Australian military planners are grappling with a grey-zone Chinese shaping strategy that threatens to disrupt[1] ‘stability, security and sovereignty’[2] in the Indo-Pacific. China’s strategy utilises a whole-of-government approach to influence competitors and potential partners through all means short of war. Wolf-warrior diplomacy[3] , global Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI)[4] and the application of debt trap diplomacy[5] have attracted the interest and ire of nations everywhere[6] . In this competition, regional partnerships are core to the long term shaping objectives of both Australia and China. Without these partnerships it will prove far more difficult for either nation to achieve their desired end-states[7] . Potential partners seemingly have two options; the Chinese offer of extensive development and wealth with the potential for long term servitude, versus the Australian offer of ethical treatment and support with the assurance of long term sovereignty and the rule of international law – at least that is the narrative Australia is trying to sell, a narrative that is hypocritical and historically flawed.
For the last sixty years, Australia has been Timor’s bully, taking what it wanted and disregarding international rules.[8] Nested within this dark period of Australian international diplomacy are ethical failures that reaffirm the importance of integrity, honesty and mateship in the current complex geo-strategic environment. If Australia is to sell a convincing narrative and employ an effective counter-shaping strategy to the Chinese endeavours it must address core ethical issues; Australia must establish an ethically principled whole-of-government framework to shape the near region and build a network of nations committed to ‘stability, security and sovereignty’ in the Indo-Pacific.
‘Shaping’ – the Strategic-Policy conundrum
In the last five years, the Australian Government has attempted to adapt its Defence policy to the changing geo-strategic environment. It has identified a number of challenges that must be addressed if Australia is to succeed.
In the 2016 Defence White Paper the Australian Government identified a number of strategic drivers that would shape the region by 2035. While all are important, the one most relevant to this paper is the second strategic driver – ‘challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order[9] , including competition between countries and major powers trying to promote their interests outside of the established rules’[10] – as it focuses less on the kinetic modalities of war and more on the challenges facing soft power enforcement (‘shaping’). It recognises the importance of building alliances, strengthening laws and the interconnectedness of global networks that reinforces whole-of-government involvement. Given Australia’s smaller power stature relative to regional competitors such as China, this driver offers challenges and opportunities that must be adequately addressed to shape the regional balance of power.
Building on concepts identified in the 2016 Defence White Paper, the 2020 Defence Strategic Update provides policy direction to ‘shape, deter and respond’ to the shifting geo-strategic environment. Australia’s acquisitions, military displays and joint exercises send a message to the public and the region that Australia is ready and able to deter and respond with military force. Whilst the objectives to ‘deter’ and ‘respond’ can be considered predominantly military-focussed pursuits, the objective to ‘shape’ must be viewed as a whole-of-government endeavour in which all departments act in concert. Finance, trade, health, policing, intelligence and communications all contribute to the diplomatic challenges and opportunities within the complex geo-strategic environment. They set the preconditions for military responses and therefore must be aligned within a shaping strategy in order to increase the chances of success.
However, perhaps the primary conundrum with the ‘shaping’ strategy is that it omits a principled foundation to guide the whole-of-government activities. At the strategic and doctrinal level these principles would offer a form of mission command by articulating the framework for all subsequent actions. Without these distinguishable principles it may prove challenging to consistently and positively influence other nations in the near region to align with Australia, as diverging actions could cause mistrust in Canberra’s intent. If Australia cannot create stronger relationships then it cannot succeed, as kinetic military endeavours would arguably struggle in any direct confrontation unless part of a larger coalition.[11] Therefore Australia needs strong relationships that support its aims to ensure ‘stability, security and sovereignty in our immediate region’[12] . But why would a nation side with Australia if they are getting something better from a competitor? As a middle power, it is unlikely that Australia can offer a greater quantity of reasons, but perhaps it can offer a greater quality. This paper will argue that an ethically qualitative approach can lay a foundation for success in Australian shaping activities in the near region.
Why will this work? The answers lie in the ethical failures from Australia’s past.
A snapshot of Australia’s ethical failures in shaping Timor
Australian actions with Timor since the 1960s raises legitimate questions about the ethics and morality of Australian strategic shaping and decision-making. When considering the following timeline of events, ask yourself what benefit a clearly defined ethically principled shaping strategy would have on Australia’s strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific?
