The Significance of the Ethics of Care to Military Leadership and the Prevention of Moral Injury
Introduction
There is a degree of confusion about the word ‘care’. Most people believe ‘caring’ almost exclusively means nurturing, kindness and looking after someone in need. Indeed, caring, empathy, even a deep sense of humanity could all be synonymous. However, when considering the ethics of care, the meaning of the word care is slightly different. Like philosophy generally, the ethics of care is rather cold-blooded on the issue of emotions. One does not have to be a particularly ‘feeling’ person to be a proponent of care ethics, although it would not hurt. The ethics of care places a demand on a person to address the needs of others, not out of a desire to show kindness or even empathy, but out of a sense of responsibility. In other words, to be an ethical person, and especially a leader, we assume responsibility for the avoidable suffering of others, especially the innocent. An ethical person will take steps to lessen avoidable suffering if it is possible for them to do so, without significantly harming themselves (under ethics of care the rights of an individual are also considered). In a practical sense, this is the moral high ground.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the philosophy of care as a necessary ethical principle for military leaders and combatants. It is proposed that where a leader, military or otherwise, does not care about the consequences of their decisions, they are, by definition, unethical. While it is not the role of the military to decide the ethical status of a conflict, it is important to ‘care’ that every military objective is achieved ethically and responsibly. The philosophy of care is therefore the most legitimate way to prosecute war. Moreover, ensuring the behaviour of combatants is ethical, eg does not cause unnecessary and avoidable suffering, is also the most meaningful way to reduce the risk of barbarism and/or moral injury amongst those embroiled in war.
A Reflection on a Proposal to Address Moral Injury
Johnathon Shay[1] originated the term ‘moral injury’, and for him it reflected a failure of moral leadership in a ‘high stakes’ situation leading to a sense of betrayal amongst those who followed.[2] While leadership failure may be at the heart of most moral injury, a more specific definition is provided by Litz, Lebowitz, Gray and Nash (2009); namely, that moral injury refers to the development of post-traumatic symptoms after ‘perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations’.[3] Until very recently, moral injury was not a diagnosable mental illness, even though those experiencing it often presented with symptoms every bit as debilitating as other post-traumatic stress disorders. Because to meet the criteria of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the individual must be exposed to ‘actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence’,[4] which is specifically absent in cases of ‘pure’ moral injury–otherwise it would be PTSD.
The quote below originates from a paper titled Moral Injury in the Australian Defence Force, proposing a new way of solving the problem of combat-related moral injury. For reasons that will be become evident as this discussion progresses, the author has not been identified and the paper was never published. The author advocated a type of training designed to lower feelings of guilt and shame in response to immoral acts committed either by an individual, their colleagues or others in the area of operations, with the intention of reducing moral injury. Training to make ADF personnel less responsive to immoral acts would never be adopted by the ADF, therefore the paper was seen as counter-productive to the broader discussion of moral injury. Even so, the author raised a number of issues that deserve consideration.
Soldiers have to do what they need to do to win. Soldiers need to limit these actions in order to maintain civilian support for future military action. Some individuals given power will abuse it to advance their own interests at the expense of those under their command. Yet, in the end, practical military necessity has no more moral dimension than a lion killing a zebra... The requirement for soldiers to be seen at all times to act ‘morally’ is thus, ironically, the proverbial Achilles heel of our military and therefore something of a conundrum in the prevention of[5] this putative condition [moral injury]. [6]
The idea that morality is an ‘Achilles heel’ for a modern Western combatant is a hardnosed but not outlandish perspective. If we accept that morality is culturally defined, something judged right or wrong is not a ‘fact’ but a reflection of the cultural norms of a particular group at a particular time. While the prohibition against killing is universal in modern liberal democracies, in a military context not killing an enemy in combat (or at least trying to, e.g., firing a weapon vs refusing to fire) could be the greater moral failing. Raising the question: when are violent or lethal acts acceptable or unacceptable in a military context? Restraints on military action already exist in law, ie, Rules of Engagement (ROE), International Humanitarian Law and Geneva Conventions. However, not all adversaries adhere to international law, much less ROE, and this lack of restraint potentially gives them an operational advantage against those who do.
