Despite the shortfalls of mental models to represent the information environment, integration of information warfare concepts into existing frameworks for the planning and conduct of military campaigns enable Western militaries to adapt to the demands of contemporary political warfare.

Adapting to Contemporary Political Warfare: Western Military Frameworks, Mental Models and Design Thinking for Information Warfare  

Introduction

The Greek philosopher Homer introduced the notion that actions across the physical and cognitive domains were necessary to create power.^[1] Since then, both individuals and nations have  sought power through physical violence in war and the manipulation of human thought through actions short of war, termed by many as 'political warfare'. From Sun Tzu to Eisenhower, the practice of political warfare and the tools of propaganda, coercion, and persuasion remain constant despite the ubiquitous nature and global reach of information today. As Western policy grapples with multiple actors and dual uses of information, adversaries are increasingly exploiting mental models that define concepts of national power, warfighting domains, levels of war and competition.^[2] Non-Western concepts of unrestricted warfare purposefully blur mental boundaries between political and military control of information to take advantage of the evolving context of information in society.^[3] In response, Western militaries use design thinking to enhance existing procedural frameworks such as Boyd's OODA loop or Clausewitz's centre of gravity (COG) constructs to adapt to emerging concepts of information warfare (IW). However, the inputs to these frameworks rely on mental models that do not have sufficient detail to control ubiquitous and global-reaching information in contemporary political warfare.

This essay will argue that despite the shortfalls of mental models to represent the information environment, integration of IW concepts into existing frameworks for the planning and conduct of military campaigns enables Western militaries to adapt to the demands of contemporary political warfare. Firstly, this essay will highlight the cognitive aspects of political warfare and identify IW as the response by Western militaries to the contemporary militarisation of information by adversaries. It will then outline the constraints of conceptualising a complex information environment and demonstrate that existing mental models do not adequately inform the planning and conduct of IW. Despite these limitations, this essay finishes with an outline of design thinking in existing planning frameworks and demonstrates that forming multiple mental models allows IW concepts to adapt to the demands of contemporary political warfare.

Contemporary Political Warfare: Militarisation of Information

Control of information in the pursuit of political objectives has endured throughout history despite evolving Western views of political warfare. Since the first century, the idea of victory in the mental or cognitive domain has defined a dichotomy that questions the value of committing military force. Sun Tzu learnt that 'subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence',^[4] while Mao took the ideas of Clausewitz, Stalin, and Lenin to outline that 'warfare is politics with bloodshed; politics is warfare without bloodshed’.^[5] Military success in controlling information, particularly in the absence of economic, diplomatic or military resources, was the basis for these views. Western militaries formed the same view given failing diplomatic, economic and military efforts against Germany in WWII. The US termed the propaganda actions that successfully disrupted German social and military cohesion in the preparation for Operation Overlord as 'psychological warfare', was the first undertaking of Allied political warfare.^[6] The US and Soviet lessons from WWII strongly influenced the Cold War, where propaganda was enhanced by other non-military and physical methods of coercion and persuasion. The US diplomat George Kennan defined this evolution of political warfare as 'every means at a nation's command … short of war … to achieve national objectives' either through overt or covert activities.^[7] However, as covert activities became increasingly unpalatable by democratic societies, the US embarked on an overt arms race to create a bias for military options for the Cold War and into the 21st century at the expense of political warfare capabilities.^[8] Despite the successful control of information and narratives in the subsequent Gulf War, less successful campaigns in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the shortfalls of Western military bias and the opportunities for adversaries given the neglect of information control in pursuing political objectives.

