An Inclusive War | Future Forge

Introduction

Since the introduction of UNSCR 1325 in October 2000, defence and security strategies in Australia have started to take note of the importance of integrating gender strategies, with a particular focus on increasing women’s participation. In Australia, legislative exclusions for the Australian Defence Force under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against women (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000) and the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Parliament of Australia, n.d.) prohibited women from serving in combat roles until 2012, when these clauses where removed (Department of Defence, 2017). Yet, nearly ten years later the debate rages on, with language around the targets to recruit women described as “Shunning Men” (SBS News, 2017) driving negative attitudes and emotional responses. Women have a history of serving in conflict effectively, yet an aggressive resistance persists. This has been a consistent rhetoric across cultures and history with women’s participation in combat kept to a minimum except under dire circumstances. So, what drives resistance to women’s participation; and why do we need to have a more inclusive Defence Force?

The “Why”

In Joshua Goldstein’s War and Gender, Goldstein conducts a thorough analysis of the systematic exclusion of women in combat. He found only two relevant variables which could conceivably drive the systematic exclusion of women from war across cultures and throughout history. These differences amount to “small, innate biological gender differences in average size, strength, and roughness of play; and cultural moulding of tough, brave men, who feminize their enemies to encode domination” (Goldstein, 2001).

The biological differences in size and strength are small enough that the bell curves overlap, meaning some women are as strong as some men on the upper and lower ends of the curve. However, these biological differences, particularly with today’s technology, do not warrant such widespread exclusion of women. As Goldstein points out, even differences in size across races vary as little as those between genders and, through history, size and strength of the race has not always determined the outcome of war. This led Goldstein to conclude that the single most important factor driving the exclusion of women in war, as “cultural moulding and the feminisation of enemies to encode domination”.

Resistance to inclusion in war, particularly from younger, less educated recruits, seems to be emotionally driven, with aggressive responses to the participation of both women and homosexual men in combat, despite homosexual men being of equal size, strength and performance. This reaction, demonstrates the link between war and masculinity.

There is a culturally engrained need for boys to prove themselves tough, strong and dominant men, hence why the effeminates who perform equally is threatening to sense of self and ability to prove themselves worthy of society. Many cultures reinforce this concept through coming of age rituals and participation in demonstrations of strength and dominance.

Goldstein believes that as a society, we have created and perpetually reinforced a system of gender segregation and stereotypes to feed the war machine. The consequence of which include the ensuing and inevitable war or act of aggression to prove dominance.

The feminine as a threat to masculinity

In Western societies, many people seem to have lost their sense of purpose (DeSalvo, 2012). Cavendish (2015) believes that middle age men are feeling lost because they’re caught between confusing social cultural pressures to be of both the masculine and strong but also sensitive. One man she interviewed stated “We are caught between the old model of being the breadwinner and the new model of being the co-washer-upper and feeder, and the truth is we never really mastered either of these roles – old or new – and this has led to a profound sense of crisis in men” (Cavendish, 2015). In some studies of the effects of the empowerment of women in developing nations, a correlation has been found between empowerment and instances of sexual based and/or domestic violence. Though the results vary across nations, a number of influencing factors have been concluded. For example, Hidrobo et al. found domestic violence as an expression of frustration or dissatisfaction, or a way to improve self-esteem (Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013). Goldstein suggests this is because the natural reaction from men who seek to reassert dominance and masculinity, is through violence and rape, just as primates would. The COVID-19 Pandemic has reinforce this theory. As lockdowns caused increased stress, insecurity and feelings of lack of control, there has been increased levels of domestic and family based violence reported by support agencies across Australia; detailing an increase in both the volume and severity of domestic violence cases (Carrington, et al. 2020).

That’s not to say that women’s empowerment is necessary a threat to men’s self-esteem globally, but that in a world where men and women are equal, men need to have built self-esteem, identity and purpose to be secure in themselves. As a significant employer of men, the military needs to understand the impact of the changing culture, to support its workforce as they navigate uncertainty. This provides an opportunity to redefine masculinity and leverage women’s empowerment as a tool to optimise the ADF’s future workforce through increase participation, innovation and performance.

