Do the existing theoretical and procedural frameworks for planning and conducting military campaigns enable western militaries to adapt to the demands of contemporary political warfare?

Introduction

This essay will examine the nature of contemporary political warfare and the ability of Western frameworks to adapt and execute military planning and campaigning in this new environment. To achieve this, the nature and intent of political warfare will be explored, and context provided through examination of its use at the nation state, middle power and terrorist organisation levels. To assess the adaptability of Western nations’ military, legislative and doctrinal frameworks in adapting to the demands of political warfare, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology security framework is adopted. Specifically, this framework is used to determined western nations’ ability to ‘identify, protect, detect and respond’ to contemporary political warfare using the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia’s legislative and doctrinal frameworks as exemplars.  

Contemporary Political Warfare

Political warfare, or POLWAR, is a stand-alone discipline in the pursuit of influencing or undermining an adversary’s political systems. In practice it remains a weapon of war, albeit below the threshold of kinetic force, to weaken a state by inhibiting its ability to achieve its strategic objectives. Specifically, POLWAR is the discipline, instruments and methods in which the political system of an adversary is the exclusive target to generate confusion, dissent, undermine relationships or influence policy decisions^[1]. As captured by Kennan, the 1948 US diplomat to the Soviet Union, POLWAR is considered a battle for influence using all the levers of national power below the threshold of war^[2]. In achieving this influence, the execution of POLWAR leverages diplomatic, economic, covert, informational and psychological means to apply pressure on an adversary’s political system to shape a particular outcome in favour of the POLWAR proponent^[3]. Its emergence in modern warfare is due, in part, to a shift in the context of conflict where national security is not based on defence against overt attack, but the threat of diminished global influence in achieving national objectives and maintaining sovereignty^[4]. To further clarify, POLWAR stands apart from commonly used synonyms such as ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey-zone’ warfare as it seeks to purposefully avoid military force and exclusively target the mechanics of political decision making, although it may be used to influence the decisions around the use or development of military forces^[5]. Contemporary use of POLWAR has become prolific, even by non-state actors, as the scale, cost and use of technology by modern militaries has forced less capable nations to seek alternatives to forceful confrontation^[6]. In examining this, it is demonstrated that superpowers, middle-regional powers and non-actors alike have used POLWAR to obtain strategic advantage; namely Russia, Iran and al-Qaeda.
As a much-attributed POLWAR practitioner, Russia has sought to influence both its region and the international community using a variety of methods that have proven difficult to counter or overtly attribute. The need for development of such capabilities is not derived from an overt desire for hostilities or perceived future threat, but to serve a domestic function as part of Russia’s strategy for national security^[7]. This is to say, Russia desires to position itself as a counter-balance to US dominance, providing alternative trade and economic value to, as example, the Middle-East that is not tethered to US primacy^[8]. Operationally, this requires the ability to undermine or inhibit the reach of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation without conflict and to generate instability in the states separating Russia and Europe^[9]. In this strategic objective, Russia targets both regional and international political systems with ever-increasing nuance and sophistication.

Regionally, during the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential elections, the pro-independence and anti-Russian candidate Yushchenko was poisoned and disfigured by an unknown assailant^[10]. Unexpectedly surviving, Yushchenko continued to campaign, and on voting day masked men were reported at polling booths harassing and intimidating Yushchenko voters^[11]. Further, millions of votes were later attributed to long since deceased citizens, giving the pro-Russian Yanukovych the win^[12]. However, the crude methods of suspected Russian POLWAR activities were discovered and mass protests erupted, resulting in a second election ultimately handing power to Yushchenko^[13]. However, these presumed Russian POLWAR tactics would soon be refined as highlighted in the following 2014 Ukrainian election, whereby voting machines were recoded to predetermine the vote count coordinated with an intensive information campaign announcing the leading and presumptive winner of the election ahead of official results^[14]. The objective of these activities was to influence undecided voters and provide an air of legitimacy to the fraudulent electronically tallied election results^[15]. Internationally, these same methods were detected in the 2016 US elections whereby compromise of the electoral system and an information campaign worked in tandem to achieve (presumed) Russian strategic objectives. It is suspected that the highly sophisticated information campaign aimed to escalate division in social groups and dominate media messaging to sway the election outcome against nominee Clinton; having had a history of tension with Russian President Putin^{[16] [17]}.

