Conceptual Frameworks Defence Values

Still Losing our Religion

Military Wellbeing Support in a Secular Context. Delve into the complexities of providing support to non-religious Australian Defence Force members. Explore the reliance on religious chaplains and the need for diverse professionals. Discover the potential impact on member well-being and join us in exploring the evolving landscape of military support.

26/07/2023

<30 min

The Case for Secular Inclusion

In 2021, The Forge published an article that presented a case for uniformed secular wellbeing practitioners in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and a move away from the exclusive model of religious (overwhelmingly Christian) chaplaincy. The article, Losing our Religion^[1](Hoglin, 2021), prompted discussion and positive and negative responses from various secular and religious advocates.

A key component of the discussion was an acknowledgement that most of the Defence population was no longer affiliated with a religion and that this proportion would further increase in the years ahead. With the relatively rapid change in religious composition, it was suggested that pastoral care and wellbeing support services should reflect this changing reality. Non-religious practitioners such as counsellors, psychologists, social workers and others should be used by Defence, together with the traditional religious chaplain for those who remain aligned with a religion.

In this article, a different approach is taken by presenting two practical workforce planning reasons for why Defence needs to hasten its consideration of a uniformed secular wellbeing capability. First, data concerning the likely religious affiliation of the next generation of recruits is explored to highlight that the loss of religiosity will continue unavoidably and the current trend is not simply a temporal anomaly. Second, the sustainability of the ADF’s attempts to continue to attract and appoint religious chaplains in the numbers currently required by the Navy, Army and Air Force to fill their establishment will be questioned against the backdrop of national workforce supply and demand for ministers of religion. An increased demand for secular wellbeing practitioners from Defence members, combined with a reduced supply and availability of religious chaplains, should provide a prima facie catalyst for Defence to more seriously embrace uniformed secular options for a wellbeing and pastoral capability.

Still losing our religion

The trend toward reduced religious affiliation has not slowed since the publication of Losing our Religion. On 1 January 2023, almost 64 per cent^[2] of permanent force members in the ADF did not identify with any religion. Having increased by an average of 3 per cent in each of the previous three calendar years, this change was higher than anticipated and continued the march toward a prediction that 75 per cent would not be affiliated with a religion by 2030. Data suggests that the faster pace of change is due to the separation of older (and more religious) members and the simultaneous recruiting of less religious members; a trend set to continue as Defence pushes to increase recruiting over the next few years.

The continued decline in religious affiliation should not surprise those who have observed the figures over time. Shown in Figure 1, there has been a gradual decrease from a workforce where 68 per cent were Christian and just 31 per cent non-religious in 2003 (1 per cent of other non-Christian religions), to one where these figures will likely be inverted within in the next 24 months (still with just 1 per cent of other religions). On current short-term trends, two-thirds of the ADF will have no religious affiliation by the end of 2023, less than one-third will remain affiliated with Christianity, and just 1 per cent will remain affiliated with a non-Christian religion.

Figure 1 - ADF Religious affiliation 2003 - 2023 (as at 1 Jan each year). Data source: PMKeyS. — **Figure 1** - *ADF Religious affiliation 2003 - 2023 (as at 1 Jan each year). Data source: PMKeyS.*

While it is relatively intuitive that recruiting has been the driving force behind the change (rather than members electing to change their affiliation after enlistment), the magnitude of the decline in religious affiliation among the ADF’s newest members might be unexpected and is worthy of closer exploration. Figure 2 shows that the most junior Defence members, typically the youngest and comprised of Privates (and equivalent in other Services) and Officer Cadets (and equivalent in other Services), overwhelmingly do not indicate a religious affiliation. Almost 83 per cent of junior Other Ranks and almost 90 per cent of Officer Cadets and Midshipmen—most of whom have been recruited since 2019—have no affiliation recorded in Defence’s human resource system.

