Applied flexibly as intended, we already have a solid framework to address contemporary political warfare. Applied inflexibly, Western theoretical and procedural frameworks diminish in effectiveness.

Introduction

Robust planning is essential for all complex activities to ensure a well-considered, risk-aware and coordinated plan is developed to address the situation. Planning involves determining facts and appreciating where information gaps may exist; assessing, mitigating and accepting a level of risk tolerable to those involved; and developing options for consideration before selecting a preferred solution. As the character of war is constantly evolving, militaries must similarly evolve to ensure they maintain an edge over adversaries that may threaten their national interests. One of the critical components to ensure military success is rigorous planning. Australia’s joint planning doctrine states: ‘Planning is of utmost importance to the successful conduct of campaigns and operations’.^[1] Successful planning relies on the quality of the planning framework; however, the primary influence will always be with those conducting the planning activities and their ability to apply operational art. Operational art is described concisely in United States  joint planning doctrine: ‘Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and evaluating risks’.^[2] Assessing the quality of a planning framework cannot be done in isolation without consideration of those applying the framework—the operational artists.

Existing theoretical frameworks for the planning and conduct of military campaigns contain inherent flexibility to enable adaption by practitioners of operational art to the demands of contemporary political warfare. The first section of this essay describes contemporary military planning in an increasingly complex world where planning frameworks used by Western militaries are examined, and the unique demands of contemporary political warfare are explored. The requirement for a coordinated Whole-of-Government (WOG) response to contemporary political warfare is detailed, including the role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in aiding other government agencies through the planning process. The second section details the inherent flexibility within contemporary planning frameworks while highlighting some of the challenges in application due to the human dimension as well as the challenge of planning in the less defined environment of contemporary political warfare. With a focus on the ADF's planning framework (the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP)), doctrinal flexibility is described as well as the ability of military professionals to apply this flexibility. The third and final section of this essay addresses the difficulties of determining the adversary’s centre of gravity (COG) and appropriate quantitative and qualitative performance measures in planning for contemporary political warfare. All three sections highlight the intrinsic flexibility of the theoretical and procedural frameworks, yet also suggest the need for that military campaign and/or planning to be interwoven into a WOG response to be effective.

Contemporary military planning in a complex world

Frameworks used by Western militaries for the planning and conduct of military operations and campaigns are, by necessity, very similar. Australia utilises the JMAP with five steps (scoping and framing, mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA analysis, and decision and concept of operations development).^[3] The US Department of Defense and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence produce joint planning doctrine (seven-step joint planning process) similar to Australia’s JMAP.^[4] The UK’s doctrine for the planning of operations adopts North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrine for compatibility with allies and partners.^[5] With interoperability and contributing as a coalition being fundamental tenets of Western militaries, the ability to collaborate at all levels, including the planning and conduct of operations, necessitates this commonality. Containing only minor differences, JMAP is entirely interoperable with planning processes used in coalition headquarters.^[6] The Australian, US and UK planning doctrine incorporates fundamentals of design to understand the problem; and arrangement of operations to prepare an appropriate response. Understanding the situation, risks and opportunities, whilst planning to deliver a proportionate and executable response to address the situation, requires educated and experienced professionals to apply operational art. The keyword is ‘art’, as there are too many variables and human factors to use a scientific or mathematical approach in isolation. The other challenge of increasing relevance to modern militaries is the evolving nature of the threat from a defined enemy and battlefield into the vagaries of contemporary political warfare.

