Modern military theory and practice divides war into three distinct and hierarchical levels: the strategic, operational, and tactical. While the strategic and tactical levels are ancient concepts, the operational level and operational art have only become prevalent within Western military thought in the last forty years, and now lay, as military historian Allan English observes, "at the heart...of the profession of arms today."^[1] The operational level is broadly defined as the bridge between the strategic level (commonly viewed as defining the political aims of war) and the tactical level (where armed forces are engaged in the battle), and is seen as the "linkage to make tactical actions serve strategic ends."^[2] It is where, as historian Hew Strachan notes, "plans of operations, the selection of objectives and the direction of the forces assigned to the operation" are managed.^[3] Operational art is thus the skilful process that ensures "harmony of effort by translating abstract strategic goals into mechanical terms that commanders can then accomplish."^[4] Following the introduction of the operational level and operational art into the United States military doctrine in the 1980s, these concepts have since been adopted and embedded into the military doctrine of several of the United States ' allies including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.^[5]

Yet, since their emergence, the operational level and operational art have also been the source of much debate within Western military discourse.^[6] Not only are both terms confusingly used interchangeably, but as the statement and question this paper has been asked to address infers, the relevance and viability of these concepts for middle powers such as Australia and Canada continues to be contested.^[7] Those that argue against the viability of the operational level and operational art for middle powers see the concepts framed, as Canadian Lieutenant Colonel Richard Dickson notes, "in the great-power context of large forces conducting high-intensity, air-land operations across extended geographical theatres."^[8] For middle powers like Australia and Canada, who have historically operated primarily as junior partners within an alliance or coalition framework, it is argued the junior partner's own operational methods are dominated by the larger lead nation and their main task is instead to focus on establishing tactical interoperability.^[9] Furthermore, Australian Major Ian Sherman notes that if the "principle policy objective [of middle powers on coalition operations] is to fulfill an alliance commitment through participation" in order to achieve diplomatic influence, it can be argued that this further negates a middle power 's need for the operational level and operational art.^[10] As Australian strategic policy in particular, as Andrew Carr observes, has historically been more concerned with its allies than its adversaries and has employed military force "to achieve an impact in Washington rather than to deter or defeat an enemy on the battlefield"^[11] then it follows that the operational domain is potentially less viable.

This paper contends, however, that this is too narrow a view on the role middle powers like Australia and Canada play on coalition operations and are likely to play in the future. Not only do junior partners need to have an understanding of operational doctrine in order to integrate tactical forces and to effectively contribute in key staff roles within coalition headquarters, but as the Australian Government in particular has recently emphasised, Australia needs to be prepared to lead coalition operations within its immediate region. Thus the ability to function coherently at the operational level and apply operational art will be required.^[12] It is for these reasons that this paper argues, with a focus on Australia and the Australian Defence Force (ADF), that operational level functionality and operational art are in fact viable concepts. In arguing this point of view, this paper will first delve further into the evolution of the operational level and operational art in Western military thought to better understand the concepts within warfare more broadly. It will then explore how these concepts have been embraced by the ADF before examining the role Australia has historically played on coalition operations and assess the role it is preparing for in the future. It will argue that as Australia is more explicitly embracing its position strategically as a leading regional power, operational level functionality and operational art are indeed viable concepts if Australia and the ADF are to achieve future strategic objectives.

The evolution of the operational level and operational art

To understand the emergence and evolution of the operational level of war and operational art in Western military thought, one must first examine the evolution of strategy. From its origins in antiquity through to the early twentieth century, the strategic level was considered the realm of military generals. It was through their art or skills that generals practised strategy which Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz defined almost two millennia later as "the theory of using battle for the purposes of the war."^[13] The connection between policy, strategy and tactics during this time was immediate as they were united in the king or emperor who led their armies on the battlefield. As modern states emerged, so too was there a marked increase in the size of armies and thus the theatre of operations along with it. As Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan note, "this increasingly removed the actions of those armies from the direct scrutiny of the sovereign, and the connection between war and politics became unacceptably stretched."^[14] Many generals came to believe, as historian and strategist Lawrence Freedman observes, that "once the purposes of war had been set by the political leadership, the war's subsequent conduct was the military's responsibility."^[15]

Following two world wars that were total in their nature, political primacy was gradually re-established over military commanders. The concept of grand or national strategy emerged as the entirety of national resources were mobilised in support of the war effort of which the military was only one, albeit large, element. In addition, the Cold War saw the emergence of nuclear deterrence strategy which was forged by 'civilian strategists' and handled at the political level.^[16] Thus, the generals, as Strachan observes, lost control of strategy. "The discipline which defined and validated the art of the commander, the business of general staffs and the processes of war planning, was no longer theirs."^[17]

