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War College Papers 2020

Evidence of operational art and the operational level of war dates back to the eighteenth century;[1] however, it was not until the early 1900s that the Soviet Army recognised the need for the operational level of war as an ‘intermediate connecting activity’ between strategy and tactics, and the term operational art was first conceived.[2] Despite these early origins, Western militaries did not adopt operational art until the 1980s, when in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States (US) recognised the need for, and incorporated the concept of operational art into doctrine.[3] Other Western militaries followed suit, with Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) adopting the US interpretations of operational level and operational art.[4] However, in an era of US global predominance, with middle powers such as Australia operating almost exclusively within the context of a coalition or alliance framework, it has been questioned whether operational art and operational level functionality remain viable concepts for middle powers.

This essay argues that operational art and operational level functionality are viable concepts for Australia, and other middle powers, who seek to independently defend their territory, capably lead regional operations, and credibly participate in and influence global operations. This essay will begin by defining operational art and operational level functionality, highlighting that although they are often considered synonymous, the concepts are distinct and should not be used interchangeably. This essay will then explore the applicability of operational art and operational level functionality through an examination of two prototypical middle powers, Australia and Canada. First, it will demonstrate that the primary role of middle powers is the defence of their sovereignty and territory, and as such operational level functionality and operational art are viable concepts for middle powers who seek to conduct independent domestic operations. Next, it will demonstrate that middle powers are expected to lead military operations, both in their immediate region and further afield, necessitating an understanding of operational level functionality and operational art. Finally, this essay will demonstrate that operational level functionality and operational art are essential for middle powers to fulfil prominent operational roles in global coalitions, and ensure their tactical contributions remain aligned to strategic success.

Operational Level Functionality and Operational Art

The operational level of war and operational art are terms that have only recently entered western military vernacular. Historically, warfare was viewed as a two-level paradigm of tactics and strategy.[5] The classical style of warfare, employing ‘mass armies on a linear battlefield’[6] in pursuit of a Napoleonic-style decisive battle, became known as the ‘strategy of a single point,’[7] and left little room for what is now viewed as the operational level of war. As organisations and technology became more complex, and the battlefield more dispersed, the requirement for a third level of war became clear.[8] Military theorists such as Basil Liddell-Hart attempted to define this level, applying the term ‘grand tactics’ to describe the gap between strategy and tactics.[9] Today, the idea of operations is commonplace, however, the concepts of operational level functionality and operational art are not sufficiently defined, often being used synonymously. For example, while Hew Strachan defines the operational level of war,[10] Clayton Newell defines the three levels of war as strategy, operational art, and tactics,[11] suggesting operational level functions and operational art are interchangeable. As such, it is necessary to first clearly define and understand these terms in order to determine their viability for middle powers.

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) defines the operational level as ‘the level of conflict concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations.’[12] This closely reflects the US Joint doctrine from which it was adopted, which states that the operational level is ‘the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or other operational areas.’[13] The operational level is often considered the bridge between military strategy and tactics, seeking to achieve the goals of strategy by combining tactics and employing tactical level forces.[14] Furthermore, the ADF has defined six warfighting functions at the operational level, including command, situational understanding, force generation and sustainment, force projection, force protection and force application.[15] These functions are capabilities and activities intended to enable the operational commander to ‘integrate, synchronise and direct campaigns and operations.’[16] Importantly, the operational level, and its functions, are not defined by the size of the force, or the intensity of the conflict, but the role they play in integrating strategy and tactics.[17] Operational level functionality, therefore, is defined as the series of activities and capabilities concerned with integrating strategy and tactics in campaigns and operations.

While operational level functionality is concerned with what activities must take place to ensure successful operations, operational art is a creative process which focusses on how these activities take place.[18] The ADF defines operational art as ‘the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations.’[19] Operational art requires a commander to identify the end state, decide on operational objectives, order a sequence of action, and apply military resources. These aspects are broadly divided into ‘operational design’ and ‘arrangement of operations,’[20] and supported by the ADF’s Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP)[21] which provides a problem-solving framework for military commanders. Initially, this concept may appear scientific in nature, however, the conduct of warfare has long been recognised as more than a simple scientific process. Clausewitz called for the ‘intuition of a genius,’[22] while Alfred Mahan stated the ‘conduct of war is an art, having its spring in the mind of man.’[23] Operational art is about the cognitive and creative processes, the ‘skilful’ element, rather than the specific activities that take place.[24] Importantly, while the ADF definition constrains operational art to campaigns and operations, the US definition from which it was derived, recognises the applicability of operational art to both strategies and battles. Operational art, therefore, ‘transcends the levels of conflict’[25] and can be applied by commanders at all levels.

