Intellectual Edge: The Pursuit of Lifetimes

Attaining an intellectual edge requires more than just ticking progressive boxes of formal education, it calls for a lifelong curiosity to critically observe and absorb experience.

06/10/2020

<15 min

Intellectual Edge: The Pursuit of Lifetimes

Attaining an intellectual edge requires more than just ticking progressive boxes of formal education, it calls for a lifelong curiosity to critically observe and absorb experience.

A military can measure its technological edge by comparing its capabilities and limitations to that of its adversary. How do combatants measure their intellectual edge, and more importantly, should they? The act of inferring that one combatant can maintain an advantage of intelligence over another presents several problems. First, it reeks of the enemy dehumanisation that militaries have practised throughout history.^[1]^,^[2] The term intellectual edge sounds intellectually arrogant. Intellectual arrogance^[3] is an individual’s inability to admit ignorance for the purpose of learning from others. This inability to admit ignorance can create biases that preclude people from being in the moment and addressing the realities of their situation. For warfighters, this presents a dangerous disadvantage. Second, given enough time, belligerents can outspend, innovate, learn, adapt, or otherwise circumvent any perceived advantage of their opponents. An intellectual edge therefore becomes fleeting and will require service members to earn it from moment to moment. And third, information superiority cannot be assumed in an evolving age of warfare.^[4] Not having accurate or verified data to base decisions on can neutralise any perceived intellectual edge. As a concept, intellectual edge works best as a post-mortem measure and our service members require something to take with them into combat. The organisation should provide service members with a culture of learning, the canon of the profession of arms, and the capacity to thrive in the complexity of war. Instead of developing a hypothetical overmatch, advantage, or edge, this article argues for empowering service members to develop the capacity to learn through complexity^[5]—or to learn in the face of challenges inherent to warfighting.

Empowering Service Members

If intellectual edge endures as a concept and becomes more than a buzzword, militaries must make radical changes in the way they perceive learning. As a first step, the concept of intellectual edge must connect firmly to a doctrine, find consistent usage throughout that philosophy, and become a measure of effectiveness; not unlike assessing a platoon commander’s ambush mentality^[6] during a military exercise. This article defines an intellectual edge as the individual’s capacity to creatively out-think and out-plan current or future belligerents.^[7] Closing the gap between an intellectual edge and the daily routine, mission, and purpose will allow servicemembers to develop a habitual application of processes and practices. These processes and practices may lead to service members developing the capacity to learn through their experiences, and the complexity^[8] associated with today’s military operating environments.^[9]

Next, military organisations should promote psychological safety,^[10] or provide the environment necessary for people to feel safe enough to fully participate in intellectual activities like group reflections. In their articles on intellectual edge, Kourelakos speaks to the changes required of a hierarchical organization to move from risk aversion to risk aware, and Garnett proposes that leadership grants its service members interpersonal permissions to experiment with new ideas.^[11]^,^[12] When leadership switches to a risk-aware mindset and provides interpersonal permissions, service members may then perceive an environment safe enough to bring their whole self and fully engage with others in tasks like problem solving.^[13] Leadership perceptions and actions may set the tone, but psychological safety requires the individual to perceive that they can bring their authentic selves to their role in the military unit without fearing damage to their self-image, as well as status, and career.^[14]

Major General Mick Ryan, Commander Australian Defence College, asserts that the “ultimate expression of institutional intellectual edge will be the capacity to either win without fighting in a strategic competition or be able to apply its strengths to win any fight that it must engage in.”^[15] Because history declares the winners and losers after the cessation of fighting, militaries must also designate formative measures, or assessments conducted during preparation for strategic competitions. Failing to do so is negligent. Establishing measurable supporting concepts can provide insight into the command and individual level capacity for learning through complexity. Some examples of measurable concepts include grit,^[16] ambiguity,^[17] emotional intelligence,^[18] learning agility,^[19] critical thinking,^[20] and empathy.^[21]

Intellectual Traits

To achieve Major General Ryan’s vision for solving institutional problems,^[22] individuals and the organization can begin with the concept of intellectual traits:^[23] integrity, independence, perseverance, empathy, humility, courage, confidence in reason, and fair-mindedness. This article specifically advocates for the practice of intellectual empathy or understanding the other’s point of view: Empathy may otherwise be defined as feeling with others. However, intellectual empathy does not just happen, one must first cultivate the intellectual humility to seek out the opinion of others.

