Perspectives – Case Study 1

By prioritising major conflict, the 2023 Defence Strategic Review leaves the ADF underprepared for the most certain national security challenge ahead: climate change.

08/02/2026

<30 min

The three Perspectives – Case Studies focuses on translating strategy into capability and offers the best essays from students of the Military Art Part-Time program that address the question:

Has the 2023 Defence Strategic Review provided the broad force design needed for the demands of the next two decades?

Editorial Note: These papers were written prior to the release of the 2024 National Defence Strategy.

Case Study 1

The purpose of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) of 2023 is to optimise Defence capability and posture to meet the security challenges facing Australia over the next two decades and beyond.^[1] Shaping and optimising the combat power of the ADF involves identifying the current and emerging strategic risks that will require an ADF operational response, developing posture and preparedness settings, and prioritising Defence spending on the force structures and capability options aligned to meeting the challenges of Australia’s strategic circumstances. This paper will contend that by focussing the force design and investment priorities on the highest strategic risk, the prospect of major conflict in our region, the DSR has left gaps in responding to the most likely strategic risk related to the impacts of climate change. As a result of these gaps, the force design will be misaligned to the full scope of demands the ADF will face in the coming decades.

Bateman and Bergin’s definition of the major elements of climate change risk to national security will be used as a framework for considering the DSR’s success or otherwise in identifying, assessing and addressing the risks and demands posed to Defence by climate change. Bateman and Bergin identify four key themes of climate change risk to national security. Firstly, militaries are polluters and there need for militaries to reduce their emissions and impacts on climate change. Secondly, climate change has direct impacts on the roles and missions of militaries, with increasing participation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) becoming routine for militaries across the globe. Thirdly, climate change has an impact as a threat multiplier, exacerbating social, economic and political vulnerabilities and contributing to instability and potential conflict. Lastly, increasing variabilities and extremities of weather, temperature and sea-level have direct impacts on Defence estate, training, activities and supporting infrastructure.^[2]

Defence’s contribution as a polluter has been largely addressed and will not be considered further in this paper. Defence briefed the incoming Government in 2022 on a range of investments to drive a 43 per cent reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 2030 and achieve net zero by 2040.^[3] The DSR further identifies the need to accelerate the Defence transition to clean energy and outlines a plan to be presented to Government by 2025.^[4] The remaining three factors will be evaluated by firstly looking at climate change impacts in the Pacific region and the failure of the DSR to fully address expected climate related demands on the ADF in maintaining the regional stability critical to Australia’s national security. Secondly, the use of the ADF in support of domestic disaster relief and recovery support will be reviewed, contending that it is unrealistic for Defence to distance itself from this role given the predicted increasing frequency and intensity of natural disaster events and lack of suitable response alternatives available to Government in the short term. Lastly, the gaps associated with climate change impacts on the DSR’s pivot to the north will be identified, considering the risks to Defence estate, infrastructure, training and activities.

Climate change impacts in the Pacific

Climate change effects in the Pacific will create significant demands on the ADF over the coming decades. Climate change remains the single greatest threat to the security of the Blue Pacific Continent^[5] and ADF operations will be impacted by both the first order effects of climate change, and climate change as a threat multiplier of existing vulnerabilities in traditional security concerns. The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and natural disasters can be expected to create increased requests for HADR from Australia as a regional leader. The higher order effects of climate change creating regional instabilities such as food insecurity, population migration, territorial disputes, political and economic instability, increase the likelihood of ADF involvement in peacekeeping operations in the region or related tasks such as bolstering the capacity of Australian Border Force in protecting Australia’s borders from climate migration.^[6] The increasing occurrences of environmental and political instability as a result of climate change in the Pacific region will almost certainly translate into an increasing demand on the ADF to provide response options for Government in support of HADR and stability operations.