Figure 2 - ADF Religious affiliation by rank Other Ranks (E00-E10) and Officer (O00-O10) (as at 1 Jan 2023). Data source: PMKeyS. — **Figure 2** - *ADF Religious affiliation by rank Other Ranks (E00-E10) and Officer (O00-O10) (as at 1 Jan 2023). Data source: PMKeyS.*

In stark contrast to Defence figures, the most recent Australian census indicated that in 2021 less than 39 per cent of Australia’s population had no religious affiliation.^[3] The difference between the religious affiliation of recruits and that of the nation’s population should rightly be queried; however, buried in the second layer of census data is indication that the differences might not be so large when relevant comparisons are made.

Figure 3 - At least 47 per cent, but as many as 54 per cent in this target recruiting demographic of 17-24-year-olds, had no religious affiliation in the first instance. — **Figure 3** - *At least 47 per cent, but as many as 54 per cent in this target recruiting demographic of 17-24-year-olds, had no religious affiliation in the first instance.*

Firstly, the headline figure of 39 per cent only reports the national figure across all age groups. When census data is explicitly examined for the usual target demographic of 17-24-year-olds, almost 47 per cent are not affiliated with a religion^[4], considerably higher than in the national population. A further 7 per cent were not stated or inadequately described (parody and unrecognised religions such as Jedi Knights, Pastafarians and others are also in this latter group which is probably less likely to include undeclared genuine Christians). Christian affiliation was 36 per cent and another 10 per cent were affiliated with non-Christian religions. This means that at least 47 per cent, but as many as 54 per cent in this target recruiting demographic of 17-24-year-olds, had no religious affiliation in the first instance.

The remaining difference between the national population and those entering Defence may rest with specific characteristics of recruiting and perceptions of the ADF. For example, non-religious recruits may offset much of the known reluctance of people with religious but non-Christian backgrounds to join Defence. Further, if just one third of applicants who previously described themselves as Christian during their childhood and adolescent years (or had their religion described on their behalf) choose to ‘lose’ their affiliation after enlistment, then this alone would account for most of the remaining difference^[5]. Finally, subtleties in Defence’s recruiting methods, which result in recruiting from slightly less religious demographics, may have a small but measurable influence on the religious affiliation of new recruits.

Figure 4 - Religious affiliation of recruits - conservatively aggregates to at least 75 per cent of the applicant demographic maintaining no religious affiliation — **Figure 4** - *Religious affiliation of recruits - conservatively aggregates to at least 75 per cent of the applicant demographic maintaining no religious affiliation*

The combination of non-affiliated applicants (47 per cent), inadequately described (7 per cent), offset of non-Christian applicants (estimate of 9 per cent), a proportion of previously described Christians no longer affiliating with Christianity at the point of enlistment (estimate of 12 per cent)^[6], and recruiting from less-religious demographics, conservatively aggregates to at least 75 per cent of the applicant demographic maintaining no religious affiliation. This figure is easily derived, entirely plausible, and close to the observed proportion of non-affiliation among the newest ADF members.

Figure 5 - General Australian Religious Demographics 17-24 y.o. through recruitment — **Figure 5** - *General Australian Religious Demographics 17-24 y.o. through recruitment*

The observation that such a large proportion of recruits have no religious affiliation, and that this is simply a characteristic of the demographic from which they are drawn, supports an assessment that the decrease in Defence members’ religious affiliation is set to continue unavoidably until at least 75 per cent have no affiliation by 2030. Increasingly, it seems that a proportion exceeding 80 per cent by 2040 is also now likely. This raises questions around why there is a paucity of uniformed secular wellbeing support options and no apparent plans to change this outside of a small number of Maritime Spiritual Wellbeing Officers in Navy. If a majority of Defence members were religious, as was the case before 2018, and if there were no other suitable and qualified professional occupations that could provide uniformed wellbeing options for serving members, then perhaps an exclusively religious chaplaincy model would at least be understandable. However, this is not the case as recruits are overwhelmingly not religious, the ADF is increasingly not religious, and there are entire alternative professions dedicated to the provision of secular wellbeing services.

The availability of religious Chaplains for the ADF

The recruiting demographic and the emerging cohorts of ADF members has already established the demand for uniformed secular wellbeing practitioners in Defence. With a backdrop of an increasing demand for secular options, the persistent challenges that the ADF has faced in obtaining the necessary numbers of religious chaplains to provide the wellbeing capability has a simple solution through augmentation with secular wellbeing professionals. This section will outline the inevitable continuation of Defence’s inability to recruit religious chaplains into the future. It will be suggested that solutions are required to address the supply of wellbeing practitioners regardless of one’s view concerning the role and appropriateness of religious chaplains in the ADF.

