Navigating New Ethical Frontiers - Part 3 - Role

Warfighters and more—the ADF must be experts in combat, plus transition across the spectrum of competition when required to conduct peacekeeping, respond to emergencies, and compete in the grey zone. Here’s how your role shapes every decision you make.

15/07/2025

<15 min

Much of the ADF’s ethical framework evolved in an era when its role was to provide kinetic force in conventional state-based warfare. While this is still part of the ADF’s purpose, the current geopolitical context, contemporary nature of conflict, and other pressures have expanded and diversified the role of the modern ADF.

Role

Historical ethical frameworks may have served the ADF well when its role was predominantly to provide kinetic force in conventional conflicts, but they would be inadequate to navigate current and future expectations of Australia’s armed forces. Reed et al state that, ‘in today’s combat environment, military personnel are more likely to be faced with ethical issues because their operations involve counterinsurgency, nation-building, and asymmetric warfare.’^[1] Beyond kinetic environments, geopolitical and technological shifts are enabling new intensities and methods of grey zone activity. The ADF has also been called upon to assist the civic community and to provide support for humanitarian aid and disaster relief, both domestically and abroad, raising discussion about its role in that sphere. This has extended to support in operations intercepting asylum seekers, a politically contentious and ethically fraught issue.^[2] The frameworks needed to navigate these various roles require different nuances and approaches from those designed for conventional state-on-state conflict.

Terminology around new and emerging military concepts in this space is evolving and definitions can be hazy. In this essay, the following language and conceptual structure will be used:

Operations Other than War – This will refer to any roles the ADF undertakes that are clearly distinct from the spectrum of strategic competition.^[3] As the lines between war and grey zone activity blur, this category does not include non-war strategic competition activities. It does include:

Defence Assistance to the Civic Community
Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief
Border protection

Unconventional Conflict^[4] – This will refer to all strategic conflict (including, but not exclusively, war) including grey zone activity and asymmetric warfare. Other terms that are often used in similar ways in other texts are ‘unconventional warfare’ and ‘irregular warfare’.

Grey Zone – This will refer specifically to intensities of conflict that may be, or definitely fall, below the threshold to be called ‘war’. This does involve unconventional conflict methods such as economic coercion and cognitive warfare but here is defined by intensity not tactics. Various intensities of interaction that would fall under this umbrella are:

Competition eg technological or political
Coercion eg economic
Open conflict below the level of warfare

Asymmetric Warfare – This will refer to conflicts where participants are significantly different in status (eg state and non-state), structure, and/or tactics. It includes:

Counterinsurgency
State vs non-state warfare
Counterterrorism

Unconventional Conflict Methods – This sphere has significant interaction with technological developments. It includes actions that fall (sometimes significantly) short of the threshold of ‘war’ or even ‘violence’ but that nonetheless are part of the ecosystem of interest advancement that includes war, coercion and diplomacy. It includes:

Political warfare
Psychological warfare
Cognitive warfare
Information warfare
Economic coercion
Soft power
Cyber warfare

Unconventional conflict is on the rise. Through the 20^tth century, civilian deaths went from being less than 20 per cent of the death toll in war to circa 75 per cent.^[5] Dowdall and Smith note that, ‘it is increasingly common for military practitioners to spend the majority of their time operating amongst the civilian population.’^[6] These contexts can present challenges to the ethical authorities embedded in the rank structure, with most counterinsurgency engagements depending heavily on the decisions of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) rather than commissioned officers.^[7] In some of the more nuanced kinetic conflict environments, particularly counterinsurgency operations, IHL and its underlying ethical principles can be difficult to accurately map onto a muddied situation. In particular, IHL demands the principle of Distinction, that is between combatants and non-combatants, and certain actions such as the use of lethal force are applicable and ethically acceptable depending on that status. In counterinsurgency operations, this Distinction is complicated by both ‘civilian belligerents’^[8] who move along a spectrum between conventional combatant and uninvolved innocent, and by the difficulty of distinguishing someone’s status when opponents and civilians are intermingled.

