Beware the Intent of a Eurasian Entente

The most pressing national security and economic challenge facing Australia is an emerging epoch in which a Eurasian bloc changes the power and economic direction of the globe.

After a long period of relative stability, the world changed dramatically with the fall of the Berlin Wall and soon thereafter the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world. What emerged was a unipolar world with the United States of America acknowledged as the most powerful nation on earth. The unpredicted seismic shift that ushered in the reordering of the security environment soon affected the economic environment too.

From a security perspective, history did not end^[1] with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the ‘great game’^[2] changed. America, aided by Anglo-European^[3] states and various proxies^[4], embarked on campaigns of regime change, resource capture and population control. The campaigns occurred under the guise of ‘bringing democracy’ to the ‘less fortunate’. Many of the political, military, economic and cultural techniques employed had been refined for over a century in Central and South America and, to an extent, Western Europe.^[5] What was new was the advent of psychological, legal, media and informational techniques that took advantage of scientific and technological developments. The target states ranged from those in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and the former Soviet republics. For a time, Russia was vulnerable to being broken up or ceasing to exist. Some states were co-opted, some were bribed, whilst others required the application of economic sanctions or violence in the form of: targeted assassination; extraordinary rendition; arm, equip and train activities; colour revolutions; false flag and/or legal or illegal invasion.^[6] In a few cases, blockade was the favoured tool.^[7] Often after the states’ resources were captured, appropriate regimes established and various parties ‘compensated’, the scale of the economic, cultural and political destruction would take generations to repair. State reconstruction was often made difficult due to the loss of national control of their capital, population and natural resources, necessitating ‘others to pay’ through the provision of international aid and security.^[8]

Unfortunately for the ‘hawks’^[9], not all efforts were successful. Some Eurasian states, such as Russia and Iran, survived the onslaught and even grew in strength. China, on the other hand, had been peacefully developing. The common view was that Chinese development would lead to the adoption of ‘universal’ norms and renunciation of communism. However, China has not followed the expected path and has recently gained international notoriety due to its growing multi-dimensional might; and thus. many now see it as an adversary. For some, the three ‘recalcitrant’ states threaten the ‘rules-based’ order,^[10] freedom of navigation, democracy,^[11] press freedom,^[12] human rights, supply chains and ‘fair’ global trade.

As the world reorganises politically and economically, geography still matters. It is worth considering the ideas of the geographer Halford Mackinder.^[13] At the turn of the 20th century, Mackinder divided the world into three broad areas: the World Island, the Offshore Islands and the Outer Islands. Within the World Island, Mackinder designated an area covering much of Russia and Central Asia as the Heartland. Mackinder then warned Britain through his Heartland Theory^[14], that their prosperity and security would be undermined if improved surface transport opened up the Eurasian Heartland. Mackinder also warned that if a single entity controlled and exploited Eurasia, traditional British reliance on sea power and seaborne trade would become a weakness. Expanding on Mackinder is Nicholas Spykman’s^[15] ideas of the Rimland and the concept of ‘containment’. The Rimland encompasses the West, South and East Eurasian littoral^[16], effectively surrounding the Heartland. As Spykman identified, containment was the obvious technique to control states looking to expand into the ‘living space’ of the Heartland or beyond it. Supporting Mackinder and Spykman’s ideas were the writings of Mahan and Corbett who guided actions in the maritime commons.^[17] The four are the pillars of an anti-Eurasia or ‘maritime’ strategy and others have built on their foundations. The reorganisation of the security and economic environments that continues from the collapse of the Soviet Union still affects the dynamics of Eurasia. Mackinder’s warning is prescient and applies to modern states, blocs or corporations reliant on maritime commerce around Eurasia.

The power dynamic of the current ‘great game’ has yet to settle into a steady state. For much of recent history, since the days of Mongol dominance, no single state or bloc has controlled the Eurasian Heartland; but times appear to be changing. The emergent political multi-polarity, economic globalism and social informatization, coupled with global warming,^[18] have combined to compress relationships and increase the complexity of interactions.^[19] The turbulence has created a degree of suspicion, tension and fear. In Australia, the concerns are seeing rearmament^[20], novel engagement^[21] and preparations for war.^[22] Regardless of the tensions, it is useful to remember Australia is a powerful, wealthy and well-resourced state with significant national power potential.^[23] Australia is also located outside the ‘natural places of conflict’ and relatively secure. As in geopolitik and economics, the military domain is seeing lock-step change. Modern intelligence-combat systems using sophisticated physical, biological, chemical and electronic weapons guided by highly developed reconnaissance-surveillance technologies now make any individual, infrastructure or point on the Australian island-continent a potential target. The growing concern for security of what is called the ‘Indo-Pacific region’ by Australian academics,^[24] soldiers and politicians is shaping intellectual considerations, economic decisions, physical preparation and justifying narratives,^{[25] [26]} but misses the key change. The changes will also adversely affect Australia’s economic and security trajectory and thus undermine our relevance, freedom, security and prosperity.

What is important is to consider the economic and security changes that might occur if the thesis is even partially correct.

The relentless march of globalisation seems unstoppable. Globalists believe the success of their ideas is inevitable, beneficial and right. The march is underpinned with plentiful finances, moral capital derived from traditional values,^[30] and the application of coercion. However, some ‘nationalist states’ survived the security, cultural, informational and economic onslaught to slowly recover their strength, independence and vigour. The recovery, especially of Russia, ushered in what the Russians consider is the end of a unipolar world and the emergence not of the previous bipolar world, but of a new multipolar epoch.^{[31] [32]} Russia acknowledged that it was no longer a superpower, but considered itself a ‘great power’^[33]and one that must be listened to. Initially, ‘multi-polarity’ and the ‘cooperative workings of states as equals’ was advocated by Russia. Russia emphasised that the Westphalian system^[34] that underpinned the principles of the United Nations, was the only framework for international relations.^[35] Slowly it became clear that the Europeans, Americans and the Anglo-states did not share Russia’s view.^[36] The perception of ‘perpetual dominance of the Euro-Atlantic^[37] bloc’ encouraged globalist states^[38] to embark on a campaign of political, cultural and economic globalisation that would remake the world.