Being constrained to do the right thing when it is militarily advantageous to do the wrong thing may give one’s opponent greater liberty of action. For example, if it was not considered morally ‘wrong’ to kill a child working for the enemy, then doing so would not be a moral dilemma and may not result in moral injury. As all soldiers will eventually bear witness to morally reprehensible acts in war, our author argues it is their conflicted moral judgements about such acts, as opposed to the acts themselves, that make them vulnerable to moral injury. Consequently, as the ADF has a responsibility to keep soldiers safe from injury, perhaps including moral injury, then military training should reduce or even eradicate moral conflict and thereby remove the potential Achilles heel.
In order to achieve this outcome, the author suggests Western militaries should develop moral resilience training ‘to break down the social conditioning which is the basis of the (learned) capacity to feel “shame” and “guilt”.’ In other words, training military personnel to become morally disengaged and therefore less caring will, arguably, protect them from remorse for immoral acts committed either by themselves or their colleagues. Presumably, it also frees them by lowering their sense of restraint, thereby making them more dangerous to the enemy (and possibly anyone else in the battlespace). Some readers will now be pondering the growing list of ethical failures of Western militaries. Shocking images from Abu Ghraib prison, the Black Hearts incident in Iraq, the murderous rampage at My Lai in Vietnam, the torture and murder of a teenager in Somalia, endless brutal murders in Bosnia, the Bread Basket incident in Iraq, and alleged illegal killings in Afghanistan, will stand out as reasons why doing what our author proposes is, at the very least, reckless. Given all of these incidents occurred amongst people who had not been trained in moral ambivalence (at least that we know of), one can only imagine what might be done by military personnel who have specifically been trained not to care.
However, leaving this issue aside for a moment (it is dealt with in the next section), the author makes the fair point that exposing ‘good’ people to the horrors of war and leaving them vulnerable to lifelong trauma and moral injury is also an ethical issue, especially if there is a way to prevent it. If depriving a person of their established moral compass isn’t itself a form of preventable harm, at least on some level, desensitising the combatant to morally reprehensible behaviour seems a pragmatic solution. One could even argue military training already desensitises combatants to killing by using figure-shaped targets, so are we not already doing what the author is proposing?
There is no question military training is designed to harden combatants and prepare them for the grim reality of war. Inevitably, both training and the lived experience of war can lessen outward sensitivity to human suffering and degradation. However, military personnel are not expected to become dehumanised in this process. Indeed, it is the combatant’s role in ending human suffering, protecting the vulnerable, preventing tyranny and abuse and standing between the innocent and the cruel, that often creates a desire to be in the military. These motivations are strong drivers for going above and beyond what is militarily expedient, and may even result in acts of extreme heroism, like saving a wounded person under fire. It seems highly improbable that people who have been trained in moral ambivalence would sense any requirement to risk their own life or go beyond the minimum required. Indeed, why would such people accept the unlimited liability of military service at all?
In contrast to the recommendations of the author of Moral Injury in the Australian Defence Force, the ADF has gone in exactly the opposite direction and focused on increasing moral awareness training throughout the institution. Beginning with a strong focus on values and character as foundations of excellence. Indeed, precisely because military training and exposure to war can desensitise people, it would be irresponsible and unethical not to increase an awareness of human rights and ethical reasoning amongst combatants. Not just because it lessens the risk of atrocities by military personnel but because it reinforces the collective values of the ADF that bond combatants together.
Dealing with the Consequences of Moral Ambivalence
The author of Moral Injury in the Australian Defence Force sees the problem of atrocities not as a breach of human rights but from the perspective of reputational risk, as outlined in the following quote:
It remains vitally important that soldiers are seen to behave in a manner consistent with the moral values of civilians sitting at home, because these people choose the government and their opposition to military behaviour that they deem ‘immoral’ will lead to the recall of troops and the loss of government ability to project military force.
In a rather cynical way, to avoid the reputational problem of combatants doing the wrong thing, the author behoves leaders to instil ethical reasoning into military combatants after training them not to feel guilt or shame about their own or others’ immoral behaviour. Given the purpose of ‘moral resilience’ training (largely teaching people not to care) is contradictory to military ethics training (which demands they do care) this is likely to be a vexing issue for military leaders. However, even if it were achievable, there would always be conflict between doing what is morally right and doing what is militarily expedient. For the combatant trained not to feel guilt or empathise with another’s suffering, the metric is likely to shift in favour of military expedience. The purpose of feeling guilt or shame is to make us ‘care’ enough to do the right thing, especially when we have something to lose by doing the right thing or something to gain by doing the wrong thing. It stands to reason that training to prevent guilt and shame would inevitably increase the probability of immoral behaviour and the commission of atrocities by Western military personnel. While this might give a short-term advantage in a tactical sense, it is wildly counter-productive to the achievement of Western military objectives, such as greater human rights, personal freedom and democracy.
