Thinking Strategically - Reflections

22/03/2023

<30 min

The Australian Government is very active on many fronts, including Defence.^[1] The relatively recent realisation that the world is heading to a great geostrategic reset^[2], leading to a new world order, has raised the anxiety of politicians, agriculturalists, miners, industrialists and the military.^[3] Both the transition and the new geostrategic state are potentially inimical to Australia’s interests and sovereignty, making the work of ‘thinking strategically’ urgent.

This article explores the concept of ‘strategic thinking’. It provides a model for those who are urgently grappling with the current geostrategic turbulence and trying to find a path through it, and a place in the emerging order. This article does not directly consider Australia’s circumstances or strategic thinking. The model offers assistance to those who need to develop and assess their own strategies and the strategies of others.

The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘strategy’ as: noun: 1. a plan which is devised to achieve a particular outcome. 2. a cunning plan involving skilful management in getting the better of an adversary or attaining an end; ‘stratagem’. 3. also, chiefly US, strategics. a. generalship; the science or art of combining and employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and operations. b. the use, or a particular use, of this science or art. From the Greek stratēgia generalship.

‘Thinking’ is defined as: an adjective: 1. capable of thought; able to reason. 2. thoughtful; reflective: any thinking person would agree. As a noun; 3. thought; reflection. 4. opinion; judgement: to indicate one's thinking on the subject. And as a phrase; 5. to put on one's thinking cap.^[4] Colloquially to reflect upon or consider a matter; cogitate.

In contrast, no definition exists for ‘thinking strategically’.

In actuality, ‘thinking strategically’ and ‘strategy’ are thought of, studied, considered and used as a practice, a product, a narrative, a problem resolution approach, a collective process and as a theory.^[5] A summary of these ideas is below.

Strategy as a practice. Strategy as a practice is often described in competitive terms, most often using analogies based on games. An example is the ‘The Great Game’^[6], a historical rivalry between Russia and Great Britain in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The game analogy is complicated by the existence of two types of games—finite and infinite.^[7] Chess^[8] is a good representation of the former, while Go^[9] is illustrative of the latter. The differences lead to a binary view. Finite games are tightly bounded, winner-takes-all contests, contain fixed rules and have an obvious end. In contrast, infinite games are loosely coupled, create states of relative advantage, contain changing or contested rules and the end may not be obvious. Of the two, infinite games best reflect life.
Strategy as a product. As a product, a strategy is easy to find. The product will contain the word ‘strategy’ in the title. Strategies will often be built around Lykke’s ‘Ends-Ways-Means’ model.^[10] Lykke developed the model due to the unique circumstances of the 1980s, as the American Army rebuilt after the failures identified in the Vietnam War. Lykke used the model to teach students strategy, at their War College. The model has been criticised, but is in wide usage in the Australian Department of Defence and Australian Defence Force.
Strategy as a narrative^[11]. As a narrative, a strategy is used to tell a story in a future tense.^[12] The telling is often from the perspective of the leading character. Strategy as a narrative is viable, since man is a storytelling being with a deep psychological and spiritual embrace of folk tales, myths, parables, dreamings and beliefs.^[13] Effective narratives contain characters, plotlines, morals (biases and values) and an ending point or goal that can be used to influence people as individuals and/or as a collective.^[14] Narratives are very popular at the moment. Narrative as a strategy is particularly evident in the ‘woke’ and ‘climate changers’ efforts to remake the world^[15], and the Anglo-American-European view of the conflict in Ukraine. The issue with narratives is that their value is based on how closely they match reality.^[16] Reality matching is an activity which exposes false narratives while highlighting core truths.
Strategy as a collective process. Thinking strategically can also be used as a collective process, especially in business,^[17] where goals and purpose are translated into feasible actions that lead to desired consequences. An example of a collective process is the strategy to unite the German principalities, cities and kingdoms into a new state, under Prussian tutelage. The close cooperation of Roon^[18], the architect of the army; Moltke^[19], the director of operations; and Bismarck^[20], the diplomat and statesman, created the conditions for success. That cooperation was acknowledged by Wilhelm I^[21] at a victory dinner after the defeat of France in 1870.^[22] As with most successful enterprises, the Prussians were blessed with a combination of good people, circumstances and some luck.
Strategy as an approach to problem resolution. For many people and organisations ‘thinking strategically’ is used to help resolve problems.^[23] As a problem-solving approach, the crux of a problem hinges on understanding the problem itself, defining the ‘essential achievement’ and seeking ways to gain the most impact at the lowest cost.^[24] Within organisations, ‘vertical strategic coherence’ is of value since ‘vertical coherence’ avoids dissonance, distraction and waste.^[25] An example of vertical coherence was the Prussian ‘way of war’. As Moltke^[26] said, ‘no plan survives first contact’, and as such he had his staff ensure the troops were moved to ‘jump off’ points efficiently, while he taught his forces to effectively use ‘double envelopment’^[27] to destroy ‘field armies’. Moltke also said that the objective could not be provided beforehand. His reasoning was that the political situation is constantly evolving, but ultimately politics would define the focus and limits of action.^[28] The difference between solving a problem and undertaking a strategy development task can be quite subtle.
Strategy as a theory^[29] of success. Finally ‘thinking strategically’ can also be considered a theory. Meisner, in Hoffman’s The Missing Element in the Crafting of National Strategy – A theory of Success^[30], considered that defining strategy as a theory of a success is a must. As a ‘success theory’, creativity is encouraged while keeping the process grounded in reality. In line with strategy as a theory, we can conceive of strategy as an ‘applied theory’ that articulates a ‘theory of success’, which, as noted by Gray, makes a ‘planner’ a ‘theorist’.^[31] By becoming a theory, the implicit becomes explicit, rhapsodic prose becomes pragmatic plans, and those plans can be tested, refined and adapted as the situation changes. (As an aside, it would be more correct to call it a ‘hypothesis’^[32], since there is no guarantee that the strategy will succeed, nor necessarily be predictive.)