Criminal justice ethical frameworks can provide some useful insight here.^[9] In domestic policing, the focus is on ‘suspects’ rather than the military model of ‘enemies’, and the level of force proportionally acceptable is lessened. Instead of the military lens on conflict or the police lens on peacekeeping, Dowdall and Smith propose that the counterinsurgency environment be considered as an ‘interim environment’ between conventional warfare and police operations. In such a ‘war amongst the people’^[10] a focus on restraint is paramount. The role of military personnel can fluctuate from one task to the next between the essentially peaceful all the way to conventional combat, and interact with a spectrum of combatants, ‘civilian belligerents’, and innocents. In such an environment, the concept of a ‘continuum of force’, inherently Proportionate in nature, can act as a pragmatic framework.^[11]

This ‘continuum of force’ approach can call into question previously accepted restrictions around the type of weapons condoned for military use and the related need to never target non-combatants. Several non-lethal weapons are prohibited under IHL because of their indiscriminate nature or a desire to avoid ‘unnecessary suffering’. Tear gas, for example, is prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention except for ‘law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.^[12] Likewise, the use in warfare of bullets that ‘expand or flatten easily in the human body’ is considered prohibited under customary international law,^[13] but they are used worldwide by police officers because they limit the risk of conventional bullets passing through the intended target and hitting bystanders.^[14] The use of these IHL prohibited weapons, rather than IHL permitted lethal force, might actually reduce harm in asymmetric and counterinsurgency operations, a situation Dr Stephen Coleman sums up as, ‘It could be argued that international law simply has not been able to keep up with the changing nature of warfare and that in modern asymmetric conflicts it is actually more appropriate for military personnel to utilise non-lethal weapons than traditional lethal ones.’^[15]

If using non-lethal weapons, there may also be an ethical argument for the deliberate targeting of non-combatants.^[16] Weapons such as Active Denial Technology (directed energy designed to cause pain but not injury^[17]) or anaesthetic gas that renders people temporarily unconscious, could be used to clear an area of civilians, or to incapacitate everyone in an area in order to carry out more precise attacks. However, such operations would violate the prohibition on deliberate targeting of non-combatants or failing to Discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. A far more destructive approach of applying explosive force targeting a military object may well be legal (subject to Proportionality tests) even if there were resultant non-combatant casualties.^[18]

In addition to kinetic operations that do not meet the definitions of conventional war, non-kinetic grey zone activity is posing increasing challenges. Chief of Defence Force General Angus Campbell has stated, ‘the use of coercive statecraft, lawfare and influence operations in the grey-zone between peace and war undermine the traditional understandings of the international rules based order and test the thresholds for conventional military response.’^[19] This paradigm necessitates nuance in the use of force.^[20] As well as being an ADF-specific concern, as geopolitical competition increasingly blurs military objectives with economic, diplomatic, and informational ones there is a greater need for coordination and collaboration between different arms of national power. This has been termed ‘integrated campaigning’^[21] and an ethical framework will need to be able to function with that model of operations.

Various theories have been proposed for the grey zone of military activity. ADF-P-0 ME clarifies, ‘The ADF’s ethical approach to the use of force other than war reflects the same principles traditionally applied to conventional war’ and supports jus ad vim as a component of Just War theory. Lieutenant Colonel William Soucie writes of a ‘competition-continuum’ with ‘peace’ at one end and ‘war’ at the other and no clear dividing line between to two.^[22] Several non-Western countries have longstanding theories of statecraft that conceptualise the grey zone in more nuanced ways than the peace/war dichotomy typical of traditional Western military thinking.^[23] Notably, Chinese and Russian military strategy have well-developed frameworks of grey zone activity.^[24]

In particular, the use of cyberwarfare in the grey zone has many similar complications to unconventional kinetic conflict in terms of Proportionality and Distinction.^[25] In addition, competition within the spheres of information, narrative control, and public opinion can be especially challenging for democratic countries with core values of freedom of speech and an unfettered forum for public debate. States with more authoritarian systems of governance can have the advantage in this space,^[26] and the ethical challenge for Australia and the ADF is how to neutralise this advantage while upholding key principles of democracy and personal freedoms. Carl Miller talks about the ‘intrinsic value’ of information and truth as a core concept in an open democracy with intellectual rigour. He argues that if information becomes ‘instrumentalised’ as a weapon of military objective, it fundamentally degrades that concept and leads not only to a lack of trust and goodwill in engaging with information but also to a ‘moral rot’ of society.^[27] This argument has parallels with the imperative to protect cultural property in IHL.