In the 1960s, maritime natural resource exploration and mining technology offered economic opportunities but also raised concerns over sovereign sea jurisdiction. The Timor Sea was one such region that contained trillions of cubic feet of natural gas and hundreds of millions of barrels of crude oil[13] . However, before extraction could begin, the maritime borders and jurisdiction rights had to be de-conflicted between Australia, Indonesia and Portugal[14] . In 1962, Australia attempted to establish these borders by making a ‘continental shelf[15] claim that extended to the Timor Trough[16] and ran to within 75kms of the Timorese coast’[17] . Australian oil exploration permits were issued before Indonesia and Portugal could negotiate the initial maritime border claims. Whilst Canberra’s claim was not unwarranted, it presaged the questionably tactless and diplomatically short-sighted decisions that Australia would become known for in the ensuing years.
Australia’s decision was rejected by Indonesia and Portugal, who insisted that boundaries should be established between the three states at a median line. However, this would invalidate many of the exploration permits, as the resources would reside outside Australia’s jurisdiction. Consequently, in 1972 the Timor Treaty was codified[18] with Indonesia which recognised a ‘maritime border halfway between the Timor trough and the median line’[19] , seemingly a good outcome for both parties. Again, however, Australia’s integrity was drawn into question as a 1970 report from the Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources (BMR) identified that, despite the existence of the Timor Trough, both Australia and Timor were on the same continental shelf.[20] This essentially meant that Indonesia could have made the same claims as Australia; had Canberra not buried it[21] . After succeeding with these disingenuous negotiations, Australia soon turned their attention to Portugal in order to finalise the border agreements along the ‘Timor Gap’[22] . This would prove fruitless as the Portuguese were overthrown in 1974 by Timorese independence elements.
The overthrow of the Portuguese presented Canberra with a number of difficult decisions that required tactful negotiation and strategic foresight to minimise the chances of destabilising the region and maximising the benefits to Australia. Australia decided to openly support the Timorese rights to self-determination –reflecting its commitment to freedom. However, behind closed doors a completely different discussion was being had. Canberra and Jakarta were concerned that Timor would not be economically viable, leaving it vulnerable to a communist takeover.[23] Australia was also conscious that the maritime resources in the region would be easier to claim if Timor became an Indonesian territory. After considering these factors, Canberra privately endorsed Jakarta’s desire to incorporate Timor into Indonesia.[24] This sort of mixed messaging did little to build a foundation of trust with either party and highlighted the ugly underbelly of Australia’s international diplomacy – that a partnership with Australia might provide short term gains, but it could also raise long term concerns.
Indonesia invaded Timor in 1975 in what became an extremely violent occupation, with reports of over 100 000 dead due to famine alone[25] , and, conveniently, a fortuitous economic opportunity for Australia. Although the widespread violence did not suit the narrative that Australia was trying to influence, the relationship with Indonesia would certainly pay dividends for Australia’s maritime mining objectives. In 1979 Canberra ‘recognised East Timor as an Indonesian territory’[26] and the Timor Gap Treaty was signed ten years later, allowing Indonesia and Australia to extract resources from the Timor Gap. However, Indonesia’s Suharto Government collapsed in 1998, once more prompting Australian attempts to favourably shape the outcome.
The new Habibie Government, supported by Canberra,[27] proposed a referendum on independence for Timor but also required a swift Australian review of the Timor Gap Treaty to ensure mining continuity.[28] In 1999 the East Timorese people overwhelmingly voted for independence resulting in rampant violence and an Australian-led UN intervention, but it wasn’t until 2002 that Timor-Leste[29] formally gained its independence.[30] In that same year, Australia removed ‘itself from the compulsory jurisdiction of UNCLOS[31] on maritime boundary disputes’[32] . This pre-emptive move meant that Australia could not be bound by any decisions enforced by the provision in an international court. Australia’s actions stand in stark contrast to the rules-based global order that Australia expects of other nations today.[33] Although Australia had agreed to a 90/10 split in favour of Timor-Leste under the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in 2003,[34] Canberra wanted an 80% stake in the Greater Sunrise Oil Field, the largest oil field in the region and estimated to be worth over $50 billion[35] . Dili rejected this offer on the basis of UNCLOS, but as the poorest country in the region,[36] was in a difficult negotiating position and needed a quick resolution.