A ‘Thinking Strategically’ Model. The development of a ‘thinking strategically’ model based on the idea that strategy can be conceived as a theory has great appeal. Additionally, treating strategy as a problem resolution approach and as a collective process easily leads to the notion that strategy should be viewed as a theory of success, and thus modelled. The appeal is driven by the ability to codify, integrate and harmonise good ideas and its ability to be presented visually. The combination of elements provides the model’s framework and following explanation.

The model provides a visual guide to the key elements that make up a ‘Thinking Strategically’ model. The model can be used to support those embarking on the journey of learning to think strategically, undertaking a strategic thinking task or analysing others’ strategies. Understanding other strategies without a framework is much more difficult than is necessary. The process offered helps discern facts which are evaluated against the current norms, leading to action and thus modified norms, so that future experiences will be evaluated differently. In fact, with the plethora of ‘strategies’ about, a model makes the analysis task so much easier and also allows quick side-by-side comparison.

Within the vast body of strategic knowledge, we can see the elements of a model. Ideas such as a context, lines of effort, the Wéltanschauung^[33] or ‘worldview’ of key actors, and a ‘test of success’ help ‘strategic thinking practitioners’. Here the Lykke model is modified but incorporated because of its utility. In a political-military context, the inclusion of additional elements such as Wéltanschauung helps to ensure that the ‘right adversary’ is engaged at the ‘right time’, in the ‘right place’, in the ‘right proportions’, in the ‘right way’ and for the ‘right reason’ and ‘right purpose’.^[34]In a civil-business context, ‘adversary’ could be changed out for ‘competitors’. As for a ‘test of success’^[35], simply incorporating standard military descriptors such as ‘feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable’ would suffice. Other terms or elements, such as ‘sustainable’, ‘adaptable’ and ‘consequences’ could be added if necessary or desired. Alternatively, a series of questions that are tightly connected might also work. Questions such as: Does the strategy achieve the result desired? Will the strategy yield success with the lowest cost in blood, sweat and treasure?^[36] Will success be achieved in the shortest time? Significantly, a new idea is incorporated, that of a ‘guiding compass’^[37]. A ‘guiding compass’ points out the direction that needs to be followed and helps avoid excessive, unwarranted and dangerous deviation.^[38]

The model begins at the top with the ideas of ‘Subsidiarity’^[39], ‘Conundrum’ and ‘Self-synchronisation’.^[40] The three sit under the title as guiding ideas for organisations that value command by task/intent, encourage the use of dilemmas or conundrums against a foe whether military or civilian, and prompt subordinates to work towards a goal, often with little, poor or no guidance or direction.

