Just like the changing character of war, the process for campaign planning will have to continue to develop to keep up with the nuances of the future battlefield.

‘I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable’.
Attributed to Dwight D Eisenhower^[1]

Planning for a campaign is essential to understand and integrate not just the warfighting elements of a campaign, but to identify other actors and effects that are important for success in war. Traditionally, campaign planning has been executed in distinct phases consisting of sequential actions, making it a linear process.^[2] This, however, is not the case with modern campaigns and operational environment. Linearity, therefore, tops the list of criticisms of the Western military planning processes. To deal with the complex and adaptive environment faced by militaries today, the modern campaign planning needs to continuously evolve. A campaign plan does not now merely comprise of offensive and defensive operations,  it must address pre-conflict shaping of battlefield and post-conflict stability and support operations. The Western militaries use various tools to formalise this planning process. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) utilises the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) while the United States and a few other Western militaries employ the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). These planning processes are mutually inspired and therefore share a fair amount of commonality in their strengths and weaknesses.^[3] No planning process is perfect, and planning processes like JMAP have often been criticised as too linear and dogmatic.^[4] The resurgence of political warfare has only fuelled the debate further. Political warfare, unlike conventional warfare, operates below the threshold of war creating exceptional difficulties in decision making.^[5] With the aim to avoid a military confrontation, it exploits and targets other domains of national power through covert and overt means to achieve the desired political aims. The recent bloodless Russian annexation of Crimea and operational efficiency shown by a non-state actor like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), have further led to questioning of the efficiency of the Western military planning process. This realisation is not lost on Western military and extensive debates and articles have been written about ways to improve the planning process. Introduction of new concepts like operational design and building up on existing constructs like centre of gravity, continuous changes are being applied to these planning frameworks. Just like the changing character of war, the process for campaign planning will have to continue to develop to keep up with the nuances of the future battlefield.

This essay therefore supports the argument that the existing theoretical and procedural frameworks like JMAP and JOPP enable Western militaries to adapt to the demands of contemporary warfare. They may not be perfect and deliver all the answers, but these frameworks provide militaries a foundation to build upon. To further this argument, the essay will first define political warfare and identify its key attributes which allow it to be waged below the threshold of war. Thereafter, the essay will explore the Western military planning process primarily through the perspective of the US and Australian models, emphasising how the planning processes have continued to adapt to the changing character of war and have the capacity to do so with political warfare. The last part of the essay will reinforce the argument through study of two important sub-constructs within Western planning frameworks. The first is a continuously developing framework of operational design, which encourages and enables the planner to see the problem as it exists, and not as they want it to be. The second is an existing framework of the centre of gravity (COG), which, if correctly employed, has the potential to provide apt solutions to the ‘wicked’ problems of political warfare. The scope of the essay will not be in a detailed explanation of the planning processes or its sub-construct, but in revealing how the planning process learns and adapts to the demands of political warfare.

Political warfare and planning process

Political warfare is one of the many terms that are used to describe a conflict short of conventional warfare. Interestingly, political warfare is not a new phenomenon for the Western countries. Until the Cold War, the US and the UK were some of the most efficient employers of political warfare.^[6] While commenting on political warfare, the US diplomat George Kennan emphasised that it requires all the means of national power and employs both overt and covert actions to achieve the national objectives. In doing so, the actions remain below the threshold of war.^[7] The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Political Work Regulations published their new rules publicly in 2003 under the ‘Three Warfares’ strategy. In doing so, it identified ‘psychological warfare’, ‘public opinion warfare’ and ‘legal warfare’ as the three key tasks.^[8] The Chinese have used the term ‘unrestricted warfare’, the Russians have used the term ‘new generation warfare’ and the West, under the lead of the United States, has classified these activities as ‘grey zone conflicts’, ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘irregular warfare’. Acknowledging this multiplicity of terminology, the RAND Corporation executed a study on modern political warfare in which some key attributes to modern political parfare were identified. The list starts by emphasising that ‘political warfare employs all the elements of national power’, and concluded that ‘political warfare extends, rather than replaces, traditional conflict by achieving effects at lower cost’.^[9] For the Western militaries to effectively address modern political warfare, their planning frameworks must have the capability to neutralise these attributes.

