Abstract
The increasingly blurred line between state and non-state actors in tight urban warfare zones requires allied forces to have clearly defined and fully informed communication and command chains to minimise unintended consequences.
Taking recent military confrontations, especially those in Nangarhar, Mosul, Tikrit and Aleppo, into account, this paper argues that recent military battles, especially those that resulted in absolute victory, were extensively fought in urban settings (in an ecosystem comprising thick concrete residential structures with dense populous). Deploying troops in such urban settings, especially for offence, forces decision makers to face serious challenges with irrefutable consequences, since, in addition to confronting significantly vivid categories of enemy combatants, it is imperative for military commanders to contain losses within their ranks and limit collateral damage to a minimum. Taking these challenges faced by commanders into account, this paper offers an alternative strategy to strengthen offensive mechanisms in such complex scenarios. It also provides significant arguments to support its operational effectiveness, whose foundations are laid on a fusion of command and control and tactical manoeuvres, which, when employed effectively and efficiently, could result in positive outcomes.
Understanding the area of operations (AO)
By carefully classifying recent military conflicts on the basis of continuity, battle tactics, topographical impact, and commanders’ intuitive decision making, and analysing them, this paper (not solely based on character of conflict) establishes a link with an asymmetric style of warfare, evidence of which can be seen in recent combat engagements in urban settings. However, even the most passionate military theorist/modern warfare enthusiast cannot postulate definitively that future military battles will be fought solely in unconventional environments, no matter how probable/possible that may be. That said, this paper, with absolutely no restraint, predicts that 21st century battles will be fought with a combination of traditional and non-traditional elements. Their employment may vary from time to time, but the challenges emanating from their implementation will retain their complexity and force military commanders to bear consequences of their decisions. Limiting the argument to operations in complex environments, it would be incorrect to state that large-scale military confrontations will be limited to urban settings, even though many military theorists continue to argue this, especially in the case of tactical operations which determine the fate of the battle. To this extent, this paper identifies certain factors which significantly impact military operations in urban settings:
Too many stakeholders
The presence of vivid large-scale actors in operational settings ─ such as intergovernmental aid organisations, healthcare and humanitarian-centric institutions, non-governmental entities and private military organisations ─ exponentially increases operational challenges for military commanders, making their AOs volatile and troops in the region susceptible to violence from local and regional groups/masses. In cases of allied deployment, it becomes more complex for joint operation task forces to carry out search and seizure operations jointly with partnered organisations (local/national/global) in the vicinity.
Role of non-state actors
The extent of violence induced by adversaries, especially that of non-state actors, is beyond comprehension; it can be explained by their methodology of employing unconventional tactics to subdue allied forces by recruiting local populous, certain ethnicities or religious minorities, making it impossible for an allied force’s military commanders to identify friend from the foe.
Military commanders are always wary of overutilisation of resources, and significant time and manpower is spent on securing supply routes. Critical resources are scarce and acquiring locally available vital resources such as electricity, clean water and access to agricultural produce could result in frequent skirmishes, forcing decision makers to take unprecedented postures (the last stand).
Adversary’s centre of mass
According to Mao, ‘the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea’. An adversary combatant’s success depends largely on recruiting youths from the local population, providing them with a source of inspiration and nationalising their fight by promising them a hope/taste of victory and glorification of a bright future. To this extent, it is imperative for military commanders to have extensive knowledge of the region’s politico-culture and societal framework.
Urbanomics
A large proportion of the informed youth may be found in a cluster in semi-urban or urban areas of the region. The adversary may employ measures to influence certain sections of this community to increase their cadre and attract informed, opinionated personnel to their cause, a strategy that is largely used to influence weaker sections of the society; their agenda is to instigate fanaticism within the ranks and create factions that are fearless in employing terror tactics.
The status of IDPs
During a conflict, global attention is often largely on the fate of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), whom no stakeholder wishes to involve directly at the discussion table pertaining to the socio-political and demographic challenges (partly/wholly due to the demographic divide) and face demonstrations from agitated local masses against the rehabilitation of IDPs in their vicinity. The challenge may also arrive from the influx of refugees fleeing illegally as seen during intense battles in the regions of Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
Also, taking the aforementioned point of view with respect to military engagements in urban settings and comparing it with other operational settings, the former provides heterogenous operational requirements due to unclear rules of engagements because of the following factors:
- Traditional challenges posed from disbanded military units/former soldiers and rogue military organisations reinforced by the government forces and local militia.
- Non-traditional challenges posed by radically motivated (religiously inspired) insurgents supported by terror factions, organsied crime units, sympathetic local masses, illegal refugees or recently arrived internally displaced persons.
Taking these factors into account, military commanders must employ holistic strategy, keeping in mind the politico-cultural volatility of the region, the diversity of threats/tactics employed by combatants, the presence of large-scale, concrete residential structures, and sympathetic local masses, and ensure effective and efficient implementation of their strategy on the ground. Ground-level commanders (lower echelons) and theatre commanders in particular, must keep the Principles of VUCA in mind (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) [1] and remember the hard lessons from operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Command & Control is the key
The solution lies in fusing strategic decision making in urban settings with command and control and with tactical manoeuvres. The author took the first initiative to formulate a draft of a possible fusion of command and control with strategic decision making for military forces in urban settings. He took the reference from the incumbent doctrine formulated by the British Army Command, certain concepts of which are available in open domain and have a foundation common in most modern armies’ operational doctrine and sections of the operational principles of NATO’s operations by land-based elements.