Negotiations for the Greater Sunrise Oil Field continued until 2007[37] when both nations agreed to a 50/50 split, however this too would be invalidated over concerns related to Australia’s integrity.[38] In 2012 it was revealed that Australian spies had bugged Dili government offices in order to gain leverage over the negotiations in order to understand the Timorese ‘bottom line’[39] . When Dili appealed the decision at The Hague on the basis of unethical behaviour,[40] Australia disputed the claims and raided the Canberra office of lawyer Bernard Collaery[41] , seizing key documents on the basis of national security, impacting the appeal.[42] The negotiations became protracted, with both countries eventually signing the Timor Sea Maritime Treaties Boundary in 2018.[43] The new agreement saw Timor-Leste awarded 70% of the revenues from the Greater Sunrise Oil Field, with promises that they would not seek reimbursement for the period in which the revenues were divided by the Timor Gap Treaty between Indonesia and Australia.[44] Although Australia could not dispute the unethical decisions of the past, in this brief moment, it demonstrated how more powerful countries can abide by the rules-based global order and enhance regional stability.
Dili will require greater international support if it is to achieve long term prosperity.[45] Conscious of the nature of its relationship with Australia, Timor-Leste has turned to China in order to diversify its support network. China has responded swiftly by initiating multi-million dollar BRI projects including a ‘national high-voltage electric grid and highway’[46] systems. Further, Dili has sent over 1000 Timorese workers to China in the last 20 years[47] in order to upskill their civil servants across various domains.[48] [49] Whilst some Australian commentators have suggested that Timor-Leste is walking into a dangerous debt trap scenario, it is understandably difficult for Dili to ignore Chinese overtures; after all, ‘China was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with Timor-Leste’[50] at independence and Australia’s unethical decision-making is still fresh in Timorese minds. Although Australia has offered support through ‘aid and development assistance’[51] , attempts to offer a quantifiably competitive alternative to China may be at odds with what regional neighbours like Timor-Leste want. According to the country’s former President, Jose Ramos-Horta, they need potential partners to consider how they can ‘qualitatively support’[52] the nation’s development – a message that suggests Australia must learn from its past ethical failures.
An ethically-principled shaping strategy
The last sixty years of Australian engagement in the Timor region have revealed a number of ethical failures that offer direction for future shaping strategies. The intent behind reflecting on this is not to tarnish Australia’s reputation in an attempt to ‘virtue signal’. Rather, it highlights the requirement for an ethically principled framework to provide moral and qualitative parameters within which whole-of-government shaping actions can be more effectively directed to build regional partnerships and solidify Australia’s strategic position in the Indo-Pacific.
Justification
China is rapidly shaping the Indo-Pacific and advancing its interests in ways that could threaten regional sovereignty, security and stability[53] . Canberra should seek to influence regional nations to align more closely with Australia to counter these threats for the betterment and interests of all. Strong partnerships are built on trust and mutual benefit. Trust is developed over time through demonstrated reliability.[54] It is understandable why Timor-Leste may not look to Australia as its sole partner and turn down Chinese advances. Australia engaged in two-faced deals, turned its back on human rights violations, defied a rules-based global order, spied to gain leverage in negotiations and demonstrated flawed integrity. It is a damning narrative that needs to be corrected if Australia is to be seen as the partner of choice.[55] Therefore in order for Australia to change this narrative it needs to identify a model that will guide future behaviour in order to achieve its objectives.
The ethical triangle was assessed to determine which ethical approach would most appropriately integrate with government policy to address whole-of-government decision-making in a shaping strategy. An ethically principled approach was selected because it ensures that the ‘focus is on universally accepted rules and one’s moral obligation’[56] which aligns well with the rules-based global order and offers direction in the sometimes ambiguous space of international diplomacy. It can also be clearly articulated and applied in decision-making processes and policies. As such, the following principles have been identified to more effectively direct actions and achieve Australia’s strategic shaping objectives.
