Perspectives – Case Study 2

The DSR promises reform for an era of major power competition—but its slow tempo, contested priorities, and political risk may leave the nation strategically outpaced when it matters most.

15/02/2026

<30 min

The three Perspectives – Case Studies focuses on translating strategy into capability and offers the best essays from students of the Military Art Part-Time program that address the question:

Has the 2023 Defence Strategic Review provided the broad force design needed for the demands of the next two decades?

Editorial Note: These papers were written prior to the release of the 2024 National Defence Strategy.

Case Study 2

Set against a backdrop of increasing major power competition, particularly with China's assertive stance in the Indo-Pacific region, rapid geopolitical shifts and emerging security challenges will likely be the defining features of Australia's Defence operating environment over the next two decades. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) addresses this as a holistic consideration of Australia's Defence broad force design, ensuring it has the right capabilities and posture for these strategic challenges^[1]. The end-state for this review was to identify six priority areas for immediate action (Figure 1)^[2]. The DSR, however, is jeopardised by its poor implementation tempo and orchestration, uncertain political and financial support, and failure to provide the versatile and flexible force structure required for evolving, non-traditional, regional threats and diplomatic demands of the Indo-Pacific. These shortfalls critically undermine the effectiveness and relevance of the DSR and, therefore, its ability to provide the broad force design needed for the coming decades.

Australia's Defence Operating Environment

Over the next two decades, Australia's threat operating environment is anticipated to be shaped by several key factors. These include the rise of China as a strategic competitor, technological advancements in warfare, and evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. The expansion of China's military capabilities and assertive posture in and beyond the South China Sea have been identified as primary concerns, necessitating a recalibration of Australia's Defence strategy and capabilities^[3]. The focus on technological advancements, particularly in cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing, underscores the need for Australia to enhance its technological edge and cyber resilience^[4]. Establishing AUKUS and expanding this partnership reflects Australia's strategic pivot towards deepening alliances with like-minded countries to address these challenges^[5].

Figure 1: The DSR’s identified order of six priority areas requiring immediate action:
1.	Acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS to improve our deterrence capabilities;
2.	Developing the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) ability to precisely strike targets at longer-range and manufacture munitions in Australia;
3.	Improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases;
4.	Initiatives to improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled Defence workforce;
5.	Lifting our capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into ADF capability, in close partnership with Australian industry; and
6.	Deepening of our diplomatic and defence partnerships with key partners in the Indo-Pacific.

It is now well established that Australia's strategic environment no longer affords the luxury of extended warning times. The rapid pace of geopolitical developments, especially China's military modernisation and regional assertiveness, necessitates swiftly adapting Australia's defence capabilities^[6]. China has already begun to project hard power into the South China Sea, East China Sea, and around Taiwan to assert its interests in the Indo-Pacific. With President Xi Jinping's modernisation goals of 'informationisation', 'professionalisation' and 'intelligentisation' stratified out to 2050^[7], these hard power means will likely continue to advance at an accelerating rate.

Tempo of Implementation and Strategic Orchestration

The concept of "tempo" is crucial in defence readiness. As described by Robert Leonhard in the context of a chess game, "tempo consists of the player's pace of moves, such that the opponent, who may have a good plan, has no time to execute it". In this way, tempo will force the opponent to consistently 'react' defensively while the player advances their plan^[8]. In defence planning, "tempo" refers to the speed and efficiency with which military capabilities can be developed, acquired, and operationalised. A rapid tempo is crucial for maintaining strategic relevance, especially in a fast-evolving security environment. The DSR's effectiveness is contingent not only on the strategies it outlines but also on the relative speed and efficiency of its implementation compared to that of competing nations.

