The swift success of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the result of a balanced symbiosis between operational art and the operational level. Political skewing of that balance led to the protracted disarray of the subsequent stabilisation period.

What role did operational art and the operational level play in the Coalition war in Iraq?

As argued by Dr Michael Evans, the concepts of operational art and the operational level serve as the key links between the umbrella of strategy and the creative and sequenced application of force at the tactical level^[1]. The formal acknowledgment of these concepts within US doctrine highlights their importance to campaign planning and the symbiotic relationship needed between the two^[2]. As US involvement within the Middle East has spanned decades and numerous operations, it is not surprising that these concepts have played significant roles in the success or otherwise of their strategic objectives. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in particular exemplifies how operational art and the operational level, influenced by strategic imperatives, shaped military decisions over an eight-year duration, and will therefore be explored in detail.  

This essay argues that the initial successes of Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrate what can be achieved when operational art and the operational level are synchronised toward the same strategic goal. However, when these elements are not balanced or adequately resourced, wars that require stability operations risk becoming protracted manifestations of political will. To support this argument, this essay will first explore the US approach to, and use of, planning at the operational level pre-invasion to 2011. This exploration will highlight that the subsequent transition between mission focus and successive headquarters introduced significant complexity to operational responsibility and subsequent planning efforts despite initial mastery. Lastly, the paper will break down how US operational art, unbound by risk tolerances and force composition issues, secured key strategic objectives within the initial weeks of OIF. When public opinion and political appetite shifted away from kinetic operations, it restricted the creativity and opportunity to utilise operational art to its fullest extent.

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Operational Level

The concept of an operational level of war was not widely embraced in the American military lexicon until the mid-1980s where the crucible of the Cold War and advancements in Russian operational theory made it a compelling subject. Distinct from operational art, the operational level seeks to combine tactical effects in pursuit of strategic aims through the specific levels of responsibility and planning^[3]. Subsequent developments in US military theory and practice were not without critique, as detractors viewed this definition as an independent level of war subject to its own command, thereby insulating it from strategic direction^[4]. Despite these assertions, and as contended by Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field, the operational level is crucial to effective military planning because it clearly delineates the command responsibilities of military functions such as manoeuvre, logistics and intelligence toward a unified goal^[5]. For the purposes of analysing the role these two concepts played throughout OIF, the relationships between Central Command (CENTCOM), Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), and Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) will be explored in detail. CENTCOM, which had served functionally as the operational headquarters for operations such as EARNEST WILL and DESERT STORM, had attempted to carry this over to OIF, leading to, as argued by David Dawson, a loss of theatre-wide perspective^[6]. The disaggregated planning direction between CENTCOM, CFLCC and the US government also meant that these efforts were not wholly focused on the strategic end state prior to the invasion^[7]. Investigation into the initial planning efforts and the subsequent transition between operational phases will further highlight how tactical effects, and the ability to achieve them, influence strategic objectives.

Planning at the operational level would prove to be a constant challenge to OIF because not only was there little continuity between successive headquarters, but the inherent mission focus would fundamentally change between combat, stabilisation and the mixture of both. Although combat operations did not commence until March 2003, Gregory Fontenot et al argue that OIF planning started the day after operation DESERT STORM ended^[8]. While initially a philosophical statement concerning the region's stability and its impact globally, this ‘planning’ manifested into tangible preparedness initiatives that were crucial to the initial invasion. Several years prior to the 17 March 2003, the US Army commenced six-monthly exercises dedicated to testing the reception, onward movement, and the command and control of its forces through deployments to Kuwait^[9]. These preparations were vital to the achievement of the initial objectives of OIF, such as ending the Saddam regime and securing Iraqi oilfields; however, initial planning efforts would not be sufficient for what was to come^[10]. CENTCOM had been directed to develop a JTF that would work closely with the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to address post-hostility operations. However, ORHA would only have two months prior to the invasion to work with this JTF before it ultimately was disbanded and its responsibilities transferred to the CFLCC^[11]. What created a flashpoint once dedicated combat operations ceased was that ORHA planning did not address the key concern of who would replace CFLCC and CENTCOM once the transfer of authority occurred^[12]. These initial planning gaps would ultimately set the conditions for a protracted and costly campaign, with operational planners needing to refocus throughout the years.

