Defining ‘Right’: What are the ADF’s Ethics?

This essay will discuss the structure of the ADF’s, through the lens of Army’s experience, espoused ethics, and argue that the ADF’s discourse must move from normative ethics to applied ethics.

01/12/2021

> 30 min

Overture

“It’s another day during your deployment on Operation Belesian Freedom. Its halfway through your six-month tour, two years after the initial stabilisation operation. The Belesian Interim Government is 18 months mature, a Status of Forces Agreement exists, and the ADF contribution to the Coalition CJTF is a battlegroup-sized mentoring task group. You are on patrol in the rural areas outside of Puerto Princess, partnered with Belesian Army elements. By now, the Coalition role in Belesia is a supporting one with a clear mentoring mandate, reinforced by the SOFA that stipulates Coalition forces are not law enforcement agents. You are also aware of the cultural differences between Australia and the partner provincial Belesians you are working with. During RSO&I, it was made clear that Coalition forces are not to interfere in internal or ‘cultural’ activities or actions of the Belesian partners.

One day, your platoon is on patrol with Belesian Army partners. Your element conducts a halt near a small town during which some locals approach to offer chai tea for sale. You are on piquet on the perimeter of the admin harbour when you notice several of the Belesian soldiers dragging a young boy into dead ground just outside the position. Once the group is obscured from your view you can hear sounds that make it clear that abuse is occurring. This happens in view of the Belesian commander, who appears indifferent to the situation.”

…what do you do next?

Reading the introductory vignette, the reader almost certainly formed an immediate and intuitive opinion as to what they would do in that situation. As a rational actor, the reader considers that act to be the good, the moral, the ethical, the right choice. Indeed, the ADF demands every act taken by its members be the ethically right choice. All the young soldier, the junior officer, the hardened SNCO, needs to do is identify what the right choice is, and take it. Yet the ADF continues to identify isolated and systemic cases of decisions and actions by its members that it considers unethical and antithetical to ADF values. Notable examples such as the IGADF Inquiry into alleged Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) violations in Afghanistan serve to underscore that despite apparent similarities in worldviews of ADF members, the capacity for vastly differing ethical and moral mores throughout the organisation exists, the consequences of which can be significant for both the ADF and the individual.

“Knowing you have no legal authority to intervene in the actions of the Belesian Army within their own country, and cognisant of the sensitive strategic implications of interfering, you remain at your post on piquet. Its not my place to intervene, this isn’t Australia, you tell yourself, and besides the policy is clear, I’m not allowed. The sounds of abuse continue for the next fifteen minutes or so, before stopping. You complete the patrol and eventually, your deployment. Upon returning home, your family tells you how proud of you they are for ‘helping the people of Belesia’. Yet every time you think of your deployment, you can only think of a crying child, helpless.

In this fictionalised vignette, the individual selected what is perhaps the most apparent choice – to abide by strictures placed upon them through the lawful authority of the organisation. Legally appropriate and strategically sound, the decision to not intervene in apparent child abuse may be deemed ethical by some. Following the rules, taking into account the bigger picture, these can perhaps justify action or inaction in many such circumstances. Yet on another level, the subject experiences lingering doubt over the rightness of what transpired. In another place, would failure to act when such an abhorrent act be considered ethical? Popularly held morality would likely not consider it such. The conflict between the two positions, the unpalatability of what must be ignored and the effects on the victim is difficult to rationalise, regardless of the technically-correct legalities. The moral agent in this scenario is forced to choose and is morally dislocated as a result. This follows them and continues to affect their mind for some time. A moral injury^[1] has occurred.

“Unable and unwilling to countenance such a grossly immoral act, especially with the ability to prevent it, you dismount from the PMV and move to the dead ground. You make your displeasure at their conduct clear and order them back into the position. You are immediately reprimanded by the patrol commander for abandoning your post, and the Belesian partners demeanour has turned sour. After the patrol is complete, the battlegroup CO receives a complaint from his Belesian counterpart. Tensions between the mentoring force and the host nation emerge and there is increased threat of possible green-on-blue attacks in your Forward Operating Base, particularly towards yourself, as payback for insulting the Belesians. As such, your deployment is cut short and you a returned to Australia early. You feel as if you are being unofficially punished for doing the right thing.”

Introduction

This essay will discuss the structure of the ADF’s, through the lens of Army’s experience, espoused ethics, and argue that the ADF’s discourse must move from normative ethics to applied ethics. I will argue that this shift to applied ethics will necessitate the adoption and enforcement of a dominant ethical philosophy.