Militarisation of contemporary political warfare against the West takes advantage of the changing information environment and Western perceptions of conflict. China's concept of 'unrestricted warfare' was born from observations of the West in the Gulf War and clear opportunities to diffuse elements of national power or notions of war and conflict.^[9] Diffusion seeks to remove the primacy of military force in centrally controlled 'national campaigns' but maintain military involvement in all aspects of national power to avoid perceived military conflict that Western militaries require to justify a response.^[10] The increasingly ubiquitous nature and global reach of information in the cyber domain have diffused military activity through speed, simultaneity and non-attribution of national activities.^[11] Additionally, access to the cyber domain through globalisation allows non-state actors to achieve political objectives, as demonstrated by ISIS using social media and propaganda to counter Western narratives.^[12] These actions take advantage of gaps in Western constructs of time, geography or adversaries that define a military campaign.^[13] Additionally, they exploit democratic ideas in the use of the military during periods of perceived peace, given demands for transparency, separation of powers and the challenges of an open media. Militarisation of information against Western governments demands greater control and alignment of information actions across elements of national power. It also demands new constructs that acknowledge constant competition and the potential for simultaneous cooperation and conflict.^[14] Western governments realise the demands of contemporary political warfare and are developing capability that can contest the provision and assurance of information regardless of the perception of cooperation or conflict.

Western militaries are adapting to the constant competition of contemporary political warfare through developing IW concepts and capabilities. Since the 1990s, Western militaries have used terms such as ‘information operations’, ‘information superiority’ and ‘network-centric warfare’ to describe the concept of IW.^[15] IW is the contest to assure information that supports decision making whilst denying and degrading that of an adversary.^[16] IW is not military-specific, as it describes competition for information regardless of personal, commercial or strategic context. However, the military use of the term describes the synchronisation of operational security (OPSEC) with psychological, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities to achieve military objectives.^[17] These activities rely heavily on intelligence to detect the early stages of political warfare to inform planning for IW.^[18] Intelligence remains a strength of Western militaries given the significant investment in recent decades. However, as highlighted previously, Western governments divested offensive information capabilities after the Cold War. As such, militaries are now reinvesting in intelligence functions and adapting information capabilities previously employed in war to the demands of constant competition and technology advancement.^[19] However, the strategic policy is yet to recognise the constant competition, unrestricted policies of adversaries and ubiquitous character of information to allow IW theory, practice and structures to develop.^[20] Policy is not the only constraint for Western IW. The following section will outline the additional challenge of adapting existing mental models to integrate IW into the planning and conduct of military campaigns.

Information Warfare: Shortfalls of Existing Mental Models

The context of IW is constantly evolving with technology and requires new mental models to capture and understand human perception and the effects of disinformation. Competition for the hearts and minds is central to political warfare, with the success of a military campaign determined by the perceptions of various audiences.^[21] As audiences become more connected through technology, opportunities to change an audience's perceptions through information or disinformation are increased. Disinformation refers to the intentional use of false information in order to mislead a public audience.^[22] Political disinformation, otherwise known as propaganda, is an enduring character of any state conflict. However, as information permeates militaries and societies, disinformation is harder to control, manipulate, and isolate.^[23] Addressing these challenges requires mental models that capture the complexity of global connections, gaps within societies where technology is not prevalent, and the attention span of multiple audiences. Mental models also need to capture the opportunities to amplify, obfuscate, or persuade audiences as a counter to disinformation, given the 24-hour news cycle, society's baseline resilience, and the opportunities and threats of open or closed media.^[24] Without these, it is challenging to plan information effects across a military campaign and manage the risks of manipulating information or keeping secrets that avoid adversary exploitation. To date, the West has successfully countered disinformation by presenting the truth despite the perceived limitations of bureaucracy and the open media. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to discern truth in a complex system or control the effects of IW with models that do not consider uncertainty.

Simplifying the levels of war and warfighting domains ignores the complexities of information and risks applying prediction-based planning frameworks to unpredictable problems. Simple frameworks allow complex systems to be understood by many but inadequately capture the intricacies of unpredictable and asymmetric environments.^[25] The global reach of information across multiple audiences creates a complex system. The inputs to this system are unlimited and range from state-controlled media down to an individual recording a battlefield incident on their phone to create multiple reactions across multiple audiences.^[26] This complexity challenges the utility of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war as complexity obfuscates the source of information. While the levels of war are helpful in undertaking operational art and control of operations, it complicates authorities to respond to an action that is unattributable to a level of war. Additionally, information is domain agnostic. While the simplification of land, air, sea, space and cyber allows for deconfliction of military effects, it removes information as a common connection, making the consequence of information actions challenging to assess.^[27] These intricacies of the complex information environment are difficult to highlight in planning without complementary models or the capacity to predict inputs and outputs to the system. General McCrystal supports this in observations in Iraq where successful planning for past problems was based on prediction. However, emerging speed and complexity in Iraq meant that prediction was difficult and incompatible with reductionist models of Western planning.^[28] His observation highlights the need for frameworks that can differentiate between the complicated and complex, and enable commanders to adapt to the speed of the information environment to avoid chaos.