While the majority of CFLCC planning staff were focused on Operation Cobra II, the ground combat component of OIF, a select group were identified for subsequent efforts focused on post-hostility operations^[13]. However, the planning undertaken during this period relied on the key assumptions that force flow would continue between military phases and that the Iraqi Army would be available to support^[14]. Both these assumptions would prove incorrect, setting back planning efforts and decreasing the responsiveness and efficiency of subsequent planning through Operation ECLIPSE II or Phase IV operations. Further, even the extensive planning conducted by ORHA concerning contracted humanitarian services was delayed as funding would not be assigned until after combat operations commenced^[15]. The delay in funding meant that subsequent efforts to stand up contracts, and train and prepare personnel for reconstruction deployments to Iraq, did not occur until three months after Baghdad had fallen^[16]. The resulting discontent from a lack of humanitarian initiatives led to widespread looting during the transitionary period between operational objectives, further eroding the infrastructure required to support a functioning government. This highlights how important the link is between tactical actions and the ability to achieve strategic objectives, as the instability following Saddam Hussein’s removal would ultimately manifest into an eight-year insurgency. The disconnect between planning at the operational level and execution on the ground is further highlighted by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Landis, the executive office of the 1st Brigade Combat Team. He stated that while he was aware of Phase IV operational planning, these plans were not disseminated to his headquarters^[17]. Therefore, while operational planning had been immensely successful during the invasion, it would not be until political and strategic goals realigned in 2007 that stabilisation planning bore fruit.

The transition between CFLCC and CJTF-7 in May 2003 would place significant stress on operational planning teams as the reorganisation was based on V Corps headquarters and not organic CFLCC staff. As Major General Barbara Fast would state, once CENTCOM and CFLCC transitioned authority, they left with a significant portion of the theatre’s assets, leaving behind a disorganised intelligence collection system^[18]. Removing key assets such as analysts, human intelligence operatives, and liaison officers would impact planning efforts as operations were now being conducted with reduced situational awareness. With the security situation deteriorating, President George W. Bush would respond by ordering an increase in troop numbers in 2007. As posited by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, this was a decided shift in strategic direction where President Bush stated the operational objectives and selected the generals who would make them happen, contrary to traditional political/military advice cycles^[19]. The resulting invigoration of threat appetite and resources allowed planners to link greater tactical effects, such as increased security, community engagement, and reconstruction efforts, to the larger picture objectives of nation-building. But this initiative was not without critique as Robert Weiler argues that if the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and US Government had retained at least some of the Iraqi Army, the 2007 troop surge would not have been required. Weiler would further state that the period 2004-06 spent training new soldiers could have fast-tracked desperately needed stability operations^[20]. Therefore, strategic imperatives such as task organisation, non-combat operations, and risk tolerance would play crucial roles in the ability of US forces to plan and sequence tactical effects throughout OIF. These imperatives would ultimately force a well-designed, rehearsed, and executed invasion to morph into an eight-year occupation.

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operational Art

The concept of American operational art existed for less than 20 years before it was employed within OIF; this relatively nascent cognitive process meant that its definitions and implementation have evolved over time^[21]. During this period, the leading US doctrine was FM 3-0, which framed operational art as ‘the application of creative imagination by commanders and staff–supported by their skill, knowledge and experience–to design strategies, campaigns and major operations’^[22]. As Dr Antulio Echevarria argues, this definition is problematic because of the subjectivity of ‘creativeness’ against a backdrop of historical US operational art that was primarily focused on arms superiority^[23]. Unlike previous operations within the Middle East, such as Desert Storm, OIF’s concept and application of operational art required fundamental changes because previous notions of decisive military victory being the key to obtaining strategic goals became less relevant as the overall operation continued. When explored through the Clausewitzian maxim, the divergence between operational art in OIF and previous military operations highlights that war, politics and strategy, like speech, may have divergent ‘grammar’ but are bound by the same ‘logic’^[24]. The wide-ranging goals which framed the commencement of OIF shifted throughout its eight-year duration, thereby changing the ‘first grammar’ of defeating the enemy’s forces to the ‘second grammar’ of dealing with irregular warfare or insurgencies^[25]. Further, while initial successes were obtained through the creative application of force, the transition between military phases meant that commanders were placed under increasing pressure to utilise operational art within a rapidly deteriorating security environment with fewer resources.

The overwhelming success of Phase II and Phase III of the military campaign of OIF, being seize the initiative and dominate, were primarily achieved through the Third Infantry Division’s execution of a rapid advance later called the ‘Thunder Run’. This advance would be the fastest land movement in US military history, with over 704 kilometres in preparatory movement over 14 days and a further 300 kilometres in a single 24-hour sprint^[26]. The synchronisation between Coalition air assets, multiple brigades across successive objectives, and the securing of key nodes directly resulted from the ability to exercise operational art specifically within a near-peer enemy threat environment. Further, while FM 3-0 asserts that operational art can only occur at the operational level, the link between strategic objectives and tactical actions was displayed throughout 2007 during the peak of the surge and counterinsurgent (COIN) operations. US forces were approaching COIN challenges through a clear ‘hold, build’ methodology, thereby denying insurgents re-entry into previously cleared areas^[27]. As argued by Major Aaron Kaufman, these COIN efforts were supported by greater tactical exposure and therefore gained experience, and not necessarily through the doctrine that was developed during this period^[28]. This notion highlights the importance of the individual commander when exercising operational art within the greater umbrella of strategic intent and direction. Major Kaufman further posits that, because of the support provided at the operational level through increased manning and authorisation to disperse forces, Corps commanders and below were empowered to use their experiences and imagination when developing and executing plans^[29]. Therefore, the balance between the operational level and the ability to execute operational art is the key, as without the appropriate resources, support, or strategic direction, the luxury of being able to think creatively is severely restricted.