Contemporary political warfare, also referred to as ‘grey-zone’ and ‘hybrid’ warfare, is described in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) as: ‘Grey-zone: activities designed to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict’.^[7] Contemporary political warfare is intended to coerce and exploit nations through activities that may not meet the threshold of conventional armed conflict, though they may be conducted as a precursor to conventional war.^[8] These activities may include the use of para-military forces, trade and economic exploitation and/or information operations.^[9] It must be recognised that coercive and exploitation activities are not new; however, with an increasingly interconnected world, through trade, commerce, travel and information technology, grey-zone tactics targeting a  country’s interests are easier to execute, more difficult to detect and increasing in their use.^[10] One of the earlier published definitions for political warfare stated: ‘political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives’.^[11] The logic flows that a response to political warfare would require the utilisation of all instruments of national power—Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME). With the complexity of grey-zone activities, including Finance, Intelligence and Law enforcement (FIL) to the DIME construct to truly reflect WOG is valid.^[12] Responding to or utilising political warfare requires this WOG approach with all elements working together in a coordinated approach, which takes planning.

NATO uses seven indicators to identify hybrid threats, with ‘military posturing as a part of strategic messaging’ being the only indicator directly related to the military.^[13] The ADF encourages the synchronisation of WOG agencies in response to threats to Australia and aims to support other government agencies in their efforts.^[14] With significant resources and expertise, the ADF is often utilised in assisting other government agencies in planning and responding to grey-zone activities against Australia. In addition to resources, the ADF is the only Australian government agency with a deliberate planning framework for joint campaign and operation planning (utilising JMAP) that may be used to understand and develop a WOG response to grey-zone activities. With other government agencies not having a deliberate planning process, the ADF’s responsibility is to guide and educate other government agencies through the JMAP planning process to ensure a robust, considered, and proportionate response is produced.

With the military being just one part of DIME-FIL responding to grey-zone activities, it in no way diminishes the ADF’s contribution or response. The 2020 DSU sets three strategic objectives for Defence planning: ‘to shape Australia’s strategic environment; to deter actions against Australia’s interests; and to respond with credible military force, when required’.^[15] Understandably, military peacetime preparation has traditionally focused on the ‘respond’ objective; however, increasing effort is now invested in shaping and deterring. Traditional battlefield dominance is no longer a decisive factor with a convergence of state and non-state actors conducting grey-zone operations.^[16] Death of enemy forces and destruction of their property remain valid outputs for modern militaries; however, deliberate non-kinetic shaping and deterrence activities will be more effective in preventing grey-zone attacks on Australia and its interests.^[17] Although the 2020 DSU states ‘shape, deter, respond’ as strategic planning objectives for defence, they are, in fact, WOG objectives. To enact these objectives, practitioners of operational art must ensure flexible application of the doctrine to ensure WOG involvement and considerations during planning to shape, deter and respond to grey-zone threats.

Flexible and adaptive planning framework with human limitations

Military operational planning processes acknowledge the variability of circumstances that may be encountered and provide flexibility with applying planning doctrine. For example, Australia’s JMAP publication states: ‘The Joint Military Appreciation Process is a linear process but, if required by the circumstances, it may need to be applied in a less rigid fashion, with steps repeated, re-ordered or omitted.’^[18] The ADF’s JMAP planning manual ADFP 5.0.1 does include a hypothetical example to illustrate to and educate the reader; however, the example or any other parts of the process are not intended to be used as a template for operational planning.^[19] One of the tables within ADFP 5.0.1 is unfortunately labelled as a template (table 4B.1) and, although you may use it as a template, it must be stressed that the process is entirely flexible to the demands of the situation and requirements of the commander and their planning team.^[20] JMAP is neither a strict process nor a template; JMAP serves as a framework or tool to enable considered appreciation of the operating environment and development of appropriate courses of action. The flexible application of operational planning within the JMAP framework makes JMAP suitable for a broad spectrum of operations from natural disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and conventional warfare to grey-zone activities. The challenge in applying the JMAP is for practitioners to utilise the inherent flexibility and not be rigid in following the process, which is often a challenge for military professionals.