In trying to remake the world, the world bifurcated into two camps. Each camp created their own views, approaches and narratives. One camp believes that the world should be highly integrated. One aspect advocated is the need to abandon or at least modify unique national, tribal or ethnic customs, traditions and cultures for the greater good. They also call for unelected supra-state bodies to govern the world, based on globalist ideologies.^[39] The globalist camp argues that the world has already introduced a number of supra-state bodies, which subordinated the state, so more should not be feared.^[40] Institutions such as the United Nations,, the European Union, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and others’ ‘successes’ justify more integration, not less. For the globalist system to work, political, intelligence and corporate elements must coalesce into a powerful ‘conglomerate’.^[41] The globalist system is highly centralised and techno-bureaucratic, verging on totalitarian.^{[42] [43]} The second camp is diametrically opposed, and driven by ‘patriotism’. They believe that centralisation of power and decisions is in direct contravention of ‘subsidiarity’^[44], the exercise of national and individual ‘free will’, and the sovereignty of the state. This group emphasises the coexistence of sovereign states which are responsible for the peaceful development, security and prosperity of their people. These states encourage ‘self-first, then my neighbour’ and they oppose ‘majoritarianism’.^[45] They emphasise the need for sovereign and independent states to undertake activities in accordance with their unique customs, traditions and cultural norms, signed treaties and international laws. For the latter, integration would only extend to the degree it was a ‘lubricant’^[46] to the freedom, prosperity and security of their people, and critically, that their sovereignty would not be surrendered to ‘supra-state’ bodies.^{[47] [48]}

As a result, of the bifurcation and pressure from threats, sanctions and embargoes, an emerging ‘entente’^[49], rather than an alliance,^[50] has been forming between Russia, China and Iran^[51]. The entente provides the outer points of an ‘influence triangle’, which means that more than 50% of the Heartland will be available to exploitation by them and those willing to cooperate. Interestingly, the triangular nature of the relationship and distances separating each state means that each of the three only needs to emphasise the relationship in two directions to ensure a solid bloc. In essence, a ‘greater Eurasian entente’ is emerging.^[52] That entente will coexist, cooperate, collaborate, compete, confront or engage in conflict as a peer to the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Anglo-American alliance.^[53]

Russia, China and Iran are the core attractor-influence^[54] states of a ‘greater Eurasian entente’, while the other states in close proximity are categorised as central or linking states. Peripheral states and states beyond the core, such as the European Union, India and South-East Asian states, act as close but external markets.^[55] The peripheral states’ ‘closeness’ to the entente will wax and wane based on their interests and the interests of the entente.^[56] In essence, a ‘continental bloc’ with a sufficiently large internal market and overland access to large external markets means that a maritime system is no longer required to thrive. In effect, the entente acts as the single entity that triggers Mackinder’s warning. The sheer size of the entente undermines Spykman’s Rimland states’ economic and military dominance, their containment^[57] capacity and ultimately their global control. The changes are possible because finances, technology, materials science and political will are available to develop Eurasia.

Economically, Rimland states rely on maritime power. To thrive, Rimland states have heavily invested in the current maritime economic and security system. The globalist aim is to continue those trends that have generated their wealth and power while benefiting the rest of the globe to varying degrees. To continue those trends to their natural conclusion, globalists espouse a ‘new world order’ leading to ‘one world government’.^[58] Most of the aims and outline plans of the globalists are publicly available from organisations such as the World Economic Forum^[59], renowned for its annual gathering at Davos, Switzerland. The Forum is but one body developing concepts, testing ideas and proselytising.^[60] Many of the ideas being proselytised have their most recent roots in the battle against communism, but often go deeper into historic power struggles. Critically, the globalists have overwhelmed the ‘nationalists’ who valued the sovereignty of their states. States that have existed since the days of Metternich^[61] and the Congress of Vienna 1814-15^[62] or formed under their rules are under pressure to integrate. National unity,^[63] or patriotism as advocated by the nationalists, is undermined by the near free flow of alien^[64] foreigners into Europe from Africa and the Middle East; while America is seeing a similar flow from Central and South America.^[65] Using economic, cultural and power arguments, the globalists destroyed many of the previously strong resource extraction and manufacturing centres in their home nations; shifting those factories, mines, quarries and new industries to locations with the cheapest labour, lowest environmental standards, weakest labour laws and/or easier access to key natural resources. The main shifts have been from America and Europe to Mexico and Asia, but especially to China. Narratively, the globalist vision is ‘sustainable progress’, but progress that is in accordance with their global sustainability goals.^[66] The core concept is for European and American-designed products to be manufactured abroad.^[67] The material for the products is delivered to mega-factories and finished products are shipped to buyers across the globe. The ‘maritime commons’ are relatively safe, but the ‘security of the shipments’ is undertaken by the American Navy^[68] and cooperative coastal states.  For the scheme to work, ports able to handle large bulk and container ships are essential, since internal Eurasian infrastructure is in a ‘pre-modern’ condition and unable to handle the size and volume of resources and goods to be moved. Thus, for many, the unipolar world and the ideas proposed by the globalists are seductive and seem to suit everyone’s interests.

While globalism is seductive, the changing political, financial and demographic^[69] nature of Europe and America create internal tensions which conceal the devastating economic and cultural impacts. The academic, corporate and political advocates of globalism highlight the benefits of cheap goods and plentiful services, as they simultaneously conceal the true beneficiaries and losers. Rather than embrace the diversity of nations as the Westphalian and United Nations systems envisage, globalisation urges homogeneity in terms of governance system; de-religionisation^[70] to facilitate tension-free immigration; growth in eugenics through abortion and euthanasia^[71] to control population sizes; community secularisation to ameliorate religious tensions; and an embrace of modern monetary concepts^[72] to fund the programs. The result is significant shifts in the location and nature of the ‘winners and losers’.^[73] As work replacement for the ‘losers’, the globalists offer jobs in financial services, coffee and retail shops, ‘coding’, and yet-to-emerge ‘green’ technologies. For those people in the wrong age, educational or work group, unemployment, despondency and an early death or ‘radicalisation’ emerged as their destiny.^{[74] [75]}  One can see what has occurred in places such as the American ‘Rust Belt’, the Pennsylvanian coal mining regions and the ‘flyover’ states; in East Germany’s industrial parks and smaller villages; and the shuttering of factories across Eastern Europe^[76]. Within Australia, traditional manufacturing centres in NSW, Victoria, and South Australia have been gutted. Expensive short-term, small-scale Defence projects act as partial job replacement programs.^[77] In Australia, the government has been willing to pay significant premiums to appease local populations to retain or gain seats in parliament.^[21] Efforts to develop ‘sovereign industry plans’^[79] that are designed to be sustainable and achievable are underway, but not yet tested. The impacts of the changes are apparent in the social and political struggles in America and Europe. For example, the ‘Yellow Jacket’ riots in France or the ‘BLM/Antifa’^[80] riots across America are unravelling existing norms. Fortunately, serious rioting has yet to occur in Australia.^[81] The model on offer is fragile, being resisted internally, leading to increasingly draconian control measures. In all, the globalist trajectory is set by their hubris and likely to lead to disaster.