When President Bush declared that OIF’s mission had been accomplished on 01 May 2003, it set in motion a shift in public perception and strategic risk acceptance, ultimately changing the fundamental parameters of operational art for the remainder of the campaign. The transition between major combat operations to the subsequent phases of stabilisation and enabling civil authority meant that the scope for commanders to accept risk was limited, and so too their ability to creatively achieve mission requirements^[30]. Despite operational art and the creative coordination of host nation forces occurring throughout significant operations such as OP PHANTOM FURY (AL FAJR), these did not secure the overall strategic intent as insurgent operations continued to rise^[31]. The inability to link successive stabilisation/combat operations with strategic goals highlights the risk of disjointed operational art planned and executed at the operational level. Further, as OIF continued to extend beyond the initial occupation, it fell victim to the same disconnect between intended decisiveness and operational reality that the public and policymakers expected^[32]. The notion of an iterative operational feedback loop is supported by Colonel Joseph Anderson, who states that his stabilisation efforts in Mosul were heavily influenced by the time he served in Panama, Kosovo and Haiti^[33]. Therefore, experience and the appetite for acquiring it from both politician and commander would prove to be a crucial link that did not manifest when it was initially needed. Ultimately, this meant that campaign initiatives, such as the 2007 troop surge, were fighting to regain what was initially lost in the transition between combat and stabilisation operations.

The execution of carefully orchestrated operations to achieve strategic aims was exemplified during the initial occupation of Iraq in 2003. However, the transition to subsequent phases that did not receive the same planning and risk-tolerance levels meant that objectives such as pacifying an insurgency were harder to achieve. Much like operational art and the operational level are two sides of the same coin, Eliot Cohen posits that politics, statecraft and campaigns are as inseparable as they are interdependent^[34]. This dynamic led to an increase in COIN proficiency for the US and its Coalition partners and raised, as a directive of the US Department of Defense, the profile of stability operations to those of combat orientation^[35]. However, as this decision was not made until 2005, the aperture for true operational art within OIF was already narrowed. Once the CPA was established in 2003, CJTF–7 was, in essence, working for two governmental groups with conflicting priorities in addition to the De-Baathification initiatives and the disbandment of the Iraqi Army^[36].

These factors highlight how crucial the foundation that enables operational art is to the success or otherwise of a military campaign. As surmised by Bethesda Croker, who co-directed the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the CSIS, there weren’t sufficient staffing nor mandates across military personnel, and interdepartmental friction led to inefficiencies that eroded the legitimacy of OIF^[37]. Further, the operational art developed and displayed throughout the kinetic phases of OIF could not, by virtue of shifting objectives and insufficient authorisations, and therefore did not translate to effective stabilisation operations until these were addressed. Therefore, with additional resources and coherent strategic direction, the 2007 surge ushered in a new wave of creative problem solving, which ultimately set the conditions for the complete withdrawal of US forces in 2011.

Conclusion

This essay has established that the initial invasion and subsequent removal of the Saddam regime serve as compelling examples of the effective synchronisation between operational art and operational level planning. However, when the mission focus shifted to stability operations and nation-building, US military commanders were not supported or enabled as effectively. Ultimately, the initial achievements would be outweighed by a protracted insurgency, the effects of which are still felt today.

The paper first explored the US’ approach to operational level planning, highlighting the kinetic focus of the initial invasion from the perspectives of both CENTCOM and CFLCC. Planned rehearsals and consistent objectives allowed thorough contingency planning and freedom of manoeuvre for its assigned forces achieving unprecedented success. However, when Phase IV operations commenced, the handover of planning responsibility to CJTF-7 was ineffective, leading to planning setbacks and loss of developed capability. With the additional pressure of the CPA and its conflicting priorities, the link between tactical action and strategic goals would not reach the same heights again.

Lastly, the paper broke down how operational art and the ability of US forces to harness it were heavily influenced by risk tolerances and force composition limitations. When President Bush declared mission accomplished, it marked a substantial shift in the public and political will to sustain casualties in pursuit of a safer Iraq. This, coupled with the lack of force flow to enable the required security operations, meant that the scope for the creative use of forces in pursuit of strategic goals was significantly restricted. These concerns were, in part, addressed through the 2007 surge initiative as commanders would have the means and ways to achieve the ends.