Learning starts with intellectual humility, or the open-mindedness to seek out other perspectives and recognize one’s own limits, bias, and egocentrism. Intellectual humility is the opposite of intellectual arrogance, and provides the opportunity to employ intellectual empathy, which can lead to a better understanding of the other, or those with differing perspectives or privileges. The practice, awareness, and desire to probe for diverse ideas and include the other in discourse does not come naturally.^[24]

Empathy also requires purposeful practice. Research revealed that group members tend to falsely perceive that others in the group will simultaneously experience similar emotions, and moreover inappropriately infer that the group feels the same as they do.^[25] From strategic planners to those digging a fighting hole, service members know to turn the map around and take a belligerent’s perspective.^[26] Leaders should also extend this courtesy to those whose thinking diverges from their own. Major General Ryan writes that an essential aspect of developing an intellectual edge requires that “groups at different levels…harness the disparate and diverse intellects of its individuals to solve complex institutional problems…”^[27] This assertion directly ties the concept of intellectual edge with intellectual humility and intellectual empathy. Otherwise stated, diverse intellects must be recruited, protected, and empowered by the military organisation so that they are given a voice that others will seek out, listen to, and adopt their perspective—even if only temporarily as they validate or discredit the perspective.

Intellectual empathy also requires rationality, therefore emotions should be surfaced and recognised prior to acting.^[28] Ideas that evoke divisiveness and discomfort should signal the need to unpack both the emotions and ideas. US Marine Corps Commandant General David H Berger stated in a recent article that the Marines “will not allow a failure of imagination to define this period…will continue to challenge the status quo and continue to ask all the hard questions—regardless of the discomfort they produce.”^[29] To deal with the discomfort, and thereby allow for honest, open dialogue, service members could practise mindfulness.^[30] Mindfulness will focus service members, allowing them to stay in the present, regulate emotions, and without judgement address the issues at hand. Otherwise, when being challenged, leaders will likely fall back into a debilitating habit pattern of acting on feelings of defensiveness and embarrassment instead of staying in the present to deal with the discomfort that can ultimately lead to learning.

Barriers to Implementation

The intellectual traits of humility and empathy can eventually build to developing a lifelong learner, or they can become a list of buzzwords. Trait theory is an example of listing nice-to-have leadership qualities that embodies the definition of useless as personal traits do not predict a potential for leadership.^[31] And the concept of empathy is not without its own controversy: Education may have a negative correlation with empathy; meaning, when one increases the other decreases.^[32] One could infer that the danger in becoming an expert is the attitude that one no longer needs to include others in decision-making. Experts intuitively see what to do when posed with a problem in their domain. This negative correlation demonstrates the applicability of intellectual traits for novices and experts alike. And more so than novices, experts must recognise the existence of unconscious biases and reflect on the natural tendency to bypass collaboration or dismiss the contributions of others. This tendency can grow to include silencing new ideas and ignoring the data that their way of doing things no longer serves them well.

Learning through complexity, or the learning required to adapt and achieve in ambiguity and uncertainty, requires more than simple expertise. Such learning is messy, nonlinear, tough to predict, and difficult to measure.^[33] Unfortunately, typical near-term measures—like exams—do not predict far-term learning transfer, or the future application of learning in context.^[34] Still, leaders will likely hold tightly to an illusion of control^[35] and overvalue examinations, student surveys, and other near-term learning measures.