Middle Powers

In the global hierarchy of national power, Australia considers itself a middle power; neither a superpower able to impose its will on others, nor a failing state incapable of standing up for its interests.[26] There is no precise definition of middle powers;[27] however, they are often viewed as ‘those states which are not economically or militarily big or strong enough’[28] to impose their will on others, but who are ‘sufficiently capable, credible and motivated to be able to make an impact on international relations.’[29] Multiple approaches exist to assess power. The positional approach identifies ‘quantifiable factors such as gross domestic product, population, military size and defence spending, to develop an ‘objective’ ranking of state size.’[30] Alternatively, the behavioural approach suggests middle powers ‘pursue multilateral solutions,’ and ‘embrace compromise positions’ in response to international problems and disputes.[31] Most importantly, middle powers are expected ‘to be able to defend their interests, and negotiate with, rather than simply obey, great powers.’[32] Australia and Canada are often viewed as prototypical middle powers,[33] with other nations such as Indonesia and South Korea also considered to meet the criteria.[34] Middle powers, therefore, seek to independently defend their interests, while establishing sufficient capability to influence other nations, and credibly contribute to multilateral responses to global issues.

Independent defence

The debate surrounding the operational level and operational art tends to focus on a middle power’s role as a regional security leader or global security contributor, often forgetting the significant role of domestic operations.[35] Middle powers are expected to defend their interests, and the most vital interest for a nation is the protection of its territory and sovereignty.[36] Although the relative importance of strategic interests may vary over time, owing to the changing risks associated with those interests,[37] the defence of a nation’s sovereignty and territory should remain a central concern of its strategy. This is also true for middle powers, such as Australia. ADF doctrine states that ‘the principal task of the ADF is to deter and defeat attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations in defence of Australian territory.’[38] Although this task was derived from the 2009 Defence White Paper,[39] the need to independently defend Australia remains a prominent interest, with the 2020 Defence Strategic Update highlighting the need for Australia to ‘take greater responsibility for our own security’ and ‘grow its self-reliant ability to deliver deterrent effects.’[40] More recently, defending our security has expanded to include actions in response to natural disasters and global pandemics, where the ADF has been employed in support of other civil authorities.[41] As a middle power, Australia must be capable of defending its interests without the aid of its allies.

For middle powers, operational level functionality is a viable and necessary concept for independent operations, both in warfare and non-conflict situations. The viability of operational level functionality during high-end conflict is self-evident, however high-end conflict on Australian territory is considered unlikely,[42] and as a consequence, the applicability of operational level functionality in independent defence is often forgotten. However, the operational level exists wherever there is a joining of activities to achieve strategic objectives.[43] Operational level functionality, therefore, applies to the entire spectrum of conflict, and can equally be applied to humanitarian operations and disaster relief. Operation GOLD, the ADF’s support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, provides an example of a domestic security operation in which the six warfighting functions were employed at the operational level.[44] During Operation GOLD, over 4000 personnel were deployed under the command of the Headquarters Australian Theatre. Although the ADF was in a supporting role for the event, operational level functionality was critical to the success of the operation. The development of chemical, biological and radiological response, and ship underway recovery capabilities provide examples of both force generation and sustainment and force protection functions, and are just two of the many ADF capabilities that were integrated to achieve the strategic security objectives.[45] More recently, ADF support through Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST, integrating maritime, air and land capabilities with other government agencies,[46] provides another example of operational level functionality to achieve strategic objectives. Operational level functionality is routinely practiced in domestic operations to achieve national strategic objectives.

Likewise, the concept of operational art applies to domestic operations that may or may not involve conflict. Although some commentators have argued that operational art is fundamentally about conflict and exists wherever there is a clash of wills,[47] Michael Evans argues that ‘any military activity that contributes to the pursuit of a declared strategic aim can be considered operational.’[48] This is reflected in the ADF concept of operational art, with JMAP intended to apply to a variety of operations, from domestic to overseas, opposed or unopposed, and those which integrate other government departments.[49] Operational art is therefore a viable concept for domestic humanitarian operations as much as it is for high-end conflict. Canada further substantiates the applicability of operational art, citing lessons learned from Canadian Forces’ Y2K preparations as compelling evidence of the need for operational art ‘in its complete form’ in campaign planning, establishment of operational level headquarters and development of supporting plans.[50] Operational art, and operational level functionality are unarguably viable concepts for middle powers who seek to independently defend their national strategic interests on a domestic level.