Australian acquisition of the DSR's key capabilities must be viewed in context to the aforementioned rate of China's military evolution. Comparison can be drawn from the procurement and implementation plans for the nuclear-powered submarines and an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) shield. The transition to nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS agreement involves acquiring at least three Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s and building a new design in cooperation with the United Kingdom and the United States for delivery in the early 2040s. However, concerns about a capability gap during this transition period have been raised^[9]. Without domestic large-scale nuclear infrastructure, including weapons or power generation, considerable planning and consideration are still required for managing Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines (i.e. nuclear waste disposal^[10]) and the eventual development of the 'AUKUS-class'. On top of existing international post-COVID economic supply chain and inflation demands, this significant friction has already seen delays to this forecast acquisition^[11], and risks further extension of the Collins-class capability gap.

While nuclear-powered submarines will allow Australia to deter throughout the region, the A2/AD shield provides the deterrent back home. Through 'deterrence by denial' the DSR aims to stop an adversary by denying any attempt to project power against Australia through its northern approaches^[12]. Australia's current surveillance capabilities lack the fidelity required to support targeted long-range fires^[13], and a strike capability (identified as necessary in both the 2009 and 2016 white papers) is yet to arrive. Subsequently, Australia’s A2/AD shield is effectively being established from scratch^[14]. 2022 saw many announcements regarding the procurement of A2/AD strike capabilities and the sovereign development of guided weapons and explosive ordinance with Raytheon Australia and Lockheed Martin Australia^[15], scheduled to start production by 2025. In contrast to the nuclear-powered submarines, Australia looks likely to have this capability long before threat forces have the capacity or reason to test it.

While the orchestration of the AUKUS acquisition sequence may be driven through procurement timelines, it is essential to acknowledge what it means in the temporal context of peer actions in Australia’s region. While the Chinese military build-up and modernisation are impressive, the PLA remains fixated on its near region. Most Chinese ship-building is focussed on corvettes and patrol-class, and missile development and build-up prioritising that of intermediate-range^[16]. Through rapid integration of the A2/AD shield, contrasted with the delayed acquisition of nuclear submarines, Australia is placing its immediate prioritisation on a defence capability and posture that is not soon to be challenged. This capability is in exchange for the inability to sufficiently force-project strategic assets into the regions currently or soon may be under competition of influence. Furthermore, based on these timelines and the intense focus of China on military modernisation, it is uncertain if the AUKUS submarines will be the dominant military hardware in this region when they arrive^[17]. In this way, the current implementation of DSRs critical strategic capabilities is sacrificing an indefinite amount of time, in exchange for a dubious capability advantage.

It is also imperative to reflect on this order of capability development and what it implies for Australia's influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Australia's immediate focus on near-region A2/AD appears to underscore a Defence philosophy, signalling a myopic approach. One that places haste on immediate deterrence but fails to prioritise a timeline focussed upon regional influence or security. Indo-Pacific partners may begin to view Australia as a country that prioritises its ability to deliver explosive ordinance onto their doorstep rather than send other strategic assets capable of supporting them against their adversaries. This narrative may further undermine Australian influence in the Indo-Pacific.

In summary, in an environment of accelerated geopolitical competition in Australia’s near region, where the argument can be made, Australia failed to observe its own stipulated 10-year warning time. The DSR fails to prioritise the rapid acquisition of strategic capabilities which can force-project quick enough to deter near-term competition. Combined with the rapid focus on an A2/AD shield, this prioritisation fails to appreciate the current threat force capability or intent and undermines Australia’s legitimacy as a nation aiming to support its peers to maintain independence.

Financial and Political Risks

Implementing the DSR's proposals requires stable and substantial financial investment, yet political uncertainties and the prospect of shifting priorities pose significant risks. Financially, the DSR comes off a reduced funding base, a repercussion of what could be considered a premature post–Cold War ‘peace dividend’. Historical budget allocations to Defence in 1987 stood at approximately 9% of the total budget and about 2.5% of GDP, compared to significantly lower current proportions^[18]. Restoring funding to these levels would require substantial increases in the defence budget, which may not be politically feasible given the myriad other demands on government spending. Over the last 25 years, extensive underfunding has had detrimental impacts on Australia's defence capability and infrastructure, leading to a critical under-preparedness in the Australian Defence Force that the DSR seeks to address. The recommendation to significantly increase the defence budget will face harsh scrutiny and possible opposition in the Expenditure Review Committee meetings, where any proposals for such substantial increments will likely be resisted due to the broader fiscal implications.