The military, economic and political revival of the Russian Federation over the last 20 years, coupled with the abandonment of communism and embrace of Orthodox Christianity while remaining multi-ethnic, has ushered in a new dynamic. Russian President Putin identified the end of the ‘unipolar world’ in his speech at the Munich Security Forum in 2007, in which he stated that Russia was back, and that the world would be best served by an ‘equivalency of states’^[25] Putin then offered friendship and partnership to the audience. Europe was ambivalent, while the Americans were against the proposal.^[83] America had worked for over 100 years, after defeating Spain in the 1800s, to first check Germany^[84] and then Russia^[85] and is now aiming to ‘control’ or ‘dominate’ China. In effect, America^[86] heeds Mackinder, Spykman, Corbett and Mahan to protect their land and maritime investments and expand their dominance.^[87] An increasing number of statements, papers and articles highlight American and European antipathy to Russia, increasing tensions.^[88] Think tanks, politicians and media personalities also frame Russia in a poor light.^[89] The information action is coupled to a never-ending sequence of ‘provocation-talks-provocation’. To date, Russian efforts to shake off communism norms and become a Christian society^{[90] [91]} with the expectation of becoming a European state have been rebuffed. Russia noted the retention and expansion of NATO and the deployment of Euro-Atlantic forces into Eastern Europe^[92]—after providing a perception that they would not^[93]—as indications of malfeasance. Russia is also closely watching Brussels’ actions against Hungry and Poland, in the battle for the soul of Europe.^{[94] [95]} In effect we are seeing an inversion of the religious positions of Russia and the Euro-Atlantic bloc; as one embraces Christianity, the other rejects it.  Since 2007, Russia’s operations in the Caucasus, Crimea^[06] and now Syria have highlighted its recovery and destructive potential.^[97] Russia’s survival and growth whilst under embargo and sanctions was unexpected.^[98] Many of the sanctioned and embargoed targets have benefited from the pressure to embrace innovation, modernisation and expansion.^[99] Those efforts have created a self-sufficient, powerful and resilient state.^{[100] [101] [102]}All the while, Russia has refused to open up ownership of its firms, thus retaining control of its resources and the means of product to build wealth and power. Simultaneously, Russia has reformed and rearmed its military, which is again dominant and feared in the near abroad.  As its strength has increased, Russia has enhanced its presence in key geopolitical areas.^[103] The absorption of Crimea and the creation of new and expanded air and sea bases in Syria have increased its power projection capability.^[104] From the Syrian bases, Russian forces can influence Southern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa. For the Europeans and Americans, Russia can now threaten NATO’s southern flank and operations in the Middle East, North Africa and the Arctic. The changed security environment restricts the Euro-Atlantic bloc^[105] to predominantly threatening Russia through Ukraine.^[106] The relative military strength and political position of the Russians versus the Euro-Atlantic bloc appears to have created a stalemate. The stalemate allows America to shift its effort to the Pacific while Russia can focus on Eurasia. Over time, Russia has come to realise that the Americans and Europeans cannot be trusted, forcing Russia to look east to China and south to Iran. We may be seeing a case of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, but nonetheless an entente is emerging.

As for China, the end of the Cold War ushered in a period of political, economic, cultural and military growth, such that China is now a confident, capable and independent state. China characterises the world as having political multi-polarity, economic globalism and social informatization attributes.^[107] Political multi-polarity is important for China, since it is the last significant communist regime^[108] mercantilist,^[109] and does not intend to cede sovereignty. Globalism drives China’s economic growth due to the massive shift of manufacturing to China. Like Russia, China does not permit majority ownership or direct investment in its industries, as a result retaining control and generating wealth. China’s growth has been so great that its economy will soon become larger than America’s. Critically, the Chinese growth has not been isolated, but is widespread and requires its domestic market to absorb production. As a result, many Chinese moved out of poverty^[110] and some have become millionaires and billionaires.^[111] Social informatization has been embraced across the globe, with near instant access to any information that is wanted. In China, social informatization has been embraced, but with ‘unique Chinese characteristics’, which has benefited the populous, but some have found a few of those characteristics anathema.^[112] The Chinese are well aware of their near destruction by foreign forces in the late 1800s to early 1900s and the devastation of the early-mid 20th century civil war. The Chinese are very proud of their recovery, achievements, prosperity and the strength of their government.^[113] They see their resurgence as retaking their rightful place after ‘100 years of shame’. Militarily, China can now afford a modernisation program that has it shifting from a strategic posture^[114] of ‘defensive defence’ to one of ‘defensive offense’.^{[115] [116]} Strategically, its growing strength has seen a move from a predominantly continental force to one capable of both continental and maritime warfare, protected by increasingly sophisticated anti-access capabilities.^[117] The defensive layer to the east was historically coastal, but it is now capable of being forward deployed to artificial islands and can dominate the ‘first island chain’ and its choke points.^[118] Concepts exist to extend the defensive system to the ‘second island chain’.^[119] The defensive system covers China’s industrial heart situated on the vulnerable eastern coast, and secures submarine ballistic missile-firing areas in the China Seas.^[120] While to the north, west and south, China considers itself reasonably secure through treaties, agreements and understandings with Russia^[121] and Mongolia. There are also significant natural barriers, such as the Taklamakan and Gobi deserts, Hindu Kush and Himalayas.^[122] The combination of Chinese military and economic strength has led to the view in America, Europe and the Anglo states^[123] that China is now the ‘pacing’^[124] state.^{[125] [126]} China will need to ensure it avoids natural drifts to hubris. Concurrently, China has embarked on creating a ‘string of pearls’^[127] within the Rimland. Those ‘pearls’ and the sea lanes for oil shipments are threatened by India^[128] and the USA, whom the Chinese may, at some point, consider to be adversaries. China is aware that its reliance on the ‘maritime commons’ and sea lanes contains choke points^[129] that may be closed. Prudence requires the development of new sea lanes, such as Russia’s northern channel along its Arctic coast, improved Eurasian infrastructure and unfettered exploitation of the untapped resources laying in the Heartland.