Beyond the tacit expectations of support from Australia as part of the Pacific family, the Australian Government has undertaken formal security commitments in the region to provide disaster relief and protection from military aggression, which would have severe political ramifications if not met. A salient example is the Falepili Union treaty with Tuvalu, in which Australia has committed to supporting migration of the Tuvaluan population as they are displaced by rising sea levels, but also providing assistance to Tuvalu in the event of a natural disaster, public health emergency or military aggression.^[7] Conceivably, all three of these scenarios could result in an ADF tasking. Questions have been raised about the ADF’s capability to support a defence guarantee for Tuvalu, with Graham and Shrimpton suggesting the ADF difficulties in sustaining recent HADR operations in Tonga present a poor indicator of a credible response in Tuvalu.^[8] Whilst Australia’s primary motivation for the agreement seems to be to deny China a security foothold in the region, the HADR and defence guarantee must be perceived as credible by Indo-Pacific nations in order for Australia’s position as security partner of choice in the region to remain firm and prevent the pivot to Beijing for security, as has already occurred in the Solomons and Kiribati in recent years.

The DSR identifies that climate change is now a national security issue and a major destabilising factor in the Pacific and it should be expected that the DSR therefore provides some assessment and recommendations in relation to the Defence structure, posture and preparedness to respond. The DSR highlights that the Pacific is critical to the security of Australia and the essentiality of HADR to Australia’s Pacific engagement. It further acknowledges the risk that climate change poses to the region as threat multiplier, and ensuing potential for increasing demands for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and response to intrastate and interstate conflict.^[9] In terms of force design priorities and recommendations however, the DSR is silent on explicit capability requirements to support the expected demands of Pacific HADR and stability operations. At most, the DSR definition of ‘focused force’^[10] identifies that the capabilities required to address the primary military threat will provide some latent capability to deal with lower-level contingencies and crises.

The DSR is lacking in its stated aim of optimising Defence capability and posture to meet the nation’s security challenges to 2033 and beyond when it comes to the national security impacts of climate change in the Indo-Pacific region. The DSR highlights the vital importance of Pacific stability and engagement and significant expected demands related to climate change in the region over the coming decades, but describes only a latent capability to respond. Demands on the ADF as a result of first, or higher order effects of climate change in the Pacific are almost a certainty and Australia’s credibility as a security partner and regional leader relies on the ADF being able to credibly respond, yet the DSR does not specifically address these demands in its force design priorities.

Domestic disaster response and recovery support

Consistent with the upwards trend of climate change impacts in the Pacific, domestic climate events are also predicted to continue rising in frequency and intensity, presenting a significant risk to Australians. Since the extreme bushfire season of 2019-2020, which resulted in a significant loss of life and livelihood, Australia’s resilience and response to domestic disasters has been the subject of intense debate. Significant weaknesses in emergency management structures, funding arrangements and responsibilities between the state and federal governments have been identified and the role of the ADF in augmenting response and recovery support, when state resources have been overwhelmed, has been a major consideration.^[11] Clarke highlights the increasing trend in ADF involvement in climate change related operations over the past 25 years and its correlation with Australia’s rising mean temperature anomaly.^[12] Whilst alternatives to the ADF are being explored, the continuing pace of extreme weather events predicted and current immaturity of alternate capabilities make it likely that the demands on the ADF to contribute to domestic disaster response and recovery support will continue in the coming decades.

The use of ADF personnel to support domestic disaster relief is problematic due to the concurrency pressures on preparedness and capacity for primary security and warfighting tasks.^[13] This has been recognised by Government, with the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements and the DSR clearly articulating the risks to the defence of Australia inherent in continuing to use the ADF in this role.^[14] A suitable alternative to ADF support has not yet been agreed and implemented and there have been suggestions that the ADF should be postured to play a larger role, rather than be supplanted. In his speech to the National Press Club in 2020, Prime Minister Scott Morrison spoke of consideration for a greater role in domestic disaster relief for the ADF.^[15] Glasser has further highlighted the need to adapt the posture, training and capabilities of the ADF to meet the expected demands of disaster relief alongside traditional security roles.^[16] Until a clear decision and implementation of an alternative to Defence as a disaster response force is attained, its it is likely that Defence will continue to be requested to provide support and concurrency pressures should be accounted for in the Defence force design.