As an example of the utility of POLWAR, the middle power Iran has also adopted these methods to enhance their national security and propel their strategic agenda. Further, through adopting POLWAR, Iran has generated a force-multiplier in rallying internal and external party factions, as well as regional neighbours, in resisting US influence to position itself as a leader against ‘US imperialism’^[18]. Like Russia, Iran uses information warfare vectored through social media and sympathetic or controlled media outlets to influence social discourse and normalise its political messaging^[19]. However, Iran has also developed a strong network of proxy-state actors to provide a level of deniability for its actions as well as directly influence or generate events that serve a higher political, security or national objective^[20].  These actions are central to Iranian defence strategy, and as such Iran has developed or funded Iranian news broadcasting in 45 countries, five foreign-language broadcasting stations and over 70 ‘Iranian Cultural Centres’ across the globe in addition to 26 official embassies^[21]. These efforts have seen Iraqi and Iranian relations flourish and ties strengthen with Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Houthi controlled Yemen, establishing a regional resistance to US influence^[22].

Similarly, al-Qaeda, while not a nation state or commanding the same influence it once did, uses POLWAR tactics to influence and achieve strategic military ends. Post the 9/11 attacks, the ability to influence the regional and religious narrative has been key in their strategy of resistance against stronger adversaries^[23]. The al-Qaeda POLWAR has two key objectives: undermine the authority and objectives of the enemy; and, in parallel, rally their people to the cause^[24]. Through leveraging religion and the ubiquity of the internet, al-Qaeda is able to broadcast the west’s departure from religious norms as well as emphasise and politically frame the west’s military interventions or mistakes. Through this method of POLWAR, al-Qaeda were successful in not only expanding their recruitment base to international levels but were also able to generate sympathisers within western political systems, reducing the resolve for continued war^[25]. In achieving this, great effort was placed in the curating of messages and visuals to undermine the legitimacy of Western nations and the righteousness of resistance, in a battle for hearts and minds, which in winning translated to operational support and mobility by the local population^[26]. As a result, POLWAR provided the vastly outgunned al-Qaeda a method that could control the perception of the people, and in doing so directly attack the political objectives of the US and Western allies.  

In understanding the intent, utility and use of POLWAR, history has demonstrated that super, middle and ideological powers can harness its effects to shape strategic outcomes beyond the means of conventional arms. Moreover, as commonality, the exemplars of Russia, Iran and al-Qaeda perceive themselves to be at a constant state of conflict, and as such POLWAR provides the ability to influence outwardly without tempting reprisals. As a result, these actors are empowered to undermine the ‘enemy’ as an enduring effort and manage risk through deniability. In this context, examination is now made of existing western military frameworks to identify their appropriateness and readiness for countering the enduring and nuanced nature of POLWAR.

Western Military Framework Environment for Managing POLWAR

In order to examine the effectiveness of Western frameworks, a structured approach has been drawn from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The NIST security framework is a US initiative that brought together academia, defence and industry in an effort to manage risks of external influence, interference and disruption to critical infrastructure and networks^[27]. This collaboration resulted in the identification of five functions of security, namely ‘identify, protect, detect, respond, recover’^[28]. These functions create a framework ‘to apply the principles and best practices of risk management to improving security and resilience’^[29]. Moreover, the intrusion mechanisms and principles of exploitation outlined by NIST broadly correlate when examining POLWAR, notably reconnaissance, weaponisation, delivery and exploitation^[30]. As a result, NIST’s principles of security are well structured to enable examination of Western military frameworks for planning and campaigning to identify, protect, detect and respond to POLWAR activities^[31].