Although there were effective uses of the two concepts throughout the campaign, the lag between kinetic/stability phase transition highlights that the balance between them must be continuously focused and synchronised toward the desired strategic end state.

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Footnotes

¹ Michael Evans, The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power (Land Warfare Studies Centre Duntroon, Australia, 2004), 50.

² Wilson C Blythe, 'A History of Operational Art,' Military Review 98, no. 6 (2018): 45-46.

³ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Field Manual 3-0, pg 6-1, 6-3 (Washington, DC: General William S Wallace, 2008).

⁴ Justin Kelly and Michael J Brennan, 'The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art,' Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ, no. 56 (2010): 114.

⁵ Chris Field, 'Planning in Operation Iraqi Freedom: observations of an Australian liaison officer,' Australian Army Journal 1, no. 2 (2003): 36.

⁶ David A Dawson, The Evolution of US Central Command From Operational To Strategic Headquarters, Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010), 6,7.

⁷ Dr. Donald P. Wright, Colonel Timothy R. Reese, and with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center, 2008), 100.

⁸ Gregory Fontenot, Edmund J Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Office of the Chief of Staff (ARMY) (WASHINGTON DC, 2004), xxii.

⁹ Major Jason Ballard, Operational Art and the Sustainment Warfighting Function, Army Command And General Staff College School Of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS 2011), 27-28.

¹⁰ Baker Spring, 'Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Objectives Met,' The Heritage Foundation  (2003): np.

¹¹ Gregory L Rhoden, Occupation and Governance: The New Face of Operational Art, Army Command And General Staff College School Of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2006), 30,31.

¹² Wright, Reese, and Team, On Point II Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003–January 2005, 77.

¹³ Kevin Benson, '"Phase IV" CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,' Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign  (2005): 183.

¹⁴ Benson, ‘"Phase IV" CFLCC Stability Operations Planning,' 183; Douglas J Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper Collins, 2009), 366-68, 428-30.

¹⁵ Tommy Franks, Malcolm McConnell, and Eric Conger, American soldier (Regan Books New York, 2004), 525.

¹⁶ Jay Garner, Iraq revisited,' Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign  (2004): 258.

¹⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Steve Landis, 'Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,' interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, no. 9, 21 December, 2005.

¹⁸ Major General Barbara Fast, 'Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,' interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, no. 3, 2006.

¹⁹ Justin Kelly and Michael J Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 70.

²⁰ Robert S Weiler, Eliminating Success During ECLIPSE II: An examination of the decision to disband the Iraqi military, Marine Corps Command and Staff College (Quantico, VA, 2009), 2-3.

²¹ Michael Detlef Krause and R Cody Phillips, Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, vol. 70 (Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005), 443-44.

²² Command, Short Field Manual 3-0, 6-1.

²³ II Echevarria and J Antulio, [American Operational Art, 1917-2008,' The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present  (2011): 160-61.

²⁴ Carl von Clausewitz et al, On war (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 252.

²⁵ John Andreas Olsen and Martin Van Creveld, The evolution of operational art: from Napoleon to the present (OUP Oxford, 2010), 6.

²⁶ David Zucchino, Thunder Run: the armored strike to capture Baghdad (Grove Press, 2004), 18.

²⁷ Kelly and Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy, 116.

²⁸ Aaron J Kaufman, Learning from Our Military History: The United States Army, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Potential for Operational Art and Thinking, Army Command And General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth KS, 2013), 66.

²⁹ Kaufman, Learning from Our Military History: The United States Army, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Potential for Operational Art and Thinking, 16-17.

³⁰ Major Blue Huber, Operational Art and Risk: Why Doctrine Does Not Help, Army Command And General Staff College School Of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2013), 65.

³¹ Wright, Reese, and Team, On Point II Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003–January 2005, 44,169,74,244.

³² Alexander Mattelaer, 'The Crisis In Operational Art' (paper presented at the European Security and Defence Forum, London, Chatham House, 2009), 2.

³³ Colonel Joseph Anderson, 'Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,' interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, no. 9, 4 November, 2005.

³⁴ Eliot A Cohen, Supreme command: Soldiers, statesmen and leadership in wartime (Simon and Schuster, 2012), 51.

³⁵ Mattelaer, 'The Crisis In Operational Art,' 12.

³⁶ Huber, Operational Art and Risk: Why Doctrine Does Not Help, 59; James Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq: A history of the coalition provisional authority, vol. 847 (Rand Corporation, 2009), 77.

³⁷ (Bethesda Crocker) in Lloyd J Matthews, Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-conflict in the 21st Century (DIANE Publishing, 2004), 30,31.