Of course, there are other serious problems associated with the ‘moral resilience’ training proposal. Not least the immorality of depriving people of their own moral compass. Presumably, this is something that could never be ‘undone’ without immediately raising the risk of belated moral injury for the individual concerned. Consequently, of necessity, the individual would have to remain permanently changed to be both unfeeling and uncaring. Families are likely to be horrified at the idea of ‘brainwashing’ their children to be morally ambivalent and lacking an ability to care. Such an outcome is only likely to reduce the attractiveness of military service and lower the number of people who volunteer to join. Indeed, this is likely to become the more significant ‘Achilles heel’ of such a program.
Responsibility and Accountability
Perhaps the most serious problem for the ‘moral resilience’ proposal is the issue of personal accountability. While leaders who order personnel to commit acts in breach of International Humanitarian Law can be held accountable for their actions under Article 28 of the Rome Statutes,[7] primary responsibility for war crimes rests with the individual/s who commit criminal acts in war.[8] [9] Such criminal responsibility could be contested if combatants are deemed mentally incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. While one might argue not feeling guilt or shame does not necessarily make a person incapable of making an ethical decision, being unable to feel guilt or shame may make it harder to distinguish between doing a right or wrong thing, especially under pressure. If this was the result of military training, it seems probable that responsibility for immoral actions would then shift entirely, or at least in part, to the military leaders who deployed these people. This is an outcome few senior leaders are likely to welcome, as it may make them doubly accountable for the wrongdoing of personnel under their command.
Since the release of the Brereton Report into alleged illegal killings by special forces personnel in Afghanistan, the issue of accountability has become something of a clarion call for the ADF. Such accountability does not rest with senior leaders or officers, but must be understood by every ADF member including the lowest ranks in the military. Indeed, personal responsibility is a focus of the new ADF-P-0 Command doctrine (currently being developed). In order to achieve this, military personnel are expected to care about the consequences of their actions and respond to that care by making decisions which reduce avoidable harm to the innocent and vulnerable. More importantly, the new doctrine will require leaders to take actions that ensure those under their command also act this way.
Regardless of the suggested benefits proposed by the author of Moral Injury in the Australian Defence Force, ‘moral resilience’ training as outlined by the author is never likely to be developed or conducted in the ADF. However, until very recently it was also unlikely the military would have regarded increasing a combatant’s ability to ‘care’ was a military advantage either. Presumably this is because ‘caring’ seems to imply emotional weakness which arguably might make a combatant more vulnerable to ‘moral injury’, PTSD or even cowardice. While there is no disagreement that war requires people to be tough, pragmatic, and stoic, the question remains whether a lack of care, as suggested by the author of Moral Injury in the Australian Defence Force–or the enhancement of care as proposed in this paper–makes combatants more militarily capable and effective. This is where the discussion will go in the second part of this two-part series on An Ethical Leader Cares, (Part II).
1 Shay, J (1994) Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character. Athenaeum Books, New York.
2 Shay, J (2014) Moral Injury. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 31, pp 182-191
3 Litz, BT, Lebowitz, L, Gray, MJ, & Nash, PW (2009). Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy. Clinical Psychology review, 29(8), pp 695-706.
4 American Psychiatric Association (2013) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th Ed American Psychiatric Publishing. Washington DC, p271.
5 Anonymous (2017) Moral Injury in the Australian Defence Force.
6 Ibid
7 For a discussion see Guilfoyle, D, Kyriakakis, J & O’Brian, M (2022). Command responsibility, Australian war crimes in Afghanistan and the Brereton report, International Law Studies, 99, pp222-283.
8 Rule 151. Individual Responsibility, International Humanitarian Law – at http://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule151 accessed 15 Jan 2020
9 See also ADF-I-0 Law of Armed Conflict (2023) Doctrine Directorate, Department of Defence, Canberra.
Social Mastery
Biography
Anne Goyne
CDLE
Anne Goyne the Senior Psychologist and Deputy Director Research at the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics (CDLE) at the Australian Defence College (ADC)
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