Much to many stakeholders’ disappointment, Iran has survived as an independent state. With the demise of Iraq, Iran has emerged as a powerful state that cannot easily be influenced. The continued conflict in the Middle East, extending from Afghanistan^[130] across Arabia and into North Africa, has provided Iran with opportunities to extend its power. As a unique Islamic theocracy that emerged from the 1979 revolution against Shah Mohammad Reza Phahlavi, Iran has had to survive a stand-off with America, a war of attrition with Iraq^[131] and the turmoil in the Middle East caused by the occupation of Iraq by an American coalition. Iran’s strength, confidence and determination underpin its cooperation with the Russians to assist Assad’s Syria against an insurgency^[132] and rebellion. Iran and Russia also cooperate to convoy oil and food to the heavily sanctioned Syrian populace, while American, Kurdish and Turkish forces deny Syria their own oil and wheat.^[133] Iran’s influence over Lebanon and the successes of their partners, the Houthis, in the conflict against Saudi Arabia in Yemen, further demonstrate its power. Significantly, Houthi missile and drone raids on Saudi oil and gas infrastructure exposed Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. The raids caused considerable damage, large export losses and a massive repair bill.^{[134] [135]} Closer to home, Iran is the dominant player in the yet-to-recover Iraq. Iran has a unique geography. The ring of mountains and the Persian Gulf make its defences difficult to breach. It also possesses a nuclear and missile program.^{[136] [137]} Economically, Iran is self-sustaining but heavily sanctioned. China and Russia trade with Iran, ignoring wider sanctions. The market for energy in China is lucrative. In time, Arabian oil and gas might be piped to China via Iran. Some, including Syrian President Assad, have proposed the opposite, that is, piping Iranian and Arabian gas and oil through Syria and then to Europe via Turkey, while others have proposed piping under the Mediterranean via Israel.^[138] However, with the completion of the Nord Stream^[139] gas distribution complex between Russian and Germany under the Baltic (Ost) Sea, it is unlikely that gas piped from Arabia would be cheaper than direct access to Russian gas. With Nord Stream, Germany becomes a major European distribution hub, yet again increasing its influence in Europe. Critically, Iran has a relatively young population, sufficient arable land, sound industrial base, good geostrategic location and significant oil reserves, which make it a key Eurasian node and a useful complement to Russia and China.

The international isolation of Russia, China and Iran created a natural partnership that is strategically significant. Russia, China and Iran share more similar views than differences and have thus defied the trends of the ‘new global order’. Inadvertently, European and Anglo-American^[140] pressure pushed the three states together, creating new and unfamiliar security and economic dynamics. A new normal has yet to emerge. In disregard to Mackinder’s warning, the pressure created an entente—but the entente did not emerge from a standing start.  The entente resulted from the natural consequences of the Soviet collapse; the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization^[141] (2002) based on the former Soviet states’ need for security; the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement^[142] (2003) to enable economic development; and the Eurasian Economic Union^[143] (2014) with an ‘integrated single market’ of 180 million people. Those arrangements built on historic contacts, economic history and military agreements. With a population in excess of 1.5 billion and combined economy nearing $15 trillion^[144], the entente possesses the intellectual, financial, material and population resources to embark on nationally and collectively beneficial projects. In addition, the three possess sufficient collective military strength operating along difficult to interdict interior lines that none can be easily defeated or contained without great cost to an antagonist. The key to the creation of the entente was Russia’s forced pivot to China.^[145]

Since the dawn of time, trade has traversed Eurasia, reaching its peak during the 15th century. Trade using camel caravans occurred over the ‘silk roads’^[146] for both internal trade and trade with Europe. From the 15th century, as the Mongol dominance declined, land trade also declined while maritime trade flourished. The Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French and English merchants drove maritime trade from the Atlantic coast of Europe. The European ‘Rimlanders’ not only benefited from the maritime trade, but added wealth and power by becoming colonialists. The colonies emerged from the expansion of their ‘trading posts’ and ‘safe harbours’ into empires that lasted several hundred years. While the maritime states flourished, it remained obvious that land trade was feasible but the infrastructure and institutions to facilitate continental trade were lacking. Some individuals, Russians^[147] in particular, proposed versions of a new ‘silk road’ and the development of Eurasia for their benefit; but they lacked the resources to actualise their concepts. In addition, Britain was wary of any threats to India ‘from the north’, so a ‘great game’ between Russia ‘looking south’ for ports and natural barriers played out in the Caucasus and Central Asia.^[148] At the same time, Russian efforts to become part of Europe, which started during the time of Czar Peter the Great, have been continually resisted. The ‘game’ ensured little development occurred. It was only late in the 19th century that a rail link allowed trans-Eurasian rail travel from Lisbon to Vladivostok, with changes due to differing gauges. The Lisbon-Vladivostok link was irrelevant as a trade route during the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ European wars of the 20th century; but during World War II the Russian section ensured Lend-Lease^[149] material from America reached Russian forces on the eastern and Manchurian fronts. Concurrent with the European conflicts were the uprisings that ended the Qing dynasty in 1911-12, the Second Chinese-Japanese war of 1937-45, and the Chinese Civil War of 1937-49. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the reordering and opening of the Eurasian states is triggering economic growth. Projects that have been beyond national capacities can now be developed and incorporated into grander designs.^{[150] [151]} The concurrent resurgence of China, Russia and Iran and their entente provide the real possibility of Eurasia development. Historic concepts based on the silk roads have been revived, modernised and laid out in the Chinese Belts and Road Initiative (BRI) and similar Russian concepts.^{[152] [153]}

The BRI is widely published, critiqued, politicised and opposed.^[154] BRI contains both maritime and terrestrial connections between China, Africa, Europe and Australasia. Over 100 economies and six economic corridors that radiate from China are incorporated into the BRI.^[155] The maritime components will continue, but will struggle against ‘Rimlander’ resistance^[156] and become a distraction from where the main investment and innovations will occur. For security and economic reasons, the Eurasian portions will ultimately receive priority. Achieving the necessary infrastructure will be multi-generational, but is within the capacity of modern engineering and finances. Expanding Eurasian land transport will open up Eurasia and take pressure off current international ports, canals and shipping systems.^[157] As the land infrastructure is developed, maritime infrastructure will decline in significance, but is unlikely to disappear, since it will remain important to facilitate trade with the rest of the world.

To justify the development, estimates indicate that land transport costs of containers from China to Europe across Eurasia are much lower and take half the time of seaborne transit.^{[158] [159]} States within the entente’s ‘triangle of influence’ will clearly benefit from resource exploration, discovery and exploitation. Over time, Eurasia will see mega-mines and quarries opening, supported by an interconnected grid of super-highways and fast bulk carrying railroads. Gas and oil pipelines will supply the points of need with energy. Water sourced from new dams will supply communities, agribusinesses, mines and industries, using canals or pipelines crisscrossing and opening up the land. To facilitate information collation and dissemination, modern terrestrial and orbiting telecommunications will be incorporated. The value of Eurasia could also rise if the forecast global warming^[160] changes shift the productive agricultural zones north.^[161] Connecting Eurasian natural resources with manufacturing hubs has begun. Gas pipelines and economic corridors exist between Russia and China,^[162] with additional agreements reached for railways and canals connecting China to the Indian Ocean. Recent agreement for pipelines and railways connecting China and Iran have also been finalised.