Security leader

Although the most vital interest for a middle power is the protection of its territory and sovereignty, it is their role as a regional leader, shaping the strategic environment in support of their interests, that is perhaps the most significant task for middle powers and requires the greatest application of operational level functionality and operational art. Following the protection of Australian territory and sovereignty, the next task of the ADF is to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor, conducting military operations to protect our nationals, provide humanitarian assistance, or stabilise the security environment.[51] The 2020 Defence Strategic Update recognised the importance of Australia’s role as a regional leader and has identified Australia’s immediate region, ‘ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime and mainland South-East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South-West Pacific’[52] as the primary focus of defence planning. It is in this environment that Australia is likely to be a lead-nation in crises,[53] and must therefore be prepared to conduct operations, either unilaterally, or in coalition with other regional powers, to protect its interests and those of its near neighbours.

Australia has a strong history of leading regional military operations, providing evidence that the operational level functionality and operational art are viable concepts for middle powers who seek to shape and influence their regional strategic environment. Operation STABILISE was the Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999. Responding to widespread violence between Indonesia and East Timor, the United Nations (UN) sanctioned a mission which aimed ‘to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support United Nations Mission East Timor (UNAMET) in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.’[54] Complicating these objectives, the Australian government also sought to maintain good relations with Indonesia in order to maintain the security of its northern maritime approaches.[55] Australia was appointed as the lead nation, heading up a multinational force of 11500 personnel from 22 nations, and Major General Peter Cosgrove was appointed as the Joint Task Force Commander of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), which became the operational headquarters for the mission and provided direct interface between the strategic decision-makers and the tactical forces.[56] As the lead nation, Australia applied operational art to develop a four-phase operational approach, successfully achieving both UN and Australian government objectives. Although many lessons were learnt by the ADF during its execution, Operation STABILISE is a clear demonstration of the application of operational level functionality and operational art in regional operations.

It could be claimed that Australia is in a unique position to act as a regional leader, and as such, not all middle powers require operational art and operational level functionality. Evans argues that given its proximity to the US, Canada does not have a significant regional military role, and therefore the need for operational art does not apply.[57] Indeed, there are many in the Canadian armed forces who hold this view today, assuming that Canada would not have to act either unilaterally, or as the lead nation in a multinational force.[58] Operation ASSURANCE provides evidence to the contrary. Operation ASSURANCE was a multinational operation intended to secure the safety of Rwandan refugees in Zaire, during which Canada, somewhat unexpectedly, became the lead nation.[59] Although Africa is not in Canada’s immediate region, middle powers can and will be called upon to lead multinational responses. Furthermore, lessons learned from Operation ASSURANCE highlight the intellectual shortfall of Canadian military planners, who believed ‘they did not have to concern themselves with operational design,’[60] instead focussing on contributing tactical force-packages in support of another nation’s plan. This failure to understand the need for the operational level was a significant shortfall during Operation ASSURANCE. Middle powers, therefore, require operational level functionality and operational art to lead military operations, whether in their immediate region or further afield.

Coalition contributions

The final role for middle powers is to contribute to military contingencies in support of global security.[61] While it has been argued that operational level functionality and operational art are not required by middle powers when contributing to these ‘wars of choice,’ these concepts are essential for middle powers to credibly participate in global operations. Australia’s alliance with the United States is a constant feature of its defence strategy,[62] and as a result, there is an underlying assumption that the ADF will primarily operate under US command and control within a coalition environment.[63] Consequentially, middle powers, including Canada and Australia regularly view themselves as the junior alliance partner, contributing small, niche capabilities in support of a typically US-led coalition. These tactical level contributions are considered to neither apply, nor require, operational level functionality or operational art. Furthermore, it has been argued that where demonstrating commitment to the alliance is the primary objective for the middle power participation, the junior alliance partner subordinates itself to the operational approach of the lead nation, and thus neither operational level functionality nor operational art is required.[64]

Despite the argument that only the lead nation can apply operational level functionality and operational art, this fails to recognise the role credible middle powers play in global operations. Ian Sherman argues that throughout Operation SLIPPER, the ADF’s contribution to Afghanistan following the 2001 terrorist attacks, Australia was unable to apply operational level functionality as it conceded its strategic interests to the US and did not have any interaction with the strategic policymaker, the President of the United States.[65] However, Sherman goes on to argue that Australia could have embedded staff within International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), providing senior representation to actively participate in campaign planning and design and exert influence.[66] This has recently occurred, with senior Australian representatives being embedded in the operational level Resolute Support Headquarters and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan.[67] Likewise, the Canadian Army Commander was deployed as the ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, another example of middle powers fulfilling operational level functions in global coalitions.[68] Middle powers must have the capability to operate at the operational level to credibly fulfil these prominent positions within coalition environments.