It is difficult to determine the precise number of chaplains in the national community that might be available to the ADF; however, it is possible to make some conservative estimates. The most recent national census indicated that just over 17,500^[7] people described their occupation as a ‘Minister of Religion’ as part of the Social and Welfare Professionals occupational grouping.^[8] Not all ministers of religion are necessarily in chaplaincy roles or describe themselves as chaplains, just as not all chaplains would necessarily define themselves as a minister of religion. Nonetheless, this figure provides a starting point as to how many chaplains may be in the community. In contrast, an additional 134,000^[9] people described themselves as a Social and Welfare Professional alongside counsellors, psychologists, social workers and others. Therefore, ministers of religion comprise just under 12 per cent of the professional grouping. In principle, perhaps 17,500 should be enough to provide chaplains for the ADF and satisfy national demand; however, it is not that simple.

To help explain why 17,500 ministers of religion is not enough to provide for both Defence and the broader needs of the community, it is first worth examining the propensity of the average Australian to join the ADF. It is estimated that only around 13 per cent of regular Australians in the recruiting demographic of 17-to-24-year-olds have both the propensity and base level eligibility (eg, health, aptitude, citizenship, clean criminal history) to join the military before other factors of eligibility, such as specific job qualifications and requirements, are considered.^[10] This means that only around 340,000 of the approximately 2.5-2.6 million^[11] Australians in this age group are willing and able to enlist in any given year. From this group of approximately 340,000 Australians, the ADF enlists around 5,000 ab initio recruits each year to maintain its full-time strength of 60,000 and has never entirely achieved its recruiting target. These figures for propensity and eligibility diminish rapidly for other age groups where health and domestic circumstances (eg, family, ongoing employment and community relationships) further restrict the applicant pool. In aggregate, this means that less than 2 in every 1000 Australians in the target demographic eventually join the military.

It follows that, if the ADF finds it challenging to recruit 5000 per year from a pool of over 2.5 million people aged 17-24, then recruiting more than a handful of chaplains from a pool of just 17,500 – where only a quarter are under the age of 40 and 5,400 are already over the eligible age – can only be viewed as unsustainable wishful thinking. Even with a genuine intention to fill chaplaincy positions with appropriately qualified ordained ministers (or equivalent) who have a propensity to join the ADF and are eligible to do so, Defence is unlikely to ever fill its recruiting target based simply on the number of ministers of religion in Australia. This scenario has existed for the last several decades and is one that will not change given current policy and selection constraints. It does not even consider that many of the 17,500 do not hold the qualifications to be a Defence chaplain, or the number of chaplains required for Australia’s 2,600 faith-based schools, the 3,000 reportedly needed for the National Student Wellbeing Program (formerly the National School Chaplaincy Program), and those required for about 600 church-owned hospitals and aged care homes, let alone regular community and traditional church-based roles.

Figure 6 - The availability of Chaplains in Australia is not enough to meet the needs of Defence — **Figure 6** - *The availability of Chaplains in Australia is not enough to meet the needs of Defence*

To compensate for deficiencies in ab initio recruiting of chaplains, the ADF has turned to various solutions to solve its recruiting dilemma, including use of reservists, retirement age extension waivers, and sponsored education schemes, but even these will have limited enduring effectiveness.