According to NATO’s operational doctrine with respect to land-based elements, ‘command and control’ is“a conviction based on philosophy of command whose foundations lay on planning at the centre and dissemination of the planning to lower echelons for effective implementation by ground forces, giving the task of manoeuvring to ground force commanders (lower echelons) and giving them the freedom/consciousness to take the initiative and act”. According to the British Army Command, command and control is “a philosophy that instils the idea to act collectively, through joint efforts, and act with a defined authority, while giving freedom to lower echelon commanders to manoeuvre as they seem fit”. To the author’s surprise, the US Army doctrine promotes the concept of unity in command at the higher echelon levels through joint operations with respect to land-based elements. The doctrine defines command and control as a “commander’s ability to take critical decisions through leadership and authority and showcasing it through mission commands, highlighting disciplined initiatives within the commander’s motive to give lower echelon commanders flexibility in decision making and necessary fluidity required to carry out successful land-based operations”.
Putting aside these interpretations, according to the author, ‘command and control’ is:
- Correct interpretation of a commander’s orders to lower echelons to remove ambiguity and miscommunication in understanding the intention of the commander, mission directives and critical operational principles.
- Clear and concise instructions to lower echelons on their roles during land-based operations (their necessity and importance) and, most importantly, the purpose of their task.
- Responsibility of action by lower echelons during land-based operations, keeping in mind the intention of the commander’s instructions (how he expects them to do it).
- Tactical decision making by lower commanders, keeping in mind how to achieve their objectives.
- Necessary resource allocation to lower and subordinate commanders.
- Controlling in a minimal way without hampering lower echelon commanders’ freedom to manoeuvre and make tactical decisions on the ground.
Reinforce Command & Control with Tactical Manoeuvres
The principle of command and control must be reinforced with tactical manoeuvres before being fused into strategic decision making on military operations in urban settings. The tactical manoeuvres are applied here to further augment the impact on the adversary. The logic behind reinforcing tactical manoeuvres with command and control is based on“the philosophy of command and control as a critical fabric to the principle of tactical manoeuvres approach, by giving sufficient room to lower echelon decision makers and the necessary authority and elasticity to harness and exploit the adversary’s vulnerability as and when they identify. As a consequence, the fusion will employ lower echelon commanders to retain the adversary in their sights and engage the moral segments of the adversary rather than their acts itself”. The principle of fusion as elaborated above is not limited to lethal tactics, and can be equally employed in non-lethal actions. However, by combining the lethality and non-lethality segments and further fusing them into strategy and implementing military action, the effect would be severely catastrophic for adversary combatants, as it would certainly demolish their ability to fight and significantly affect their operational consistency.
Why restrategise?
With the two concepts explained, it is now imperative for us to comprehend the necessity to implement the aforementioned concepts in urban settings. Since tactical manoeuvres are employed by lower echelon leadership out of sheer necessity in urban environments (due to scenarios pertaining to study of combatant offensive capability, factors that might influence their area of operations, involvement of other militant entities, identification of factors that might create adversaries’ operational instability and help identify factors that might systematically diminish their operational manoeuvrability and logistics), command and control becomes the necessity of the hour. This is especially during combat operations in urban settings, where lower echelon commanders, with their individualistic intuitive decision making, display creative ingenuity and autonomy in manoeuvrability while giving special emphasis to a higher echelon commander’s intent.
In the same context, certain research carried out by military theorists in combat operations in urban environments highlights the importance of delegation to the lower level echelons, going as far as the rifleman, while giving due respect to the chain of command irrespective of any particular combat mission, based on the mission briefings (display of essential materials, maps, sand tables and enemy positions which may be of operational value). The objective is to instil the higher echelon’s intent for the mission, develop a sense of trust, equal acceptance of risks, and importance of the individual per se along with the motivation to take the initiative rather than wait for command. Implementing this command model during military operations in urban settings will maximise the effectiveness of troops operationally, giving them better opportunities to identify and harness scenarios arising during combat, as they will be devoid of seeking constant approvals and instructions in such time-sensitive environments.
Thus, to successfully attain the objective, especially during combat operations in urban environments, I recommend that lower echelon commanders initially maintain light footprints, which means identifying the adversary before understanding the rules of the game and prematurely sending too many foot patrols in the myth of mapping the AO. By systematically targeting the adversary’s factors of operational consistency, reinforced by principles of command and control and followed by timely, effective and efficient coordination/cooperation between lower and higher echelon commanders, desired results can be achieved, keeping the adversary on a constant run and forcing him to concede defeat or unconditionally surrender.
[1] The concept of VUCA has been discussed extensively by Lt Gen VK Ahluwalia, PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM, Director CLAWS, in numerous in-house conferences and seminars and his insight/ military thought expanded my purview of modern military operations in complex environments, for which I am eternally grateful. It is perhaps his military thought which motivated me to carry out this research.
Biography
Anant Mishra
Anant Mishra is a Web Manager Cum Researcher, Military Strategy & Tactics at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. He is also a Visiting Research Fellow at the Terrorism & Security Directorate of the International Centre for Policing & Security, University of South Wales, Pontypridd.
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