While operational level functionality may not be readily recognised as viable for middle powers in coalition contributions, operational art is acknowledged as being applicable at all levels of war. In his analysis of Operation SLIPPER, Sherman argues that the ADF did not practice operational art, as they operated within the tactical, rather than operational level of warfare. However, he agrees that ADF elements planned and executed tactical actions using tools and techniques which replicate operational art.[69] This is reflective of an increasing belief amongst tactical commanders that operational art and campaigning are relevant skills at the unit level.[70] Furthermore, subordinate tactical commanders should have a working knowledge and understanding of operational art, such that their decisions and actions will contribute effectively to operational and then strategic objectives.[71] This is particularly relevant in modern wars, where tactical actions can have a significant strategic effect. Even where junior coalition partners are constrained to tactical functions, they must have an understanding of and apply operational art to ensure they contribute to strategic success.

Conclusion

Operational level functionality and operational art are fundamental concepts for military forces, regardless of their position in the global power hierarchy. Although these concepts have only recently entered western military thought, there is broad evidence of their application throughout history, particularly for middle powers, who are often viewed as only operating in the tactical realm. Through an exploration of Australian and Canadian operations, this essay has argued that operational art and operational level functionality are relevant and viable concepts for middle powers, who seek to independently defend their interests, capably lead regional operations, and credibly participate in global coalitions. First, this essay demonstrated that operational level functionality and operational art are viable concepts for middle powers whose primary task is to conduct independent domestic operations in defence of their national interests. Next, through a discussion of Australia’s Operation STABILISE and Canada’s Operation ASSURANCE, this essay demonstrated that middle powers are expected to lead military operations, necessitating an understanding of the operational level functionality and operational art. Finally, this essay established that operational level functionality and operational art are essential for middle powers to fulfil prominent operational roles in global coalitions, and ensure tactical contributions remain aligned to strategic success. Operational level functionality and operational art are unarguably viable concepts for middle powers. The more appropriate question, therefore, is not whether the concepts are viable, but rather, how middle powers can best apply operational level functionality and operational art to their respective military operations.

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[1] Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art, 1740-1813: From Frederick the Great to Napoleon (Abingdon, Oxon, United States: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005),, 4; Adam W. Hilburgh, "Catherine the Great: A Case for Operational Art," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27, no. 2 (2014):: 283.

[2] Richard Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," (Kansas: United States Command and General Staff College, 2004),, 18-19; Milan Vego, "On Operational Art," Strategos 1, no. 2 (2017):: 18-19.

[3] Vego, "On Operational Art," 20; Romeo P. Cubas, "Operational Art," Marine Corps Gazette 98, no. 8 (2014):: 38.

[4] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 1.

[5] Michael Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (2008): 107.

[6] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 107

[7] James J Schneider, "The Loose Marble-and the Origins of Operational Art," (Fort Leavenworth: US Army War College, 1989), 86; Brigadier Justin Kelly and Michael James Brennan, "Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy," (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 17.

[8] Clayton Newell, The Framework of Operational Warfare (London, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 1991), 15.

[9] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 107; Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," International security 5, no. 3 (1980): 61.

[10] Hew Strachan, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War," in The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, ed. Hew Strachan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 210.

[11] Newell, The Framework of Operational Warfare, xii.

[12] Department of Defence, "Operations Series - Addp 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations," (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2012), glossary.

[13] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 7.

[14] Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," 61.

[15] Defence, "Operations Series - Addp 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations," 1-12.

[16] Defence, "Operations Series - Addp 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations," 3-1, 3-2.

[17] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 32.

[18] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 8.

[19] Commonwealth of Australia, "Addp 00.1 Command and Control," (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2019), 4-11.

[20] Department of Defence, "Plan Series - Addp 5.0 - Joint Planning," (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2018), 2-2, 2-3.

[21] Department of Defence, "Plans Series - Adfp 5.0.1 - Joint Military Appreciation Process," (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2019), 1; Aaron P. Jackson, "Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art," Security Challenges 13, no. 1 (2017): 59.

[22] Thomas G. Mahnken, "Strategic Theory," in Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, ed. James J. Wirtz John Baylis, Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 58.

