A Specialised Workforce & The Future ADF: Two Dangers to Consider

Synopsis

The ADF’s future capability necessarily involves a growing specialised workforce. Understanding, embracing and integrating their role into operational doctrine and leadership models will maximise the benefits and minimise the pitfalls.

This article examines two interrelated aspects of leadership and command in the ADF, with an eye to the future.

One aspect of it is cultural. It is about the ADF’s organisational culture, and it touches on some of the themes of the Afghanistan Inquiry Report. It is written at a time when the ADF’s response to the Report is under development.^[1] No criticism is implied here: the Report is profoundly shocking in not only for the nature of the incidents, the number and the span of time covered – it requires a profound response. I look forward to a future when those elements of this article are a relic of the past.

The other aspect is more enduring, and it relates to issues of mission command. The ADF seeks a technological edge (or at least to remain competitive) in the face of increased strategic competition.^[2] Our strategic documents recognise that the nature of the workforce is changing.^[3] While the complexity of equipment, systems, and systems-of-systems will grow increasingly complex, the human grey matter in the loop remains the same. Increasing task and tool complexity, and increasing potential consequences for failure, favour depth of skill over breadth. The tendency towards specialisation and expertise presents challenges to communication and integration across a force seeking to be tactically and strategically flexible and responsive.

This article focuses on these two aspects to consider organisational culture and vulnerability, now and into the future. It combines observations on the nature of organisations now; and workforce and task trends into the future. It will explore how the increasing specialisation of the ADF workforce could contribute to a cultural and a functional maladaptation: an increased vulnerability to one of the dangers writ large through the Report (the normalisation of deviance); and increased complexity of mission command. It aims to contribute to the Afghanistan Inquiry Reform Plan’s Cultural Reform Stream^[4] and discussion on future leadership doctrine, and suggests two areas for further study.

The increasing specialisation of the ADF Workforce

There is no need to accept intuitively that the march of technology results in increasing requirements for specialisation: there has long been acceptance that organisations tend to require streams of specialisation as they become larger, and their tasks become more complex.^[5] Militaries are not alone in this. Healthcare is another field where the stakes (literally life and death) are comparatively high. The Journal of the American Medical Association noted an increase in medical specialisations in the USA from 18 in 1960 to 158 in 2011.^[6] Response to the strategic environment and the ADF’s increasingly modern technological capabilities have resulted in novel methods of career management. This has included experimentation with the recruitment of cyber specialists outside of traditional career management models.^[7] It has also seen the establishment of a Specialist Service Soldier stream, a career path where progression is predicated on technical proficiency rather than the traditional milestone career courses focussed on leadership and generalist military skills.

This increased specialisation of individuals also manifests in increasingly specialised organisational structures. A survey of the ADF’s history shows the aggregation of increasingly technical platforms and workforces into specialist units, Force Element Groups and similar structures at the expense of generic organisations.^[8] A contemporary example can be seen in the evolution of the ADF’s health capability. In the land domain, the last two decades have seen the transition from a distributed model of healthcare delivery to centralisation in companies, then specialist health battalions progressing to, under Army’s Force Structure Implementation Plan, the establishment of a health brigade. Broadly speaking, this grouping of experts allows the following:

Management of scarcity: meeting the increased requirements to most effectively use small numbers of highly skilled specialists. Specialists tend to be organisationally expensive: they require investment in time and money to become experts.

Managing development and currency: providing specialist knowledge to manage development opportunities for specialists to keep them abreast of best practice. Like other functions such as intelligence and cyber, in the health field these developmental opportunities often require access to other agencies or to commercial industry.

Managing governance: Meeting the requirement for specialist knowledge to meet credentialling and legal requirements for practitioners. Many other functions, such as aviation, have governance regimes that are best met through similar centralisation.

This tendency to specialisation has traditionally caused concern. It exists in tension with a preference, noticeable across militaries, for the flexibility deemed inherent in more homogenous structures. Militaries have correspondingly pursued organisational simplification and reduction in specialisation to improve responsiveness and flexibility.^[9] There are two other areas of concern that leaders should consider: the vulnerability of specialist organisations inside more generalist structures to normalised deviance, and the complexities of incorporating increasing specialisation in mission command.