In January 2023 there were around half-a-dozen reservists employed on full-time contracts to fill positions unable to be filled by full-time chaplains—most of whom required a retirement age extension waiver. A further dozen full-time positions were filled by permanent force chaplains requiring an age extension waiver. When those requiring an age extension waiver are combined with the number within two years of Defence’s compulsory retirement age, 20 per cent of all chaplains in permanent force positions exceed or are about to exceed retirement age. Evidently, ADF chaplaincy is now culturally reliant on age extension waivers and, with no succession plans in place, vacancies will either reappear or a fresh waiver cycle will be required. While waivers are a legitimate means to provide capability by exception, they are not an enduring solution and illustrate that Defence’s ability to recruit religious chaplains has exceeded breaking point.^[12]

A further initiative to increase the supply of new chaplains is a sponsored education scheme for currently serving ADF members to become chaplains. This scheme has limited effectiveness with just a few participants spread across several cohorts at any given time. Even with small numbers, the ongoing utility of this scheme has a questionable lifespan with the decrease in religious affiliation of serving members likely to reduce the number of interested in-service applicants. It is not speculative to suggest that if the scheme had struggled to attract interest among serving members when Christian religious affiliation exceeded 50 per cent as recently as 2016, it is not going to fare any better when it is just 25 per cent by 2030 or even 20 per cent by 2040.

The ability of the ADF to fill most of its chaplaincy positions in the past has been a testament to recruiting creativity, use of available policy solutions, and engagement of current serving members to consider a role as a chaplain. However, the very existence of these initiatives is evidence of the difficulty in recruiting religious chaplains and they mask the real problems in continuing to rely exclusively on religious chaplains for the provision of wellbeing support. The ongoing recruiting problems are likely to persist into the future and as the effectiveness of the current short-term solutions diminish, growing vacancies are extremely likely at a time when the ADF needs its wellbeing capability the most.

A solution to the likely chaplaincy shortages is straightforward. With a recruiting pool of non-religious wellbeing practitioners almost eight times larger than ministers of religion, and likely to reflect a more favourable propensity and eligibility to join the ADF, expanding Defence’s wellbeing capability to recruit non-religious practitioners to fill the inevitable gaps in religious chaplaincy seems obvious. More importantly, failure to start a Defence-wide program to recruit secular wellbeing practitioners will compromise wellbeing in Defence, an outcome nobody wants.

Conclusion

The imperative for change, driven by the demographics of Australian society and the likely shortage of religious chaplains in the future, is relatively clear and unavoidable. It is almost inevitable that members with no religious affiliation will exceed three-quarters of the total ADF permanent force population by the end of this decade, driven by the newest and future recruits. While the pace of change will slow down in the 2030s, unless there is a dramatic shift in the propensity of young religious Australians to join ADF, it is also inevitable that the proportion of non-religious Defence members will approach and then surpass 80% by 2040 as the current cohorts reach deeper into their careers. In practical terms this means that around 50,000 permanent force members will not have a religious affiliation by 2040.

Simultaneously, maintaining the strength of religious chaplaincy will become increasingly unsustainable. The relatively modest, but already unachievable, recruiting target for chaplains will become even more challenging to obtain year in, year out without significant compromise in qualification and selection criteria. The reasons to continue to exclude non-religious wellbeing practitioners from serving in a uniformed capacity will become increasingly unsustainable and eventually untenable if Defence aims to maintain a uniformed wellbeing capability. To provide fair, reasonable, equitable and adequate wellbeing support, Defence will need to recruit a secular wellbeing capability to support the entire force.

The reluctance of the ADF to consider secular options is time limited and it will soon be confronted with the binary choice of either vacant chaplain positions to the detriment of Defence members, or to open wellbeing positions to secular practitioners. Principled stances on whether or not religious chaplains can provide adequate, unbiased wellbeing and pastoral care to non-religious sailors, soldiers and aviators will become almost irrelevant when the numbers of religious chaplains available to Defence are inadequate. The simultaneity of reduced religiosity in Defence members and decreased supply of religious chaplains should, on the surface, make a decision for Defence to engage secular options simple. Ultimately, the longer Defence procrastinates in its evolutionary transition toward secular wellbeing, the greater it places Defence members at risk of adverse health and wellbeing outcomes.