War provides an opportunity to prove masculinity, strength and to commit to serving a higher purpose. This is supported by figures that demonstrate men during defence service have lower suicide rates than the general population, 53% lower for men serving full-time, 46% lower for men in the Reserve, yet 14% higher for ex-service members (The Australian Institute for Health and Welfare, 2018). The question remains whether the increase in suicide rate post separation stems from disillusioned sense of identity, lower employment, lack of respect and understanding culturally from the general population of their perceived feats in war and becoming disconnected to the defence network of relationships. These issues are compounded by the sense that members have sacrificed for the organisation, often putting it as the first priority for the duration of service, frequently resulting in relationship breakdown and little friendship connections outside of the organisation (the recently announced Royal Commission into Veteran Suicide will no doubt illuminate some of these issues). The separation from service life can therefore, leave people feeling lost, angry and frustrated. These feelings can be further agitated by women’s contribution being seen as equal, further undermining the sense of value of their contribution in masculine terms.

The evidence implies that aggressive and defensive responses to women in combat are a reaction to “threats” to masculinity, self-esteem and a cultural system that reinforces throughout the generations images of the masculine war hero and the nurturing, gentle women (Goldstein, 2001).

The media plays a large part in perpetuating the stereotypes and exasperating the divide through images of the masculine warrior and portraying females as victims or through other stories suggesting women to be inferior (SBS News, 2017). Although the shift in culture over the last 60 years has been significant, the cultural delineation and expected norms of boys and girls continues to exist and is what feeds the perceptions and insecurities of future adults. This is what continues to provide resistance. Established gender norms reinforces a fear in boys of being soft or girly, through teasing, bullying and behavioural moulding, which instils insecurity and necessitates the need to prove ones’ masculinity. The inclusion of homosexuals and women, who represent the effeminate are perceived threats to the achievement of manhood, by diminishing the masculine value of participation in war.

Proven effectiveness

Regardless of perceptions regarding the inclusion of women and homosexuals, the reality is, inclusion in the military across all roles, is strategically necessary. As with the experience of the Red Army in WWII, the Israeli Defence Force in the War of Independence and with The Special Operations Executive known as ‘Churchill’s secret army’ (which included approximately 3200 women (Wikipedia, 2018)), the inclusion of women is an operational necessity.

Women have also proven to be involved and effective in terrorism throughout history and across multiple contexts–from the People's Will and the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, to the suicide bombers or Black Widows of Chechnya, to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Spencer, 2016). According to Speckhard (2015), one in five foreign fighters recruited by ISIS were women. In a study of all known suicide bombers between 1981 and 2008, attacks perpetrated by women were more lethal than those carried out by men (O'Rourke, 2009).

This not only demonstrates the effectiveness of female combatants but also how gender bias, remains a critical vulnerability. While Men continue to see Women as powerless victims (Aolain, 2013), both in terms of their potential to be effective contributors to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and as potential perpetrators of violence, security forces remain blinded to critical strategic opportunities and potential threats.

Workforce and organisational impact

Since 2001, Australian women in the 18-54 year age group have been consistently more likely than men to have attained a Bachelor Degree or higher qualification. In 2015, 30% of men compared with 40% of women aged 25-29 obtained a Bachelor Degree or above (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). War has evolved from trench warfare, and as technology continues to reshape the nature of the battlespace, the military needs educated and diverse minds to lead and operate the technological equipment for the future of war.

Women make up 46.2% of Australia’s labour force (Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2017) and in a survey of 1,800 professionals, 40 case studies, and numerous focus groups and interviews; diversity had an overwhelming positive correlation with organisation performance. Companies with diverse leaders were 45% more likely to report a growth in market share over the previous year and 70% more likely to report that the firm captured a new market (Hewlett, Marshall, & Sherbin, 2013). Preparing for the wars of the future is increasing about using innovation, leveraging technology and complex problem solving. Innovation was one of the Australian Defence Force’s core values (Department of Defence, 2017), and remains a strategic priority, demonstrating the importance to achieving capability. Diversity in a group increases the information available for problem solving and enhances the ability of the group to generate effective and creative solutions to problems (Anconda & Caldwell, 1992; Bantel & Jackson, 1989).