This essay will cover a review of ADF ethical epistemology, which will be used to discuss the gaps in Defence’s application of a coherent ethical framework. It will touch on tensions between the current approach to ethical training and suggest a way forward.

Ethics 101

Ethical philosophy is broad topic, encompassing thousands of years of human thought. To explore the extent of all ethical philosophies is far beyond the scope of this essay, however it is useful to touch upon the dominant theories. Broadly speaking, ethics can be divided into three primary categories, consequentialism, deontological and virtue ethics.

Consequentialism and deontological ethics stand in contrast to one another. Consequentialist ethics holds that the determinant of the moral value of an act is drawn from the consequences of said act^[2]. Should a given act produce overall good results, the act itself is ethical. To understand consequentialism in its most basic concept, the phrase ‘the ends justifies the means’ is useful.

This stands in direct opposition to deontology, which looks to the adherence of any act to a set of rules or duties, regardless of the outcome. For this reason, deontology is referred to as duty ethics^[3]. A very simple example of this is religion and the requirements they often impose upon their adherents.

Virtue ethics is contrasted with consequentialism and deontology in that it is an agent-centred theory, as opposed to act-centred. Virtue ethics looks to neither an acts outcomes or conformity with rules, but rather the inherent nature of one’s moral character^[4]. It emphasises the importance of moral character traits in the individual. To minimise vices and make virtues central to one’s character is to be morally and ethically good.

As can be gathered from these brief descriptions, the dominant modes of ethical thinking are not always complementary. Deontology and consequentialism in particular are commonly viewed as mutually exclusive. Scenarios can be envisaged wherein different philosophies produce the same outcome, but largely a consequentialist and a deontologist will see regular conflicts in what they deem ethical.

This central conflict stems from where the moral agent draws the rightness or wrongness of an act. Adherents of deontology look to the act itself and its conformance with a duty or higher principles. A consequentialist looks to the outcomes of said act. In a military context, both these views have pros and cons. A deontic view might consider adherence to the orders and rules imposed by military service to be the most effective way of ensuring ethical conduct. What then when confronted with a duty that conflicts with personal morals, as illustrated earlier in the overture? Moral dislocation, as a minimum could be expected.

Ethics within the ADF

Consequentialism can appear attractive to a mission-focussed organisation such as the ADF. Outcomes that advance mission success can only be viewed as net positives, particularly when under pressure to fulfil assigned tasks. As a practical organisation where failure to achieve specific outcomes can mean loss of life, the ADF and its members could easily be drawn to doing whatever needs to be done in order to win. This line of logic is easy to follow to rather unpalatable places. If the ends justifies the means, and our ends are, in some form or another, always centred on protecting the nation and its interests, there is little that could not be justified.

With this inherent tension between ethical philosophies the ADF has an obligation to act as the arbitrator for the ethical conflicts that will inevitably arise. This can only be done through the articulation of an endorsed normative ethical framework and a clear, reproducible method for applying it in ethical decision making. A perfect example of this is the ADF approach to leadership. Introduction to leadership training invariably begins by exposing the individual to a range of leadership theories and various approaches summarised through principles and methods. The multitude of normative leadership theories are backgrounding only – the single endorsed ADF approach to leadership is made clear. ADF-P-0 Leadership gives all members a clear reference to guide their application of leadership.^[5] Through this and other publications or training, the organisation is provided with a definition of leadership and principles of leadership to follow. We are even furnished with a concise explanation of applied leadership: Mission Command. Hence, what constitutes ‘Good Leadership’ and ‘Bad Leadership’ are made clear, with a guide on how to employ ‘Good Leadership’ provided to all who require it.

To effectively understand Defence’s ethical stance, it is necessary to explore the extant body of work on the topic. The most obvious place to start identifying the ADF and Army’s explicit stance on ethics is doctrine and policy. As with leadership, these capstone documents form direction to all members to guide actions and training. At the time of writing, the Defence doctrine on ethics is yet to be published. The Army Ethics Enhancement Plan^[6] (AEEP) lays out the importance of ethical education and established the tenets of Army’s ethical framework and ethical competency, but does not clarify which ethics we are to be competent in.