In recent years, the ADF’s role has also expanded significantly into operations that are not of a conflict or competition nature. In particular, it has been frequently called on to assist the wider community in Defence Assistance to the Civic Community operations including assisting with the Covid-19 pandemic.^[28] It has also responded to natural disasters both domestically and abroad through Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief. With increasingly severe climate change, it is expected that need for climate-related disaster response will increase both within Australia and internationally.^[29] Corporal Riley has written on the challenges of utilising ADF support for tasks tangential to its main role both in terms of mission clarity, and in terms of the different ethical challenges that members will face dealing with confronting scenarios on home soil, including those caused or exacerbated by political failings.^[30]

Of particular note is the use of the ADF in border operations. In 2001, the ADF was used by then Prime Minister John Howard to deter asylum seekers arriving by boat.^[31] This policy was controversial both then as now.^[32] The ADF continues to be used in border patrol operations through Operation Resolute^[33]. As Major Gareth Rice points out, ‘Such use of a nation’s military to potentially deny a human right poses notable ethical challenges in regard to the use of force.’^[34] This can increase the risk of moral injury, with one veteran describing a sense of guilt and anger after rescued asylum seekers were confined in offshore detention:^[35] ‘To know that these [people] were going to refugee camps as a political power move sort of felt like a kick in the guts too.’^[36] Following his service in border patrol operations, this veteran struggled with suicidal thoughts and mental health conditions including PTSD.^[37] The ADF-P-0 ME addresses the issue of ADF members objecting to orders on an ethical basis with reference to the primacy of the rule of law, clarifying the necessity of armed forces in a democracy to defer to elected authority.^[38]

In summary, the nature of conflict and statecraft has changed and continues to change from the traditional state-on-state kinetic warfare that previously defined the ADF’s role. An increase in nuanced asymmetrical environments such as counterinsurgency has challenged existing modes of military thinking and operating. Activity in the grey zone between peace and war, fuelled by technological advancements, has highlighted the necessity for more flexible and continuum-based approaches to the use of force. Increased reliance on the ADF to provide assistance in operations other than war, such as community tasks, humanitarian support, and border patrol, have raised questions about the function of the ADF in such situations and how ethical operation in those roles may differ from traditional military frameworks.

Next in Navigating New Ethical Frontiers: Part 4, Culture

Footnotes

¹ K Robinson et al., The relationship of risk to rules, values, virtues, and moral complexity: What we can learn from the moral struggles of military leaders.

² G Rice, Border protection and human rights: The Australian Defence Force's challenge, https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/INFORMIT.677761401362353, Human Rights Defender, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2019, accessed November 2023.

³ There can be an element of strategy involved in operations other than war in demonstrating Australia’s resources and capability and willingness to assist our neighbours, but here that is considered incidental to the principle goal of such operations.

⁴ The word ‘conflict’ rather than ‘warfare’ is chosen here in acknowledgement of the smooth scale between competitive statecraft and kinetic violence. Many frameworks draw a line in the sand beyond which an ethic distinct to warfighting applies; however, in the current environment such a line may be at best arbitrary and at worst fictitious.

⁵ DW Lovell, ‘Educating for Ethical Behaviour? Preparing Military Leaders for Ethical Challenges’, in I Primoratz and DW Lovell, Protecting Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21^st Century, 2012, Routledge.

⁶ J Dowdall and MLR Smith, Counter-insurgency in the grey: The ethical challenge for military conduct, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523261003640850, Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 31, 2010.

⁷ K Atwell and A Milburn (Hosts) (12 February 2021) Pacific gambit: The role of irregular warfare in Australia's great strategic shift, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/pacific-gambit-the-role-of-irregular-warfare-in-australias-great-strategic-shift/, [podcast], Irregular Warfare Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, accessed 23 November 2023; This issue will be discussed in more depth in the chapter on Culture.

⁸ J Dowdall and MLR Smith, Counter-insurgency in the grey: The ethical challenge for military conduct, quoting a term used by Albert Janin

⁹ J Dowdall and MLR Smith, Counter-insurgency in the grey: The ethical challenge for military conduct.

¹⁰ A concept explored in depth by General Sir Rupert Smith.

¹¹ J Dowdall and MLR Smith, Counter-insurgency in the grey: The ethical challenge for military conduct.

¹² International Committee of the Red Cross, Chemical and biological weapons, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/chemical-biological-weapons, International Committee of the Red Cross, 8 April 2013, accessed 9 November 2023.

¹³ S Coleman, New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict. p33

¹⁴ S Coleman, New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict. p34

¹⁵ S Coleman, New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict. p34

¹⁶ S Coleman, New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict. p37

¹⁷ Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office, Active Denial Technology, https://jnlwp.defense.gov/Press-Room/Fact-Sheets/Article-View-Fact-sheets/Article/577989/active-denial-technology/, U.S. Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 11 May 2020, accessed 23 November 2023.

¹⁸ S Coleman, New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict. p37

¹⁹ A Campbell, An Address by General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-general-angus-campbell-chief-defence-force, Lowy Institute, 12 April 2023, accessed 4 November 2023.

²⁰ A Campbell, An Address by General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force.

²¹ A Campbell, An Address by General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force.