Our view of women in combat has been shaped by traditional gender perspectives, consistently warrior women who don’t fit conventional gender roles have been marginalized, delegitimize, or, like Joan of Arc, sanctified after martyrdom (Markowitz, 2018). Gender perspectives shape our attitudes and inferences about war. When a young man gets recruited to Islamic State (IS) he is a combatant, yet when a woman makes the same choice, the narrative becomes different. She is called a victim, tricked, manipulated, taken advantage of. Laura Sjoberg (2018) found that with regards to the Iraq and Syria conflict, as has happened throughout history, women have unwittingly been characterised as victims of “masculine violence”. She found that a formal survey of stories of women involved in the conflict demonstrated that women combatants opposing IS were either silenced or sensationalised and females who joined IS were routinely portrayed as brainwashed and emphasized manipulation and/or helplessness (Sjoberg, 2018). Many stories can be found where female victims are characterised as helpless and in need of protection, facing terrible abuse from IS a continuation of the traditional war propaganda, inciting the male hero to come to the rescue - Join the War on Terror, save your helpless women. Sjoberg (2018) found that news stories of females contained stereotypical assumptions about women’s helplessness, even if those ‘victims’ have taken part in fighting. Effectively, these narratives remove choice from female perpetrators. By removing the responsibility of women to choose her role as a combatant, we remove accountability and thereby fail to respond appropriately to risk. This perspective puts our forces at risk of underestimating female combatants and also ensures that females within our militaries consistently receive the message that combat is not place for a woman, equally reducing opportunity to better respond to the changing needs of war. As our enemies successfully recruit and leverage women within their forces, we must recognise and embrace lessons from history.

How do we move forward?

Australia’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2021-2031 sets the agenda for move forward with aims to deliver on four outcomes:

Supporting women’s meaningful participation and needs in peace processes
Reducing sexual and gender-based violence
Supporting resilience, crisis and security, law and justice efforts to meet the needs and rights of all women and girls
Demonstrating leadership and accountability for WPS

With greater recognition of women’s capacity to mobilise into terrorist/combatant roles, more must be done to encourage women to represent a greater footprint in conflict zones, security policy and leadership. This is for both practical/cultural necessity posed by the need to engage with and search women, but also for the strategic opportunities presented by a diverse perspective.

Our societies play a part in reinforcing gender roles throughout childhood with rough-play, toughing up boys, encouraging competition and segregation. When making vast changes to this long-standing, culturally groomed system of war, analysis needs to consider all who are impacted. In order to successfully achieve integration, analysis on gender perspectives needs to include the impact of masculine perspectives.

Importantly, the concept of gender roles is a psychological and socially constructed set of ideas that are malleable to change (Levant & Wilmer, 2011). Through education, meaningful connections and integration; together we can start to shift perspectives. To do this we must reflect and challenge our own bias to understand other perspectives. We must embrace each other’s strengths and weakness by recognising as a team our differences are complimentary not divisive. We must support our (male/female/other) counterparts through the change journey for the benefit of a more effective force. We must recognise that challenging a construct which has been socialised and reinforced throughout history will create a sense of loss, disenfranchisement and anger in some people, which we will need to confront and move through together. We need to acknowledge this is a difficult process for everyone involved and it may not be a smooth journey but it’s necessary. We simply don’t have the numbers or skills to available to exclude people based on bias. For Men this process can challenge a historically enforced sense of identity, achievement and success but can be redefined through education, empowerment and purpose.

Conclusion

With the changing demographics of tomorrow’s soldier, resistance needs to be acknowledged so that the change process can be managed more effectively. Hence, understanding gender perspectives in war includes recognising that men will be impacted by women’s presence, specifically because it challenges their view of women, war, masculinity and identity. To effectively change such an enduring system of exclusion, the narrative must change to embrace gender (all) perspectives and respond to the broader needs of a modern workforce and to modern warfare. Continuing to operate through traditional gender stereotypes blinds forces from potential threats and impede efforts to recruit the best possible fighting force of the future.