The development of an alternative to the ADF for domestic disaster relief will be challenging to realise in the next decade. The support provided by the ADF to augment the capacity of the states is described by Alexander as being a function of capability and scale. The ADF maintains a range of military and support capabilities not readily available to community or industry, inclusive of skilled personnel trained to operate such capabilities in highly demanding situations. It also provides a readily accessible, prepaid workforce able to provide support to low-skilled support tasks, prepositioned and capable of internal management of planning, movement and logistical functions.^[17] Funding is a significant barrier to replicate the capabilities and scale that Defence currently provides, particularly as the responsibility for initial disaster response rests within individual states and territories. Recruiting, training, maintaining and coordinating a national disaster relief workforce, either paid or volunteer, is also a monumental task which will be further hampered if tackled differently by each state. Even if the funding barrier could be overcome, using the acquisition and force generation lead time of major Defence capabilities as an indicator, it could reasonably be expected to take a decade or more to develop a sufficiently equipped and skilled core of capabilities and workforce to provide a realistic alternative to the ADF. Such being the case, it would be reasonable to expect the ADF to plan and posture, via the DSR, to meet at least some level of the increasing needs of domestic disaster response and recovery support until able to transition to an alternative.

The DSR does not include demands for domestic disaster relief in the force design and assigns the responsibility to the Commonwealth to arrange suitable response measures in conjunction with the states and territories, with Defence as a measure of last resort only.^[18] Government has only agreed-in-principle to the recommendation, and exploration of alternatives continues. The recent National Climate Risk Assessment has identified the concurrency impacts to Defence preparedness as a key risk to progress to second pass assessment and implementation planning. Public submissions have also been collated in support of a discussion paper on Alternative Commonwealth Capabilities for Crisis Response.^[19] Development and implementation of alternative capacity and capability will take significant time and funding to implement, however, as previously described. There is not currently, nor likely to be in the next decade, a suitable mature alternative to calling out Defence as an adjunct domestic disaster relief force, despite acknowledgement of the impact on Defence preparedness to undertake primary security roles. By disassociating Defence from the problem, the DSR force design fails to recognise that until such time as an alternative is implemented, Defence will continue to be called out, realising the preparedness and concurrency risks highlighted.

ADF operations in the north

Defence activities in northern Australia will be particularly prone to the impacts of climate change over the next 20 years. Thomas describes two major aspects to this impact. Firstly, the increasing frequency and intensity of climate events will affect Defence bases, infrastructure, ports and equipment, including the reliance on civilian infrastructure such as sewerage, power, water. Extremes of heat, humidity, tides and weather have the potential to challenge both personnel and equipment, with the operating performance of fuels and sensors, and the ability of personnel to operate in high temperature environments posing significant challenges.^[20] Secondly, climate hazards will impact the conduct of military training. Drought, floods, extreme weather and tide events will constrain the viability of training safely and to the extent needed to achieve required preparedness levels. For example, the fire danger associated with live fire activities in dry conditions.^[21] Townsville is an example of a major northern Defence base that also hosts some of Australia’s largest joint and multilateral training exercises in the nearby training areas. The coming decades in the Townsville regions are predicted to bring higher temperatures and more frequent hot days above 35 degrees Celsius. The region will also be subject to more intense downpours and cyclones, rising sea levels, more frequent sea level extremes and warmer, more acidic seas.^[22] This increasingly harsh operating environment is representative of the challenges that must be a key consideration in ADF force design decisions when expanding its posture and operations in northern Australia.