The speed and reach of information require processes that avoid liminality so commanders can manage confusion and orientate across multiple coexisting systems. Liminality is the mental ambiguity and disorientation before, during and after understood concepts change.^[29] Liminality was the basis of Russia's successful annexation of Crimea in 2014 as the Ukraine military were subject to simultaneous misinformation and cyber activities that disorientated command to the point that they were unable to act in time to counter Russian advances.^[30] In the past, Western militaries have looked to simplified frameworks such as Boyd's ‘observe, orientate, decide and act’ (OODA) loop to counter liminality. However, the speed and coexistence of multiple information systems creates chaos and stops the OODA loop at 'orientation', as demonstrated in Ukraine. In the absence of suitable intelligence to identify misinformation, new frameworks that recognise the effects of liminality, such as Snowden's Cynefin framework, need consideration.^[31] However, the Cynefin framework has shortfalls of its own as misdirected actions taken to gain orientation in perceived chaos may have unintended consequences, particularly given the reach of cyber and information beyond traditional operational boundaries. Intelligence remains central to informing multiple mental models of the interaction between the physical and information environments, allowing commanders to select the appropriate framework to avoid liminality and unintended consequences. Mental models of both the physical and cognitive simplify complexity at risk of losing clarity for an immediate solution. As such, Western militaries are incorporating operational design into theoretical and procedural planning frameworks to address IW complexity and uncertainty. The following section will explore operational design across existing planning frameworks and demonstrate utility in forming multiple mental models for IW.

Operational Design: Design Thinking for Information Warfare

Western militaries continue to develop approaches to operational design that seek to overcome the shortfalls of applying prediction-based frameworks for IW. The Australian Army's concept of accelerated warfare observes that processes and structures designed and tested in previous conflicts are no longer appropriate and require a more adaptive mindset in addressing the speed of technology and social change.^[32] Other Western militaries share this observation with a concerted effort to enhance military planning methods to adapt to complexity through design thinking.^[33] Design thinking in the operational context takes emerging theories around complexity theory, systems thinking, and social theory to build a holistic model of a problem to inform operational planning beyond a single adversary or desired physical effect.^[34] These inputs look to enhance operational design and avoid mechanistic formulas, simplified models or prediction-based processes to create multiple perspectives of a problem and test multiple and potentially innovative solutions. However, these holistic inputs now challenge the simple military appreciation processes of the past to handle complexity and uncertainty. For example, US doctrine identifies potential shortfalls and outlines that identifying a centre of gravity or measuring effects-based operations are difficult without a predictable or well-defined threat.^[35] Incorporating design thinking at the beginning of campaign planning creates multiple mental models. These models can then be used to assess the suitability of traditional planning frameworks to address context-specific complexity. Despite the limitations of traditional constructs to address complexity, they maintain utility in bringing together physical and cognitive models.

Despite limitations around the utility of the COG for complex dynamic problems, combining physical and cognitive models during the COG process supports IW. The COG is a target or several targets that may constitute a source of adversary strength found in the physical or cognitive domain that may have decisive results if attacked.^[36] The COG serves as a focal point for military planning to understand critical vulnerabilities and requirements known as critical factors of an adversary strength. However, there is debate as to its utility given the enduring nature of IW beyond decisive conflict.^[37] Others argue that applying the COG is not logical when the adversary cannot be identified or the environment is an adaptive system.^[38] These views have merit. However, the COG process remains a tool of operational design and can adapt to IW challenges if the desire for efficiency and decisive action is removed. Once removed, the process of combining the physical and cognitive aspects of an observed environment into critical factors of an unidentified adversary becomes a new model. As such, the value of the COG construct is no longer a single source of power to direct kinetic effects against a COG such as an adversary leader. Instead, the value is the list of factors within a complex and unpredictable system that may be subsequently targeted and measured. ^[39] Targeting and measuring responses without a desire for efficiency or decisive action allows mental models to develop and support indirect actions such as denying online recruiting or propaganda networks without an identified COG or clear adversary. Although not always complete, the combined physical and cognitive factors model within a COG construct provides options for planning IW effects.