The evolution of combat, technology and society has made women in combat a necessary strategic requirement to building a sustainable, competitive force into the future. Women throughout history have proven that they have the courage and resilience to support and participate in combat. Allowing women to serve in combat roles isn’t about political correctness or equity, it’s about having the best possible workforce for the future.

Bibliography

Anconda, D., & Caldwell, D. (1992). Bridging the boundary: Esteranl actiivity and performance in organizational teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(4), 634-665

Aolain, F. (2013). Situation Women in Counterterrorism Discourses: Undulating Musculinities and Luminal Feminities. Boston University Law Review, 93(3), 1085-1122

Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2021) Australia’s National Action plan on Women, Peace and Security 2021-2031. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Retrieved from www.dfat.gov.au.

Carrington, K., Morley, C., Warren, S., et al. (2020) Impact of COVID on Domestic and Family Violence Workforce and Clients: Research Report. QUT Centre for Justice, QUT, Brisbane Australia.

Commonwealth of Australia. (2017). 2016 Progress Report of the Australian National Action Plan of Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018. Canberra. Retrieved from https://www.pmc.gov.au/office-women/international-forums/australian-national-action-plan-women-peace-and-security-2012-2018.

Department of Defence. (2012). Pathways to Change: A Strategy for Cultural Change and Reinforcement. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Department of Defence. (2017, 10 12). Defence Leadership Framework. Retrieved from PeopleConnect: http://drnet/People/Learning-and-Development/Development-Programs/Leadership-Practice/Pages/Defence-Leadership-Framework.aspx

Goldstein, J. (2001). Gender and War. Cambridge: University of Cambridge. doi:052180716 6

Hewlett, S. A., Marshall, M., & Sherbin, L. (2013, December). How Can Diversity Drive Innovation? Harvard Business Review, 22.

Hidrobo, M., & Fernald, L. (2013). Cash Transfers and Domestic Violence. Journal of Health, Economics, 32(1), 304-319.

Levant, R. & Wilmer, D. (2011). Masculinity constructs as protective buffers and risk factors for men’s health. American Journal of men’s Health, 8, 110-120. doi:dx.doi.org.exproxy.rit.edu/10.1177/1557988313494408.

Markowitz, M. (2018, March 8). Women With Guns: The Red Army Female Snipers of World War II. Retrieved from https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/women-guns-red-army-female-snipers-world-war-ii/

McLennan, W. (2017, September 17). Facts and stats about suicide in Australia. Retrieved from http://www.mindframe-media.info/for-media/reporting-suicide/facts-and-stats

O'Rourke, L. A. (2009). What's Special About Female Suicide Terrorism? Security Stud., 18, 681.

Royal Australian Air Force. (2015). Air Force Plan JERICHO. Canberra: Royal Australian Air Force.

Royal Australian Air Force. (2017, October 23). Gender Programs. Retrieved from Directorate of Workforce Diversity: http://drnet/raaf/DWD/Pages/Gender%20Programs.aspx

Royal Australian Air Force. (2017, October 20). Total Workforce Management - Air Force. Retrieved from Directorate of Personnel - Air Force: http://drnet/raaf/PERSAF/TWM-AF/Pages/TWM-AF.aspx

Royal Australian Air Force. (2017, September 25). What is New Horizons? Retrieved from New Horizons: http://drnet/raaf/NewHorizon/Pages/What%20is%20New%20Horizon.aspx

SBS News. (2017, August 11). Australian Army Shunning male recruits for women. Retrieved from SBS News: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australian-army-shunning-male-recruits-for-women

Sjoberg, L. (2018). Jihadi Brides and Female volunteers: Reading the Islamic State's War to se Gender and Agency in Conflict Dynamics. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 296-311. doi:10.1177/0738894217695050

Speckhard, A. (2015, September). Brides of ISIS. USA Today, pp. 18-20.