Even with the increase in data, processes, and educational opportunities, organisations may still remain less prepared for the future.^[36] And that paradox can influence leadership to demand more control by adding more courses and purchasing new technology, assuming that these actions will result in a paradigm shift. Expertise in the profession of arms serves as a baseline requirement for achieving an intellectual edge, and professional military education (PME) can lead that development. PME must also consider informal learning, or the learning that occurs on the job (in context) and outside of the formal, institutionally controlled learning. Informal learning leads to improved service-member performance as well as the achievement of strategic goals.^[37] This learning is difficult to regulate; therefore, formal schools might reconsider their perceived monopoly on learning. Instead, PME should empower service members with the practice of reflection to make their learning more effective, and “unearth erroneous assumptions and mistakes, and to identify and forestall unintended negative consequences”.^[38]

Next Steps

Intellectual empathy and mindfulness are measurable practices that affect decision-making and can allow teams to harness the power of diversity to solve problems. These practices may serve warfighters well in learning through complexity. Adding applied processes like these can lead to new thinking and radical change. Prescribing more of what we already do, just better, will not result in transformative change. PME may need to operate from a different philosophy and theory of education.^[39]

Kurt Lewin said that there is nothing so practical as good theory.^[40]^,^[41] The intellectual edge concept still requires a strong philosophical grounding, and then maybe it becomes a theory; a practical tool for warfighters. In 2008, Nicolaides and Yorks started the conversation in the field of adult learning and development exploring the epistemological implications of learning through complexity.^[42] A most demanding and trying human endeavour, the profession of arms should join this cross-paradigmatic discourse. This conversation views learning as a verb and not a syllabus or list of content to study, and one that may lead to a discovery of applicable practices for creating intellectual warfighters. Maybe then the intellectual edge can become the thing that empowers service members to holistically develop themselves and ultimately decisively win on the battlefield.

Footnotes

^[1]Bruneau, E., & Kteily, N. (2017). The enemy as animal: Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare. PloS one, 12(7), e0181422.

^[2]NPR 'Less Than Human': The Psychology Of Cruelty March 29, 20111:00 PM ET Heard on Talk of the Nation.

^[3]Samuelson, P. L., Jarvinen, M. J., Paulus, T. B., Church, I. M., Hardy, S. A., & Barrett, J. L. (2015). Implicit theories of intellectual virtues and vices: A focus on intellectual humility. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 10(5), 389-406.

^[4]Malloy, R. E. (2004). The Fleeting Nature of Information Superiority. NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT.

^[5]Nicolaides, A., & Yorks, L. (2008). An Epistemology of Learning Through. Emergence: Complexity & Organization, 10(1).

^[6]Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3 Tactics.

^[7]Ryan, M. (2020) The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition Joint Force Quarterly 96

^[8]Yorks, L., & Nicolaides, A. (2013). Toward an integral approach for evolving mindsets for generative learning and timely action in the midst of ambiguity. Teachers College Record, 115(8), 1-26.

^[9]Fenwick, T. (2003). Reclaiming and re-embodying experiential learning through complexity science. Studies in the Education of Adults, 35(2), 123-141.

^[10]Hirak, R., Peng, A. C., Carmeli, A., & Schaubroeck, J. M. (2012). Linking leader inclusiveness to work unit performance: The importance of psychological safety and learning from failures. The Leadership Quarterly, 23(1), 107-117.

^[11]https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/harnessing-intellectual-edge-reform-ado-loss-focused-culture-outcomes-focused-culture.

^[12]https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/do-we-have-permission-intellectual-edge.

^[13]Carmeli, A., Sheaffer, Z., Binyamin, G., Reiter?Palmon, R., & Shimoni, T. (2014). Transformational leadership and creative problem?solving: The mediating role of psychological safety and reflexivity. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 48(2), 115-135.

^[14]Kahn, W. A. (1990). Psychological conditions of personal engagement and disengagement at work. Academy of management journal, 33(4), 692-724.

^[15]Ryan, M. (2020) The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition Joint Force Quarterly 96

^[16]Duckworth, A. L., Peterson, C., Matthews, M. D., & Kelly, D. R. (2007). Grit: perseverance and passion for long-term goals. Journal of personality and social psychology, 92(6), 1087.

^[17]McLain, D. L. (1993). The MSTAT-I: A new measure of an individual's tolerance for ambiguity. Educational and psychological measurement, 53(1), 183-189.

