, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273 (1948), 2.

¹⁰ Taylor, 'Munitions of the Mind',  201.

¹¹ Elzabeth G Troeder, A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare (US Army War College Press, 2019), 3.

¹² Kennan, 'The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare',  3-5.

¹³ Paterson and Hanley, 'Political Warfare in the Digital Age',  440.

¹⁴ Troeder, A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare, 7.

¹⁵ Paterson and Hanley, 'Political Warfare in the Digital Age',  447.

¹⁶ Ross Babbage, Winning Without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail: Volume I, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2019), 3.

¹⁷ Javier Jordan, 'International Competition Below the Threshold of War: Toward a Theory of Gray Zone Conflict', Journal of Strategic Security 14, no. 1 (2020), https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.1.1836, 11.

¹⁸ Troeder, A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare, 10; Christopher S. Chivvis, 'Hybrid War: Russian Contemporary Political Warfare', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1362903, 317-318.

¹⁹ James Shires, 'The Simulation of Scandal: Hack-and-Leak Operations, the Gulf States, and US Politics', Texas National Security Review  (2020), 11; Jordan, 'International Competition Below the Threshold of War: Toward a Theory of Gray Zone Conflict',  11.

²⁰ Paterson and Hanley, 'Political Warfare in the Digital Age',  439; Troeder, A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare, 10.

²¹ Troeder, A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare, 11.

²² Gerasimov, quoted in David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks, 'Violence in Context: Mapping the Strategies and Operational Art of Irregular Warfare', Contemporary Security Policy 39, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1432922, 223.

²³ Kerry K Gershaneck, 'Terms and Definitions', in Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China's Strategy to "Win without Fighting" (Marine Corps University Press Quantico United States, 2020), 17.

²⁴ Gershaneck, 'Terms and Definitions',  18.

²⁵ Gershaneck, 'Terms and Definitions',  19; David J. Keegan and Kyle Churchman, 'Taiwan Prospers, China Ratchets Up Coercion, and US Support Remains "Rock-Solid"', Comparative Connections 23, no. 1 (2021), 80.

²⁶ Gershaneck, 'An Introduction to PRC Political Warfare,',  8.

²⁷ Gershaneck, 'An Introduction to PRC Political Warfare,',  8.

²⁸ Paterson and Hanley, "Political Warfare in the Digital Age," 442; Brendan Nicholson, "ADF Chief: West Faces New Threat of Political Warfare," The Strategist 14 (2019), 2.

²⁹ Cary Mittelmark, "Playing Chess with the Dragon: Chinese-U.S. Competition in the Era of Irregular Warfare," Small Wars & Insurgencies 32, no. 2 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2021.1870423, 217.

³⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, "Synopsis - Operational Art," in ADDP 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations, ed. Department of Defence (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2013), 15.

³¹ Commonwealth of Australia, "Foundations of Joint Planning," in ADDP 5.0 - Joint Planning, ed. Department of Defence (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2018), 2.

³² Commonwealth of Australia, "Synopsis - Operational Art," 15.

³³ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step One: Scoping and Framing', in ADDP 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process, ed. Joint Doctrine Directorate (Canberra: Defence Publishing, Library and Information Services, 2019), 1.

³⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step One: Scoping and Framing',  25.

³⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Two: Mission Analysis',  2.

³⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Two: Mission Analysis',  10; Dan Madden et al., Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, Rand Corporation (2016), 35.

³⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Two: Mission Analysis',  33.

³⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Two: Mission Analysis',  33.

³⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Two: Mission Analysis',  42.

⁴⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Foundations of Joint Planning',  14.

⁴¹ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Three: Course of Action Development',  2.

⁴² Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Four: Course of Action Analysis',  1.

⁴³ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Five: Decision and Concept of Operations Development',  1.

⁴⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Foundations of Joint Planning',  18.

⁴⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Foundations of Joint Planning',  18.

⁴⁶ Ben Zweibelson, 'One Piece at a Time: Why Linear Planning and Institutionalisms Promote Military Campaign Failures', Defence Studies 15, no. 4 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2015.1113667, 366.

⁴⁷ Zweibelson, 'One Piece at a Time',  370.

⁴⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Joint Planning',  9.

⁴⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Joint Planning',  9; Commonwealth of Australia, 'Step Two: Mission Analysis',  11.

⁵⁰ Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context',  210.

⁵¹ Troeder, A Whole-of-Government Approach to Gray Zone Warfare, 22.

⁵² Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context',  210.

⁵³ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Principal Organisations and Responsibilities',  15; Commonwealth of Australia, 'Context', in ADDP 00.9 - Multinational Coordination: Defence's Contribition to Australian Government Responses, ed Department of Defence (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2013), 4.

⁵⁴ Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context',  211.

⁵⁵ Jordan, 'International Competition Below the Threshold of War: Toward a Theory of Gray Zone Conflict',  10; Alan Dupont, 'The US-China Cold War Has Already Started', The Diplomat 6 (2020), 1.

⁵⁶ Gershaneck, 'Conclusions and Recommendations',  152; Babbage, Winning Without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail: Volume I, 80.

⁵⁷ Madden et al, Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, 48-49.

⁵⁸ Madden et al, Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, 48-49; Mittelmark, Playing Chess with the Dragon: Chinese-U.S. Competition in the Era of Irregular Warfare',  214.

⁵⁹ Madden et al, Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, 50.

⁶⁰ Nicholson, 'ADF Chief: West Faces New Threat of Political Warfare', 1; Jordan, 'International Competition Below the Threshold of War: Toward a Theory of Gray Zone Conflict',  10.

⁶¹ Commonwealth of Australia, 'Foundations of Joint Planning',  14; Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context',  213.

⁶² Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context,,  215.

⁶³ Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context',  215.

⁶⁴ Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context',  216; Madden et al, Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare, 48-49.

⁶⁵ Ucko and Marks, Violence in Context',  215.

⁶⁶ Daniel Baldino and Andrew Carr, Defence Diplomacy and the Australian Defence Force: Smokescreen or Strategy?', Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 2 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1113229, 140; Ucko and Marks, Violence in Context',  215.

⁶⁷ Ucko and Marks, 'Violence in Context',  216.