Effects-based planning frameworks allow integration of IW across warfighting domains, levels of war and competition if integrated across all operational activities. Outlined and adopted by Western militaries post the Gulf War, effects-based operations (EBO) is a process for achieving strategic outcomes or effects on an adversary through the synergistic and accumulative application of military and non-military capabilities.^[40] Given such a broad scope, subsequent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the shortfalls of EBO given the control required to send clear messages, measure results and maintain resilience to unpredictable adversary responses across multiple lines and levels of information operations.^[41] A modified approach treats IW as a line of operation synchronised across other lines of activity.^[42] This approach also proved ineffective as the centralised narrative could not adapt to multiple audiences and the persistence of information in, through and beyond the campaign.^[43] These gaps were illustrated in finalising coalition involvement in Afghanistan. The disconnect of information effects between coalition campaign activities and strategic narratives of withdrawal allowed the Taliban to adjust operations and avoid decisive actions to maintain power once the coalition had withdrawn. Despite the complexities of coordinating EBO across military and non-military capabilities and audiences, EBO remains a valuable framework for planners to look at the cognitive effect of operations regardless of the domain, level of war or perceived competition. It provides the mental model to see information as ubiquitous and, when combined with COG analysis, provides the required link between conflict's physical and cognitive aspects. Be it a tweet through a social network or a deterrence message through kinetic actions, linking physical and cognitive effects through design thinking is central to overcoming the limitations of Western militaries in planning and conduct of IW.

Conclusion

This essay has argued that existing frameworks for planning and conducting military campaigns enable Western militaries to integrate IW concepts to adapt to the demands of contemporary political warfare. It firstly highlighted the cognitive elements of political warfare and IW as the response by Western militaries to the contemporary militarisation of information that seeks advantage in constant completion across a ubiquitous and global information environment. It then demonstrated that existing mental models of national power, warfighting domains, levels of war and competition do not acknowledge the ubiquitous nature and speed of information that risks operational campaigns and commanders being overwhelmed and defeated through complexity, chaos and unpredictability. However, this essay finished with an analysis of design thinking concepts and existing COG and EBO planning frameworks to demonstrate their value in combing physical and mental models for the conduct of IW given the demands of contemporary political warfare.

Western military desires for efficient and decisive action cloud the debate on the utility of military planning frameworks, particularly when viewed through mental models of physical domains, levels of war and types of conflict that constrain understanding of complexity and uncertainty. The adversary no longer views peace and conflict through these lenses and has militarised information in a manner that takes advantage of Western mental models and the ubiquitous global reach of information to avoid physical warfare. However, as Western militaries adapt to the complexity and uncertainty of the information environment, design thinking remains a valid approach to test the utility of traditional OODA, COG and EBO frameworks. As design thinking enhances the inputs to these frameworks, IW concepts and capabilities will become increasingly integrated across campaigns and inform future policies of Western democratic societies to allow for greater freedom in employing IW across all elements of national power. Information is central to political warfare, and the demand for Western militaries to control information increases as it permeates all aspects of physical warfare. Despite the limitation of Western military mental models, existing frameworks enhanced by design thinking allow new models to support military IW campaign planning and conduct that adapts to the demands of contemporary political warfare.

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Footnotes

¹ L Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013). 42-46.

² A Nestoras, 'Political Warfare: Competition in the Cyber Era,' European View 18, no. 2 (2019). 4430-4432

³ C O’Neill, 'Mental Models - Part I - Rethinking the Peace-War Spectrum,' The Forge, 2021, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mental-models-part-i-rethinking-peace-war-spectrum.