As for the definition, ‘thinking strategically is an art, supported by science, to combine elements in the most advantageous way, to achieve a goal in the shortest time and at minimal cost’.^[41] The definition is designed to emphasise the human dimension, the search for suitable elements, the costs involved and, optimally, to draw out creativity.^[42] Much as the unique artistic creativity of Da Vinci’s and Pollack produced the Mona Lisa^[43] and Blue Poles^[44], even though they used essentially the same oil paints and canvas. As with masterpieces, creativity is not common.^[45] So, templates and models are provided to consolidate hard-learned lessons, to teach and to guide. However, template solutions often lead to pedestrian products, which achieve pedestrian results.^[46] The choice is between being a ‘painter by numbers’ or an ‘inspired master’.

The model nests ideas, actions and behaviours within a Context and Worldview.^[47] Both the context and worldviews of those who are audiences, protagonists or antagonists need to be considered, reflected on, discussed and understood to maximise the actions advocated or directed by the strategy. Elements such as ‘big idea’ have been abandoned and replaced by the concept of a ‘Guiding Compass’. The compass acts as a ‘guide in the wilderness of the future’ and provides a means to ground the thinking process. In some cases, a ‘guiding compass’ encourages a spiritual element to emerge.^[48] Sound ‘guiding compasses’ help to ensure that less than godly or downright evil choices are avoided. For example, a sound ‘guiding compass’ may have helped the Germans avoid the catastrophe of World War 2.

Strategy as a problem-solving tool is heavily emphasised in higher military colleges, businesses and various institutions.^[49] The idea of ‘a problem to be solved’ remains in the model but is downplayed. Problem resolution is really about shifting from an undesired or obsolete state to a desired future one. So, if you consider an ‘as is’ position to reflect ‘Today’ and the ‘to be’ position to be the state you’d like to see ‘Tomorrow’, a problem can be solved using this framework. Lykke’s^[50] ‘Ends’ is divided into Outcomes and Purpose (or aim would suffice)—effectively ‘what’ and ‘why’. Identifying a purpose or goal that needs to be achieved encourages a result-oriented perspective. However, both positive and negative outcomes need to be identified and weighed. Ignoring negative outcomes doesn’t make them go away.

‘Ways and Means’ remain and are well documented in various public and private publications and thinking aids. The ways and means are tightly coupled to the lines of effort and they should be expressed in terms of ‘scope-cost-schedule’, which can be further divided into ‘work/action packages’ leading to the identification of a ‘critical path’. The use of project management technique adds thinking discipline. Within Australia, using the 4Es (effective, efficient, economic and ethical) brings Commonwealth procurement guidelines^[51] on the use of resources into a practitioner’s mind and allows subsequent assessment of the ‘proper use’ or ‘value for money’ of any actions. 4Es is a useful test, and in some respects unethical strategies seem to fail.

The ‘Context’ box is very important, since nothing happens in a vacuum. Vickers’^[52] considered that the situation is always changing due to the interaction of actor and events over time, making the situation relatively unstable; but those actor-event interactions needs to be accounted for.^[53] Considering the context encourages the consideration of the nature of the conflict, its historic background, the physical and electronic domains, the seasonal attributes, the psycho-spiritual nature of the people and escalatory dominance, to name a few factors which influence a strategy. One way to consider the context is to conduct a Cynefin^[54] assessment, though other tools are available. The Cynefin framework posits that situations can be chaotic, complex, complicated, ordered or disordered. During chaotic, complicated or disordered situations, running experiments or using tools like the Boyd Cycle (OODA loop)^[55] as both a decision and learning tool to conduct ‘thought experiments’ is vital. For Cynefin assessments to be valid, care needs to be taken to achieve ‘situational stability’. A situation could move from one quadrant to another faster than it can be understood or for actions take effect, so experiments must be run at a rate commensurate with the situation, not at a speed of your preference, otherwise a model will be of little help. The context factors, though similar to those in the Lines of Effort^[56], are not the same. The idea of lines of effort are well documented elsewhere, though here ‘ideation’^[57] replaces ‘information’ since the battle of ideas appears to be a better fit. In essence, lines of effort link ‘ways’, ‘means’ and ‘outcomes’ to ‘purpose’. They are not discussed further, except to note the significance of defining them, at least initially, in terms of scope-cost-schedule. The lines of effort may also be used to achieve deceptive, distractive or disrupting outcomes.