Previous Defence reviews have highlighted the pressures climate change will levy on the Defence estate, however the DSR does not articulate or assess climate change when assigning priorities for estate and force posture in the north. The DSR places significant emphasis on remediation and hardening of Defence bases in the north of Australia and the strategic criticality of the ability to posture in the north, including robust civil infrastructure. The DSR’s land domain force structure design priorities include major redisposition of Army personnel and equipment across northern bases, including an additional 500 personnel and their families to move from Adelaide to Townsville. The need to consider climate risks to estate is well established with the 2016 White Paper highlighting the need to ensure Defence estate is appropriately planned and postured to meet the implications of climate change beyond 2025.^[23] The 2018 senate committee on the Implications of climate change for Australia’s national security noted the additional stress that climate change places on a range of military support and enabling functions.^[24] The DSR does note the vulnerability of northern civil infrastructure to the effects of climate change, including road and rail networks and security of fuel supply, but recommends that these be dealt with by other bodies or in future work. Therefore, the DSR as it stands fails to fully identify or address the climate risks associated with the force design priorities in the north of Australia, one of the most climate affected areas of Australia. This suggests that the ADF will be inadequately prepared to deal with these climate risks as they are realised.

Conclusion

When considering a three-point estimate of the strategic risks facing Australia in the next two decades, the worst-case scenario is that major power competition spills over into a conflict scenario that impacts Australia’s sovereignty and national interests. The best-case is of course that the Indo-Pacific region is stable, secure and prosperous economically, politically and environmentally and the ADF remains an uncalled upon insurance policy. This paper contends that the most-likely, in fact almost certain scenario, is that the ADF will be operationally tasked in relation to the effects of climate change. The DSR has framed its force design and investment priorities around the highest strategic risk, and there is no argument that the ADF must be capable of deterrence and response to the highest level of threat Australia is likely to face. When addressing the most-likely threat of climate change however, this paper has shown that the force design articulated in the DSR contains serious gaps in its ability to meet the demands expected to be meted on Defence in the coming decades.

Batemen and Bergin’s definition of the major elements of climate change risk to national security provides a useful framework against which this paper has examined the extent to which the DSR addresses climate change impacts in the Pacific, domestically and in the execution of Defence activities in the north. The DSR is clear in recognising that climate change will amplify challenges across the region, and emphasises the importance of the collective security and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, yet describes only latent capability to deal with emergent crises and low-level conflicts. The ADF’s role in HADR, peacekeeping and stability operations, as a result of climate change, are critical to Australia’s reputation and regional leadership, and the credibility of Australia’s ability to provide a defence guarantee under formal arrangements such as that with Tuvalu. The DSR dissociates Defence from a routine role in domestic disaster relief and recovery support, citing the concurrency pressures impacting preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness for the ADF’s primary task. It is unrealistic for Defence to expect operational taskings in support of domestic disaster relief to cease until a viable alternative has been implemented, which could conceivably take more than a decade. This will leave Defence realising the identified concurrency risks when Government has no other response alternatives and must act to save the lives of Australians. Lastly, Defence estate and infrastructure has been established on the basis of a stable climate with predictable variability.^[25] The DSR places an immediate priority on remediation and hardening of Defence bases in the north of Australia and makes significant posture changes in the region. The impact of climate change is likely to have severe ramifications on Defence activities and critical infrastructure in northern Australia in the coming decades. Despite there being an established case for consideration through previous Defence reviews, the DSR does not explicitly address these issues.

The implications of the gaps identified in this paper are manifold. By not designing the force to meet the demands of the most-likely national security threat, climate change, the risks of concurrency pressures impacting preparedness, readiness and combat effectiveness are more likely to be realised. This could have severe follow-on consequences to the ADF’s ability to meet the primary military security threat identified in the DSR as well as reputational impacts to Australia’s position in the Indo-Pacific, putting further pressure on regional stability. It is heartening to see that there is significant energy being devoted to addressing, or at least further defining, some of these issues through parallel initiatives such as the National Climate Change Risk Assessment, Alternative Commonwealth Capabilities for Crisis Response Discussion Paper and others. The forthcoming National Defence Strategy and biennial net assessment of the DSR provide significant opportunities to recognise the significance of climate change impacts and should seek to refine the ADF force design priorities to ensure Defence is truly postured to meet the demands of the coming decades.