In accordance with NIST, ‘Identify’ is defined as ‘understanding the business context [and] the resources that support critical functions’^[32]. Further, ‘Protect’ is to ‘develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services’, while ‘Detect’ is the development of systems to identify malign activities^[33]. In order to appropriately achieve these three functions as a counter to POLWAR, Western military planning frameworks would require mechanisms to highlight critical national and political functions. However, upon examination it becomes apparent that Western militaries are not designed or mandated to achieve this, and as such are not appropriately empowered. Specifically, with Australia as an example, through the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, the mandate for identification and protection of critical functions rests with the Minister for Home Affairs; with management responsibilities delegated to State Premiers, and not the military^[34]. Further, the identification and protection of government from foreign influence is vested with the Attorney-General under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018^[35]. Similarly, the US and UK have vested powers of identifying critical infrastructure and the security of government process with civilian organisations: the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Home Office, respectively^{[36] [37]}. As a result of these legislative frameworks, the Western functions for countering POLWAR are disaggregated and the military is not empowered, or obliged, to identify, detect or protect the government from POLWAR activities unless directed by government as a defined military operation. However, as characterised by NIST, any such military operation would be defined as a ‘Response’ function, and in this the military is legislatively restricted to reactive defensive or supportive measures and not active denial of POLWAR.

In understanding the militaries legislative restrictions, and its role as a responsive action, examination must turn to how Western militaries obtain their authority to commence planning and response action. As a definition, ‘Respond’ calls for the ability to ‘develop and implement appropriate activities to take action’^[38]. In this, the United States Joint Planning Doctrine outlines four explicit phases of planning: Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development and Plan Assessment^[39]. The first aspect of this process, strategic guidance, outlines where the US military receives its authority and direction for the execution of military force, namely the President of the United States^[40]. While the military is enabled to provide guidance to the President through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is not empowered to operate without the President’s explicit authority^[41]. This command structure highlights that the US Military would require external mechanisms to detect POLWAR activities and then require the political powers to determine military force as an appropriate response measure to initiate a military planning process^[42]. Similarly, Australia’s Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations, states ‘the ADF will only be committed to campaigns and operations by government in pursuit of national strategic objectives’^[43]. This too suggests that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is reliant on external elements to detect the POLWAR activities and preference military action as a response measure before planning a military response. Further, the UK, in Allied Joint Doctrine for Planning of Operations 5, integrating the Northern Alliance of Treaty Nations (NATO) Defence Planning Process, establishes five steps for military planning, the first of which requires political guidance and authority^[44]. As a result, reiterating that the military is not the target of POLWAR but instead the political system is, these processes are reliant on their respective political authorities to instigate a response. In this, a critical flaw of the Western approach to combating POLWAR is uncovered; if an adversary’s POLWAR activities are successful in influencing the decisions of government, they are capable of containing or negating military force by depriving it of political authority^[45].

In considering the deprivation of political authority, such actions need not be overt or hostile and need only to disincentivise military—or any—action to be effective. This is to say that nullifying the activation of the military can be achieved through implied threat of economic hardship, invoking Western legal protections or, more importantly, undermining political will. To clarify, for Australia, the mechanism for the military to name and engage an enemy can be achieved by an act of Cabinet, without consent of Parliament or the Queen’s vested Executive Power in the Governor-General^[46]. Such power exists under the Defence Act 1903, Section 50C; however, any member of Government can table the matter for debate and make any use of, or the intent to use, military force public knowledge^[47]. In understanding this, for the military to counter POLWAR and initiate a defence it would require the Cabinet of the day to, in effect, openly declare an intent to do so. This declaration brings with it public scrutiny and debate—providing an additional POLWAR platform for the adversary. Such public scrutiny is of little consequence to nations such as Russia and Iran, having made countering Western influence a cultural cornerstone of national politics. However, for Australia and other Western nations, declaring an intent to attack a nation, politically or otherwise, is a more difficult proposition as it provides the target nation justifiable retaliatory or defensive measures under the United Nations Charter, Article 51. Specifically, it provides the target nation justification in using response measures for self-defence and the ability to seek sanctions under the rules of the World Trade Organisation^{[48] [49] [50]}. As a result, Western nations are seemingly trapped by their own rules-based order. In short, if western nations wish to harness the military in response to, or conducting, POLWAR, its disclosure is inevitable and provides advantage to the adversary.