Luck, chance and deception are elements that are rarely discussed in strategic texts. Luck favours the brave and the prepared and is of such importance that Napoleon first wanted ‘lucky’ generals, stating that competence came next.^[58] What Napoleon seems to be saying about luck was that ‘lucky generals’ have the ‘coup d'œil’^[59], which he defined as, ‘ a gift of being able to see at a glance the possibilities offered by the terrain … One can call it the coup d'œil militaire and it is inborn in great generals.’ Individuals only get it with experience, with practice and repetitive training. Chance cannot be underestimated. Most would think through chance using risk management concepts, which would probably be adequate. Care needs to be taken when one gambles, much like in a casino. While deception can be self-generated or prompted by outside forces.

As for ‘worldview’ or ‘Wéltanschauung’, it is an idea borrowed from ‘soft systems’.^[60] A ‘worldview’ captures a person’s or group’s conceptions, philosophy or view of the world. An understanding of the worldviews of the actors and audiences that will be confronted by the strategy is critical to understanding the situation from multiple perspectives. Multiple perspectives will be especially important during civilisational clashes. Depending on the situation, everything is ‘lawful’ and ‘right’ in its time and place.^[61] For those who appreciate models, the Vickers Appreciation model is inspirational when considering Wéltanschauung. Much of Vickers’ work is devoted to the analysis of judgement in terms of what he called ‘appreciative behaviour’. Vickers published his thoughts in The Art of Judgement^[62] in 1965. He believed that social institutions are best analysed as systems, and his published work, Human Systems are Different^[63], contributes to systems and strategic thinking.

As for the scientific and mathematical elements of strategy, these are the most neglected parts of a strategic practitioner’s tool kit. For those involved in national strategy, a useful start point is the Composite Index of National Capabilities^[64] (CINC). The index is a measure of national power formulated by J.D. Singer^[65] in 1963 for the Correlations of War project.^[66] The index uses the averages of the percentages of global totals in six categories. The categories represent each state’s economic, military and demographic shares of the global totals. As a formula, CINC=(TPR+UPR+ISPR+ECR+MER+MPR)/6 is effectively a ratio of a country to the world. The variables are: TPR=total population of a country ratio, UPR=urban population of a country ratio, ISPR=iron and steel production of a country ratio, ECR=primary energy consumption ratio, MER=military expenditure ratio, MPR=military personnel ratio.^[67] The correlation highlights the negative consequences of deindustrialisation. Other strategic domains will require other tools to provide the scientific and mathematical underpinnings of the art of strategy.

Notes of caution: Perception-fact mismatches, freak events, jumping to the endgame and reckless disregard for the order of operations are some of the serious faults that strategic practitioners can fall into. One of the most common faults is that of ‘perception-fact’ mismatch highlighted by a misunderstanding of the variation between what is stated and what the actual behaviour is.^[68] The difference is essentially between a lie and the truth, which confuses and misguides. Propaganda (often called information actions/operations)^[69] is a key tool that deceives.^[70] Propaganda is a well-developed field with a scientific basis and a broad toolset to mislead.^[71]^[72] Differentiating the perception-fact mismatch is difficult due to people’s immersion in propaganda that aims to mobilise local opinions, persuade neutrals and undermine adversary legitimacy or alternate opinions. Relying on a narrow range of media, influencers and politicians will likely lead to groupthink.^[73]^[74] Freak events such as ‘black swans’^[75] and ‘grey rhinos’^[76] that may be looming on the horizon are heavily influenced by confirmation or other bias^[77], leading to each data-point confirming what is wanted to be seen. As with experimentation, the eye should be on the elements that disprove, not confirm. Having the endgame sorted must be backed by sound calculus and an algorithm capturing branches and sequels.^[78] The branches and sequels cannot be left to their own devices. As for order of operations^[79], there is a critical path^[80] that cannot be avoided. Project management^[81] offers the idea of work packages that must be resources— or as the military says, ‘troops to tasks’ A strategic thinker or practitioner needs the intellectual, moral and spiritual strength to search to attain discernment^[82]. Discernment of the actual actions or behaviours that will be undertaken is often obfuscated in strategic products. Using the framework or model will assist in developing or identifying the true strategy. A hint: the lines of effort are likely to be the real behaviours.