Significantly, the China-Iran^[163] deal displaced Indian-Iranian^[164] plans due to the easier financing offered by China. Construction payment will be via a combination of barter, novel financial products or control agreements, not necessarily by hard currencies.^[165]  For instance, the new railways and pipelines across Iran, through Central Asia to China, require the provision of Iranian oil to China for 25 years.^[166] While the principal beneficiaries will be inside the ‘triangle’, states outside of the ‘triangle’ will benefit if they are willing to engage under the entente’s rules,^[167] in particular non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, mutually beneficial trade, win-win initiatives and adherence to international laws.

Australia has, over 200 years, blossomed into a First World state with one of the highest living standards, incomes and life expectancy.^[168] The flourishing is due to the unique combination of security, geography, resource and population factors, which has meshed with the needs of global markets. For many politicians, industrialists, agriculturalists and citizens there is a poor appreciation that the trends that have brought us to this point are changing. There is limited understanding of the implications arising from the actions and pressures that are occurring in Eurasia. While political, economic and cultural changes take considerable time, the potential for Australia to fall into the ‘boiling frog’s’ experience is possible, even probable. If Australia is not attuned to the sounds and motions of the world, time may not favour Australia.

For Mackinder, Australia is an Outer Island. As an Outer Island Australia is irrelevant to the Eurasia machinations. The simple Australian story begins as an island-continent that was vast and undeveloped by European standards, with unknown resources and a seemingly sparse population of semi-nomadic Aboriginal people.^[169] While claimed in 1770 by Britain, settlement did not occur until 1788. For the British, no power existed within the continent which Europeans could recognise or who could contest or resist external forces. It is telling that Australia was the last continent settled and required very few troops and ships to secure it from internal or external threats. Australians have felt sufficiently secure^[170] so that they generally see security through either British or American eyes and have deployed and continue to expect their forces to act as auxiliaries in those two powers’ wars. Only during the Pacific War did Australia feel the need for a different form of military and economic security. During the war, Australia survived air, sea and land raids by Japan, which touched Darwin, Broome, New Guinea (as it was known then) and even Sydney from bases in the Indonesian-Philippines-New Guinea archipelago. After the war, in recognition of its vulnerability, Australia embarked on a significant program of European migration^[171] and industrialisation.^[172]

From the initial landings and settlements, Australia moved from being a penal colony, to an English ‘farm’ and now a global ‘farm, quarry and mine’. For a brief period during the 1950s to 1980s, Australia conceived, established, developed and maintained a political-military-industrial-agricultural complex that could be mobilised in a ‘time of war’. In effect, Australia anticipated fighting the last war again, just better. However, from the 1980s, Australia abandoned the post-war approach and shifted to the globalist ‘farm-quarry-mine’ structure that efficiently feeds the ‘global system’ with large quantities of easily extracted, high-quality ores, natural gas, coal and significant volumes of some of the finest and purest produce available anywhere. Ships move the ores, minerals, energy and produce, though airfreight does move high-value, low-volume^[173] produce. Australia’s dominant position as a global supplier of minerals, produce and energy relies on inherent natural resources, advanced technology, large amounts of foreign capital and sophisticated logistic management. National capabilities that did not support the globalist ‘farm-quarry-mine’ paradigm have slowly withered, been abandoned, dismantled or ‘right-sized’. What happened to the economy matched the similar abandoning, dismantling and ‘right-sizing’ of the military complex.^[174] Initially the key markets were in Europe, then Japan and now China. Due to the massive reliance on China, any changes to the Chinese market significantly affect Australia. While political disputes have affected Australian exports to China, the most serious future threat will be easier Chinese access to Eurasian ores and produce at similar standards and cheaper prices.

The economic cost of losing Chinese trade is significant. Trade between Australia and China is asymmetric, with Australia much more dependent on China than China is on Australia. In May 2020, China accounted for 47% of Australian exports, while exports to Australia from China amount to 2% of all Chinese exports. As for imports to China, Australia supplies 7% of their imported goods, while China supplies Australia with 33% of all imported goods. There is also a large disparity in the nature of trade. Australian exports are predominately commodities, of which 16% are processed commodities and 4% are manufactured goods. Only 2.5% of Australian goods are ‘elaborately transformed’, or ‘complex manufactured’. In contrast, 93% of China’s exports to Australia are manufactured and 87% are ‘complex manufactured’. As a rule, exports to China are low value per unit, but shipped in large volumes; and those exports earn approximately $100 million for every million tonnes. In contrast, China’s exports are high value, earning more than $3 billion for every million tonnes. In addition, students and tourism account for $16 billion and financial services earn $700 million for Australia. Australia exists as a simple provider of raw materials and a customer for finished goods. Unlike ASEAN,^[175] Europe or America, which have complementary and integrated manufacturing operations in or with China, no goods are shipped from China to Australia for processing before export to third countries.^[176]

In 2020, Australia received a taste of what disruption to trade with China would be like. China closed its markets to Australian coal, copper, cotton, barley, wine and seafood and restricted the import of meats.^[177] In addition to unilateral Chinese action, closing Australia’s borders due to the pandemic stopped Chinese students coming and tourists from visiting. The halt to people flows was significant, since China is the largest single source of students and tourists. The cost of the most recent disruption to trade is approximately $34 billion, or 22% of sales and 8% of exports.^[178]  Alternative markets or a rethink of the Australian economic concept are required if the loss of Chinese trade becomes pervasive. The reductions experienced in 2020 were overcome by finding alternate buyers. For instance, while coal experts to China were down 83%, the overall drop was only 8% after sales increases to India, Japan and South Korea. Likewise, barley, copper, wine and seafood were sold to other buyers, but not necessarily on a replacement market basis. However, there is a real concern in the ability to find an alternate buyer of iron ore.^[179] Around 700 million tonnes of Australian iron ore was shipped to China in 2020. No other state imports as much. Alternative markets in Europe, Japan, South Korea and India together only require 260 million tonnes—and they already have suppliers. It is widely known that China is working to reduce the significance of Australia’s iron ore sales by developing mines in alternate states and reopening mothballed Chinese mines. There appear to be no viable alternate markets for Australian iron ore.^[18] So too, wool exports are heavily dependent on China. China takes 75% of the clip and, as with iron ore, no alternate market can take the volume supplied to China.^[181] As for Chinese products imported into Australia, China has a dominant share in 68 of the top 100 types of goods shipped into Australia. Cutting off access to Chinese goods would remove essential supplies, such as pharmaceuticals, semi-conductors and electronics, which would be extremely difficult to replace.^[182] Australia is the world’s largest supplier of bauxite and alumina, but shockingly must import 100% of the needed aluminium flat products, affecting many industries, such as shipbuilding. Another example is fuel. Australia has failed to retain the internationally agreed 90 days of oil reserves due to declining storage capacity and refining facilities. The Government claims that obligations are met by a strategy of purchasing oil and then holding it abroad either on ships or in some other countries’ storage tanks. In addition, the Government counts oil in transit as part of the 90 days holdings. How the oil held abroad would be delivered has not been adequately addressed, nor how we would deal with decisions by the holding countries to refuse to release the fuel.^[183]