Specialisation and the vulnerability of closed communities

‘Normalised deviance’ refers to the potential for parts of an organisation to accept behaviour that differs from organisational values. Variations on the term can be found in diverse fields. It will be familiar to students of risk management and safety as ‘organisational drift’.^[1] It is a theme in the root causes of accidents in aviation safety.^[11] It is also a consistent theme in the Afghanistan Inquiry Report in describing the conditions that led the commission of war crimes.^[12]

There are several factors that make an increasingly specialised ADF vulnerable to normalised deviance. This is not to say that increasing specialisation leads to normalised deviance which leads to risk of atrocity. Atrocity is the dark apotheosis of a matrix of bad outcomes including more prosaic risks such as injury, mission failure or breach of legislation.^[13] The first factor relates to the changeability of the strategic environment that the ADF is expected to adapt to. Continual transformation and reform will be required.^[14] In any organisational change, there will be winners and losers. Changing criteria for success, reallocation of resources, or changes to the perceived importance of one’s role are contributing factors to deviance from organisational norms.^[15] The second factor is shown in the Afghanistan Inquiry Report: the danger of organisations that are ‘impenetrable’, by virtue of specialised skills, language or command arrangements. The more an organisation includes areas of specialised knowledge (referred to by Vaughan as ‘structural secrecy’) and processes, the harder it is for deviation from organisational norms to be detected and averted by those outside of it.^[16] Thirdly, the opportunity for normalised deviance facilitated by impenetrability can be increased when hierarchies do ‘little to monitor or audit the activities of lower-level participants’.^[17] A lack of monitoring may not be ascribed to negligence: it could be engendered by a physical separation from commanders, poor organisational alignment or the difficulty of a non-expert commander attempting oversight of a specialist capability. This last issue of monitoring, and particularly the monitoring of specialist organisations, intersects with the challenge of specialist organisations in a mission command environment.

Specialisation, mission command and the difficulties in translation

This section discusses two challenges for the command of an increasingly specialised workforce. The first is resolving the incongruence of specialisation of functions (i.e. those who ‘do’) and the desirability for breadth in commanders. The second is that the ADF construct for mission command could better account for this dichotomy.

There is an issue that as functions become more complex and specialised, communication (making the complex simple and the simple compelling) becomes more challenging. This is also not a new phenomenon—I have fond memories of a frustrated peer threatening to explain MILIS functions to me using sock-puppets—but is an issue that promises to increase with increased specialisation. The impact of operational and tactical events on them will become harder to quantify by non-expert staff, especially as the physical distance or span of subordination distance between the commander/staff and the specialist increases. Recognition of the advantages and pitfalls of increased access to information technology on command and control is already a part of ADF doctrine.^[18] But best-practice information flow is of no utility if the parties to it do not understand the language that the other is speaking. An increase in specialisation requires an increase in efforts to communicate meaningfully. This is a shared responsibility. On one side are commanders who are deliberately educated for breadth rather than depth.^[19] In addition to understanding what a special capability ‘brings to the fight’, they need to understand the conditions, prerequisites, and requirements that the specialist needs to generate their effects. On the other side, specialists need to ensure that leaders and decision makers provide the warnings and indicators they need to support devolved decision making in a mission command environment. Warnings and indicators are only useful if they include the right type of information and provision of it in time to inform decision and action. Thus, specialist requirements may have to be factored into the design of common operating pictures. This is alluded to, but not explicitly stated, in current ADF operational doctrine on managing the operational environment.^[20] It is also not yet recognised in the ADF’s approach to command.

There is a curious issue in our doctrinal approach to mission command. The language in the ADDP 00.1 on understanding is described as a one-way flow: for the system to work, subordinates must understand their commanders’ intent and the broader context.^[21] There is a missing element here: Commanders must understand the requirements for successful employment of specialist elements and have sufficient understanding of their requirements and vulnerabilities to adapt in a timely fashion. Similar to the communications issues previously discussed, there are two aspects to this: knowing what could go wrong and what means could fix it; and a temporal aspect that involves setting conditions so that warnings and indicators can be observed, analysed and addressed in a timely fashion.