Bibliography

References

Alexander, Stephen. “Australian Defence Force Refocus of Resources Will Leave a Gap in Response and Recovery.” The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 38, no. 3 (July 1, 2023): 6.

Australian Government - Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water. “National Climate Risk Assessment - First Pass Assessment Report,” 2024.

Australian Government - Department of Defence. 2016 Defence White Paper. Parliamentary Paper (Australia. Parliament) ; 2016, No. 59, 2016.http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf.

———. National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, 2023.

Australian Government: Department of Defence. “Incoming Government Brief (Declassified),” September 2022.https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-09/514_2122_documents.pdf.

Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty.” Accessed April 4, 2024.https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty.

Bateman, S., and A. Bergin. Naval, National Security and Defence Issues from Climate Change. Research Handbook on Climate Change, Oceans and Coasts. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2020.https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112239.00030.

Bergin, Anthony. “Senate Report on Climate Change and National Security Offers Opportunities for Defence.” The Strategist, June 4, 2018.https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/senate-report-on-climate-change-and-national-security-offers-opportunities-for-defence/.

Clarke, Amanda Gosling. “Military Challenges From Climate Change.” Contemporary Issues in Air and Space Power 1, no. 1 (November 1, 2023): bp36471855.https://doi.org/10.58930/bp36471855.

Department of Home Affairs Website. “Alternative Commonwealth Capabilities for Crisis Response Discussion Paper.” Department of Home Affairs Website. Accessed April 6, 2024.https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au.

Glasser, Robert Daniel. “The Rapidly Emerging Crisis on Our Doorstep.” [Barton, Australian Capital Territory]: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021.

Graham, Euan, and Bec Shrimpton. “The Defence and Security Implications of the Australia–Tuvalu Treaty.” The Strategist, November 23, 2023.https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-defence-and-security-implications-of-the-australia-tuvalu-treaty/.

Mark Binskin, Chair. “Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements: Report.” Inquiry Report. [Manuka, A.C.T.]: Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, October 28, 2020. Australian Family & Society Abstracts Database.

Morrison, Scott. “Address, National Press Club.” PM Transcripts, January 29, 2020.https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-42638.

Ogge, Mark, Bill Browne, and Travis Hughes. “HeatWatch: Increasing Extreme Heat in Townsville.” The Australia Institute, March 2019.https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/P692-HeatWatch-Townsville-WEB_0.pdf.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. “The Pacific Security Outlook Report: 2022-2023,” 2022.

Queensland Government: Department of Environment and Science. “Climate Change in the Townsville-Thuringowa Region,” 2019.https://www.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0025/124675/townsville-climate-change-impact-summary.pdf.

Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee. Senate Report: Implications of Climate Change for Australia’s National Security, 2018.

Thomas, Michael. “Climate Change and Military Forces.” Edited by Robert Glasser, Cathy Johnstone, and Anastasia Kapetas. The Geopolitics of Climate and Security in the Indo-Pacific. Barton, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022.

Footnotes

¹ Australian Government - Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, 2023, 12.

² S. Bateman and A. Bergin, Naval, National Security and Defence Issues from Climate Change, Research Handbook on Climate Change, Oceans and Coasts (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2020), 409–424,https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112239.00030.

³ Australian Government: Department of Defence, “Incoming Government Brief (Declassified),” September 2022, 76,https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-09/514_2122_documents.pdf.

⁴ Australian Government - Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, 41.

⁵ Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “The Pacific Security Outlook Report: 2022-2023,” 2022.

⁶ Amanda Gosling Clarke, “Military Challenges From Climate Change,” Contemporary Issues in Air and Space Power 1, no. 1 (November 1, 2023): bp36471855,https://doi.org/10.58930/bp36471855.

⁷ “Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty,” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed April 4, 2024,https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty.

⁸ Euan Graham and Bec Shrimpton, “The Defence and Security Implications of the Australia–Tuvalu Treaty,” The Strategist, November 23, 2023,https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-defence-and-security-implications-of-the-australia-tuvalu-treaty/.

⁹ Australian Government - Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, 41–46.