Politically, the DSR is at risk due to the gap between the politically endorsed strategic priorities and the actual capability proposals received from the Defence Department. In the past, scenarios for the ADF’s force-structuring were only approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee without explicit political endorsement^[19]. For the DSR's goals to be effectively met, there must be alignment between government strategic intent and the operational scenarios for force design. The DSR's intent for the ADF to focus on a clear and present threat rather than a range of potential adversaries suggests a shift toward force design scenarios that align with the increasing tension with China. This shift necessitates a degree of political consensus and support that may be challenging to sustain over the long term, especially in a democratic nation where the short tenure of political parties risks their prioritisation towards policies that see more immediate benefit for their voting constituents.

The other political friction about to be encountered is the soon-to-be-released 2024 National Defence Strategy. While it’s said this strategy will broadly reflect the DSR, this document will outline the Labour Government's capability plan to align the ADF with the DSR^[20]. In this way, it risks becoming a politicised instrument that could either reinforce the DSR's recommendations through a broader, more coordinated approach to defence planning or overshadow and divert from them, depending on political influences at its release^[21]. As the National Defence Strategy is set to be a living document, this further risks a continuous 'watering down' of the DSR’s recommendations to align with financial and political pressures, meaning the force design proposed may never come to fruition.

These risks underscore the complex challenge facing the implementation of the DSR. While it sets ambitious targets for reforming Australia's defence posture and capabilities, the financial and political landscapes present formidable hurdles that could significantly impact its successful execution and, by extension, its effectiveness.

Misalignment with Indo-Pacific Regional Strategy

Australia's strategic recalibration must account for the complex dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region. Australia must maintain a balanced approach that navigates the challenges posed by China's strategic ambitions while fostering regional stability and cooperation. This balance involves a nuanced foreign policy that leverages alliances and partnerships, advocates for a rules-based international order, and promotes engagement with China in areas of mutual interest.

While the DSR advocates the transition from a Balanced to a Focused force, inclined towards acquiring high-end offensive capabilities and could be seen as reactive to perceived threats, an alternate Defence Strategy lies within the philosophy of defensive realism. This philosophy proposes that a state can achieve adequate security without threatening others, thereby reducing the chances of escalation and conflict. Sam Roggeveen's "Echidna Strategy" articulates this vision for Australia's Defence, advocating for a formidable but non-provocative defence posture, one that emphasises making Australia a 'hard target' through investments in asymmetric capabilities while enhancing its ability to contribute to regional stability through non-offensive means^[22]. Not only could this strategy be more sustainable and less likely to contribute to regional arms races, but this approach resonates with Australia's strategic context, where the primary aim is to dissuade potential aggressors by showcasing robust defensive capabilities rather than seeking to match the offensive power of regional powers like China. By investing in and enhancing capabilities tailored to Australia's unique strategic circumstances, the "Echidna Strategy" proposes a cost-effective way to maintain sovereignty, security, and regional stability, all of which are crucial for Australia's long-term defence posture in a rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific environment.

The need to oppose non-traditional threats is another argument favouring a Balanced force. Susan Harris Rimmer argues that alongside traditional security, non-traditional threats, particularly the impact of climate change as a 'threat multiplier', need to be integrated into strategic considerations^[23]. This argument suggests that Australia should focus on dual-use military capabilities for climate emergencies, reject nuclear options incompatible with international law and a rules-based order, and increase investment in conflict prevention, climate response, development assistance, and preventive diplomacy. Integrating dual-use capabilities would allow the ADF to maintain a robust deterrent posture while providing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and support for regional stability. This Defence posture would promote a favourable image of Australia that underscores responsible and engaged regional leadership. The balanced application of hard and soft power requires a versatile and responsive military (i.e. a Balanced force) capable of addressing a spectrum of challenges, from high-end military deterrence to securing peace and stability within the region.