⁴ S Tzu and S Pin, The Art of War (Translated), ed. R Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 50.

⁵ R Babbage, Winning Without Fighting, Volume 1 (Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019). 5-6.

⁶ Allied Command, The Outline Plan for Political Warfare — 'Overlord' (CIA Library, 1944), https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP13X00001R000100370007-7.pdf.

⁷ L Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation PP - Santa Monica, CA, 2018). xiii.

⁸ T Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).9-15.

⁹ Babbage, Winning Without Fighting. 9-10.

¹⁰ J Kelly and M Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute Monographs (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).49-56.

¹¹ A Nestoras, 'Political Warfare: Competition in the Cyber Era,' European View 18, no. 2 (2019). 4430-4432.

¹² P Singer and E Brookings, 'Jihadi Digital Natives,' The New Atlantis, 2019, https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/jihadi-digital-natives.

¹³ Australian Government, ADF-P-3: Campaigns and Operations, 2nd ed. (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2021).170-171.

¹⁴ C O’Neill, 'Mental Models - Part II - Cooperation, Competition and Conflict,' The Forge, 2021, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/mental-models-part-ii-cooperation-competition-and-conflict.

¹⁵ D Ventre, Information Warfare, Second, Information Systems, Web and Pervasive Computing Series (London: Wiley, 2016). 40-61.

¹⁶ S Coyle, 'Australia’s Defence and National Security: How Defence Is Enhancing Australia’s Cyber Resilience,' United Services 72, no. 3 (2021).

¹⁷ Ventre, Information Warfare. 20-27

¹⁸ Robinson et al, Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses. 233-234

¹⁹ Australian Government, The Department of Defence: 2020 Force Structure Plan (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020). 27-31.

²⁰ Australian Government, Joint Doctrine Note 1-20: Information War - Australian Defence Force Manoevre in the Information Environment (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020). 5-4 – 5-5

²¹ Robinson et al, Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses. 229-233.

²² Nestoras, “Political Warfare: Competition in the Cyber Era.” 4429.

²³ Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. 5-16.

²⁴ T Paterson and L Hanley, 'Political Warfare in the Digital Age: Cyber Subversion, Information Operations and "Deep Fakes,"’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 74, no. 4 (2020): 447-449.

²⁵ O’Neill, “Mental Models - Part I - Rethinking the Peace-War Spectrum.”

²⁶ Paterson and Hanley, “Political Warfare in the Digital Age: Cyber Subversion, Information Operations and ‘Deep Fakes.’” 444-449.

²⁷ Australian Government, Army’s Future Land Operating Concept (Canberra, 2009). 15-23.

²⁸ G McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (Penguin Books Limited, 2015). 84-85.

²⁹ Australian Government, Joint Doctrine Note 1-20: Information War - Australian Defence Force Manoevre in the Information Environment. 4-4, 4-5.

³⁰ B Jensen, B Valeriano, and R Maness, 'Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist,' Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 2 (February 2019): 212–230.

³¹ D Snowden and M Boone, 'A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,' Harvard Business Review 85 (December 1, 2007): 68-76,149.

³² Australian Government, Army in Motion: Army’s Contribution to Defence Strategy, Two (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020). 18-22.

³³ Australian Government, 'Design Thinking: Applications for the Australian Defence Force,' ed. A Jackson, Joint Studies Paper Series 3 (2019). 2-19

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (Washington: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020). Ch 4, 23-24.

³⁶ Freedman, Strategy: A History. 201-210.

³⁷ M Evans, 'The Closing of the Australian Military Mind,' Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (2008): 105–31.

³⁸ T Scott, The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2011). 40-47.

³⁹ D Smith, K Jeter, and O Westgaard, 'Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,' Joint Force Quarterly, no. 78 (2015). 132-135.

⁴⁰ P Davis, Effects-Based Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). 7-15.

⁴¹ Scott, The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force. 47-49

⁴² Australian Government, Joint Doctrine Note 1-20: Information War - Australian Defence Force Manoevre in the Information Environment. 5-7 – 5-8

⁴³ Australian Government, Army’s Future Land Operating Concept. 18-23.