These developments led to the perceived need to bridge the void that now existed between strategy and tactics. While several military theorists in the United Kingdom attempted to differentiate between minor or military strategy and grand or national strategy in the interwar years, it is widely acknowledged that it was the Soviet military theorists during this time who introduced the concept of operational art and the operational level.^[18] In seeking to grasp the sheer scale and extent of modern warfare following their experience in the First World War, as Dickson notes, the Soviet theorists recognised that

the inherent interconnectedness between forces and actions throughout the breadth and depth of the theatre meant that tactical actions were not self-contained, and victory in engagements and battles did not necessarily add up to achieving the overall strategic aim. The key to unlocking this problem lay in the intermediate connecting activity – what they came to call operational art.^[19]

Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin, writing in the context of large scale, total war, defined operational art as "'the means by which the senior commander transformed a series of tactical successes into operational 'bounds' linked together by the commander's intent and plan and contributing to strategic success in a given theatre of military actions."^[20] He thus saw warfare as three distinct functions. While the Soviets retained this understanding of the operational level and operational art throughout the twentieth century, it took until the early 1980s as the United States was reeling from the aftermath of the Vietnam War for these concepts to take hold within Western strategic thought.^[21]

Writing in 1980, US military theorist Edward Luttwak first criticised the lack of an "adequate term for the operational level of warfare" within Anglo-Saxon military terminology arguing that "the operational level of war, as opposed to the tactical and strategic levels, is or ought to be of the greatest concern to the analyst."^[22] In arguing for the operational level, which he saw as purely the domain of military professionals, he linked its absence and civilian interference in the conduct of military operations to the US defeat in Vietnam.^[23] Driven partly by this desire to regain control of the conduct of war and restore a professional military identity, and partly due to the need to find alternatives to an all-out nuclear war with the Soviets, the United States Army formally embraced the operational level in their Field Manual (FM) 100‑5 in 1982 recognising three distinct levels of war. It was not until the 1986 version that they subsequently adopted the concept of operational art.^[24] Similar to Svechin's definition (and also the classical understanding of strategy), US doctrine defined operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theatre of war or theatre of operations through the design, organisation, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."^[25] Subsequent definitions have remained relatively similar but have come to focus, as Milan Vego notes, on the cognitive ability of commanders and staffs defining operational art as the development of strategies, campaigns, and operations supported by "skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgement."^[26]

The operational level has also become a key battle ground for debate on different schemes of warfare or ways of waging war including manoeuvre and attrition. As new technologies also continue to emerge, it has seen, as Strachan notes, "the 'revolution in military affairs', 'network-centric warfare', 'effects-based operations' and transformation" pass through.^[27] Operational doctrine has also garnered criticism, however, as Kelly and Brennan deplore, for purposefully "widening the gap between politics and warfare" thus reducing "political leadership to the role of 'strategic sponsors'" and mirroring the similar journey strategy underwent in the early nineteenth century.^[28] Despite these concerns, however, the operational level and operational art have become deeply embedded within Western military thought and practice and are unlikely to disappear any time soon.

Following the United States lead, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia subsequently adopted operational level functionality and the concept of operational art within their own doctrines. Today, it is taught at most Western military colleges and, as John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld note, these colleges and operational headquarters "abound with manuals, procedures, and checklists for dealing with the operational level of war and operational art...[providing] a common, coherent set of references covering a logical framework, proven methodologies, and a standardised vocabulary."^[29] Yet, as Allan English notes, they remain "complex concepts with varying interpretations depending on the context in which they are used."^[30] Great power status, large forces and an ability to operate over an extended theatre as characterised by the US military unsurprisingly dominates the context in which operational doctrine is commonly viewed. This has led to the argument as laid out at the beginning of this paper that those mainly middle powers with small forces who prefer to operate within a coalition or alliance framework are "incapable of exercising operational art."^[31] Not only is this too narrow a view on Australia 's role in coalition operations, but as the Australian government 's recently released 2020 Defence Strategic Update reinforces, Australia must be prepared to lead potential future coalition operations in the region.^[32] Thus, the ability to function coherently at the operational level and apply operational art will be an imperative. Before exploring this in further detail, this paper will briefly look at how Australia has embraced operational level functionality and operational art.

Australian operational art

Australian military doctrine today defines the operational level as where "military campaigns and operations are planned, synchronised and conducted to achieve strategic objectives and the strategic end state."^[33] Operational art is thus "the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions."^[34] As the ADF embraced the operational level and operational art following its emergence in Western military thought in the 1980s, it did so in parallel with an increased interest and move towards fully integrated joint operations.^[35] The ADF itself is still a young organisation with the three services existing as single service agencies up until 1976 and only formally joining with Defence's civilian structure in 1997 to form an integrated civil-military organisation. The Chief of Joint Operations was appointed in 2008 as the operational level commander based out at what was then the newly established Headquarters Joint Operations Command.^[36] Reinforced by ADF leadership in recent years is the recognition that all ADF operations now and into the future are joint and will require interagency and coalition coordination.^[37] And so the operational level and operational art have thus become the "domain of primacy for the joint approach" and currently fulfil a distinct function within the ADF and wider Department of Defence that focuses on building this joint capability.^[38]

The ADF 's practice of operational art, however, has come under criticism by Australian military theorists and practitioners in the last twelve or so years for failing "to keep up with conceptional development" through its doctrine, planning and education.^[39] Yet despite these criticisms (which may have prompted the more recent review and update of ADF joint operational doctrine^[40]), their authors, such as Michael Evans for example, argue strongly for the viability of operational level functionality and operational art for Australia despite what he sees as the ADF's traditional tactical mindset. For Evans, writing in 2008, "operational art is necessary because in the globalised conditions of the early 21^st century, the ADF is faced by a simultaneous requirement to be a global 'security contributor' and a regional 'security leader.'"^[41] It is in filling both these roles that Australia requires coherent operational level functionality and a comprehensive understanding of operational art. This is even more important today, as the final section of this paper will discuss, as Australian strategic and defence policy has most recently prioritised its regional leadership role over global security contributions.