²² WR Soucie, Peekaboo with Mars or: How I learned to love Jus ad Vim and address the ethical implications to the changing character of war, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/peekaboo-mars-or-how-i-learned-love-jus-ad-vim-and-address-ethical-implications-changing-character-war, The Forge, n.d., accessed 12 November 2023.

²³ A Campbell, Transcript of General Angus J Campbell’s address to the 2023 ASPI Conference - Disruption and Deterrence.

²⁴ R Babbage, Winning Without Fighting: Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Campaigns and How the West Can Prevail, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/winning-without-fighting-chinese-and-russian-political-warfare-campaigns-and-how-the-west-can-prevail, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 24 July 2019, accessed 24 November 2023.

²⁵ The cyber domain is discussed in more detail in the chapter on Technology.

²⁶ B Jebb and A Darnley-Stuart (20 October 2023) ‘Subversion: The strategic weaponisation of narratives’, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/irregular-warfare-podcast-the-strategic-weaponization-of-narratives/, [podcast], Irregular War Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, accessed 23 October 2023.

²⁷ S Fegan (Host) (17 August 2022) ‘What are we getting wrong about online manipulation?’, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/rules-based-audio-what-are-we-getting-wrong-about-online-manipulation, [podcast], Rules Based Audio, Lowy Institute, accessed 21 November 2023.

²⁸ Australian Government, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review, Australian Government Defence, 2023, accessed 28 October 2023, p41.

²⁹ Australian Government, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023, p41.

³⁰ C Riley, Is emotionally unintelligent leadership the enemy within?, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/first-place-category-1-essays, The Forge, 2023, accessed 20 November 2023.

³¹ G Rice, Border protection and human rights: The Australian Defence Force's challenge.

³² C Rawlinson, Turn back boats policy doomed: former ADF chief, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-18/barrie-on-asylum-seeker-boat-policy-dound-to-fail/4965582, ABC, 18 September 2013, accessed 23 November 2023.

³³ Australian Government Defence, Operation Resolute, https://www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/operations/resolute, Defence, n.d., accessed 28 October 2023.

³⁴ G Rice, Border protection and human rights: The Australian Defence Force's challenge.

³⁵ D Hurst Royal commissioner accuses ADF of ‘too much talk and not enough action’ on veteran suicide, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/sep/13/royal-commissioner-accuses-adf-of-too-much-talk-and-not-enough-action-on-veteran-suicide, The Guardian, 13 September 2023, accessed 23 November 2023; Australian Associated Press, Seaman who retrieved dead bodies of asylum seekers still tormented by ‘dangerous’ mission, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/09/seaman-who-retrieved-dead-bodies-of-asylum-seekers-still-tormented-by-dangerous-mission, The Guardian, 9 December 2021, accessed 23 November 2023.

³⁶ J Ross and A Brewster, 'A doll in the water' actually a baby as navy sailor tells of distress at sea to Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-09/qld-royal-commission-into-defence-and-veteran-suicide-navy/100687314, ABC, 9 December 2021, accessed 23 November 2023.

³⁷ Australian Associated Press, Seaman who retrieved dead bodies of asylum seekers still tormented by ‘dangerous’ mission.

³⁸ Australian Defence Force, ADF Philosophical Doctrine - Military Ethics, p12.

Cite Article

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Footnote

RIS

(Storey, 2025)

Storey, E. 2025. 'Navigating New Ethical Frontiers - Part 3 - Role'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/navigating-new-ethical-frontiers-part-3-role (Accessed: 16 July 2025).

(Storey, 2025)

Storey, E. 2025. 'Navigating New Ethical Frontiers - Part 3 - Role'. Available at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/navigating-new-ethical-frontiers-part-3-role (Accessed: 16 July 2025).

Emma Storey, "Navigating New Ethical Frontiers - Part 3 - Role", The Forge, Published: July 15, 2025, https://theforge.defence.gov.au/article/navigating-new-ethical-frontiers-part-3-role. (accessed July 16, 2025).

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Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Social Mastery

Conceptual Frameworks Defence Values social-ethics-level1

Ethical Philosophies social-ethics-level2

Moral Leadership social-ethics-level3

Lead organisation through ethical concerns social-ethics-level4

Stewarding the Profession social-ethics-level5

Biography

Emma Storey

Able Seaman

Emma Storey is a classical saxophonist with the Royal Australian Navy Band in Sydney. Prior to joining the Navy Band, she completed a Bachelor of Music (performance) in classical music from Sydney Conservatorium, part of the University of Sydney, and began a Bachelor of Music (performance) in jazz music. Since joining the Navy Band she has developed an interest in military theory, particularly ethics and the nature of militaries in society and the use of force.

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