Military professionals are inculcated into the military during recruit or officer training by being taught the importance and criticality of following established rules, values, norms and protocols to operate as a collective team.^[21] Whilst this is valid for a number of situations, it does stifle individualism and creativity as members strive to conform and seek out established processes and procedures to perform their duties. Following initial training, the starting point for the majority of enlisted personnel and officers is at the tactical level, where low risk tolerance and compliance to rules and processes are further reinforced. As careers progress into operational and strategic levels of influence, this adherence to rules needs to evolve into critical and creative thought as situations become more complex and risks may not be able to be mitigated to a low level. In addition to indoctrinated conformity, the type of people the military recruits is relevant to this argument. Militaries generally recruit cognitively conservative personnel because of their likelihood of success in their earlier tactic-orientated careers. Cognitively adaptive personnel may struggle at the rule and detail-oriented tactical level but are cognitively better suited to complex operational and strategic levels. However, even if they make it through the recruitment process, cognitively adaptive personnel may not succeed in their earlier tactical careers to make it through to the operational and strategic levels.^[22] Notwithstanding the causes, the military must develop personnel who can think critically and creatively during planning activities to create innovative solutions in response to complex and ambiguous situations.

Major General Ryan wrote: ‘The intellectual edge for an individual is the capacity for that person to be able to creatively out-think and out-plan potential adversaries’.^[23] Professional Military Education (PME) is essential to developing this intellectual edge through programs such as the Australian Command and Staff Course. However, a significant challenge lies in ensuring the operational and strategic work environment is amenable to less defined, riskier, and less rule-compliant thinking. Commanders and staff involved with joint operational planning must accept and become comfortable with ambiguous, uncertain and less complete operational and strategic environments if they are to succeed. Not to be confused with grey-zone warfare (though there are similarities), this ambiguous environment is often referred to as the ‘grey area’ between the absolutes of black and white. Whilst failure is generally not an option for military operations, planners need to ensure they consider more than just the most conservative solution. Australia’s JMAP doctrine acknowledges this: ‘JMAP is nevertheless subject to some inherent limitations that stem from its linear nature and formulaic structure. It will not foster critical thinking by itself’.^[24] Deep-seated norms of the military challenge the ability to divert from existing doctrine, as evident in the ability to change doctrine itself.

Although the military prides itself on its ability to adapt and innovate, it must be acknowledged that there remains an inherent institutionalisation within the military that limits unrestricted creativity, though this is not necessarily a negative trait. In his paper describing an update to ADFP 5.0.1, Dr Jackson describes the balance of change that would be acceptable to military institutions.^[25] Jackson details a compromise was necessary between the desires and accessibility of the intended audience to the requirement for intellectual robustness.^[26] There is also a factor regarding an acceptable rate of change, especially for a large and diverse organisation such as the ADF. Significant changes to doctrine can’t simply be published and distributed, they require a deliberate transition, including education and training. This example highlights the real-world ability of the ADF to adapt in an intellectual setting. Adaption isn’t easy nor without resistance, though understanding an institution’s inherent cultural limitation towards change enables adaption to occur at an acceptable level and pace to ensure changes can occur. Although JMAP contains words enabling flexible application of the process, it remains with the humans using the framework to utilise the inherent flexibility in response to the situation and not be mentally committed to a strict, linear process.

Utilising a consistent framework for the planning and conduct of all military campaigns has significant benefits that outweigh any inherent disadvantages. Although, in the context of operational assessment, US Joint Planning doctrine provides a clear description of the reasons for having a robust framework that applies equally to JMAP: ‘An operational assessment framework helps organize and analyse data and communicate recommendations to the commander’.^[27] Within the five steps, the JMAP framework enables problem definition, prioritisation of planning and related activities, understanding available resources and allocation as necessary, and risk identification, mitigation and acceptance.^[28] Understood and practised by military professionals with concise and complementary doctrine, the JMAP framework provides a deliberate planning tool to prompt, highlight and refer users to specific steps they may follow, adapt or omit. Understandably, this may be perceived as an inefficient process, though the advantage lies in the deliberate action to follow, adapt or omit, which ensures each step in the process is at least considered during planning.^[29] A single, flexible framework decreases training and education; however, it is essential that a significant part of JMAP training is focussed on the flexible application of the framework in non-traditional scenarios such as grey-zone activities. Another advantage of the JMAP framework is to encourage the development of consistent products to be provided to decision-makers so they may concentrate on the information contained within and not waste valuable time interpreting the data. Although the flexible application of JMAP is essential, there are some elements within the framework that will challenge practitioners when applying JMAP to grey-zone activities.