In conclusion, strategic thinking has become vitally important due to the strategic turbulence. The world is resetting and a new order is emerging, which may not be as benign as it has been in the past. Strategy development has been thought of, studied, considered and used as a practice, a product, a narrative, a problem resolution approach, a collective process and as a theory. Of the six ideas, strategy as a theory of success lends itself to codification and offers structured support to learning, development and analysis of strategies. The model provided captures the essential elements that were discerned from some of the many strategic texts that are available. Probably the most critical element of the model is the idea of a ‘guiding compass’, without which it is difficult to maintain focus, encourage subsidiarity, support self-synchronisation and create conundrums for an adversary. In essence, strategies and tactics do not change; situations change, means change, and the combinations change. Thus, the way the model is applied must be adjusted to the task, rather than slavishly applied to avoid the common problem of rhapsodic prose, ‘slick talkers’ and procrastinators. The process offered helps discern facts which are evaluated against the norms, leading to action and modified norms so that future experiences will be evaluated differently. As such, the model provides segments and guide rails to support logic and reason during the development or analysis of a strategy.

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Critical path method - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

Project management - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

Discernment - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

Footnotes

¹ A Defence Strategic Review is underway, with a final report due in March 2023. An interim report was provided to Government in November 2022, but was not released to the public.

² The decline in Anglo-American-European influence and rise of a Eurasian security and economic community is coupled with the expansion of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to a BRICS+ organisation. The shifting relative power equation is creating turbulence as the fading powers are resisting the rising security and economic power centres.

³ This is often referred to as ‘threats to the ‘rules’ based order emanating from Russia and China.

⁴ Macquarie Dictionary.

⁵ Course: Thinking Strategically (2022-S2) (adele.edu.au) The course was run over the period 26 September to 9 December at the Australian Defence College, Weston Creek, ACT. The convenor was: Dr Michael Hatherell ( michael.hatherell@adele.edu.au) The course broke strategy into those six types.

⁶ Great Game - Wikipedia and New Great Game in the Caucasus and Central Asia – Asia Times accessed 25/01/2023

⁷ Finite and Infinite Games - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

⁸ Chess - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

⁹ Go (game) - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

¹⁰ Beyond Ends, Ways, and Means: We Need a Better Strategic Framework to Win in an Era of Great Power Competition - Modern War Institute (usma.edu) accessed 25/01/2023

¹¹ A narrative approach to Strategy as Practice: strategy making from texts and narratives (Chapter 12) - Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as Practice accessed 25/01/2023

¹² Narrative - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

¹³ ibid

¹⁴ ibid

¹⁵ Both climate change and woke narrative contain kernels of truth, wrapped in many untruths and are resistant to debate. In effect propaganda is being employed to coerce compliance, acceptance and approval. As with the conflict in Ukraine, discerning the truth is no simple matter.

¹⁶ Perception Is Not Reality | Psychology Today accessed 25/01/2023

¹⁷ The traditional strategy process - strategy making in the past (themanager.org) accessed 25/01/2023

¹⁸ Albrecht von Roon - Wikipedia accessed 01/02/2023

¹⁹ Helmuth von Moltke the Elder - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

²⁰ Otto von Bismarck - Wikipedia accessed 01/02/2023

²¹ William I, German Emperor - Wikipedia accessed 01/02/2023

²² Fridman, O., (ed), 2021, Strategiya, C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd. p 105, ISBN 9781787384842 ‘Strategiya’ sheds light on the roots of Russian strategic and military thought. The book places current operations in a historic light.

²³ Problem solving techniques: Steps and methods (deakin.edu.au) accessed 25/01/2023

²⁴ Rumelt, R., 2022, Crux: How Leaders Become Strategist, Profile Trade, ISBN 978-1788169509

²⁵ Rumelt, R., 2017, Good Strategy/Bad Strategy: The difference and why it matters, Profile Trade, ISBN 978-1781256176

²⁶ Helmuth von Moltke the Elder - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023 Moltke is one of the greatest generals in history. He guided the Prussian Army to victory against Austria, Denmark and France which lead to the creation of the German Empire. He is regarded as the creator of the modern method of directing armies in the field. He is often described as the embodiment of "Prussian military organization and tactical genius".