The Australian Productivity Commission conducted an analysis of Australia’s supply chain, using 80% as the threshold for vulnerability.^{[184] [185]} In a paper on the economic consequences for Australia of being cut off from the Chinese markets, the author indicates that the threshold set by the Productivity Commission was arbitrary and had the impact of downplaying supply chain dangers.^[186] With an 80% threshold, as little as 5% of Australia’s imports are vulnerable to disruption. However, the advent of economic impacts stemming from the coronavirus pandemic on supply chains, through an inability to sustain the flow rates required by just-in-time economics coupled with panic buying and distribution problems due to work restrictions, forced the Government to acknowledge the warnings from many stakeholders and individuals who considered that the current approach was fragile. In response to the vulnerability of Australian trade to disruption, a ‘resilience initiative’ was announced in late 2020. The ‘initiative’ then expanded to include Japan and India in a trilateral review in April 2021.^[187] These reviews seem to admit that a profound economic shift needs to occur.

The loss of export markets causes a reduction in demand, lower prices, reduced activity and reduced national income. The loss of imports creates limited supply, higher prices and bottlenecks. The experience of a disruption to globalised economics is not unique to Australia. The current heavy emphasis on single major market exports and imports served Australia well while the security and economic environments were benign. As the environment becomes increasingly turbulent, Australia becomes vulnerable to coercion. In effect, ‘Australian globalisation’ as executed by politicians, bureaucrats and corporations, has failed or is failing as an economic strategy for turbulent times. Some commentators are starting to say that globalisation has peaked.^[188] Moreover, that peaking is for political rather than economic reasons. During times of uncertainty, an alternative strategy is required. With the clear evidence of geopolitk and economic turbulence, ‘regionalisation’ is emerging as a viable solution.^[189] Regionally, states’ interests are more closely aligned and practical solutions easier to find. As a result, new sources of resources will emerge, new manufacturing centres will be built and transportation improved to cope with a less just-in-time economic model. Regardless of the strategy selected, the economy will need to mitigate the effects of coercion by reducing single sources of supply and lone buyers. Re-industrialising in critical self-sufficiency and self-defence areas, and rebalancing mining and primary production to match lower demand, are obvious changes. In addition, services industries must de-financialise and optimise to finance productive effort.^[190] Profound infrastructural, educational, environmental and social changes would follow. Change is possible if we remember that, between 1939 and 1941, Australia reorganised its economy and placed industries on a ‘war footing’.^[191] The shifts during the 1940s and into the 1950s offer pointers as to what Australia needs to do if Eurasian development significantly and permanently affects Australia’s relevance in a Eurasian-centric global economy.

Reliance on globalisation needs to make way for a strategy more in tune with the times and capable of being optimised to reality. One strategy is to develop a modernised version of the post-World War II mercantilism. A return to mercantilism would better balance Australia to meet the changes that are likely to emerge from the advent of a ‘greater Eurasian partnership’. However, how we would be able to make mercantilism sustainable, if we could not previously do so, makes this approach unattractive, but possible. Another strategy is to develop a regional trading bloc incorporating Australia, Indonesian, Philippines and Papua New Guinea (PNG, as it is now) as core states. The small Pacific states, Malaysia and French Territories could join, if they were inclined. The Indonesian-Philippines-PNG archipelagic triangle has a population of approximately 330 million people that could act as a creative pool, labour force and internal market. In addition, the area has significant mineral deposits and energy reserves. Couple those attributes with Australian minerals, energy and agriculture, it is possible to conceive of a viable economic bloc with significant security and economic potential. Rather than ship raw material to Eurasia, plants in Indonesia, Philippines or PNG could undertake the processing and production of goods suited to our environmentally unique region. Care will need to be taken, since each state has unique historical factors and dissimilar legal, religious and commercial practices. However, globalisation has given us insights into how to combine important commercial attributes; sustaining unique customs, traditions and cultures will need additional consideration. In effect, it might be possible to combine the best of the Westphalian and globalist systems without the pitfalls—much like the Eurasian states propose in their ‘partnership’. Such a bloc has not been necessary previously but might provide a win-win for each of our states and ensure their freedom, security and prosperity.

From a security perspective, Australia is now more vulnerable than it has ever been.^[192] Australia has relied on its distance from Eurasia, ‘partnerships’ with ‘superpowers’,^[193]194^[32] and the buffer offered by the Indonesian-Philippines-PNG archipelagic triangle. The combination of factors has provided a ‘peace dividend’ by keeping military spending low. Any state aiming to engage in combat with Australia has, up to now, needed to secure, use parts of, or transit through the ‘archipelagic triangle’. The current view is that a Eurasian opponent—since no regional state is powerful or interested enough to threaten Australia—would use the seas to move their forces whilst under land-based air cover from key sites in the ‘archipelagic triangle’. As such, bottling an opponent in their Eurasian bases by prohibiting the use of the South China, East China, Yellow, Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas, while further controlling the choke points leading from those seas into the open oceans or into the ‘triangle’, has been considered vital. The denial strategy is why Australian air and naval forces are emphasised. If they did break out, perforate the ‘triangle’ and touched Australia, the Army only needs to hold long enough for British or American counteractions to save the day. The strategy explains why the Army is a mix of limited capabilities, not optimised for archipelagic or continental combat and not even partially war ready.^[195] The blocking concept is deeply ingrained in the thoughts of allies, academics, military and politicians. The general population have little to no idea as to where their sons are likely to die or why.