Integrity in everything that we do. This means adhering to moral and ethical expectations of right and wrong regardless of situation. More specifically; complying with a rules-based global order and upholding international ethical expectations according to law. Although this may not always appear to benefit Australia, it offers greater long term benefits by establishing trust in partnerships. Integrity related decisions will also be driven by the following moral obligations:
- Respecting the property and sovereign resource rights of other nations.
- Choosing principle over profit by taking all reasonable steps to minimise corporate greed and maximise regional social and economic advancement for the betterment and stability of the Indo-Pacific.
- Committing to justice in accordance with the international rules-based global order.
Honesty in our engagements. Reciprocal candour and transparency ensure that regional neighbours trust that Australia is not conspiring against them. It means that Australia will say what it wants and do what it says, expecting the same in return for mutual benefit. It also means that Australia will not attempt to dishonestly obtain benefits and ensures transparency of decision-making actions (with appropriate considerations for national security). Whilst transparency may at times impact business deals or economic agendas, it will undoubtedly build faith that Australian interactions do not come with strings attached or fine print.[57]
Mateship in the region. This calls for forging an Australian inspired concept of friendship built on equality, loyalty and reciprocity. Equality ensures that Australia does not act from a position of dominance, intimidation or coercion but instead treats its neighbours with fairness. Loyalty and reciprocity also ensure that Australia and its neighbours offer support towards each other’s goals. For Australia this means ensuring it provides the support required to form strong partnerships and maintain regional stability.
Together, these principles lay a framework that directs subordinate actions and subsequently develops trust and credibility in order to forge strong partnerships to combat threats in the region. To realise this objective all decisions must be vetted and justified against these principles. Without this key step, the Australian narrative becomes vulnerable to manipulation to the detriment of the overall shaping strategy and stability of the region.
Counter arguments to an ethically-principled shaping strategy
There are a number of counter arguments and risks to an ethically principled shaping strategy. If these risks aren’t appropriately addressed Australia remains vulnerable to repeat the mistakes of the past under claims that this plan is too idealistic for international diplomacy. Outlined below are a few of the counter arguments coupled with mitigating perspectives.
Australia already acts by these principles – Timor-Leste was just an isolated case. It was by no means an isolated case. The people of West Papua have experienced violence committed by the Indonesian military for decades whilst their mining resources have been exploited by foreign entities including Australia’s.[58] Similarly, the people of Bougainville had 20 000 of their people killed in the civil war during the period 1989–1997 in response to threats against the Australian owned mine (which Bougainvillean’s saw little revenue from).[59] These are just two examples of unethical and immoral actions involving Australia that delegitimises the sincerity of its commitment to the narrative it is trying to project to potential partners.
Quality alone won’t win. A level of quantitative support and investment is undoubtedly important to a shaping strategy, but the simple fact is that Australia cannot match the Chinese quantitative and coercive approach. Canberra simply does not have the whole-of-government resources to quantitatively compete with China.[60] Therefore it must adopt a qualitative approach driven by ethical principles.
Non-exploitative governments do not exist – it’s too idealistic. In ancient Greece, Thrasymachus argued with Socrates that non-exploitative regimes simply do not exist.[61] The point being that governments will always act in a way that achieves an advantage for them or the people they represent. If this is the case, then Australia must highlight how an ethically principled shaping strategy can create a strong network of partnerships and bring prosperity in all nations in the region.
No one else plays by these idealistic rules of diplomacy, why should Australia? Recent history demonstrates how ethically principled decision-making could have a different result. Further, why should Australia do what everyone else is doing? If Australia truly wants to shape the near region it needs to be the nation that leads that change, not through words but through actions. Otherwise, Australia risks being a nation that expects others to do as it says, but not as it does.
If Australia is too self-righteous it may have to hold ethically questionable allies to account. Yes, Australia may, but shouldn’t that be a positive objective? That’s not to say that the strategy should be tactless in its approach. But if a rules-based global order is what Australia wants then it needs to ensure that is applied to everyone, not just the Chinese.