²⁷ Battle of Cannae - Wikipedia The Battle of Cannae was a key engagement of the Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage. The battle was fought on 2 August 216 BC near Cannae in Apulia. The Carthaginians were led by Hannibal. They surrounded and annihilated the larger Roman force under the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro. It is regarded as one of the greatest tactical feats in military history and one of the worst defeats in Roman history. By modern times Cannae acquired a mythic quality, and is often used as an example of the perfect defeat of an enemy army. Cannae was the model embraced by Moltke.

²⁸ Dupuy, T., 1984. A Genius for War: the German Army and General Staff 1807–1945. Fairfax, VA: Hero Books. ISBN 978-0-915979-02-8

²⁹ Theory is a noun. It is defined as: 1 - A set of statements or principles devised to explain a group of facts or phenomena, especially one that has been repeatedly tested or is widely accepted and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena. 2 - The branch of a science or art consisting of its explanatory statements, accepted principles, and methods of analysis, as opposed to practice. 3 - A set of theorems that constitute a systematic view of a branch of mathematics.

³⁰ The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy: A Theory of Success > Institute for National Strategic Studies > News (ndu.edu) accessed 25/01/2023

³¹ ibid

³² Hypothesis - Wikipedia accessed 25/0102023

³³ Worldview - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023Wéltanschauung is the fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual or society encompassing the whole of the individual's or society's knowledge, culture, and point of view. The term ‘worldview’ is a ‘calque’ of the German word Wéltanschauung.

³⁴ On Wars, Battles, and Military Operations: Defining Success | The Vineyard of the Saker accessed 24/10/2022

³⁵ ibid

³⁶ Fridman, O., (ed), 2021, Strategiya,

³⁷ On Wars, Battles, and Military Operations: Defining Success | The Vineyard of the Saker accessed 24/10/2022.

³⁸ Ibid. The author, M. Tajik provides an excellent description of ‘guiding compass’ and its moral link.

³⁹ Subsidiarity - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023. Subsidiarity is a principle of social organization that holds that social and political issues should be dealt with at the most immediate or local level that is consistent with their resolution. Subsidiarity is the foundation of mission command or ‘Führen mit Auftrag’.

⁴⁰ The three formed the core of some work I participated in whilst in Future Land Warfare in the early 2000s.

⁴¹ This a composite of various ideas, but relies heavily on the definitions and descriptions contained in Strategiya.

⁴² Fridman, O., 2021, Strategiya.

⁴³ Mona Lisa - Wikipedia Mona Lisa is a half-length portrait painting by Italian artist Leonardo da Vinci. The painting is considered an archetypal masterpiece of the Italian Renaissance.

⁴⁴ Blue Poles - Wikipedia Blue Poles, also known as Number 11, 1952 is an abstract expressionist painting by American artist Jackson Pollock.

⁴⁵ Fridman, O., 2021, Strategiya.

⁴⁶ ibid

⁴⁷ Events occur within a context, with the participants influenced by their worldviews. The nesting fits neatly.

⁴⁸ On Wars, Battles, and Military Operations: Defining Success | The Vineyard of the Saker accessed 24/10/2022.

⁴⁹ Course: Thinking Strategically (2022-S2) (adele.edu.au). Hoffman’s presentation to the class

⁵⁰ Beyond Ends, Ways, and Means: We Need a Better Strategic Framework to Win in an Era of Great Power Competition - Modern War Institute (usma.edu) accessed 25/01/2023

⁵¹ Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (legislation.gov.au) Division 2-The Dictionary…proper, when used in relation to the use or management of public resources, means efficient, effective, economical and ethical.

⁵² Geoffrey Vickers and appreciative systems - Hiccupedia - Wiki (usask.ca) accessed 25/01/2023

⁵³ ibid

⁵⁴ Cynefin framework - Wikipedia

⁵⁵ OODA loop - Wikipedia The OODA loop has become an important concept in litigation, business, law enforcement, management education, and military strategy.

⁵⁶ Line Of Effort Definition - Military Planning Terms - MilitaryDictionary JP 5-0 (Joint Operation Planning) In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions

⁵⁷ Ideation (creative process) - Wikipedia Ideation is the process of generating, developing, and communicating new ideas. Ideas are understood as a basic element of thought that can be either visual, concrete, or abstract. Ideation comprises the stages of a ‘thought cycle’: innovation, development and actualization.