[23] Beatrice Heuser, "Theory and Practice, Art and Science in Warfare: An Etymological Note," in War, Strategy and History, ed. Daniel Marston and Tamara Leahy, Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O’neill (ANU Press, 2016), 187.

[24] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 108.

[25] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 8

[26] Mark Beeson and Will Lee, "The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation between Indonesia and Australia?," in Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, ed. Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad D. Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015), 224.

[27] Beeson and Lee, "The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation between Indonesia and Australia?," 224; Detlef Nolte, "How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics," Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 885.

[28] Gareth Evans, "The Role of Middle Powers in Asia's Future," in Panel presentation to the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity on 01 Jun 17 (Jeju, Republic of Korea2017), 1.

[29] Evans, "The Role of Middle Powers in Asia's Future," 1.

[30] Andrew Carr, "Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach," Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 71-72.

[31] Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, vol. 6. (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1993),19; Carr, "Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic Impact Approach," 73.

[32] Mark Beeson, "Can Australia Save the World? The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power Diplomacy," Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 5 (2011): 564.

[33] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 122; Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 34.

[34] Helen Clark, "Australia, Mikta and the Middle Power Question," The Diplomat (2015): 2.

[35] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 105

[36] Stephan Frühling, "Balancing Australia’s Strategic Commitments," Security Challenges 3, no. 3 (2007): 150; Paul Dibb, "Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities," (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), 3.

[37] Stephan Frühling, Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War (London, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 63-4.

[38] Defence, "Operations Series - Addp 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations," 1-2.

[39] Commonwealth of Australia, "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030," ed. Department of Defence (Canberra, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), 41.

[40] Department of Defence, "2020 Defence Strategic Update," (Canberra, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), 27.

[41] Department of Defence, "2020 Defence Strategic Update," 25.

[42] Department of Defence, "2020 Defence Strategic Update," 14.

[43] James Simms, "Keeping Operational Art Relevant for Canada: A Functional Approach," (Canada: Canadian Department of National Defence, 2003), 8.

[44] Andrew Smith, "Domestic Event Support Operations," (United States: National Defense University, 2012), 15.

[45] Smith, "Domestic Event Support Operations," 17.

[46] Department of Defence, "Operation Bushfire Assist 2019-2020," Defence News (2020), https://news.defence.gov.au/national/operation-bushfire-assist-2019-2020.

[47] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 32.

[48] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 112.

[49] Jackson, "Innovative within the Paradigm: The Evolution of the Australian Defence Force’s Joint Operational Art,"68.

[50] Simms, "Keeping Operational Art Relevant for Canada: A Functional Approach," 22-23.

[51] Defence, "Operations Series - Addp 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations,"1-2, 1-3.

[52] Department of Defence, "2020 Defence Strategic Update," 21.

[53] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 124.

[54] Ian Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2017), 16-19.

[55] Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," 23-24.

[56] Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," 19, 26.

[57] Evans, "The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The Adf and Operational Art," 122.

[58] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 47.

[59] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 46.

[60] Dickson, "Operational Art in a Middle-Power Context: A Canadian Perspective," 47.

[61] Defence, "Operations Series - Addp 3.0 - Campaigns and Operations," 1-3.

[62] Department of Defence, "2020 Defence Strategic Update," 26.

[63] Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," 1.

[64] Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," 2, 15.

[65] Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," 35.

[66] Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," 39.

[67] Author’s experience on Operation HIGHROAD, 2019.

[68] Simms, "Keeping Operational Art Relevant for Canada: A Functional Approach," 22.

[69] Sherman, "Operational Art and the Adf Experience," 35.

[70] Trent Scott, "The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force," (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2011), 54.

[71] Vego, "On Operational Art," 27; Scott, "The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force," 19.

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Australian War College
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The Australian War College is responsible for the delivery of Joint Professional Military Education. The College provides a range of courses in both residential and distance learning format.

Students attending the War College comprise of Australian Defence Force personnel, Australian Public Servants from Defence and other agencies and international military personnel.

  • The Australian War College delivers the following Courses:
  • ​Defence and Strategic Studies Course​ (DSSC)
  • ​Australian Command and Staff Course (Remote) (ACSC-R)​
  • Australian Command and Staff Course (ACSC)​
  • ADF Joint Warrant Officer Course (JWOC)​​
  • Operations Based on Experience (OBOE) Seminar​
  • Public Policy and Communications​ (PPC) Course ​
  • Advanced Technology for Strategists (ATS) Course​
  • Thinking Strategically (TS) Course​