At the heart of political warfare is an attempt to achieve political objectives without resorting to military actions; this implies that the military alone cannot plan to fight political warfare. Political warfare is waged with all the elements of national power in which the military only plays a small part. Defence analysts like Michael Mazarr argue that the traditional use of force is here to stay and even in the realm of political warfare nations would be willing to employ military force.^[10] Even in the Russian annexation of Crimea or Iran’s political warfare in Iraq, the environment was prepared through covert, non-military actions but the final objectives were secured through a small but swift military intervention. What must be noted here is that by effectively employing all elements of national powers the actor was able to shape the battlefield for a quick and decisive victory through limited military means.^[11] An adaptation to political warfare would therefore require a similar whole-of-government approach and an isolated military planning process is bound to fail. A whole-of-government response, however, is beyond the scope of military alone and therefore this essay and subsequent paragraphs will address the military’s ability to adapt and respond to a battlefield shaped through political warfare. The military does not engage in political warfare directly, but when it does it would be fighting in a complex and adaptive battlefield with several actors, and this must be catered for in the planning process.

Success of political warfare is heavily dependent on the exploitation of proxy forces, influence and plausible deniability, which make it difficult to identify key actors and their true intentions.^[12] The planning processes, like JMAP and JOPP, are continuously evolving to address such confusion. The recent iteration of JMAP, for example, made a significant change in the first step of planning by adding a major step of framing.^[13] The previous version expected the planners to carry out ‘preliminary scoping’, which was about collecting data and the commander’s intentions, and prepare a timeline. Framing expects the planners to ‘deconstruct complexity and to ensure that the correct problem or series of problems are fully explored to help inform more detailed planning’.^[14] Trent Scott argues in his paper that the Western militaries often prepare for the wars they want and not the wars they have.^[15] The step of framing attempts to resolve this aspect by encouraging planners to identify the right question and not immediately look for answers. What makes political warfare a tool of choice for militarily weaker forces is their ability to mask the actors and intentions.^[16] This is compounded by a confident, well-equipped Western military’s desire to employ their technological and firepower advantage to achieve quick solutions rather than spend time on the problem. The existing planning process, at least in theory, encourages the planners to spend time deconstructing the complex system created by the political warfare.

The most criticised limitation of the Western military planning process has been its linearity and failure to promote critical thinking.^[17] In the grey zone of political warfare, non-linearity and critical thinking are extremely important to outsmart the adversary. Then again, the critics do not acknowledge that the process itself recognises these limitations and provides a fair reason for their existence. The ADF JMAP doctrine justifies the linearity with the ‘need to start somewhere, finish somewhere, and be able to logically progress in a broadly structured way’.^[18] While a non-linear process promotes critical thinking and deconstructs a complex world, it can also lead to a ‘strategic paralysis’. An inability to sufficiently understand the situation may lead to absolute inaction where the war is lost without being fought. The confusion amongst NATO countries on how to respond to the unattributable Russian actions in Crimea is a classic example of strategic paralysis. Before NATO could understand or prepare a reaction, Russia had achieved and consolidated its political aims in Crimea.^[19] The planning processes attempt to mitigate the flaws of linearity by adding a feedback loop and prompting the commander to indulge in a circulatory process and use his discretion.^[20] Further, some of these weaknesses are being addressed and refined by incorporating the operational design.

Operational Design: a work in progress

Australian Chief of Defence Force (CDF) Angus Campbell, in his address on political warfare, pointed out that Australia and the West tend to view war in binary terms, which is contrary to the essence of political warfare.^[21] Rupert Smith, in his book on the utility of force, argues that the adversaries faced by Western militaries today are easily defeated in tactical combat but retain a high threshold for defeat in the strategic realm.^[22] This implies that a traditional capability-based model of problem-solving and planning would prove to be futile in the battlefield of political warfare. The modern planning frameworks, therefore, are gradually embracing the concept of operational design which takes a systems view of the problem. The US Joint Operation Planning manual JP 5-0 reflects this in defining operational design as:

‘… a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns’.^[23]

Operational design does not replace planning and is intended to run as a parallel process. As Professor Michael Evans argues, by using operational design in complex situations campaign planners can have a better understanding of the relationship that exists between various steps and sub-steps of planning methodology to various links and nodes of national power.^[24] This assumes even more importance in political warfare where the military is just one of the responders to a developing situation.