The DSR's focus has also been criticised for its singular emphasis on defence capabilities, potentially at the expense of other dimensions of national security. Strating and Wallis argue that a comprehensive National Security Strategy that considers the full spectrum of security challenges, including cyber threats, transnational crime, and climate change, has not yet been adequately developed^[24]. The DSR, therefore, risks establishing a path-dependent trajectory that predominantly views security through an exclusively defence lens, which may divert attention and resources away from other crucial areas of national or regional security that require investment and development. Rather than focusing on the DSR's more forthright military capabilities, Geoff Raby recommends leveraging diplomatic channels and fostering economic ties to build mutual trust and cooperation within the Indo-Pacific^[25]. This strategy emphasises a more balanced approach, prioritising regional stability and prosperity through partnership and dialogue rather than predominantly military posturing. A whole-of-government approach is necessitated to deal with the strategic circumstances that are not solely the purview of Defence but require a national unified strategic response.

Australia's security is interlinked with that of its neighbours in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Rory Medcalf describes the concept of Indo-Pacific middle-players (i.e. not China or the United States) focused on inclusive democracy in a region of shared space, aimed to support regional stability and avail the need to take sides in the growing tension between the two hegemons^[26]. While this concept was initially formed as an insulator against the United States' unreliability under Trump, it has been undermined by the Biden administration’s targeted re-engagement in the region. Key to this, the AUKUS agreement has shaped Australia and the DSR towards firming an alliance that is increasingly interested in building its own front against China. This shift has led other middle-player nations in the Indo-Pacific to increase their engagement with China, which, rather than isolating, has sought to build their domestic resilience. Unlike the United States, Australia has the unique opportunity within the Indo-Pacific to leverage its decades of diplomatic support to fellow middle-players to support their independence, prosperity and continuity of a rules-based order in the region. However, this will be contingent on having a Defence force design and diplomatic capability to project influence and support to the region, which may be hampered by the DSR prioritisation of a Focused force and increased presence of the United States military on Australian shores.

In summary, the DSR's emphasis towards a Focused force, centred on the defence of Australia rather than support to Australia’s near region, risks creating the perception that Australia is no longer interested in supporting partnerships in this region. It risks isolating Australia from its peers and China (as a trading partner) through the perception of starting an 'arms race' in the region. It fails to provide a balanced, broad force design capable of responding to non-traditional threats. Furthermore, through being established before a coherent National Security Strategy, the DSR risks shaping government responses to regional tensions led by Defence rather than a balanced diplomatic reaction. These risks, combined with the DSR prioritising deeper integration with the United States, undermine Australia's influence and capability to shape and support the regional security necessary to contain China's influence and maintain a rules-based order.

Summary

Australia's 2023 DSR contends with an increasingly competitive and uncertain geopolitical landscape, heavily influenced by the assertive rise of China and the technological acceleration of warfare capabilities. While the DSR aims to recalibrate Australia's defence force to address these emerging challenges, its execution risks being marred by a slow tempo of implementation, budgetary constraints, and potential misalignments with broader strategic goals. The agile development and deployment of advanced military technologies, critical for maintaining regional influence and deterrence, may not keep pace with rapid advancements and strategic manoeuvres by potential adversaries, particularly China.

Moreover, the DSR's focus on specific capability acquisitions, such as the AUKUS-led nuclear-powered submarines, underscores concerns about a capability gap and questions the strategic prioritisation amid evolving threats. The possibility that Australia may prioritise near-region deterrence capabilities over immediate force projection assets could result in a defence posture reactive to rather than shaping regional dynamics. The strategic vision articulated in the DSR, while robust in its objectives, requires a more nuanced execution plan that enhances military readiness and ensures the alignment of defence initiatives with diplomatic efforts to promote stability and security in the Indo-Pacific. Balancing these complex strategic considerations will be critical to forging a resilient Defence broad force design capable of navigating the multifaceted security environment projected for the coming decades.

Bibliography

Four Corners, "Can Australia handle its new fleet of nuclear submarines?"2023, on ABC. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v="Igqs1qDbnK4".

Albanese, Anthony. "Release of the Defence Strategic Review." news release, 24/04/2023, 2023, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-04-24/release-defence-strategic-review.