The critical vulnerability of political authority notwithstanding, once the military is authorised as a response action its ability to plan and execute defensive or offensive action is robust. Specifically, Australia’s Campaign Cycle, as outlined in Joint Planning ADDP 5.0, allows for the identification and alignment of national strategic and military strategic objectives executed through the operational planning and tactical capabilities of military force^[51]. Moreover, the Campaign Cycle of campaign design and management is adaptable and incorporates assessment and adaptation phases to ensure that execution is meeting intended strategic outcomes^[52]. Further, such planning empowers the military to draw on whole-of-government capability and powers to execute a campaign or operation, representing the first formal mechanism by which Australia can generate a whole-of-government response to POLWAR^[53]. Moreover, in response to the critical flaw of political authority over military execution at the national strategic level, the existing frameworks are insulated from this at the military strategic level down through to the tactical level of execution^[54]. This is to say, the command and control of approved military activity is the sole remit of the Australia Defence Force^[55]. In theory this separation insulates military operational and tactical activities from any effects of adversary POLWAR directed towards government.

Such flexibility is also reflected in other Western military campaign planning, for example the US Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum. The doctrine note describes a campaign planning environment as ‘a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict’^[56]. In this, it outlines that a campaign can execute and engage an enemy at different stages of a campaign, or concurrently at different levels of the continuum, to achieve the strategic objective^[57]. As a result, a heightened level of flexibility is introduced to the military’s arsenal for influencing the outcome of military engagements. More specifically, military engagement has matured from solely an application of force to a more nuanced method to ‘create conditions to impose desired strategic objectives upon the adversary’^[58].  In this, the competition continuum speaks to the military’s ability to, once authorised, engage the adversary below and at the threshold of war, supported by whole-of-government capability.

Conclusion

In exploring the nature of contemporary political warfare, it has been established that its practitioners consider it to be an effective method to influence external parties below the threshold of kinetic conflict. Notably, through examining Russia, Iran and al-Qaeda it is shown that its development and practice is not the sole remit of superpowers. As a result, there exists a requirement for nations to incorporate this method of warfare into their management of national security and enable military planning and campaigning to identify and respond to its use. Using the NIST security framework to examine Western nations’ ability to ‘identify, protect, detect and respond’ to POLWAR, it was assessed that the current legislative and doctrinal frameworks are restrictive and contain a fatal flaw. In this, the Western legislative frameworks are found to vest the power for managing the identification of threats, protection of assets and detection of malign influence with civilian authorities, not the military. Moreover, legislatively, military planning and campaigning are contained solely as a response function. This is considered a critical weakness in the current western framework structure as POLWAR targets the very mechanism a nation uses to generate defensive action: political authority. However, beyond this critical, single point of failure, it is found that once defensive action is authorised, contemporary frameworks, specifically the US and Australian doctrinal processes, are robust and adaptive. The adaptive nature of these processes encourages cyclical improvement and adaptation as well as empowering the military to harness whole-of-government capability in addressing POLWAR. More precisely, the US military, once authorised to operate, can do so utilising its described spectrum of competition enabling it to respond to POLWAR at or below the threshold of war to achieve the strategic intent. This suggests that once free of political influence, western doctrinal frameworks are capable of combating POLWAR by establishing and shaping conditions, over that of solely applying force.

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Footnotes

^[1] Christopher Chivvis, 'Hybrid Warfare: Russian Contemprary Political Warfare,' Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (2017): 317.

^[2] Linda Robinson et al, Modern Politcal Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, 2018), 2.

^[3] Robinson et al, Modern Politcal Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses, 3-4.

^[4] Eugene Rumer, The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine In Actions, Carnegie (Washington D.C, 2019).

^[5] Chivvis, 'Hybrid Warfare: Russian Contemprary Political Warfare,' 317.

^[6] Robinson et al, Modern Politcal Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses, 219.

^[7] Rumer, The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine In Actions.

^[8] Rumer, The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine In Actions.

^[9] Rumer, The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine In Actions.

^[10] Alina Polyakova and Spencer Boyer, The Future Of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, And The Coming Age Of Global Digital Competition, Brookings - Robert Bosch Foundation (Washington DC, 2018), 2.

^[11] Polyakova and Boyer, The Future Of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, And The Coming Age Of Global Digital Competition, 2-3.

^[12] Polyakova and Boyer, The Future Of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, And The Coming Age Of Global Digital Competition, 2-3.

^[13] Polyakova and Boyer, The Future Of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, And The Coming Age Of Global Digital Competition, 2-3.