Academic and professional military education (PME) writings may illuminate popular sentiment within the force. Lieutenant Forsyth, RAN, in his 2016 paper “What is Ethical Conduct?” highlights the importance of ethical conduct for leadership whilst highlighting the same conflict in worldviews discussed here.^[7] A short Cove article by ‘Chaplain Dan’, “Ethics need a foundation” notes the conundrum of conflicting ethical frameworks and the necessity of extending training beyond definitions to what is acceptable to the organisation^[8]. Chaplain Dan further discusses that such training will highlight those with incompatible values. In her 2018 essay “Discuss the ethical challenges in satisfying both personnel welfare and the organisational requirements of the ADF,”^[9] Leading Aircraftwoman Jessica Watson identifies the apparent parallel ethical frameworks at play, albeit in a personnel management context.

Despite offering this array of definitions of normative ethics and the importance of being ethical, the ADF does not advance a single unified theory to which members may adhere. They are left to deduce, from the implicit messages of different narratives, which normative theory to apply in a given situation. From the first instance of joining, all members are introduced to the Defence Values, five virtues that give a prescribed aspirational view of character traits for a member of the ADF. Service, Courage, Respect, Integrity and Excellence as virtues offer the individual a guide for ensuring their character is in line with organisational expectations and is a simple example of virtue ethics. Even here however, the description of some of these virtues already presupposes knowledge of what is right. Courage: “the strength of character to say and do the right thing”; and Integrity: “the consistency of character to align my thoughts, words and actions to do what is right” – both these include an unconscious appeal to a pre-existing concept of moral or ethical rightness.

Before long, another message becomes clear: follow the rules. This imperative is obvious in its genesis and for good reason. The nature of military service and military hierarchy readily commend themselves to a deontic approach to ethics, reinforced through adherence to rules-based frameworks such as the Laws of Armed Conflict and Rules of Engagement. At the organisational level, the ADF follows a form of deontology through our adherence to principles laid down by Just War Theory.^[10]

Day-to-day, consequentialism has a certain allure, particularly on operations. Rigid adherence to procedure or idealised values is often overlooked when mission failure is at stake. One would be hard-pressed to find a military member that would accept catastrophic failure as long as they had held fast to what was considered right. A particularly pointed example of this trend is seen inherent in the allegations made in the IG ADF Afghanistan Inquiry Report. The description of consequentialism given in most ADF ethics packages or writings invariably refers to utilitarianism. The most well-known consequentialist theory, classical utilitarianism was proposed by Jeremy Bentham in 1789^[11]. Utilitarianism is often proposed as being a useful tool for military ethics, after all, common sense suggests military service will inevitably present dilemmas where the best outcome available is minimising harm. This is not necessarily a utilitarian view, however. As proposed by Bentham and John Stuart Mill, utility is defined as greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people^[12]. The fundamental goal of a utilitarian ethical approach is to maximise net utility, i.e happiness. Further, utilitarianism encourages the moral agent to impartially consider all affected parties equally. Given the oppositional nature of war, taking into account the happiness of adversaries is hardly relevant.

In short, the ADF espouses virtue ethics at the individual level, whilst adopting a deontological approach organisationally and implicitly cultivating a consequentialist mindset tactically. The meta-narrative of the ADF’s espoused ethics is clear, if somewhat reductive: the ADF and its members always do ‘The Right Thing’. What this ‘Right Thing’ is may very well change, dependent on the scenario. What does not change dependent on the scenario, however, is an individual’s ethical framework and moral character. The current traditionalist view of moral character^[13] makes three central claims, known as the Robustness Claim (trait-relevant behaviour will be seen across trait-relevant situations); the Stability Claim (character traits are stable across time) and the Integrity Claim (correlation between having one virtue and other virtues). This concept of virtue traits tells us that individual moral character is unlikely to change easily or rapidly.

The Army has made efforts to provide an applied ethics methodology to bridge these normative ethic frameworks with individual decision-making. The ‘Ethical Armouring’ concept, developed by ethicist Dr Deane-Peter Baker, introduces these normative ethics and provides a process for ethical decision-making^[14]. Dr Baker calls this process ‘ethical triangulation’; so named due to how it attempts to find an ideal centre ground of an ethical decision between deontology (called Constraints), consequentialism (Consequences) and virtue ethics (Character). In short, through the use of these ‘3 Cs’ and ethical triangulation, it seeks to find the best possible ethical decision. However, if unable to satisfy all tests simultaneously, as would be expected to be the case commonly, ethical triangulation advises to work through each ‘C’ in sequence – constraints, consequences, character. In other words, this attempt by Army to operationalise the three dominant normative ethical philosophies prioritises the deontological approach over the consequentialist, which in turn is prioritised over virtue. This would indicate that at least implicitly, Army consider adherence to rules to be the pre-eminent consideration for ethical decision-making.