Conclusions and further work

This article has described some reasons why the ADF’s future capability is likely to be delivered by an increasingly specialised workforce and identified a number of systemic vulnerabilities that could result. The vulnerabilities in communication and command are essentially structural and could, with modification to the ADF’s intellectual approach and doctrine, be mitigated. The vulnerabilities described in the first section, relating to normalised deviance, would appear to be more challenging.

Encouragingly, the literature on normalisation of deviance is extensive, and includes the study of militaries and organisations with similar structures and demands to the ADF.^[22] Where there is a gap is in the study of the ADF itself. A promising area for inquiry to reconcile the needs for increasing specialisation with the increased risks of normalised deviance and mitigating communication issues is that of ‘trading zones’. This is a concept by historian and philosopher of science Peter Galison describing how ‘people from vastly different theoretical, practical, or cultural perspectives can interact meaningfully about subjects which they understand from seemingly incommensurable points of view’.^[23] Effectively, a ‘trading zones’ approach offers an intellectual approach to integrating a specialist workforce into a cohesive whole.

A second area of potential study are groups within the ADF which already offer models that bridge the specialist/generalist divide to positive effect. Visible examples include the submariner community in Navy, and the Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME) community in Army. These groups, which have an identity across a variety of specialised functions and across enlisted personnel and officers, tend to share several characteristics. These include shared symbols, highly active community organisations outside of work environments, and the continued inclusions of former ADF members through associations and social media forums. The result, a sense of belonging and esprit de corps expressed in a way that is congruent with ADF values, shows that even as the ADF grapples with the Afghanistan Inquiry Report, there are positive lessons to be learned from within.

Bibliography

ADF, Inspector General of the ADF. Afghanistan Inquiry Report. Canberra: Commonwealth, 2020.

Albright, James. 'Normalization of Deviance - SOPs Are Not a Suggestion.' Business and Commercial Aviation, no. January 2017 (2017): 40-43.

Bosone, John W. 'The Erosion of Public Trust: Normalization of Deviance in the Air Force.' Air University, 2016.

Bury, Patrick. 'Barossa Night: Cohesion in the British Army Officer Corps.' The British journal of Sociology 68, no. 2 (2017): 314-45.

Chandler, Stephen H. Hanks; Gaylen N. 'Patterns of Functional Specialization in Emerging High Tech.' Journal of Small Business Management 32, no. 2 (Apr 1994) (1994): 23-37.

Commonwealth. 2016 Defence White Paper. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016.

———. 2020 Defence Strategic Update. Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020.

———. Addp 00.1 Command and Control. Edn 2 AL 1 ed. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019.

———. Addp 3.0 Campaigns and Operations. AL1 ed. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2014.

———. Afghanistan Inquiry Report Reform Plan. Online: Department of Defence, 2021.

———. The Australian Joint Professional Military Education Continuum. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019.

———. Defence Aviation Safety Manual. 3rd ed ed. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2021.

Fuchs, Allan S. Detsky; Stephen R. Gauthier; Victor R. 'Specialization in Medicine - How Much Is Appropriate.' Journal of the American Medical Association 307, no. 5 (2012): 463-64.

M.B. Berman, C.L. Batten. Increasing Future Fighter Weapon System Performance by Integrating Basing, Support, and Air Vehicle Requirements. USAF (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1983 1983).

Silverii, L. Scott. Cop Culture: Why Good Cops Go Bad. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2014.

———. 'A Darker Shade of Blue: From Public Servant to Professional Deviant: Law Enforcement's Special Operations Culture.' PhD in Urban Studies, University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations, 2011. https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1357.

Susanne C. Monahan, Beth A. Quinn. 'Beyond "Bad Apples" and "Weak Leaders" - Towards a Neo-Institutional Explanation of Organizational Deviance.' Theoretical Criminology 10, no. 3 (2006): 361-85.

Vaughan, Dianne. 'The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct and Disaster.' Annual Review of Sociology 25, no. 1999 (1999): 271-305.

Werhane, Michael E. Gorman; Patricia H. Using Trading Zones to Prevent Normalized Deviance in Organizations. Chap. 12 In Trading Zones and Interactional Expertise: Creating New Kinds of Collaboration, edited by Michael E Gorman, 245-64. London and Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010.