⁵⁸ Ten Famous Things Napoleon Bonaparte Never Said (warhistoryonline.com) “Give me lucky generals.” This is another quote that is often attributed to Napoleon, but there is no evidence to suggest he ever said the words. If he did, then as an avid amateur historian he probably based them on something Cardinal Mazarin, chief minister of France in the 17^th century, said. Mazarin had noted that one must not ask of a general “Est-il habile?” (“Is he skilful?”), but rather “Est-il heureux?” (“Is he lucky?”)

⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%C5%93il#cite_note-4Coup d'œil - Wikipedia accessed 07/03/2023 (Napoleon I, 1769-1821, Mémoires)

⁶⁰ Soft systems methodology - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

⁶¹ Fridman, O., (ed), 2021, Strategiya

⁶² Vickers, G. 1965. The Art of Judgment: A Study of Policy Making (Rethinking Public Administration) republished 1995 by Sage Publications, Inc, ISBN 9780803973633

⁶³ Vickers, G., 1983. Human Systems are Different, SAGE Publications Inc; ISBN 978-0063182622

⁶⁴ Composite Index of National Capability - Wikipedia accessed 01/02/2023

⁶⁵ J. David Singer - Wikipedia accessed 01/02/2023

⁶⁶ Composite Index of National Capability - Wikipedia accessed 01/02/2023

⁶⁷ ibid

⁶⁸ Ibid Perception Is Not Reality | Psychology Today

⁶⁹ Information actions/operations is a euphemism for propaganda Euphemism - Wikipedia

⁷⁰ Propaganda - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

⁷¹ Edward Bernays - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

⁷² Bernays, E. 1928. Propaganda. New York, Horace Liveright. ISBN 978-0804615112. From L. Tye’s biography, quoted at Wikipedia: ‘It is impossible to fundamentally grasp the social, political, economic and cultural developments of the past 100 years without some understanding of Bernays and his professional heirs in the public relations industry. PR is a 20^th-century phenomenon, and Bernays—widely eulogized as the "father of public relations" at the time of his death in 1995—played a major role in defining the industry's philosophy and methods.’

⁷³ Open-source intelligence - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

⁷⁴ Superforecaster - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023 Tetlock, P.E.; Gardner, D 2015. Superforecasting: the art and science of prediction.Crown Publishers. ISBN 9780804136693 A superforecaster is a person who makes forecasts that can be shown by statistical means to have been consistently more accurate than the general public or experts.

⁷⁵ The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023 A Black Swan is the extreme impact of rare and unpredictable outlier events. There is a human tendency to find simplistic explanations for these events, retrospectively. Taleb, N.N. 2007. Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House. ISBN 978-1400063512

⁷⁶ Wucker, M. 2016. The Gray Rhino: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Dangers We Ignore. St Martin’s Press ISBN 978-1-4668-8700-8. Wucker introduced the term "gray rhino" at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland in January 2013. Unlike highly improbable "black swans" popularized by Taleb, ‘gray rhinos’ are highly probable, high impact yet neglected threats.

⁷⁷ Cognitive Bias List: Common Types of Bias (verywellmind.com) accessed 25/01/2023

⁷⁸ Branches and sequels are now embedded in military planning activities. A branch is a deviation, while sequel is a follow on.

⁷⁹ Order of operations - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023 The order of operations or operator precedence is a collection of rules that reflect conventions about which procedures to perform first. The idea applies to many other fields including the military, chemistry, physics and even strategy.

⁸⁰ Critical path method - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023 Critical path and order of operation are similar ideas.

⁸¹ Project management - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023

⁸² Discernment - Wikipedia accessed 25/01/2023 Discernment is the ability to obtain sharp perceptions or to judge well (or the activity of so doing) Discernment in the Christian religion is considered as a virtue, a discerning individual is considered to possess wisdom, and be of good judgement; especially so with regard to subject matter often overlooked by others.

Cite Article

Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level4

Multi-agency Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level5

Social Mastery

Lead Capability social-influence-level4

Generate Climates of Trust social-character-level4

Biography

Thomas Basan

Major

Major Thomas BASAN enlisted in January 1980. As a soldier and non-commissioned officer, Major Basan served in 2^nd/4^th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and Special Air Service Regiment. On commissioning, Major Basan commanded paratroopers in 3^rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Parachute) at platoon, specialist platoon and company. Major Basan is a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff College and the Army Technical Staff Officer Course. He has also gained a master’s in systems engineering.

Bibliography

RAND Corporation

Lowy Institute

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