Austin, Greg. China’s Military Buildup: The Biggest since 1945? (2024). https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/chinas-military-buildup-the-biggest-since-1945/.

Beazley, Kim. Affording Australia’s Defence. Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2023). https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/affording-australias-defence/.

Carr, Andrew. "Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence." Survival 65, no. 4 (2023/07/04 2023): 79-100. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239058. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239058.

Dutton, Peter. Australia Takes Next Step to Delivering Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, 2022.

Feeney, David. The Submarine Capability Gap. (2020). https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/submarine-capability-gap.

Fruehling, Stephan. The Defence Strategic Review: A Revolution in Australian Defence Planning? Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2023). https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-defence-strategic-review-a-revolution-in-australian-defence-planning/.

The Australian Government. Defence Strategic Review: Terms of Reference for the Independent Leads of the Review, 2022.

———. National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, 2023.

Jackett, Jennifer. Laying the Foundations for Aukus: Strengthening Australia’s High-Tech Ecosystem in Support of Advanced Capabilities. University of Sydney (2022). https://cdn.sanity.io/files/ooh1fq7e/production/c8e54e01eb241e8c1fa1ae574cd2a137509d656d.pdf/Laying-the-foundations-for-AUKUS-Strengthening-Australias-high-tech-ecosystem-in-support-of-advanced-capabilities.pdf.

U.S. Vs. China, "Can China Catch Up With U.S. Nuclear Submarine Tech?"2023, on The Wall Street Journal. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v="IIWeJHmh0xY".

Wsj Opinion, "Nuclear Submarines, Aukus and Rebalancing the Indo-Pacific Security Environment."2024, on The Wall Street Journal. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v="iGrW66fPMjk".

Lee, Peter, and Alice Nason. 365 Days of Aukus: Progress, Challenges and Prospects. University of Sydney (2022). https://www.ussc.edu.au/365-days-of-aukus-progress-challenges-and-prospects.

Leonhard, Robert R. The Art of Maneuver : Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991.

Marles, Richard. Speech to the Sydney Institute, 2024.

Medcalf, Rory. Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won’t Map the Future. Vol. 2: La Trobe University Press, 2022.

Molesworth, Daniel. Australian Army’s Long-Range Strike Capability Could Be Firing Blind. Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2022). https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-armys-long-range-strike-capability-could-be-firing-blind/#:~:text="Australian%20Army"'s%20long%2Drange%20strike,be%20firing%20blind%20%7C%20The%20Strategist&text="The%20Australian%20government%20has%20committed,System%2C%20better%20known%20as%20HIMARS".

Nouwens, Meia. "China’s Military Modernisation: Will the People’s Liberation Army Complete Its Reforms?". In Strategic Policy, 53-64. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022.

Raby, Geoff. China’s Grand Strategy and Australia’s Future in the New Global Order. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press Digital, 2020. Book. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct="true&AuthType"=ip,sso&db="nlebk&AN"=2658558&site="eds-live&custid"=s3330841.

Rimmer, Susan Harris. "How to Defend Australians: A Heterodox Approach." Centre of Gravity Series, no. 51 (2020): 13-22. https://capweb01.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2020-03/cog_51_web.pdf.

Roggeveen, Sam. The Echidna Strategy. La Trobe, 2023.

Stewart, Courtney, and Gregory MacCallion. National Defence Strategy Will Need to Clarify Australia’s Approach to Deterrence. Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2023). https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/national-defence-strategy-will-need-to-clarify-australias-approach-to-deterrence/.

Strating, Bec, and Joanne Wallis. Australia’s Future Security: Where the Defence Strategic Review Falls Short. Lowy Institute (2023). https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-future-security-where-defence-strategic-review-falls-short.

Footnotes

¹ The Australian Government. Defence Strategic Review: Terms of Reference for the Independent Leads of the Review (2022), 1

² Anthony Albanese. "Release of the Defence Strategic Review." (news release, 24/04/2023, 2023)

³ The Australian Government. Defence Strategic Review (2023), 23

⁴ Jennifer Jackett. Laying the Foundations for Aukus: Strengthening Australia’s High-Tech Ecosystem in Support of Advanced Capabilities. (University of Sydney, 2022), 25-28

⁵ Peter Lee and Alice Nason. 365 Days of Aukus: Progress, Challenges and Prospects. (University of Sydney, 2022).