^[1] Commonwealth, Afghanistan Inquiry Report Reform Plan, 13, 23-24 (Online: Department of Defence, 2021).

^[2] Commonwealth, 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2020), 13.

^[3] Commonwealth, 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016), 148.

^[4] ADF, Inspector General of the ADF. Afghanistan Inquiry Report. Version 1.0 Canberra: Commonwealth, 2021, p.23

^[5] Stephen H. Hanks; Gaylen N. Chandler, 'Patterns of Functional Specialization in Emerging High Tech', Journal of Small Business Management 32, no. 2 (Apr 1994) (1994): 33.

^[6] Allan S. Detsky; Stephen R. Gauthier; Victor R. Fuchs, 'Specialization in Medicine - How Much is Appropriate', Journal of the American Medical Association 307, no. 5 (2012): 463.

^[7] In 2017, Army appointed a cyber warfare officer as an SSO (in advance of a cyber warfare category being established!) to employ a qualified candidate judged unlikely to pass RMC Duntroon’s physical fitness standards due to injuries.

^[8] This is not evenly distributed. There is a plethora of counter-movements. A good example is Army’s Plan BEERSHEBA, which sort to restructure Army’s combat power into three like combat brigades and standard infantry battalions. But a variety of factors including geography, personnel numbers, training capacity and equipment availability have resulted in a level of specialisation between brigades, and in the roles and equipment of infantry battalions.

^[9]This is not new. See, for example the risks ascribed to over-specialisation of US Air Force maintenance personnel in 1983 in C.L. Batten M.B. Berman, Increasing Future Fighter Weapon System Performance By Integrating Basing, Support, and Air Vehicle Requirements, USAF (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1983 1983), 14-15.

^[10] Commonwealth, Defence Aviation Safety Manual, 3rd ed ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2021), pt 2, 1-17.

^[11] James Albright, 'Normalization of Deviance - SOPs are not a suggestion', Business and Commercial Aviation, no. January 2017 (2017): 42.

^[12] Inspector General of the ADF, Afghanistan Inquiry Report (Canberra: Commonwealth, 2020), 513, 21, 26.

^[13] The genesis of this article was a personal observation of a group of transport drivers with specialist licence codes who saw themselves as exempt from the same constraints as their peers and above the directions of their section commanders without those licence codes. In one case this led to an incident where several drivers were out of communication in a training area, remote from medical or recovery support, when their chain of command believed they were in a different location.

^[14] Commonwealth, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 61.

^[15] Dianne Vaughan, 'The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct and Disaster', Annual Review of Sociology 25, no. 1999 (1999): 275.

^[16] Vaughan, 'The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct and Disaster', 276, 90-91.

^[17] Beth A. Quinn Susanne C. Monahan, 'Beyond "Bad Apples" and "Weak Leaders' - Towards a Neo-Institutional Explanation of Organizational Deviance', Theoretical Criminology 10, no. 3 (2006): 374.

^[18] Commonwealth, ADDP 00.1 Command and Control, Edn 2 AL 1 ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019), 2-9.

^[19] Commonwealth, The Australian Joint Professional Military Education Continuum (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019), 16.

^[20] Commonwealth, ADDP 3.0 Campaigns and Operations, AL1 ed. (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2014), 9-10 - 9-11.

^[21] Commonwealth, ADDP 00.1 Command and Control, 2-10 - 2-11.

^[22] While this article has endeavoured to address normalised deviance with a broad brush, examples of sources that address deviance in hierarchical organisations that informed the content include works by Patrick Bury, L. Scott Silverii and John W. Bosone cited below.

^[23] Michael E. Gorman; Patricia H. Werhane, 'Using Trading Zones to Prevent Normalized Deviance in Organizations', in Trading Zones and Interactional Expertise: Creating New Kinds of Collaboration, ed. Michael E Gorman (London and Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010), 245.

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Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Biography

Phil Baldoni

Lieutenant Colonel Phil Baldoni is a Royal Australian Corps of Transport officer, with experience in supporting land and joint force operations. He is currently posted as a Syndicate Director and Guidance Officer for the Australian Command and Staff Course at the Australian War College.