The ADF, then, asks members to resolve all these ethical theories into a coherent ontology, and apply it consistently across the spectrum of value-relevant events they encounter. Further, they are to do so at the expense of their own personal ethics, should these be in conflict. No small ask, particularly for those who are often required by the nature of their role and circumstances to act and react intuitively. The claim can be made that the instilling of these frameworks, through repetitious training and experiential learning, will create an ethical heuristic in each member; however this does not effectively account for the individual’s natural propensity to default to their preferred ethical norms when under physical and cognitive stress^[15].

How then can this variable be controlled? The ADF measures and enforces compliance of member’s behaviour in other domains far more effectively. A multitude of physical forms and fitness levels exist, yet to be a member of the ADF requires the completion of the Service-relevant fitness assessment every six to twelve months. Tolerance is made to sex and age, but the underlying principle is clear – demonstrated inability to meet a requisite standard of push-ups, sit-ups, and running, consistently (i.e including re-test opportunities) will result in that individual no longer being a member of the ADF. There is a prescribed standard, and it must be met. This is supported by an appropriate policy mechanism, which clearly lays out the method for discharging a member under such circumstances.

Yet no such test exists for ethics. Not only is there no articulated standard against which members can be compared, the mechanism to respond to ethical lapses is applicable post-event only. Unlike a physical fitness test, which assesses member’s ability to employ physical fitness at a prescribed standard prior to it being called into use on the battlefield, members of the ADF cannot be administratively sanctioned or separated from Defence for incorrect employment of ethics until a negative incident has occurred. This post-hoc response then becomes punitive in nature for the individual, instead of pre-emptive for the organisation. As such, an individual’s definitive knowledge of what is ADF-endorsed applied ethics is a posteriori only – there is always a degree of uncertainty if a given member’s concept of right will align with the organisations’ until put to the test, and the answer becomes known through experience.

The question that is left is: what normative ethical philosophy should the ADF adopt? Other consequentialist theories can produce similar difficulties as they attempt to define ‘good’ consequences in a moral sense against the military context. A broader teleological^[16] ethic may be required. With possible side-constraints (such as the requirement to adhere to the Just War principles of jus in bello^[17]and jus ad bellum^[18]) a teleological theory that evaluates individuals actions against whether they produced the intended result would be of significant practicality, and further, extremely accessible by members. Given then that the rightness of an act would be drawn from whether or not it achieves the outcome, with less emphasis on the good>bad calculus, onus would then be on those in leadership positions to ensure these outcomes are in line with higher principles, such as LOAC.

Conclusion

The tension between individual ethics and military ethics will continue to present a dilemma to the ADF in coming years. The outcomes of the IG ADF Afghanistan Inquiry have ensured that ethical conduct of members will remain at the forefront; the current approach to ethical training has ensured that further conflicts of ethics are inevitable. By moving the organisation’s discourse from describing normative ethics to selecting a philosophy for application, the ADF will be able to commence the training for, assessing of, and selecting due to, members ethical fitness.

Bibliography

Australian Army, Australian Army Ethics Enhancement Plan, Canberra, 2020

Artinger, F., Petersen, M., Gigerenzer, G. & Weibler, J., "Heuristics as adaptive decision strategies in management", Journal of organizational behavior, vol. 36, no. S1, 2015 pp. S33-S52

Baker, Deane-Peter, “Making good better: A proposal for teaching ethics at the service academies” Journal of Military Ethics, vol.11, no.3, 2012, pp.208-222

Bentham, Jeremy, "Of The Principle of Utility", An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, London, 1780, pp. 1-6

Chaplain Dan, ‘Ethics needs a foundation’, The Cove, Australian Army, 2020, https://cove.army.gov.au/article/ethics-need-foundation, (accessed 10 Aug 2020)

“Consequentialism”, Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, Encyclopedia.com, 2021, https://www.encyclopedia.com, (accessed 17 Aug 2021)

“Deontological Ethics”, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Encyclopedia.com, 2021, https://www.encyclopedia.com, (accessed 17 Aug 2021)

Department of Defence, ADF-P-0 ADF Leadership, Edition 3, 2021

Forsyth, G ‘What is Ethical Conduct?’, Ethics Papers 1/2016, Australian Defence College, 2016

Litz, Brett T., Nathan Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, and Shira Maguen, "Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy." Clinical Psychology Review, vol. 29, no. 8, 2009, pp. 695-706.

Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism, London, UK, 1863

Miller, C.B., "Character and Situationism: New Directions", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 20, no. 3, 2017, pp. 459-471

"Virtue Ethics", Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, Encyclopedia.com, 2021, https://www.encyclopedia.com, (accessed 17 Aug 2021)

Watson, Jessica, ‘Discuss the ethical challenges in satisfying both personnel welfare and the organisational requirements of the ADF’, Leadership and Ethics Papers 1/2019, Jamie Cullens Defence Leadership and Ethics Essay Competition, Prize Winning submissions 2018, Australian Defence College, 2019, p.15-23

Wertheimer, R, Empowering Our Military Conscience: Transforming Just War Theory and Military Moral Education, Taylor & Francis Group, Farnham, 2010

Footnotes

Formatted HTML Code:

^[1] As defined by Litz et al, 2009, a moral injury is “perpetuating, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations”

^[2] “Consequentialism”, Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, Encyclopedia.com, 2021, https://www.encyclopedia.com, (accessed 17 Aug 2021)

^[3] “Deontological Ethics”, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Encyclopedia.com, 2021, https://www.encyclopedia.com, (accessed 17 Aug 2021)

^[4] "Virtue Ethics", Encyclopedia of Science, Technology, and Ethics, Encyclopedia.com, 2021, https://www.encyclopedia.com, (accessed 17 Aug 2021)

^[5] Department of Defence, ADF-P-0 ADF Leadership, Edition 3, Apr 2021

^[6] Australian Army Ethics Enhancement Plan, 18 Sep 2020

^[7] G. Forsyth, ‘What is Ethical Conduct?’, Ethics Papers 1/2016, Australian Defence College, 2016

^[8] Chaplain Dan, ‘Ethics needs a foundation’, The Cove, Australian Army, 2020, https://cove.army.gov.au/article/ethics-need-foundation, (accessed 10 Aug 2020)

^[9] J. Watson, ‘Discuss the ethical challenges in satisfying both personnel welfare and the organisational requirements of the ADF’, Leadership and Ethics Papers 1/2019, Jamie Cullens Defence Leadership and Ethics Essay Competition, Prize Winning submissions 2018, Australian Defence College, 2019, p.15-23

^[10] R. Wertheimer, Empowering Our Military Conscience: Transforming Just War Theory and Military Moral Education, 2010

^[11] J. Bentham, ‘Of the Principle of Utility’, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislations, London, 1780, pp.1-6

^[12] J.Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 3, London, 1863

^[13]C.B. Miller, "Character and Situationism: New Directions", Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 20, no. 3, 2017, pp. 459-471

^[14] D.Baker, “Making good better: A proposal for teaching ethics at the service academies” Journal of Military Ethics, vol.11, no.3, 2012, pp.208-222

^[15] F. Artinger et al., "Heuristics as adaptive decision strategies in management", Journal of organizational behavior, vol. 36, no. S1, 2015, pp. S33-S52

^[16] relating to or involving the explanation of phenomena in terms of the purpose they serve rather than of the cause by which they arise.

^[17] Discrimination, Proportionality, Necessity

^[18] Just Cause, Legitimate Authority, Right Intention, Proportionality, Last Resort, Likelihood of success

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Comments

Within this area, Defence’s newest members will be exposed to the conflict spectrum and theories associated with its employment. While additional emphasis will be afforded to one’s own Service, consideration will be given to joint operations and planning processes. The topic will also include an exploration of current ADF operations and emerging technological impacts on future preparedness.

The ADF’s contribution to Australian National Power through shape, deter and respond activities will be understood in general terms. Tied with this awareness will be ADO roles and responsibilities, including civil-military relations. The importance of Defence’s contribution in this regard will be linked to a general sense of Australia’s strategic environment. Resource management fundamentals will help underpin responsible expenditure of Commonwealth funds.

All members of Defence will also need to be competent in military administration, ADF roles and structures, and undertake all initial mandatory training. This foundation will continue to develop in subsequent JPME levels and increasingly expand opportunites for Joint Stream (out-of-category) postings and roles. APS does not require core military skills.