The advent of a sophisticated intelligence-combat complex using satellites, missiles,^[196] submarines, computers, weapons using ‘new physical principles’^[197] and airborne or special forces means that traditional Australian notions of ‘warning time’, threat approaches and counter strategies are moot.^[198] Modern warfare is chiefly about ‘contactless long-range strike with precision area or point effect systems’.^[199] ‘Troop contact’ is restricted to the essentials. Infrastructure can now be precisely located in three-dimensional space and critical facilities within structures precisely plotted and held in targeting databases.^[200] Targeting databases not only contain target details, but also finding, tracking and treatment information. The advent of ‘always on’ communications means that key personnel and systems can be identified, monitored and tracked with sufficient fidelity that they can be precisely targeted. While mobile systems present a targeting problem, surveillance systems using hyper-spectral sensors, large databases and artificial intelligence have improved to the point where even camouflage and deception are increasingly difficult. Pattern setting before or after an event are also hard to avoid. The probability of survival of systems rests in part on the environment in which they operate. Surface ships are especially vulnerable due to their low speed and easy detectability. Militarily, surfaces ships are juicy targets for land, air or sea-launched anti-ship missiles. Land systems in open terrain are as vulnerable as surface ships, especially with the advent of drones, but depending on their characteristics, in restricted terrain, less so. While air systems still have speed as a means of survival, probably the safest systems operate underwater. As for striking systems, the advent of hypersonic missiles, high-speed torpedoes and drones equipped with specialised warheads or sub-munitions means that ‘near nuclear’ or precisely modulated destruction and low collateral effects can be achieved. Where less or specific destruction is needed, sophisticated non-explosive systems and warheads have been developed and used.^{[201] [202]} Many of the new striking systems are currently difficult, if not impossible, to sense or detect, let alone defeat. The suite of sophisticated attack systems makes counter or defence systems costly and burdensome, such that without massive expense few will benefit from those protections. The ‘critical component’^[203] of these new systems tends to be ‘speed’, leading to an increase in the defensive need to use ‘artificial intelligence’ that manifests in independent computer algorithm/machine decisions and actions.^[204] The systems of strategic danger present ‘sense-decide-effect’ conundrums that make many small to medium states vulnerable to modern kill/action chains or webs.^[205]

Defining the problem or determining the objective are the main ways to arrive at a viable solution.^[206] No one wants to prepare for the wrong war^[207] or economic future. However, defining a problem or the objective correctly is more difficult than it seems. It is usually only in hindsight that we can know how correct we were.^[208] Militarily, few thirst for war and most would prefer to see the military used to prevent war, so that their communities could live in peace.^[209] Where prevention has failed, then resisting invasion or coercion are precursors to actions compelling the earliest surrender of an invader or there will be no lasting peace.^[210] How to create a secure environment requires keen observation of the strategic conditions and nature of war. Orienting on the strategic situation as it is, not as you want it, in terms of threats, opponents, objectives and the forms of operations is crucial. Deciding, based on sound judgment defines the deterrent, combative and supporting tasks which need to be manned, equipped and trained for. Australia’s current public approach rests on the 2020 Defence Strategic Update^[211], which highlights the acceleration of change and the increasing complexity of the strategic environment. The Update does not identify the emergence of a ‘greater Eurasian entente’, which affects both military and economic prospects. The Update is supported by the 2020 Force Structure Plan^[212], which identifies the capability ‘adjustments’ required to meet the Update’s challenges— adjustments that are often ‘budget’ rather than ‘preparedness’ driven. Through both documents, Defence urges the need for constant vigilance to ensure that Defence continues to adapt and respond. Unsurprisingly, both those documents are supported by classified versions, databases and supporting guidance that amplify and detail the approach. However, none of those documents are tightly coupled to what could be considered ‘war plans’ or ‘training regimes’ to best execute those plans, nor drive capability acquisition.

In contrast to what is stated and assumed, Australia uses a ‘just-in-time’ approach to planning^[213], since it is often surprised, expects to be an auxiliary member to a ‘great power’, prefers to keep its options open, aims to  keep costs low and likes to ‘give diplomacy a chance’.^[214] Thus, deployment and action plans tend to be poorly deduced, considered and developed.^[215] In addition, there is heavy reliance on implied and explicit American capability guidance for a war in north Asia, which makes sovereign capacity to act elsewhere difficult, costly and problematic.^[216] The result is questionable acquisitions in terms of effect, type and numbers, undermining the ethical, economic, effective and efficient use of taxpayers’ money.^{[217] [218] [219]} Getting ‘what to do’, ‘how to do it’ and ‘what to use in doing it’ wrong has seen civilisations, empires and states destroyed, many never to recover.^[220]

As the ‘war drums’^[221] begin to sound in the Indo-Pacific,^[222] it is envisaged by many that the Americans will lead a coalition, including Australia, in a war with China.^{[223] [224] [225]}  A Pacific war is appearing to be more likely as operations in Eastern Europe become less likely. Few in Australia seem to believe China has any allies or international support.^{[226] [227]} Fewer think that its focus is likely to be on the development of its core interests in Eurasia, whilst secured by anti-access systems to the east.^[228] The Chinese assess that they are being ‘contained’ by America, and its proxies, and to break the ‘containment’ they need to accelerate the expansion of their economy. The Chinese also believe that as China's GDP approaches and then exceeds that of America’s, it will be the death knell for America’s hegemony..^{[229] [230]} China has also made clear what their ‘red lines’ are.^[231] Polls suggest that Australians prefer to be neutral in any conflict between America and China.^[232] Regardless, as with the case of Russia and Iran, academic, military and industry advocates and fiction writers are all writing of the ‘coming war’ to justify military funding, ^[233] promote  provocative actions ^[234] and  creating fear in the community. ^[235] Clear provocative actions include sailing within the Straits of Taiwan and proposing to deploy hyper-velocity missile batteries under American control in the first island chain. The multi-domain campaigns lead Australian planners to believe our forces will have time to prepare. Developers are leading the charge to procure equipment so that troops can be mobilised and forces deployed to the battle areas. Once in those areas, the troops will be ready for operations under American command. The slow build-up is conventional practice, telegraphs intent and is vulnerable to surprise strike. Ideally, planners hope a war will result in few losses or negative impacts on Australia.^[236] While American and other coalition forces will be engaged, Australia is also in the firing line. For the first time, from the moment hostilities begin, long-range missiles from Eurasia or submarines in the Pacific and/or the Indian oceans can strike Australian politicians, infrastructure, armed forces and vital resources.^[237] Concurrently, we would expect devastating cyber and strikes by weapons using ‘new physical principles’, masked to make the discovery of their points of origin difficult to determine. All the necessary targeting and shaping work will occur prior to conflict breaking out. To make matters worse, it is conceivable that specialised forces will ‘unmask’ and conduct targeted operations at close range, or in direct contact with infrastructure and people. If necessary, long-range military and/or civilian transports could deliver airborne forces to key terrain in a series of coups de main.^[238] Without doubt, surprise landings will be synchronised with missile, cyber or weapons using ‘new physical principles’ strikes. The shock of the orchestrated physical, psychological and information actions could ‘knock Australia out’ of the conflict. While it might seem fanciful that such a combination of actions would occur, it is now possible and needs to be guarded against. The demonstration of power such actions would display would accord with the notion that ‘to scare the monkey you slay the chicken’,^[239] or it could be an economy of effort action. The perception that Australia is invulnerable to serious attack, or that the focus would be elsewhere, is rapidly becoming delusional and for some Australian theorists the concept of ‘not losing’^[240] is now elementary.^[241]