⁶ Greg Austin, China’s Military Buildup: The Biggest since 1945? (2024).

⁷ Meia Nouwens, China’s Military Modernisation: Will the People’s Liberation Army Complete Its Reforms?. (In Strategic Policy. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022), 53-64

⁸ Robert R Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 16

⁹ David Feeney, The Submarine Capability Gap. (2020).

¹⁰ Four Corners, "Can Australia handle its new fleet of nuclear submarines?"2023.

¹¹ WSJ Opinion, "Nuclear Submarines, Aukus and Rebalancing the Indo-Pacific Security Environment."2024, on The Wall Street Journal

¹² The Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review, (2023) 49

¹³ Daniel Molesworth, Australian Army’s Long-Range Strike Capability Could Be Firing Blind (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022).

¹⁴ Andrew Carr, Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence. (Survival 65, no. 4, 2023/07/04, 2023): 82-83

¹⁵ Peter Dutton, Australia Takes Next Step to Delivering Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, (2022).

¹⁶ Nouwens, China’s Military Modernisation, 62

¹⁷ The Wall Street Journal, U.S. Vs. China: Can China Catch Up With U.S. Nuclear Submarine Tech? (2023)

¹⁸ Kim Beazley, Affording Australia’s Defence (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023)

¹⁹ Stephan Fruehling, The Defence Strategic Review: A Revolution in Australian Defence Planning? (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023)

²⁰ Richard Marles, Speech to the Sydney Institute (2024)

²¹ Courtney Stewart and Gregory MacCallion, National Defence Strategy Will Need to Clarify Australia’s Approach to Deterrence (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023).

²² Sam Roggeveen, The Echidna Strategy (La Trobe, 2023), 161-197

²³ Susan Harris Rimmer, How to Defend Australians: A Heterodox Approach, (Centre of Gravity Series, no. 51, 2020), 13-22

²⁴ Bec Strating and Joanne Wallis, Australia’s Future Security: Where the Defence Strategic Review Falls Short (Lowy Institute, 2023)

²⁵ Geoff Raby, China’s Grand Strategy and Australia’s Future in the New Global Order (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press Digital, 2020), 145-153

²⁶ Rory Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won’t Map the Future (Vol. 2: La Trobe University Press, 2022), 22-25

Cite Article

Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

Own Domain Awareness defence-poa-level1

Own Domain Mastery Joint Awareness defence-poa-level2

The Art of War Joint Competency defence-poa-level3

Military Power Joint Mastery defence-poa-level4

Integrated National Power defence-poa-level5

Complicated Problems defence-cognitive-level2

Complex Problems defence-cognitive-level3

Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level4

Multi-agency Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level5

National and Military Power awareness defence-nsps-level1

Operational Planning Military Science defence-nsps-level2

Campaign Planning Operational Art defence-nsps-level3

Theatre Operations Strategic Art defence-nsps-level4

Coalition Operations Political Acumen defence-nsps-level5

Social Mastery

Lead Operating Systems social-influence-level3

Lead Capability social-influence-level4

Lead Integrated Systems social-influence-level5

Moral Leadership social-ethics-level3

Lead organisation through ethical concerns social-ethics-level4

Stewarding the Profession social-ethics-level5

Biography

Matthew Jones

SO2 Strategic Analysis

Major

Major Matthew Jones is an Army Reserve infantry officer and Paediatric Surgeon currently serving as SO2 Strategic Analysis at the Australian Army Research Centre. He has commanded at a Company level, posted as an instructor on the Combat Officers’ Advanced Course, and deployed on multiple domestic operations. A recent graduate of the Australian Command and Staff Course, he holds a PhD in paediatric surgery, a Doctor of Medicine and a Master of Surgery, among other qualifications. His current research focuses on the Defence of Australia.