^[14] Polyakova and Boyer, The Future Of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, And The Coming Age Of Global Digital Competition, 2-3.

^[15] Polyakova and Boyer, The Future Of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, And The Coming Age Of Global Digital Competition, 2-3.

^[16] Marek Posard et al, From Consensus to Conflict: Understanding Foreign Measures Targeting US Elections, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, 2020), 3-4.

^[17]Matt Bevan, 'Why Does Vladimir Putin Hate Hillary Clinton?,' ABC NEWS (2018). https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-22/vladimir-putin-and-hillary-clinton-hatred-explained/9783076.?

^[18] Robinson et al, Modern Politcal Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses, 125.

^[19] Seth Jones, The Return of Political Warfare, Defense350 (Washington DC, 2018), 4.

^[20] Jones, The Return of Political Warfare, 4.

^[21] Murat Caliskan, 'Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses,' The RUSI Journal 164, no. 2 (2019): 85.

^[22] Tracey Shelton, Who are Iran's Allies in a Potential Conflict with the Unites States?, ABC News (Canberra, 2020).

^[23] James Forest, 'Perception Challenges Faced by Al-Qaeda on the Battlefield of Influence Warfare,' Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2012): 9-11.

^[24] Forest, 'Perception Challenges Faced by Al-Qaeda on the Battlefield of Influence Warfare,' 9-11.

^[25] Forest, 'Perception Challenges Faced by Al-Qaeda on the Battlefield of Influence Warfare,' 10.

^[26] Forest, 'Perception Challenges Faced by Al-Qaeda on the Battlefield of Influence Warfare,' 10.

^[27] Framework for Improving,  (Washinton DC.: US Department of Commerce, 2018), iv.

^[28] National Insitute of Standards and Technology Framework, US Department of Commerce (Washington D.C, 2020).

^[29] National Insitute of Standards and Technology Framework, v.

^[30] NIST - Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing, NIST (Washington DC, 2016), 10.

^[31] National Insitute of Standards and Technology Framework.

^[32] Framework for Improving, 7.

^[33] Framework for Improving, 7.

^[34] Federal Register of Legislation - Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018,  (2018), 47-48. https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018A00029.

^[35] Federal Register of Legislation - Foreign Influence and Transparency Scheme Act 2018,  (2018), 2. https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2019C00133.

^[36] Home Office UK,  (2020). https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office.

^[37] 'Combating Foreign Influence,'  (2020). https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/foreign-influence.

^[38] Framework for Improving, 8.

^[39] Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning, US Department of Defense (Washington DC, 2020), 3.

^[40] Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning, II-1.

^[41] Joint Publication 5-0 - Joint Planning, II-2.

^[42] Chivvis, 'Hybrid Warfare: Russian Contemprary Political Warfare,' 317.

^[43] Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations, Defence Force Publishing (Canberra, 2012), 1.16.

^[44] Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning, UK Minstry of Defence (London, 2019), 1-2.

^[45] Plans Series - Joint Planning - ADP 5.0,  (Canberra: Defence Publishing, 2018), 1.33,d.

^[46] Brendan Nelson, The Role of Government and Parliament in the Decision to Go to War, Parliament of Australia (Canberra, 2019).

^[47] Nelson, The Role of Government and Parliament in the Decision to Go to War.

^[48] Terms of Trade, Australian Parliment House (Canberra, 2020).

^[49] Codification Division Publications, United Nations (New York, 2016).

^[50] The Process — Stages In A Typical Wto Dispute Settlement Case, World Trade Organization (Geneva, 2020).

^[51] Plans Series - Joint Planning - ADP 5.0, 1.4-1.7.

^[52] Plans Series - Joint Planning - ADP 5.0, 1.16-1.21.

^[53] Plans Series - Joint Planning - ADP 5.0, 1.32.

^[54] Executive Series - Command and Control - ADDP 00.1,  (Canberra: Defence Force Publishing, 2019), 4.17-4.19.

^[55] Executive Series - Command and Control - ADDP 00.1, 4.17-4.19.

^[56] Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 - Competition Continuum,  (Washington DC: Joint Force Development, 2019), 1.

^[57] Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 - Competition Continuum, 1-2.

^[58] Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 - Competition Continuum, 5.