Biography

Colonel Phillip Hoglin, CSC, graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1994, having completed a Bachelor of Science (Honours) majoring in statistics at the Australian Defence Force Academy in 1993. In 2004 he completed a Master of Science in Management (Manpower Systems Analysis) through the United States Postgraduate School and in 2012 a Master of Philosophy (Statistics) through the University of New South Wales. He has had several appointments in workforce analysis, policy, strategy, management and recruiting. In mid-2020 Colonel Hoglin transitioned to the Reserves and remains a workforce analyst. Colonel Phillip Hoglin is available on LinkedIN (www.linkedin.com/in/phillip-hoglin)

Footnotes

¹ Phillip Hoglin, Losing our Religion: The ADFs Chaplaincy Dilemma, The Forge, 29 January 2021, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/losing-our-religion-adfs-chaplaincy-dilemma. Also published under permission as Secularism and Pastoral Care in the Australian Defence Force, Australian Army Journal 2021, 17(1): 98-111, https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaj/volume-17-number-1-0.

² Source: PMKeyS as at 1 January 2023.

³ Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2021 Census shows changes in Australias religious diversity, ABS, accessed 9 February 2023, https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/2021-census-shows-changes-australias-religious-diversity.

⁴ Described in the census as Secular Beliefs and Other Spiritual Beliefs and No Religious Affiliation.

⁵ Neil Francis, Parents answering for children,in Religiosity in Australia: Part 1: Personal faith according to the numbers, Rationalist Society of Australia, 2021: 15-16, https://www.rationalist.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Religiosity-Report-Summary-1.pdf.

⁶ In a comparison of census results of the same cohort of 7-14-year-olds in 2011 to 17-24-year-olds in 2021, it was found that Christian affiliation fell from 61 per cent to 36 per cent. Or a 41 per cent decrease among the same cohort. A decrease of one-third is conservatively estimated.

⁷ Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2021 Census - employment, income and education. 6-digit level OCCP Occupation, ABS Table builder, accessed on 10 February 2023 describes Minister of Religion strength as 17,532.

⁸ Described as ANZSCO Unit Group 2722 Ministers of Religion as a unit of Minor Group 272 Social and Welfare Professionals. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1220.0 - ANZSCO - Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations, First Edition, Revision 1 , 22 November 2022, Unit Group 2722 Ministers of Religion | Australian Bureau of Statistics (abs.gov.au).

⁹ Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2021 Census - employment, income and education. 4-digit level OCCP Occupation, ABS Table builder, accessed on 10 February 2023.

¹⁰ Defence Force Recruiting, Target Demographic Characteristics funnel, (2020), Internal document.

¹¹ Australian Bureau of Statistics, Table 8 Estimated resident population, by age and sexat 30 June, in 2022. Population by age and sex national. 202206 National, state and territory population, June 2022, Released 15 Dec 22. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/population/national-state-and-territory-population/jun-2022

¹² While age might not necessarily be a factor in the selection of a wellbeing capability, when chaplains are either Boomers or Gen X, and their dependency is increasingly from Gen Z, there may be some merit in claims that Defence chaplains could be out of touch with the average sailor, soldier or aviator. Currently, the average age of a religious full-time chaplain is 50 (54 in the Reserves), whereas the average age of sailors, soldiers and aviators in the ADF is 30. While a lot can be said for the wisdom of age and experience, there are limitations when the average age gap spans two decades.

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Social Mastery

Lead Self social-influence-level1

Lead Teams Lead Leaders social-influence-level2

Lead Operating Systems social-influence-level3

Lead Capability social-influence-level4

Lead Integrated Systems social-influence-level5

Conceptual Frameworks Defence Values social-ethics-level1

Ethical Philosophies social-ethics-level2

Moral Leadership social-ethics-level3

Lead organisation through ethical concerns social-ethics-level4

Stewarding the Profession social-ethics-level5

Culture Alignment social-culture-level1

Diversity Appreciation social-culture-level2

Cultural Stewardship social-culture-level3

Cross Cultural Leadership social-culture-level4

Cross Cultural Ambassador social-culture-level5

Biography

Phillip Hoglin CSC

Colonel

Colonel Phillip Hoglin graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1994, having completed a Bachelor of Science (Honours) majoring in statistics at the Australian Defence Force Academy in 1993. In 2004 he completed a Master of Science in Management (Manpower Systems Analysis) through the United States Postgraduate School and in 2012 a Master of Philosophy (Statistics) through the University of New South Wales. He has had several appointments in workforce analysis, policy, strategy, management and Defence Force Recruiting.