^[18]Hall, L. E., Haggerty, D. J., Cooper, J. T., Golden, C. J., & Dornheim, L. (1998). Development and validation of a measure of emotional intelligence. Personality and individual differences, 25, 167-17.

^[19]De Meuse, K. P. (2017). Learning agility: Its evolution as a psychological construct and its empirical relationship to leader success. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 69(4), 267.

^[20]Stupple, E. J., Maratos, F. A., Elander, J., Hunt, T. E., Cheung, K. Y., & Aubeeluck, A. V. (2017). Development of the Critical Thinking Toolkit (CriTT): A measure of student attitudes and beliefs about critical thinking. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 23, 91-100.

^[21]Caruso, D. R., & Mayer, J. D. (1998). A measure of emotional empathy for adolescents and adults.

^[22]Ryan, M. (2020) The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition Joint Force Quarterly 96

^[23]Paul, R., & Elder, L. (1990). Critical thinking. Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State University.

^[24]Ibid.

^[25]Markin, R. (2011). Does my group know how I feel? Measuring intellectual empathy in groups using the social relations model. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 15(1), 1.

^[26]Cutright, K. R. (2013). Empathy for Carnivores. Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies.

^[27]Ryan, M. (2020) The Intellectual Edge: A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition Joint Force Quarterly 96.

^[28]Andrade, E. B., & Ariely, D. (2009). The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 109(1), 1-8.

^[29]NOTES ON DESIGNING THE MARINE CORPS OF THE FUTURE 6 DEC 2019 | Gen. David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

^[30]Walach, H., Buchheld, N., Buttenmüller, V., Kleinknecht, N., & Schmidt, S. (2006). Measuring mindfulness—the Freiburg mindfulness inventory (FMI). Personality and individual differences, 40(8), 1543-1555.

^[31]Johns, H. E., & Moser, H. R. (1989). FROM TRAIT TO TRANSFORMATION: THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP THEORIES. Education, 110(1).

^[32]Roopa, C. G., & Joseph, C. (2007). A preliminary study on empathy and personality in military medical officers. Indian Journal of Aerospace Medicine, 51(2), 28-39.

^[33]Nicolaides, A., & Yorks, L. (2008). An Epistemology of Learning Through. Emergence: Complexity & Organization, 10(1).

^[34]Perkins, D. N., & Salomon, G. (1992). Transfer of learning. International encyclopedia of education, 2, 6452-6457.

^[35]Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of personality and social psychology, 32(2), 311.

^[36]Nicolaides, A., & Yorks, L. (2008). An Epistemology of Learning Through. Emergence: Complexity & Organization, 10(1).

^[37]Marsick, V. J., & Watkins, K. E. (2003). Demonstrating the value of an organization's learning culture: the dimensions of the learning organization questionnaire. Advances in developing human resources, 5(2), 132-151.

^[38]Marsick, V. J., Watkins, K. E., Scully-Russ, E., & Nicolaides, A. (2017). Rethinking informal and incidental learning in terms of complexity and the social context. Journal of Adult Learning, Knowledge and Innovation, 1(1), 27-34.

^[39]Garamone, J. (2020) Joint Chiefs Vision changes Military Education Philosophy. DOD News.

^[40]Lewin, K. (1951). Problems of research in social psychology. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical papers (pp. 155-169). New York: Harper & Row. (p169).

^[41]Yorks, L. (2005). Nothing so practical as a good theory.

^[42]Nicolaides, A., & Yorks, L. (2008). An Epistemology of Learning Through. Emergence: Complexity & Organization, 10(1).

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Biography

Shawn McCann

Shawn McCann retired from the United States Marine Corps after serving as an infantry officer and education officer. As a consultant, he has led the creation, implementation, and delivery of highly sought-after developmental workshops for the Marine Corps’ Training and Education Command. Shawn has earned a doctorate in adult learning and leadership from Columbia University and currently works as a Senior Researcher at EY.

Intellectual Edge: The Pursuit of Lifetimes

Empowering Service Members

Intellectual Traits

Barriers to Implementation

Next Steps

Biography

Shawn McCann

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