Centres of gravity and performance measures

In response to grey-zone activities against Australia, determining the adversary’s COG may not be possible due to the potential clandestine nature of the activity where the adversary’s identity may not be known. ADFP 5.0.1 acknowledges that COG analysis of the opposing force may not need to be applied where there is no adversary, such as Defence Aid to the Civil Community (DACC) or Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR); however, own force COG is still required.^[30] In the event that the identity of an adversary is unknown, planning must continue beyond adversary COG analysis whilst intelligence efforts continue to obtain and refine information on the adversary. This lack of detail increases the number and criticality of assumptions with a corresponding increase in risk.^[31] This example amplifies the importance of deliberate action to continue with the planning process beyond a step that may not yet be known, so that courses of action may be developed for what is known at the time. When additional information becomes available, these can be injected into the planning process to maximise the potential of the plan’s success. The other challenge for practitioners applying JMAP to grey-zone activities is the development of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP).

All sound process improvement and planning processes contain feedback mechanisms to enable continuous improvement and refinement towards an optimal product. The Six Sigma continuous improvement process is very similar to JMAP and includes five steps: define, measure, analyse, improve and control.^[32] Effectively, you can’t improve what you can’t measure. Akin to Six Sigma, the JMAP framework doctrine includes: ‘Measures of performance and effectiveness should provide succinct indications of change, effect and execution of the desired impact’.^[33] MOE and MOP are tools to determine the results of the WOG response to the situation and are determined during the planning process.^[34] With the vagaries of grey-zone activities, robust MOE and MOP development will be challenging; however, for the reasons listed above, it is essential that sufficient time be invested in determining appropriate quantitative and qualitative performance measures. As per all parts of the JMAP process, continuous review and improvement are intended to enable refinement as the operation progresses.

Conclusion

Despite significant advancements in technology, it must be remembered that warfare is a human endeavour. Technology is a significant determinant of success or failure, though the greatest determinant remains with the human dimension and their ability to prepare, plan and execute their duties. Contemporary political warfare requires a WOG effort to ensure success, and that success is a result of sound planning. This essay has shown that the existing theoretical frameworks for the planning and conduct of military campaigns do contain inherent flexibility to enable adaption by practitioners of operational art to the demands of contemporary political warfare. The essay opened with a comparison of Western military planning frameworks, detailing their similarity and interoperability. Next, contemporary political warfare was assimilated with grey-zone and hybrid warfare, and the requirement for WOG action to shape, deter and respond was explained. The second section of this essay detailed the built-in flexibility in Australia's JMAP framework, which enables it to be utilised in planning to the demands of contemporary political warfare. Military culture was explored, highlighting some of the barriers to applying operational art within the JMAP framework in addressing complex situations such as contemporary political warfare. Lastly, the challenges of determining COG and developing MOE and MOP for grey-zone activities were described.

Dutch strategic studies academic George Dimitriu provides an enlightening assessment of the modern socio-political state linking contemporary political warfare: ‘The liquid modern condition in the West presents a situation in which the fragmentation of state-level political power has decreased the effectiveness of force. It has resulted in a state of affairs where wars are fought without a clear beginning and without a clear end, a permanent state of conflict involving a fluctuating variety of militaries, non-governmental organisations, private military companies and civilians’.^[35] Applied flexibly as per its intent, JMAP provides a solid framework for WOG planning to address the demands of this contemporary political warfare. Inflexibly applied, theoretical and procedural frameworks diminish in their effectiveness, irrespective of whether that be a Western or Eastern model. Likewise, if planned in isolation from the other elements of DIME-FIL, a military campaign will fail to satisfy the demands of contemporary political warfare. It simply must be integrated, and cannot be federated to the WOG approach.