Following on from their respective recruit or commissioning course, ADF personnel will commence their Initial Employment Training (IET). This period can include workplace experience and periods of on-the-job training.

Graduation from IET marks the formal transition from Level 1 to Level 2. It is at this point when they are considered effective in the workplace.

Defence members at this level will have a sound understanding of their own Service or domain warfare systems and capability. As they progress through Level 2, they will display a stronger understanding about the ADF’s holistic contribution to Joint Force warfighting domains. This will extend to the nature and theory of war, which has developed through an academic study of historical case studies and contemporary military issues. Importantly, such awareness will help inform their understanding of the impact of technology on current and future warfare. Awareness of gender perspectives on operations will contribute to their well-rounded application of the Profession of Arms.

By recognising the difference between complicated and complex problems, personnel at this level will ensure their problem-solving strategies and decision making are optimised. In the earlier stages, personnel will employ more transactional, linear thinking, decision support tools (such as the Joint Military Appreciation Process or variations) but they will increasingly apply alternate thinking strategies to seek more sophisticated options. Greater availability of human-machine teaming systems will progressively reduce our reliance on lower order cognitive activity and thus facilitate more nuanced considerations to complex problems.

Australia’s approach to the formulation of military strategy and its strategic environment (including international and geopolitical) will strengthen as members advance in this Level. Through both courses and experience, they will also acquire a stronger understanding of interagency strategies, policies and decision making processes.

As they progress through Level 2, Defence personnel will progressively develop awareness and then expertise beyond their initial employment category.

These broader systems and processes will expand to include one or more of the five key Joint Streams: Military Support, Operations, Capability Development and Delivery, Strategy Policy and Engagement, and Intelligence.

Within JPME Level 2, Defence personnel will become increasingly proficient in their initial employment category. Through both their formal courses (initial employment training and subsequent intermediate courses) and workplace experience, they will display competency in their contribution to military power. As they develop greater technical expertise, senior personnel at this level will become suitable for growing the next generation, by seeking instructional roles.

Those operating at this level will understand both internal Joint Force command relationships and international engagement with coalition partners. Their employment of operational art will consider instruments of national power and campaign design, while the relationship challenges between strategic, operational and tactical levels of war will be clearly understood. Continual professional development will keep Level 3 practitioners abreast of emerging trends and future warfare techniques. Expertise will be apparent in the planning requirements for force generation and the factors that shape the execution of joint operations. National and military strategic planning considerations for Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous and Novel (VUCAN) environments will mature. Personnel will be increasingly aware of the influence technology has on current and future warfare as well as whole-of-government response options.

Those operating at this level will be increasingly comfortable with systems thinking to perceive and influence complex adaptive systems. Various alternative thinking strategies, such as Design Thinking and Multi-Criteria Decision Making, will allow them to thrive in the challenging multi-domain environment.

Importantly, they will be able to translate complex strategic issues into tangible ideas for their subordinates.

This level is noted for its integration of civil-military functions and instruments of national power. This includes strategy and public policy development as well as contemporary operating environments and implications for military and security forces. Awareness of both Joint and multinational logistics will complement resource management systems of the Joint Force.

Expertise in one or more of the Joint Streams specific processes will continue to develop with staff and/or leadership responsibilities aligning with roles held.

Examples of the advanced knowledge base likely to be demonstrated include: One Defence Capability System (or its successor) and FIC management, Joint Force staff roles, advanced Human Resources systems and processes, Whole of Government and international engagement approaches, as well as legislative requirements associated with the relevant Joint Stream.

Through more senior category appointments and opportunities, those at Level 3 will display expertise within their specialist category employment. Completion of charge courses, deployments, exercises and pre-command courses, personnel will increasingly expand their specialist expertise to support joint effects.

Increasing leadership expectations will develop within their category’s specialist vocation.

This level is recognised for its future Joint Force planning, development and sustainment challenges. Those operating in these positions will resolve military resource challenges and understand limitations of contracted support to operations. Operational artists will be adept at integrating strategic objectives to planning through the exploitation of emerging and non-traditional concepts for joint and multinational warfare. These skills will manifest in their ability to design and lead theatre strategies, campaigns and major operations. They will also be seeking opportunities to exploit technology’s influence on current and future warfare as well as its role in whole-of-government response options.

Cognitive performance will be enhanced through active seeking of diversity and a tolerance for ambiguity. Dealing with Defence-related wicked systems will be normal.