Design methodology also allows the planners to create and project executable plans in the required timeframe and parallelly continue to question and refine the understanding of the prevailing situation.^[25] For this to occur, design must not be confused with planning. While operational planning continues separately based on the framework of the concerned nation, a separate design team continues to work in an iterative loop to refine the commander’s understanding of the environment, problem, and probable solutions. This enables commanders to view the problem as it is and not as it should be and make well-informed decisions based on the real-time situation.^[26] Take for example the Chinese approach of psychological, public opinion and legal warfare. In all these cases the threshold is maintained below an open conflict but adequate to shape the environment. ^[27] The existing planning framework applied in isolation will allow the Western militaries to come up with a timely solution but prevent them from questioning the solution’s continued viability in a slowly changing environment. The result will be an outdated operational plan which is divorced from the reality of the eventual modified battlefield. A concurrent design team not working on a broader framework and devoid of bias can provide a better understanding of the entire system and predict to some extent the possible solutions to the emerging problem. The present application of design in planning frameworks differs between Western countries themselves, but as the essay points out it is a work in progress which aims to provide coherent solutions to the complexity of political warfare.

The curious case of Centre of Gravity

The concept of Centre of Gravity (COG) is an extremely important construct for most of the Western military planning methodology. The Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning of the US military, states that: ‘This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor and hasty analysis can have very serious consequences…’.^[28] The  ADF defines COG as, ‘The primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve an objective or the desired end state’.^[29] The COG analysis forms a key component of step two of the JMAP—Mission Analysis. Amongst the key critics of COG concept are the proponents of Complex Adaptive System (CAS) who argue that the concept of COG and effects-based operations are linear and too scientific to capture the true nature of contemporary warfare. The Australian definition of a CAS, or interactively complex system, is:

‘A system that is made up of many parts that interact with each other and with the system itself in many alternating ways, which may adapt and change over time, often unpredictably.’^[30]

The existing theoretical frameworks of military planning are often rebuked as linear and Newtonian, and concepts like COG are judged as flawed foundations for a CAS.^[31] Political warfare is a CAS, and therefore questions the relevance of COG in contemporary warfare. While COG provides key tangible targets in conventional warfare, in political warfare it is the process of assessing COG that provides equal, if not more, benefits than the final output alone. The drawback of COG as it appears are not in the concept, but in the narrow sense that it is studied in the planning process.

For COG to remain an effective tool against contemporary political warfare it must be understood and evaluated in its broader sense. A few military thinkers draw parallels between COG and crucial points, whose compromise would critically weaken the adversary.^[32] As a response, the military planners must be warned that COG is not a magic talisman, but purely a design tool.^[33] From here, one can deduce that the process of deriving COG is as important as identifying the right one. This assists the planners to see the problem as a system and not a competition of capabilities. Joseph Strange, one of the most renowned theorists of COG, encourages us to go beyond the physical realm of capability or territory to identify COG in true Clausewitzian terms.^[34]  Defeating an enemy, destroying the industry, are of no use if the human domain has not been made devoid of the will to resist. He draws attention to the moral component of war. This element assumes an even more important role in political warfare. Be it the Russian example, Iran’s political warfare in Iraq, the Chinese way of warfare or non-state actors like ISIL, they all focus on the cognitive realm of securing their own and targeting the adversary’s forces and use  ethnic or religious lines to create influence in the battlefield and achieve the political ends.^[35] Therefore, for the planning process to be successful, COG will continue to remain an important construct. Rather, used effectively in its broader sense in operational design and operational art, COG will become the ultimate tool for planners to understand the strength and weakness of the system and restore symmetry to the asymmetric warfare.

Conclusion

The concept of political warfare has existed for ages. The British employed it through the British East India Company to establish their imperialistic regime. The US had to resort to political warfare in the Cold War era when its absolute military supremacy against the Soviets was not yet established.^[36] It is only natural that the militarily weaker adversaries would resort to political warfare to counter what they see as a dominant Western influence. This implies that though the military does not and cannot directly fight a political war, it must be prepared to deploy in a complex non-linear battlefield continuously shaped by political warfare. The Western military planning processes realise this difficulty and are continuously adapting to the changing character of war. Processes like JMAP and JOPP tread a thin line between the requirement of simplifying a situation to prepare a tangible and executable outcome in time, and at the same time deconstruct a complex and adaptive environment. The evolving concept of operational design is being incorporated in Western planning processes, albeit in different ways. The aim, though, in all cases is for a commander to understand and respond to a situation as it exists and not as he or she would like it to be. The process of identifying a COG further enhances the ability of the commander to assess the adversary and the situation in a system frame and not a capability frame.