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Footnotes

¹ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication - Plans Series: Joint Planning ADDP 5.0, Edition 3 (Directorate Publishing, Library and Information Services, 2018), 1-1.

² United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (2020), I-3.

³ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3 (Directorate Publishing, Library and Information Services, 2019), 1-2.

⁴ United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning, Figure III-4, Page III-11.: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Allied Joint Publication-5: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, Edition A Version 2, UK Change 1 (NATO Standardization Office, 2019), 4-3. US seven steps are Planning Initiation, Mission Analysis, COA Development, COA Analysis & Wargaming, COA Comparison, COA Approval, Plan or Order Development.

⁵ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Allied Joint Publication-5: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, Edition A Version 2, UK Change 1, vii.

⁶ David Hombsch, ‘ACSC 2021 JOP-9 Lecture - Operational Art and Joint Operations Planning’, (2021).

⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Canberra, Australia: Australian Government Publication Service, 2020), 12.

⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 14.

⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 12.

¹⁰ ‘Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech at 2015 Army War College Strategy Conference’, 2015, accessed 04 Oct 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/606661/.

¹¹ ‘Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269’, 1948, accessed 03 Oct 2021, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269.

¹² Cesar A Rodriguez, Timothy C Walton, and Hyong Chu, ‘Putting the FIL into DIME: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power’, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 97 (2020): 122.

¹³ Murat Caliskan and Michel Liégeois, ‘The Concept of “Hybrid Warfare” Undermines NATO’s Strategic Thinking: Insights from Interviews with NATO Officials’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 32, no. 2 (2020): 300.: The other NATO indicators to identify hybrid threats are: energy security, political pressure and influence, hostile intelligence and sabotage, cyber activities, information operations and soft power (NGO) elements.

¹⁴ Justin Jones, ‘ACSC 2021 JOP LOO2 Lecture - Operational Planning Case Study - Afghanistan NEO’,  (2021).

¹⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 24-25.

16

¹⁶ David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (Oxford, United States: Hurst and Company 2020), 1, 6.

¹⁷ Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York, United States: Alfred A Knopf, 2007), eBook 313 of 47.: Antulio J Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for US Military Strategy (US Army War College Press, 2016), xii.

¹⁸ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 1-1.

¹⁹ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, iv.

²⁰ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 4B-1.

²¹ Dennis McGurk et al, ‘Joining the Ranks: The Role of Indoctrination in Transforming Civilians to Service Members’, in Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 13.

²² Murphy Danahy, ‘TEDxWestPoint: The Future of Strategic Military Leadership’, (2017).

²³ Mick Ryan, ‘An Australian Intellectual Edge for Conflict and Competition in the 21st Century’, Centre of Gravity, 48 (2019): 4, http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/6825/australian-intellectual-edge-conflict-and-competition-21st.

²⁴ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 1-9.

²⁵ Aaron P Jackson, ‘A Tale of Two Designs: Developing the Australian Defence Force’s Latest Iteration of its Joint Operations Planning Doctrine’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 17, no. 4 (2017): 179.

²⁶ Jackson, ‘A Tale of Two Designs: Developing the Australian Defence Force’s Latest Iteration of its Joint Operations Planning Doctrine’, 179.

²⁷ United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning, I-23.

²⁸ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 1-4 to 1-5.

²⁹ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 1-1.

³⁰ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 1-9 to 1-10.

³¹ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 3-31.

³² Salman Taghizadegan, Essentials of Lean Six Sigma (Oxford, United States: Elsevier Science & Technology, 2006), 44.

³³ Joint Doctrine Directorate, Australian Defence Force Procedures - Plans Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process ADFP 5.0.1, Edition 2, AL3, 1-12.

³⁴ Joint Doctrine Centre, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication - Executive Series: Multiagency Coordination - Defence’s Contribution to Australian Government Responses ADDP 00.9, Edition 1 (Defence Publishing Service, 2013), 4-12.

³⁵ George Dimitriu, ‘Clausewitz and the Politics of War: A Contemporary Theory’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43, no. 5 (2020): 680.