Spencer, A. N. (2016). The hidden Faceof Terrorism: An Analysis of the Women in Islamic State. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(3), 74-98. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1549

The Australian Institute for Health and Welfare. (2018, Jan 19). Incidence of suicide among serving and ex-serving Australian Defence Force personnel 2001-2015. doi:978-1-76054-250-4

The Institute for Economics and Peace. (2017). Global Terrorism Index. economics and peace. Retrieved from http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/

Wikipedia. (2018, April 20). Special Operations Executive. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Operations_Executive

Women, U. (2017, Oct 2). Women's role in Countering Violent Extremism. Retrieved from UN Women: www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/10/feature-womens-role-vital-in-countering-violent-extremism

Workplace Gender Equality Agency. (2017, September 29). Workplace Gender Equality Agency: Stats at a Glance. Retrieved from Workplace Gender Equality Agency: www.wgea.gov.au

Footnotes

Anconda, D., & Caldwell, D. (1992). Bridging the boundary: Esteranl actiivity and performance in organizational teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(4), 634-665

Aolain, F. (2013). Situation Women in Counterterrorism Discourses: Undulating Musculinities and Luminal Feminities. Boston University Law Review, 93(3), 1085-1122

Carrington, K., Morley, C., Warren, S., et al. (2020) Impact of COVID on Domestic and Family Violence Workforce and Clients: Research Report. QUT Centre for Justice, QUT, Brisbane Australia.

Department of Defence. (2012). Pathways to Change: A Strategy for Cultural Change and Reinforcement. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Goldstein, J. (2001). Gender and War. Cambridge: University of Cambridge. doi:052180716 6

Hewlett, S. A., Marshall, M., & Sherbin, L. (2013, December). How Can Diversity Drive Innovation? Harvard Business Review, 22.

Hidrobo, M., & Fernald, L. (2013). Cash Transfers and Domestic Violence. Journal of Health, Economics, 32(1), 304-319.

McLennan, W. (2017, September 17). Facts and stats about suicide in Australia. Retrieved from http://www.mindframe-media.info/for-media/reporting-suicide/facts-and-stats

O'Rourke, L. A. (2009). What's Special About Female Suicide Terrorism? Security Stud., 18, 681.

Royal Australian Air Force. (2015). Air Force Plan JERICHO. Canberra: Royal Australian Air Force.

Royal Australian Air Force. (2017, October 23). Gender Programs. Retrieved from Directorate of Workforce Diversity: http://drnet/raaf/DWD/Pages/Gender%20Programs.aspx

Royal Australian Air Force. (2017, October 20). Total Workforce Management - Air Force. Retrieved from Directorate of Personnel - Air Force: http://drnet/raaf/PERSAF/TWM-AF/Pages/TWM-AF.aspx

Royal Australian Air Force. (2017, September 25). What is New Horizons? Retrieved from New Horizons: http://drnet/raaf/NewHorizon/Pages/What%20is%20New%20Horizon.aspx

SBS News. (2017, August 11). Australian Army Shunning male recruits for women. Retrieved from SBS News: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australian-army-shunning-male-recruits-for-women

Speckhard, A. (2015, September). Brides of ISIS. USA Today, pp. 18-20.

Spencer, A. N. (2016). The hidden Faceof Terrorism: An Analysis of the Women in Islamic State. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(3), 74-98. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1549

The Australian Institute for Health and Welfare. (2018, Jan 19). Incidence of suicide among serving and ex-serving Australian Defence Force personnel 2001-2015. doi:978-1-76054-250-4

The Institute for Economics and Peace. (2017). Global Terrorism Index. economics and peace. Retrieved from http://economicsandpeace.org/reports/

Wikipedia. (2018, April 20). Special Operations Executive. Retrieved from Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Operations_Executive

Women, U. (2017, Oct 2). Women's role in Countering Violent Extremism. Retrieved from UN Women: www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/10/feature-womens-role-vital-in-countering-violent-extremism

Workplace Gender Equality Agency. (2017, September 29). Workplace Gender Equality Agency: Stats at a Glance. Retrieved from Workplace Gender Equality Agency: www.wgea.gov.au

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Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.

Biography

Amanda Van De Paverd

Amanda is an experienced Executive Human Resources and Project Leader specialising in creating and implementing business and workforce strategies, leadership development, transformation and change initiatives. Senior management and consulting experience across energy, mining and resources, health services, financial services and Government both in Australia and overseas.

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