Notwithstanding the military’s ability to adapt, any credible response to the nuances of political warfare will require a whole-of-government response in which other elements of national power will play a more important role. A military campaign plan, however good, will never be able to succeed in political warfare unless the whole-of-government apparatus responds to the threat coherently. Just like various combat arms have worked towards jointness to prepare joint campaign plans, political warfare by its nature demands that all key stakeholders are brought under a whole-of-government effort to prepare a ‘joint’ campaign plan and not a plan ‘joined’ in hindsight.

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Footnotes

¹ Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0—Joint Planning, 1-1.

² Jack D Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth (2009),1.

³ Trent Scott, The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, February 2011), 15.

⁴ Aaron P Jackson, ‘Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art’. Security Challenges 13, no. 1 (2017), 60.

⁵ Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva. Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses. RAND Corporation, 2018, 2.

⁶ Seth G Jones, The Return of Political Warfare. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018; Linda et al. Modern Political Warfare,11-34.

⁷ Linda et al. Modern Political Warfare, xiii.

⁸ Sangkuk Lee, ‘China’s “Three Warfares”: Origins, Applications, and Organizations’. Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (2014): 199.

⁹ Linda et al. Modern Political Warfare, 219-247.

¹⁰ Michael J Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict. US Army War College Press, Carlisle PA, 2015.

¹¹ TS Allen and AJ Moore. ‘Victory without Casualties: Russia's Information Operations’. Parameters 48, no. 1 (2018): 59-71.

>¹² Pitney Jr, John J. The Art of Political Warfare. University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.

¹³ Aaron P Jackson, ‘A Tale of Two Designs: Developing the Australian Defence Force’s Latest Iteration of its Joint Operations Planning Doctrine’. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 17, no. 4 (2017),185-88.

¹⁴ ADFP 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process, para 2.26.

¹⁵ Trent Scott, The Lost Operational Art, 16.

¹⁶ Giuseppe Caforio, ‘The asymmetric warfare: In search of a symmetry’. In Armed forces and conflict resolution: Sociological perspectives. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008.

¹⁷ C. R. Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, Study Paper No. 320 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2011); Trent Scott, The Lost Operational Art

¹⁸ ADFP 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process, para 1.33.

¹⁹ Allen, TS, and AJ Moore. ‘Victory without Casualties: Russia's Information Operations’. Parameters 48, no. 1 (2018): 59-71.

²⁰ ADFP 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process, para 1.33.

²¹ General Angus Campbell, Australian Strategic Policy Institute International Conference — ‘War in 2025’.

²² Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Vintage Books, New York, 2005.

²³ US Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning (JP 5-0, 2011), p. III-1, III-6-III-18, IV-2.

²⁴ Michael Evans, ‘Centre of gravity analysis in joint military planning and design: implications and recommendations for the Australian Defence Force’. Security Challenges 8, no. 2 (2012), 96.

²⁵ Matthew Lauder, ‘Systemic operational design: Freeing operational planning from the shackles of linearity’. (2009).

²⁶ Aaron P Jackson, ‘Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art’. Security Challenges 13, no. 1 (2017), 59-80.

²⁷ Sangkuk Lee, China’s “Three Warfares”: Origins, Applications, and Organizations’. Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (2014), 199.

²⁸ US Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning (JP 5-0, 2011), IV-23

²⁹ Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0—Joint Planning, 2-7.

³⁰ ADFP 5.0.1—Joint Military Appreciation Process, para 2.27.

³¹ James K Greer, ‘Operational Art for the Objective Force’, Military Review, Vol. 82, No. 5, September–October 2002, p. 22.

³² Darfus L. Johnson, Center of Gravity: The Source of Operational Ambiguity and Linear Thinking in the Age of Complexity (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Command and General Staff College, 1998), pp. 14-5, 46.

³³ Charles D. Allen and Glenn K. Cunningham, ‘Systems Thinking in Campaign Design’, in J. Boone Barholomees, Jr (ed.), The US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 4th edition (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010), 259.

³⁴ Joseph L Strange, and Richard Iron. Center of gravity: what Clausewitz really meant. Marine Corps War Coll Quantico VA, 2004.

³⁵ Nathan White, ‘Organizing for War: Overcoming Barriers to Whole-of-Government Strategy in the Isil Campaign’. Journal Article| Dec 28, no. 10 (2014); Matthew A Lauder, ‘Limits of Control: Examining the Employment of Proxies by the Russian Federation in Political Warfare’.; Linda et al. Modern political warfare, 240.

³⁶ Linda et al. Modern Political Warfare, 222-225.