Contested Access and Manoeuvre in Context
Contested Access and Manoeuvre (CAM) concepts must be applied to the Australian context in order to benefit Australia. Firstly, the threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) contesting access and manoeuvre in the region should be considered. Figure 1 shows a sample of People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force missile threats, produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2021.[1] At first glance, the PRC has significant long-range weapons capable of reaching the Australian mainland. Figure 1 shows that the number of missiles capable of reaching 3000 kilometres is approximately 25% of the number reaching less than 1000 kilometres. However, because of the increased area at longer ranges, the weapons per unit of area is approximately 6% of that inside 1000 kilometres.[2] For missiles capable of going further than 3000 kilometres, the numbers become 10%, reducing to 2% coverage due to area.[3] This illustrates that the area within 1000 kilometres is highly contested, but the intensity drops markedly outside this range. The vulnerability of long-range kill chains to disruption further exacerbates this effect. This highlights the weakening effects of counter-access and counter-manoeuvre activities at extended projection ranges.[4]

Defending forces can capitalise on the reduced intensity of threat counter-access and counter-manoeuvre activities at long range. Figure 2 shows the reducing intensity of China’s CAM areas overlaid with the increasing intensity of Australia’s. This illustrates Clausewitz’s concept of defence as the stronger form of war.[6] Adversary forces projecting towards Australia must progressively move away from the areas where their CAM capabilities protect them. Simultaneously, they move closer to the areas where Australia’s counter-access and counter-manoeuvre effects intensify. This provides Australia with an asymmetric advantage and supports the strategy of denial. The denial effect may be strengthened by conducting long-range effects that reduce the manoeuvre potential of the enemy at the early stages of an attack. Long-range effects require investment in the targeting enterprise and sensor networks to overcome the weaknesses identified earlier. Layering interdependent counter-manoeuvre and counter-access effects with increasing intensity as the threat increases offers Australia the ability to defend against and defeat acts of aggression.

Conclusion
When Australia adopted a strategy of denial in the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), it implicitly signalled a need to adopt A2/AD concepts. However, the lack of clear definition surrounding A2/AD terminology and historical biases in describing threat activities hindered its incorporation into the strategy. ‘Contested Access and Manoeuvre’ is a concept that better meets the needs of Australia’s strategy of denial. ‘Contested’ implies the need to conduct counter-access and counter-manoeuvre activities as well as to operate inside environments subjected to the same activities by an adversary. Counter-access and counter-manoeuvre are layered, interdependent activities that support each other across the levels of war. Counter-access is a specifically targeted activity that aims to prevent access to an area. Counter-manoeuvre seeks to limit an enemy’s freedom of manoeuvre. The intensity of counter-access and counter-manoeuvre activities increases commensurately with threat levels. As adversaries operate further from the protection of their capabilities and closer to the strengths of Australia’s systems, it confers an asymmetric advantage to Australia. This allows Australia to capitalise on the strengths of the defence. However, Australia must be willing to project forward to generate layered effects to maximise contested access and manoeuvre benefits. Long-range effects require investment in the targeting enterprise and long-range sensor networks, as well as the sustainment to support it. ‘Contested Access and Manoeuvre’ addresses language and historical barriers to including A2/AD concepts in a strategy of denial.
Adopting ‘Contested Access and Manoeuvre’ will facilitate clearer discussions and debate around the applicable concepts. It provides a conceptual basis for incorporating and apportioning the required capabilities into the strategy of denial. Further analysis of the concept may reveal critical terrain areas to support denial. These may then be matched with appropriate capabilities or investments. The conceptual thought facilitates creative thinking about how varying effects may be delivered to achieve an asymmetric advantage. Layering effects with increasing intensity provides focus to force design activities for apportioning investment, which will lead to more efficient Defence spending. The concept is broad enough in definition to be adaptable to other circumstances or domains.
The concept of ‘Contested Access and Manoeuvre’ in this paper focussed primarily on the physical aspects of the air-sea gap to Australia’s north. It details how distance may be utilised to facilitate Australia’s strategy of denial. However, the concepts discussed are broad and may be adapted to specific circumstances. Such adaptations may include contested access and manoeuvre entirely confined to cyberspace or focussed on the information environment. These particular adaptations may then be incorporated into the overall concept. ‘Contested Access and Manoeuvre’ improves the language and concepts introduced with A2/AD. It allows more meaningful debate around the concepts and inclusion into a strategy of denial. To deliver against the NDS and achieve a strategy of denial, Australia should consider adopting ‘Contested Access and Manoeuvre’ into the ADF Concept Framework.
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3 Calculations by the author assume weapons with a range of less than 1000km cover an arc of 180°, while weapons with a range of up to 5500km cover 45°.
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