As with the economy, the security domain is changing and adjustments will need to be carefully considered. Both the security and economic strategies need to be harmonised in order to avoid dissonance. If regionalisation is accepted as the economic model, then the security model will probably need to be regionalised too. A regional security pact might be built around the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA)^[242] or lessons learnt from it. However, retaining extra-regional elements, like Britain, would send a message of weakness and not accord with regionalisation. The current FPDA retains most of the forces in their home locations, but that is unlikely to be sound. To create an effective regional security setting, participating states might need to employ the idea of a ‘hedgehog’ with sufficient ‘multi-domain’ strength deployed in their operating areas to deter, resist or defeat extra-regional forces. To build the force, burden sharing should be based on the inherent strengths and wealth of each state. As for operating concepts, ‘non-nuclear multi-dimensional contactless combat’ is here, will remain for some time and should be embraced. Given the unique tropical archipelagic nature of the operating environment, novel^[243], as well as traditional and emerging systems, could find a place in the security mix and create an asymmetric advantage. Of special concern will be the common boundary with China that runs in the South China Sea. Developing strategies to deal with a border with a great power is not a new problem. There are many historical lessons that can be employed to ensure security for each party.

In conclusion, this paper has developed the thesis that the global security and economic systems are shifting from a relatively stable state that has been based on unipolar security and maritime trade assumptions, to one shaken by the advent of a ‘greater Eurasian partnership’ driven by the emerging entente between Russia, China and Iran. The entente has emerged due to a confluence of historic and modern factors, which means that around 50% of the Eurasian landmass can be controlled and exploited using terrestrial systems. The exploration for and exploitation of the resources within the influence of the entente threatens to undermine the extant maritime trade system and the application of sea power as a political determinant. In some respects, the development of Eurasia is akin to the modernisation of the ‘silk roads’ which flourished during the time of the Mongols, but on a grander scale. This development will not occur overnight, but indicators are pointing in that direction. In effect, the prediction of Mackinder that no one state should be allowed to control the Eurasian Heartland is coming to pass; and that the notion of ‘containment’ by a maritime bloc that Spykman advocated is becoming irrelevant.

For Australia, the shift has significant security and economic impacts. Australia flourished during the period when commerce was centred on maritime movement of ore, fossil fuels and primary produce to European or Asian markets and factories on the Eurasian rim, in particular China. Australian resources were critical, since Eurasia was underdeveloped. While the unique quantity and quality of Australian ores, natural gas and produce was important, Australia’s proximity to Japan and now China was unequalled and highly profitable. For many, the current wealth generation system is never-ending and unchallengeable. However, the cost of Australian exports, Australian-Chinese antagonism, and the desire of Eurasian states to benefit from the vast Chinese demand, as well as a Chinese decision to diversify their sources, has led to the development of new sources of supply in Eurasia. The experiences of the political struggle with China and the turbulence of the pandemic are clear indicators of future strife. Developing new Eurasian sources for Chinese factories and populations will be a multi-generational enterprise. New pipelines, railroads and highways have either been constructed or planned to connect resources, factories and customers across Eurasia. While it will be some time before Eurasian suppliers can overtake Australia on economic grounds, political-security factors are now beginning to impact Australia’s ability to be the ‘source of choice’ and driving change. We are seeing dangerous cracks in globalisation, as practised by Australia, and it’s time to consider a return to mercantilism, the creation of an Indonesian-Philippines-PNG trading partnership, or to develop some other economic strategy.

Australia remains outside the natural lines of historic conflict and retains a physical buffer from Eurasia. However, current security strategies are being undermined by modern intelligence-combat systems that employ modern targeting systems designed for ‘contactless war’. The development and deployment of advanced systems by Eurasian states makes key Australian leaders, forces, resources and infrastructure vulnerable to missile strikes, cyber-attacks or weapons using ‘new physical principles’ that can be deployed over or across the Indonesian-Philippines-PNG archipelagic triangle. Additionally, the advent of modern military and civilian air transport makes an airborne coup de main—supported or in support of the various strike systems from Eurasia—a real possibility. Given the striking ability of modern states, relying on American counteraction may be problematic. The concept that ‘warning time’ exists and that similar mobilisation models to those previously used will suffice, is questionable and places the freedom, security and prosperity of Australia in danger. As with the economy, a deep appraisal of our security situation is essential. If regionalisation drives the economic model, it should also drive the security model, otherwise dissonance will emerge. In essence, security and economics are separated at one’s peril.

The problems presented in this paper are not intractable, and other states have experienced worse situations. A solution will require far deeper political, economic, military and scientific thought, experimentation and investment than is customary in Australia. To prosper and retain its sovereignty in a Eurasian epoch, Australia will need to quickly learn, improvise, adapt and overcome.

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Synopsis

This paper explores the thought that the most pressing national security and economic challenge facing Australia is an emerging epoch in which a Eurasian bloc changes the power and economic direction of the globe. The paper identifies Russia, China and Iran as a ‘greater Eurasian entente’ that will coordinate the development of Eurasia for the prosperity and security of their peoples. As Mackinder warned, if an entity can control Eurasia, reliance on sea power and seaborne trade will become a liability. Many of the economic and security indicators point to Mackinder’s warning coming to pass.  The paper explores how Russia, China and Iran merged into an entente and what the economic and security implications are for Australia.  The paper advocates deep consideration of the economic and security implications if the thesis is even partially correct.

Acknowledgements

Major Stephen Wagener, Mr Nicholas Basan and Ms Sophie Wilkens, through their prompting, knowledge, advice and patience, were instrumental in the development of this paper.