Conclusion
China is expanding rapidly through the Indo-Pacific, shaping the region and influencing partnerships in a manner that threatens regional ‘stability, security and sovereignty’[62] . Australia cannot counter this quantitative, coercive and unethical approach by adopting a similar strategy without the same degree of resources and national power. Timor-Leste proved this, as numerous ethical failures and immoral actions shaped an undesirable narrative of Australia, making it more difficult to establish a meaningful partnership for the betterment of all. Whilst Australia is developing a respectable military to deter threats and respond with lethal force, any kinetic engagement with China would undoubtedly prove disproportionately harmful.[63] Therefore, it must shape the near region in a style that is within Australian capabilities in order to set the preconditions for strong partnerships that will prove beneficial for all and support credible deterrence and response options if necessary. In this manner, Australia must adopt and lead a whole-of-government, ethically principled shaping strategy for stability, security and sovereignty in the Indo-Pacific.
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[1] Beattie, T, Currey, E & Hanson, F 2020, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra.
[2] 2020 Defence Strategic Update
[3] A combative, confrontational, un-apologetic (read – do what they want) and intimidating style of international engagement led by leader of the Chinese Communist Party – Xi Jinping.
[4] A global infrastructure initiative that supports development in over 100 countries but also enables greater negotiating leverage for the Chinese.
[5] A larger power that lends financial support to a weaker power in order to gain some form of leverage – political, legal, strategic, geographical, military etc
[6] Jennings, P 2020, Xi Jinping's Coercive China Strategy Is Creating More Enemies Than Friends, The National Interest, Washington.
[7] Struver, G 2017, China's Partnership Diplomacy: International Alignment Based on Interests or Ideology, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 32-33.
[8] Raynor, S 2019, How Australia trashed its legacy in Timor-Leste, Crikey, Australia.
[9] The South China Sea situation is one example. China is claiming territory and doing what it wants despite international rulings dictating otherwise.
[10] 2016 Defence White Paper, p. 40.
[11] Brophy, D 2021, Australians don’t want a war with China. It’s time to raise voices against it, The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney.
[12] 2020 Defence Strategic Update
[13] Exact figures vary depending on the specific part of the Timor Sea.
[14] The colonial rulers of what is today Timor-Leste.
[15] In Australia’s Defence, continental shelf claims held credence under the Convention on the Continental Shelf until 1973 when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) dictated that opposing Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelf claims would have to co-exist through negotiations.
[16] The Timor Trough is an extended depression in the continental sea shelf between Timor and Australia.
[17] How Australia Cheated East Timor of its Oil, Caspian Report, 21 June 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUXxWCsi2Rk accessed 16 Jul 21.
[18] The Treaty was reached after Australia granted military and economic aid and recognised Jakarta’s claim for shipping lanes through its archipelago as internal waters.
[19] How Australia Cheated East Timor of its Oil, Caspian Report, 21 June 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUXxWCsi2Rk accessed 16 Jul 21.
[20] McGrath, K 2018, How Australia Crossed a Line in the Timor Sea, The Lowy Institute, NSW.
[21] McGrath, 2018.
[22] The Timor Gap is a ~60,000 square km area/500km gap in the Timor Sea border that contains significant oil and gas reserves.
[23] Van Klinken, G 2012, Death by deprivation in East Timor 1975-1980, World Peace Foundation, Massachusetts.
[24] Southgate, L 2019, ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interests, Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State, Bristol University Press, UK, p. 25.
[25] Van Klinken, 2012.
[26] How Australia Cheated East Timor of its Oil, Caspian Report, 21 June 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUXxWCsi2Rk accessed 16 Jul 21.
[27] Author Unknown, 2008, Howard pushed me on E Timor referendum: Habibie, ABC News, viewed 27 Jul 21, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-11-16/howard-pushed-me-on-e-timor-referendum-habibie/207044>.
[28] Leach, M 2016, The PCA ruling, Australia and Timor-Leste, The Lowy Institute, Sydney.
[29] East Timor was formally changed to Timor-Leste on 27 September 2002.
[30] Rourke, A 2019, East Timor: Indonesia's invasion and the long road to independence, The Guardian, Sydney.
[31] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
[32] Strating, R 2017, Law of the Sea: Settling the Australia and Timor-Leste Dispute, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Brisbane.
[33] Paragraphs 2.23 and 2.27 of the 2016 Defence White Paper stand in stark contrast to this decision by Australia.