From global middle power to regional security leader

Australia is a self-described middle power with a large economy, stable liberal democracy, small population, and, as Evans notes, limited ability to generate hard power.^[42] In what is considered typical middle power behaviour, Australia at the diplomatic level is more comfortable working through multilateral institutions to promote international norms and pursues collective security through alliances, in coalitions, and through international organisations.^[43] Australia 's geography has also had a large bearing on its strategic outlook. Deeply influenced by a strong sense of vulnerability due to its small population size and traditionally "far from the centres of global power"^[44] Australia made the calculated strategic decision to seek the security of a 'great and powerful friend', first the United Kingdom and then the United States.^[45] Thus Australia, through this alliance framework, prioritised an expeditionary approach within its strategic and defence policy, committing military forces on coalition operations far from its own shores.^[46] This has seen Australia deploy forces as the junior partner within a coalition to fight in both world wars, Korea, Malaya, Borneo, Vietnam, Afghanistan and the Middle East.^[47]

These operations have led to the notion that Australia maintains a tactical tradition as its own operational methods have been dominated and absorbed by the larger lead nation and Australia 's focus has instead been on tactical interoperability.^[48] But to effectively integrate tactical forces as the junior partner on coalition and alliance operations, one must have an understanding of the operational level and operational requirements of the lead nation.^[49] This is particularly the case when filling key staff and command roles in coalition operational headquarters as Australian officers currently do on multiple peacekeeping operations and in Iraq and Afghanistan.^[50] If Australian officers are to effectively participate and contribute in these roles, then they need a comprehensive understanding of operational doctrine.

While Australia will maintain its preference to operate within a coalition or alliance framework, as Australian Chief of the Defence Force General Angus Campbell remarked last year: "Australia has never fought alone, and it 's the worst place to be in a war"^[51] Australia is also increasingly acknowledging it will be required to lead potential future coalition operations in its own region. Australian Defence White Papers have emphasised both a regional and global role for the ADF over the last two decades as Australia had to take on the leading role in coalition operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. But a shift to expeditionary operations in response to the War on Terror saw regional leadership become a secondary priority and as Andrew Carr observes, Australia thus became an often absent power in the region.^[52] With the priority focus on fulfilling a junior partner role on coalition operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan, this further fuelled the debate on operational doctrine 's viability for Australia. As Australia's own region, the Indo-Pacific, has increasingly been acknowledged as the "epicentre of rising strategic competition"^[53] the recently released 2020 Defence Strategic Update has been explicit in its prioritisation and in articulating Australian intent to become a present regional leader: "We must also be prepared to lead coalition operations where it is in the interests of the region for us to do so, especially in our immediate region."^[54] Just as Michael Evans advocated back in 2008 for a new and dynamic ADF model of operational art that reflected a strategic requirement to be a global 'security contributor' and a regional 'security leader,'^[55] operational art and operational level functionality are even more important today as Australia prioritises its regional leadership role in an increasingly complex and challenging strategic environment.

Conclusion

The operational level of war and operational art are still relatively new concepts within Western military thought and discourse, first emerging in the Soviet Union in the interwar years, but only taking hold in the United States and subsequently its major allies in the 1980s. Despite this, they have become deeply embedded within Western military doctrine today. Filling the perceived void left behind by classical strategy as the strategic level became indistinctly blurred with national policy, the operational level of war is where military campaigns and operations are planned, synchronised and conducted to achieve strategic ends and operational art is the skilful process of ensuring "harmony of effort" in this task. Yet seen through its original context of great powers, fielding large forces across multiple or extended theatres, the relevance of the concepts for middle powers like Australia who operates largely as a junior partner on coalition operations continues to be disputed.

This paper has argued that operational level functionality and operational art are viable concepts for Australia as a middle power. Both concepts as they are currently practised within the ADF are inherently linked to the joint approach fulfilling an important function as the ADF seeks to expand its joint capability. And while Australia will continue to preference working in coalition, for which an understanding of operational doctrine is a necessity for junior partners to integrate forces effectively and contribute to key staff and command roles, Australia has also explicitly acknowledged that it needs to be prepared to lead coalition operations within its immediate region. Thus, the ability to function coherently at the operational level and apply operational art will be an imperative. If the operational domain is seen as linking tactical actions to strategic ends, then regardless of size, this is a viable concept for any nation as it pursues its national security interests.

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