¹⁰ Australian Government - Department of Defence, 54.

¹¹ Mark Binskin, Chair, “Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements: Report,” Inquiry Report ([Manuka, A.C.T.]: Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, October 28, 2020), Australian Family & Society Abstracts Database; Australian Government - Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “National Climate Risk Assessment - First Pass Assessment Report,” 2024.

¹² Clarke, “Military Challenges From Climate Change.”

¹³ Australian Government - Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, 41.

¹⁴ Mark Binskin, Chair, “Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements: Report,” 185–202.

¹⁵ Scott Morrison, “Address, National Press Club,” PM Transcripts, January 29, 2020,https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-42638.

¹⁶ Robert Daniel Glasser, “The Rapidly Emerging Crisis on Our Doorstep” ([Barton, Australian Capital Territory]: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021).

¹⁷ Stephen Alexander, “Australian Defence Force Refocus of Resources Will Leave a Gap in Response and Recovery,” The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 38, no. 3 (July 1, 2023): 6.

¹⁸ Australian Government - Department of Defence, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, 41.

¹⁹ Australian Government - Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, “National Climate Risk Assessment - First Pass Assessment Report,” 13–15; Department of Home Affairs Website, “Alternative Commonwealth Capabilities for Crisis Response Discussion Paper,” Department of Home Affairs Website, accessed April 6, 2024,https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au.

²⁰ Clarke, “Military Challenges From Climate Change.”

²¹ Michael Thomas, “Climate Change and Military Forces,” ed. Robert Glasser, Cathy Johnstone, and Anastasia Kapetas, The Geopolitics of Climate and Security in the Indo-Pacific (Barton, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2022).

²² Mark Ogge, Bill Browne, and Travis Hughes, “HeatWatch: Increasing Extreme Heat in Townsville” (The Australia Institute, March 2019),https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/P692-HeatWatch-Townsville-WEB_0.pdf; Queensland Government: Department of Environment and Science, “Climate Change in the Townsville-Thuringowa Region,” 2019,https://www.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0025/124675/townsville-climate-change-impact-summary.pdf.

²³ Australian Government - Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, Parliamentary Paper (Australia. Parliament) ; 2016, No. 59, 2016, 102,http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf.

²⁴ Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Senate Report: Implications of Climate Change for Australia’s National Security, 2018, 26–27.

²⁵ Anthony Bergin, “Senate Report on Climate Change and National Security Offers Opportunities for Defence,” The Strategist, June 4, 2018,https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/senate-report-on-climate-change-and-national-security-offers-opportunities-for-defence/.

Cite Article

Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Defence Mastery

Own Domain Awareness defence-poa-level1

Own Domain Mastery Joint Awareness defence-poa-level2

The Art of War Joint Competency defence-poa-level3

Military Power Joint Mastery defence-poa-level4

Integrated National Power defence-poa-level5

Complicated Problems defence-cognitive-level2

Complex Problems defence-cognitive-level3

Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level4

Multi-agency Wicked Systems defence-cognitive-level5

National and Military Power awareness defence-nsps-level1

Operational Planning Military Science defence-nsps-level2

Campaign Planning Operational Art defence-nsps-level3

Theatre Operations Strategic Art defence-nsps-level4

Coalition Operations Political Acumen defence-nsps-level5

Social Mastery

Lead Teams Lead Leaders social-influence-level2

Lead Operating Systems social-influence-level3

Lead Capability social-influence-level4

Lead Integrated Systems social-influence-level5

Moral Leadership social-ethics-level3

Lead organisation through ethical concerns social-ethics-level4

Stewarding the Profession social-ethics-level5

Character Role Model social-character-level3

Generate Climates of Trust social-character-level4

Character Exemplar social-character-level5

Biography

Kelly Chan

Leader Air Combat Program governance

Wing Commander

Wing Commander Kelly Chan is an Aviation Electrical Engineer and a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff Course (Military Art)–Part Time (formally ACSC-Remote) class of 2024. She is currently posted to Air Force Headquarters in Canberra, where she leads Air Combat Program governance.