[34] Reuters Staff, 2013, TIMELINE-Australia and East Timor's struggle to develop Sunrise gas fields, Reuters, viewed 24 Jul 21, <https://www.reuters.com/article/timor-australia-gas-idUSL4N0GS1CT20130830>.
[35] Davidson, H & Knaus, C 2018, Australia and Timor-Leste to sign deal on contentious gas field, The Guardian, Sydney.
[36] Author Unknown, 2002, East Timor poorest country in Asia, UN development agency reports, UN News, viewed 25 Jul 21, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2002/05/35762-east-timor-poorest-country-asia-un-development-agency-reports>.
[37] Interesting side note: Alexander Downer was Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs until the Liberal party defeat in 2007. He then accepted a consulting role with Woodside Petroleum Ltd in 2008, the Australian energy firm that had a leading steak in the Timor Gap oil and gas industry. At the very least, one has to question the optics of such a career transition and how that could influence the perception of an unethical narrative that was developing.
[38] Reuters Staff, 2013.
[39] Knaus, C 2019, Witness K and the 'outrageous' spy scandal that failed to shame Australia, The Guardian, Sydney.
[40] Leach, M 2019, After a border dispute and spying scandal, can Australia and Timor-Leste be good neighbours?, Swinbourne University of Technology, Swinbourne.
[41] Lawyer Bernard Collaery was representing Timor-Leste
[42] Allard, T 2013, ASIO raids office of lawyer Bernard Collaery over East Timor spy claim, Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney.
[43] Timor Sea Maritime Boundaries Treaty Consequential Amendments Act 2019
[44] De Haan, J 2018, Timor-Leste and Australia Conclude Greater Sunrise Negotiations, Future Directions International, WA.
[45] De Haan, J 2021, Political and Governance Challenges Confronting Timor-Leste, Future Directions International, WA.
[46] Hutt, D 2018, Timor-Leste developing closer ties with China, Asia Times, Hong Kong.
[47] China were the first nation to establish diplomatic relations at independence.
[48] Author Unknown, 2014, China and Timor-Leste, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, viewed 27 Jul 21, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2706_663416/>.
[49] Storey, I 2009, China’s Inroads into East Timor, The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 6.
[50] Soriano, A 2019, Is Chinese influence in Timor-Leste cause for concern?, National Security College – ANU, viewed 28 Jul 21, < https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/department-news/14169/chinese-influence-timor-leste-cause-concern>.
[51] Hutt, 2018.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Cimmino, J & Kroenig, M 2021, Global strategy 2021: An allied strategy for China, Atlantic Council, viewed 29 Jul 21, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/global-strategy-2021-an-allied-strategy-for-china/>.
[54] ADF-P-0 ADF Leadership, Edition 3, 2021, p. 36.
[55] Maslic, V (Host) 12 Jul 2021, John Blaxland – Reflexions on Australian military operations and lessons learnt, [Audio Podcast], In The Voices of War, 56:20.
[56] Martinez, K & Martinez, M 2017, Application of the Ethical Triangle in the 2014 Ebola Epidemic: A Case Study, InterAgency Journal, Volume: 8 Issue: 4, p. 39.
[57] Additionally, as the fourth richest country in our region according to GDP-PPP (behind only Singapore, Brunei and Taiwan), Australians are not in dire need of a dishonestly obtained mining deal (as an example).
[58] Elmslie, J, Kareni, R & Webb-Gannon, C 2021, West Papua is on the verge of another bloody crackdown, The Conversation, viewed 27 Jul 21, <https://theconversation.com/west-papua-is-on-the-verge-of-another-bloody-crackdown-161272>.
[59] Orsag, T 2018, A mine worth killing for: Australia’s bloody war in Bougainville, Solidarity, viewed 28 Jul 21, <https://www.solidarity.net.au/australian-imperialism/mine-worth-killing-australias-bloody-war-bougainville/>.
[60] Golley, J & Laurenceson, J 2020, Australia and the BRI: Cooperate, compete or challenge, Asia Society Australia, Sydney.
[61] Plato, 2007, The Republic, Penguin Classics, Cambridge.
[62] 2020 Defence Strategic Update
[63] Brophy, 2021.
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