Problem-solving will increasingly accept increased risk to reflect the greater depth of wisdom and confidence in one’s judgments. This level is also noted for strategic thinking, visioning and championing a learning culture.

Level 4 leaders will be strong advocates of divergent thinking in their subordinates (when appropriate), to ensure Defence continues to improve systems and processes.

Those operating at this level have a very clear understanding of the impacts on national Defence policy and strategy. They will positively influence military capability development to enhance relevant instruments of national power. A strong awareness of contemporary global affairs and trends, combined with a deep understanding of international relations theories, will enhance their management of national military resources to support national security and foreign policy. Gender, peace and security impacts will continue to guide their strategic policy development.

Those operating at this level will be considered Generalists who possess a wide range of skills and expertise in multiple Joint Stream areas. With the exception of a select few specialists, these personnel will have actively sought out opportunities to broaden their versatility beyond their specialisation. Typical areas will include: strategic planning, civil-military relationships, campaign planning, strategic governance, business and financial acumen, One Defence Capability System leadership, strategic direction setting of emerging capabilities, policy leadership for future capability needs, and industry engagement for sustainment and growth.

At the enlisted level, Tier B and C warrant officers provide a vital link across the ADF, not only championing 75% of the ADF at the strategic table but also helping translate the top-down messaging. To do this, they must excel in understanding both worlds. Strategic level warrant officers also play a pivotal role in the command team relationship not only as advisors to decision-makers, but also in the strategic leadership of organisational culture, ongoing professional development, and the ideological underpinnings of the Profession of Arms throughout the ADF’s workforce

For those still in key roles within their primary category, there will be strong leadership expectations to ensure the delivery of capability, strategic advice on capabilities, limitations and future needs, as well as shaping the professional development system to grow future generations within the field.

Senior officers and their equivalents will be comfortable in crisis leadership situations across all aspects of Defence. They will be highly effective when commanding Joint Task Forces or conducting influence operations. This performance will come from a deep understanding of Joint Force attributes, structures, capability requirements, emerging concepts and risks affecting military strategies and campaign development. Their strategic leadership abilities will extend to synthesising operational lessons learned across all Force elements including deployment, employment and sustainment. All of these areas will be enhanced by their astute awareness of political and resource implications in joint warfare strategy and planning.

Multi-agency, political and global wicked systems are an expected reality of Level 5 roles. Those operating at this level will have the cognitive agility to respond comfortably with these challenges by exploiting paradigm shifting approaches (such as nudge theory) to improve systems to a more advantageous state.

Senior leaders at this level will be expert in strategic communication and information impacts. They will comfortably implement grand strategy through future-focused policy formulation and employment of armed forces. Their expertise in national intelligence community and architecture will help them influence national security and foreign policy. The implications of contemporary challenges on national security strategies will be understood. This depth of understanding will be drawn from a strong awareness of national powers’ characteristics, capabilities and limitations combined with the civil-military relations necessary to deliver national power instruments.

Senior officers and SES band public servants at the highest echelons will be skilled in decision cycles and information/knowledge management systems. They will understand Government processes for capability acquisition and how to exploit technology enablers within enterprise systems.

As leaders of Force Element Groups (FEGs) or Joint Task Forces (JTFs), senior military officers will integrate emerging capabilities and technology to both maintain force-in-being deterrence and deliver operations to meet Government response options. In policy and advisory roles, they will exploit emerging capabilities and technologies when shaping military strategy, policy development and implementation. Industry engagement will enhance support of sovereign capability and Australia’s economic prosperity

A Service Warrant Officer is a unique appointment within each Service, one of influence and advice rather than Command. E10 Warrant Officers have strategic leadership responsibilities as Command advisors to Senior Leadership of their Service to provide critical insight to key decisions through an alternative lived experience and with support from Senior Enlisted Personnel to give a balanced, informed and analysed perspective from the workforce.

They also play a pivotal role in the organisation’s leadership, able to utilise their professional knowledge and experience to provide context and make the complex simple and the simple compelling. The unique appointment ensures the Service WO stays connected to contemporise issues for the workforce and represent those gaps and opportunities at the appropriate delegated level.

Service Warrant Officers deliberately steward, communicate and are genuinely dedicated to their Service; while always supporting strategic organisation culture and setting the conditions for long-term success.

Service Warrant Officers have a concurrent liability to foster relationships supporting Australia’s national power through networking and encouraging active engagement with counterparts to promote a commonality of purpose: – Friendship, Partnership and Leadership.